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Perspectives

Islamist Trends in the Northern Caucasus

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The threat of terrorism inspired by radical Islamism[1] is now widespread. Emanating first from Afghanistan under the Taliban, it is taking root in Iraq. It is also appearing in the North Caucasus. Most of the republics (especially Chechnya, Daghestan, Ingushetia, North Ossetia and Kabardino-Balkaria) in this area stretching between the Black Sea and the Caspian Sea could become the theaters for a new "Islamist terrorist movement" (often a journalistic shorthand) in the short or medium term. At least the idea of this occurring arises from a general observation of the present situation in the North Caucasus, over the period from the hostage crisis at the school in Beslan (North Ossetia, September 2004) through more recent guerrilla events in Nalchik (Kabardino-Balkaria, October 2005).

The present article examines whether there is in fact a risk of Islamism in the North Caucasus and, if so, what the nature is of that risk. Is a regional destabilization possible? Based on several interviews in Vladikavkaz and Moscow during field research in November 2004, and one in particular with a local radical imam, the analysis will introduce the concept of "differentiated Islam." This means that religious language and religious references may be similar on an ideological level, but politically and strategically these Islamist groups act on the basis of local conditions (for example, with respect to war objectives). Nevertheless, mutual assistance and logistical support among the local republic-based groups cannot be excluded.

Recent Background

On October 13, 2005, more than one hundred fighters simultaneously attacked the security nerve centers in Nalchik: three police stations, the Interior Ministry, the intelligence services, the department for combating organized crime, the prison guards' office, the border guards, and the soldiers defending the airport. According to information from several reliable local sources, none of the combatants were Chechens. They were mostly natives of Kabardino-Balkaria between 17 and 20 years old; one man from Ingushetia, two from Russia outside the North Caucasus, and three from Ossetia were also part of the group. The Chechen separatists did not participate but they claimed responsibility for the attack. This drama allowed the Russian authorities, as after Beslan, to argue to the international community that international Islamist terrorism was attacking their country, spreading from Chechnya to the neighboring regions.

The year 2005 opened in the North Caucasus with a series of special operations that took place not only in Chechnya and in Ingushetia,[2] but also in Daghestan, Kabardino-Balkaria and North Ossetia, against Islamist cells hidden in apartments in town centers. In mid-January, in Kaspiisk, on the Daghestani coast, the security services conducted an operation. At the end of January, in Nalchik, the leader of a local Islamist group, Muslim Ataev, was killed in a similar operation. On 2 February, Emir Yermak Tegaev, the religious and political leader of the Ossetian Muslim community otherwise known as the *jamaat,*[3] was arrested by Ossetian forces. A few months later in May, in Nalchik again, other members from the same Islamist group were killed.

The official Russian analysis seeks to link these Islamist cells with the wide global terrorist network based on the informal Al-Qaida network

[1] Islamism will be understood in here as an ideology based on a political use of Islam. Any movement with a program promoting political use of Islam is considered as Islamist.

[2] These clean up operations (*zachistki*), which are aimed at eradicating potential enemies in a village, had previously only been carried out in Chechnya. After Beslan, they also occured in the neighbouring republics.

[3] The term "Jamaat" is used to refer to Muslim communities in the North Caucasus. Now it has a strong radical political connotation.

already active in Chechnya. That analysis is not validated by careful field study, although this hardly means that no organized Islamist groups are involved. Indeed, we may identify the following:

- In North Ossetia, a group is led by Suleiman Mamiev, imam of Vladikavkaz's main mosque.
- In Kabardino-Balkaria, Islamist groups are divided between followers of Musa Mokoev, the non-violent former imam of a now closed mosque and the Yarmuk Islamist group whose leader was Muslim Ataev.
- In Chechnya, Islamism is spreading especially under Shamil Basaev's authority.
- In Daghestan, there are numerous Islamist underground structures, of which one of the more violent is the Sharia Jamaat, led by Rappani Khalilov.
- In Ingushetia, no active groups are yet well known despite Islamism's increasing strength and influence in the republic.

All these groups have their own features and their own history. It is very unlikely that these diverse Islamist factions could unify to constitute a homogeneous radical religious front in the North Caucasus, connected to a larger international network. To explain why such a regional unification of Islamism is unlikely, it is useful first to focus on the ideological history of Islamism in North Caucasus (with emphasis on Daghestan), and then to clarify the respective local contexts.[4]

Daghestan: Key to the North Caucasus?

While the Soviet Union was collapsing at the beginning of the 1990s and political life was becoming more diverse, in Daghestan the question was raised whether there could be a (re)establishment of politics based on a renewed and legalized Islamist ideology. Islamist groups were divided over this question, not on an ideological basis, but rather in terms of their chosen political priorities and the implementation of these.

Daghestan has always been the home of theological debate in the North Caucasus. Almost all the religious innovations appearing in the region were introduced and/or developed by Daghestani actors. It was in Daghestan in the 1970s, for example, that the ideas and premises behind an Islamic renaissance took shape around a group of brilliant young students. These ideas would flourish with Perestroika and the crumbing of the Soviet Union in 1991. These intellectuals shaped political Islam in the region,[5] notably Ahmed-Haji Akhtaev, Abbas Kebedov, Baggauddin Magomedov Kebedov, Saïd-Ahmed Abubarakov (who became the Mufti of Daghestan in 2000 and was assassinated in 2002), Geïdar Djamal,[6] and Hussein Apendi[7] (Halbach 2001). These figures laid the ideological basis of Islamism in the region, taking into account both traditional Islam, modern and Western liberal thinking, and in the radical writing of the Muslim Brothers. They recomposed these elements according to specific local determinants, such as opposition to popular Islam and interest in democratization after the 1991 rupture. Daghestani political Islam was thus not primarily imported, but locally shaped. Daghestan's Islamism was primarily opposed to Sufism, the main component of the popular form of Islam, which these ideologists consider to have lost its doctrinal purity and its Islamic strength and meaning. Sufism, they felt, is too compromised with local social customs to remain a religious force or become a political one (Lanskoy 2002). Their Islamism, in addition, advocated democratization, entailing abandonment of the communist system and promotion of a transparent civil society. The Islamic Renaissance Party (IRP)[8] tried to operationalize this synthesis.

Politically, however, those ideologists soon had to face a practical dilemma. Should such a political evolution remain slow but realistic, or should the advent of an Islamic state come rapidly by means of force? Baggauddin Kebedov chose the

[4] The analysis will not include the Republics of Karachay-Cherkessia and Adygeya, where tensions are not so much related to religion.

[5] Source: the author's interview with Abdulrashid Saïdov, Daghestani politician, who in the 1990s founded an Islamic and democratic party. He stopped his political activities for personal reasons between 1994 and 1996. He lives today in Moscow. Interview December 19, 2004, Moscow.

[6] Founder, among others, of the Islamic Rebirth Party in Russia. He lives today in Moscow.

[7] Today Hussein Apendei is the imam of the mosque in Kizil-Yurt, Daghestan.

[8] The IRP was founded in Astrakhan by Tatars and by several Daghestani Islamist intellectuals (Akhmed Akhtaev and the Kebedov brothers) during the Congress of the Muslims of the USSR in 1990. It then appeared national sections in each new independent state and in some new federated republics within the Russian Federation (Daghestan in particular).

second option. Ahmed-Haji Akhtaev, before his murder in 1998, put the emphasis on education, and peaceful methods. Abbas Kebedov supported him in this choice (Roshchin 2003). The ideological differences among them were minimal; the main opposition was in the practical application. The same contradiction can be found in Kabardino-Balkaria, between Musa Mokoev and Muslim Ataev. Muslim Ataev, who was leader of Yarmuk,[9] fought in Chechnya until 2002 alongside Shamil Basaev and is also affiliated with Baggauddin Kebedov, whereas Mokoev follows Ahmed-Haji Akhtaev's strategy of proselytism through education and social solidarity. For some time, the imam of the central mosque in Vladikavkaz, North Ossetia, Suleiman Mamiev, also followed the teachings of Ahmed-Haji Akhtaev (Roshchin 2005). Although ideologically, all these men articulate a "pure" Islam free of traditional ideas borrowed from Sufism, Mokoev and Mamiev employ a softer proselytism, whereas others (Baggauddin Kebedov, Basaev, and Ataev) advocate more radical and aggressive methods.

There is no possibility of a strategic political union between these two factions, whom who we may call the "realists" (Suleiman Mamiev, Musa Mokoev), and the "ultra-radicals" (for example, the new Chechen separatist leadership under Abdul-Khalim Sadullaev's command). They share only a radical Islamist ideology. Shamil Basaev's attempt in 1999 to establish a pan-Caucasus Islamist movement demonstrates such a failure, following which the radical Islamist movements in the North Caucasus underwent an ethno-nationalization.

Islamic "Localism," or the Failure of Regional Unification

Attempts to promote pan-regional Islamism failed twice in the North Caucasus in the 1990s. First, in 1991 the pan-Caucasus movement, which had called for the unification of the peoples of the Caucasus into one large confederation, did not overcome emerging nationalist debates that soon broke out, sometimes violently (as in Abkhazia and Chechnya). Later, at the end of the decade, Shamil Basaev, one of the actors in the Confederation of Peoples of the Caucasus who fought alongside the Abkhaz in 1991, tried to use Islamism as a tool for forcing the unification of the Chechen and Daghestani republics under an Islamic flag. However, the Daghestani population failed to support him and his Chechen fighters had to retreat (Roshchin 2003).

In the Caucasus, the Islamist radicalization of a group does not appear to mean that it will suddenly extend its field of action from the local to the regional level. As Oliver Roy remarks, the two failures of pan-Caucasus Islamism in the 1990s provide a reason for skepticism of the traditional view, according to which a movement becomes more international the more it bases itself on Islamic principles (Roy 2002). Shamil Basaev's failed attempt in Daghestan confirms that Islamism reinforces ethno-nationalist demands. In Chechnya, ethno-nationalism is closely related to Islamism. In other republics, demands may address a variety of issues, some ethno-nationalist, but all based on the local situation.

The situation in Ingushetia is a little more puzzling. A June 2004 attack on Ingush security forces in Nazran suggests that there were forces in Ingushetia who were influenced by the Chechen conflict. However, an analysis of the fighters' motives shows that the main target of those Ingush (and Chechen) fighters was President Murat Ziazikov, elected with the Kremlin's support in May 2002. Accordingly, it appears that if a war breaks out in Ingushetia, then its driving force will be Ingush ethno-national issues. Islamism could become a factor only at a later time.

Reports from Daghestan mention terrorist acts on a daily basis, including explosions and rebel attacks claimed by Sharia Jamaat, an Islamist group led by of Rappani Khalilov. With the exception of that group, it appears that real motives for the attacks are not just the growing popularity of radical Islam among young Daghestanis and the influence of the Chechen resistance. Other factors are at least as significant: the multi-ethnic structure of the population, power struggles between disparate clans, the high level of corruption and unemployment, and human rights violations committed by the police and Federal Security Service (FSB) such as torture and illegal detention. These do not constitute specific motives for particular attacks, but create a tense general atmosphere which could lead to violent unrest, if an Islamist group, such as Sharia Jamaat, manages to use and foment such discontent.

The present situation in Daghestan is indeed deteriorating not because of the spread of Islamist ideology but rather because of inter-clan and inter-

[9] Yarmuk is a radical Islamist group in Kabardino-Balkaria, whose leader, Muslim Ataev was killed in January 2005 and whose members have probably been largely responsible for the latest attacks in Nalchik (October 2005).

ethnic rivalries focused on administrative, economic or political interests. Militant Islamist circles are often used by clans or ethnic groups against one another to engage violently disputes over profitable administrative or political positions at the local or national levels. If policemen are shot, this is not on the order of some international Wahhabi jamaat, but rather is an action taken by one clan whose interests were affected by another clan controlling the targeted law enforcement agency. This does not mean that Islamism is not developing, but it means that Islamism requires a favorable local context in order to develop. The struggles of clan and ethnic interests in Daghestani economics and politics may be such a context.

The phenomenon of Islamization emerges in North Ossetia and Kabardino-Balkaria, yet again in response to local situations, which are not the same as those in Daghestan, Chechnya, or Ingushetia. The political protests of Musa Mokoev and Suleiman Mamiev are directed against spiritual teachings that they declare to be corrupt and incompetent. Islamist referents certainly animate the views they express, which focus on purely local opposition to the decisions of the Muftiyyat.[10] At the other end of the Islamist spectrum in these republics, the guerrilla operations of Baggauddin's followers (affiliated, for example, with the Yarmuk group) are likewise motivated by local circumstances. Contrary to early analyses, the recent attacks in Nalchik did not seek to import the Chechen conflict into Kabardino-Balkaria but rather targeted the security and power structures, which violently repress Muslim practices, for example, through the enforced closure of all mosques.

Political Islam, spread by leaders such as Mokoev or Mamiev in the North Caucasus, in Kabardino-Balkaria and North Ossetia in particular, offers a framework for opposition. But not all Islamists remain peaceful and proselytizing. Some of their followers eventually pursue violent guerrilla uprisings. Both types of protest, with differing intensities, respond to purely local problems with local motives strengthened by Islamist ideology. It is probable that the more violent form would develop more widely in a deteriorating socio-economic situation characterized by high unemployment, poverty, and business clannishness. Mokoev and Mamiev have seen many of their followers enter more radical movements.

Conclusion: Prospects for Islamist Destabilization in the North Caucasus

Contacts between Islamist groups with specific political aims may be mutually beneficial at the tactical or operational level, in the sense that these links can give Islamism a regional dimension, although based on common means rather than on common ends. Each group would remain free to preserve its strategic objectives while deriving benefit from tactical cooperation through the development of a religiously based network.

This is what happened in Nalchik in October 2005, and it has happened regularly in Daghestan. However the weekly events occurring in Daghestan, as well as the more sporadic events in Kabardino-Balkaria, will not have substantial impact as long as there are no strong radical ideological leaders. Indeed, ideological leaders have been more prominent on the moderate side (e.g., Mamiev and Mokoev today), and political Islam is itself divided. For these reasons, radical Islamist actions such as the June 2004 attacks in Ingushetia have remained without substantial consequence. For the present, such events outside Chechnya only reinforce the Chechen separatist position vis-à-vis the Kremlin and, indeed, the Chechen leadership correctly claims responsibility for the attacks. Still, they have gained no political advantage from the attacks. However, Islamist destabilization on the regional level could occur if the young, social, religious and radical movements in Daghestan and in Kabardino-Balkaria find a more charismatic leadership that would be able politically to organize the "Islamized" local interests behind the recent violence.

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[10] Suleiman Mamiev, himself, distinguishes very clearly the political position of the two opposing groups: "Regarding religion, I accept that there is a certain kind of radicalism in discourse. I preach the practice of orthodox Islam at the opposite ends of Sufi and traditionalist beliefs and superstitions which still have great influence at the heart of the Muftiyyat. The Sufi brotherhood does not embody true Islam. Politically, the Muftiyyat, under the influence of Sufism and collaborating with corrupted authorities, can't represent a fair and reliable way forward for the jamaat. I regret this decadent and dirty trend which is present in the politics of North Ossetia." Source: interview by the author, November 12, 2004, Vladikavkaz, North Ossetia.

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Research Reports

The Impact of the Asian Development Bank on Educational Policy Formation in Kazakhstan

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This study explores the impact of the Asian Development Bank (ADB) on educational policy-making in Kazakhstan. Since 1995 the ADB has become a leading development agency in Kazakhstan's post-socialist transformation, providing educational sector support and $65 million in loans for educational restructuring. My study is a part of a doctoral dissertation that examines the discourses and practices of two funding organizations in Kazakhstan, the ADB and Soros Foundation-Kazakhstan, with a focus on the policy implications of providing external assistance to the country's education sector.

Since independence in 1991, Kazakhstan's educational system has faced the challenges of redefining its curriculum, organization, and how it governs schools (DeYoung and Suzhikova 1997). At the same time, the country's public expenditure on education as a proportion of gross domestic product (GDP) declined by more than half — from 6.8% in 1990 to 2.9% of a much smaller GDP in 1994 (ADB 2002b: 5). In this transition period, development agencies have become essential to providing funding for educational reform. For example, in 1998-1999, Kazakhstan's education sector received $36.6 million in grants and $27.5 million in loans (ADB 2002a: 19). Although external agencies have become an important source of funding and educational innovation in Kazakhstan, their role in the country's educational development has received scant scholarly attention.

Many developing countries depend on external agencies for assistance in areas ranging from overall educational policy and planning to major reform efforts at various levels of education (Spaulding 1981). Yet, research on the role and impact of external assistance in the educational development of recipient countries has not been proportionate to the magnitude and importance of educational aid in the developing world. There is a need to understand the effect of development assistance on education decision-making and agenda-setting in recipient countries (Samoff 1999), given the multiple pathways through which agencies influence educational policy formation in the process of giving aid. Past aid modalities that have received extensive criticisms include the attitudinal domain in agency-recipient relationship. In particular, agencies' tend to construe policy dialogue as persuasion (McGinn 1997), display insufficient regard for recipients' formulation of priorities, and devalue local knowledge. In general, policy dialogue is deemed successful when it moves in the direction already favored by the recipients (Cassen 1996), yet, as Samoff maintained, in the aid process "there may be a great deal of talking, but there seems to be a lot less listening, and very little hearing" (Samoff 1999: 264). Other criticisms of the aid process include development agencies' educational policy frameworks that ignore context-bound conditions and histories (Torres 2002), recommendations that are constrained by insufficient empirical support (Dore 1994), excessive generalization from the data, and a use of a limited model of "education" (McGinn 1997; Samoff 1999). Samoff (1999) asserted that agency-generated priorities restrict policy dialogue, engendering recipient countries' dependence on external analytical constructs. Such criticisms point to an incongruence between development agencies' stated objectives and their practices, as well as agencies' limited organizational learning from past mistakes (Cahn 1993; Forss et al. 1999; Samoff 1999, 2004; Tilak 2002).

Given these critiques, development agencies have become increasingly concerned about "how they make use of their own existing knowledge and how they learn to develop better policies and practices" (King and McGrath 2004: 29). In their

discussion of knowledge-based aid, McGrath and King (2004) contend that a new aid paradigm is emerging. This paradigm has engendered a shift in agency discourse about knowledge management and learning, and a return to language on partnership, ownership, and capacity-building in recipient countries. Given the past power asymmetries and emerging aid modalities, this study enhances our understanding of development rhetoric and reality in an emerging region of development cooperation.

The study was guided by Argyris and Schon's (1974) theoretical framework of organizational learning, according to which espoused theories (discourses) and theories-in-use (actions) within organizations are analyzed for the purposes of organizational change and improved professional practice. Incongruence between discourse and practices potentially leads to a professional practice that produces unintended outcomes and repeated mistakes, or to the continued existence of inadequate theoretical perspectives in organizations. In the context of development agencies, failure of aid-funded projects has often been attributed to this discrepancy between agencies' stated development objectives and their actual practices (Cahn 1993; Hurst 1981).

The study draws on document analysis and interviews with the ADB's staff and Kazakhstan's education ministry officials, conducted in Kazakhstan using the country's two official languages (Kazakh and Russian), as well as in English. Data collection and analysis for this study were conducted in two stages. The initial data collection and analysis took place between 1998 and 2000, during which time I interviewed more than 20 individuals involved in the ADB's educational lending in Kazakhstan. The second stage of data collection occurred in 2003, when the ADB's first official evaluations of its educational lending in Kazakhstan were completed. Document analysis examined the official documents of the ADB and Ministry of Education (MOE), such as agency mission reports and memos, minutes of meetings, correspondence, the education sector study, as well as the Government of Kazakhstan's decrees, guidelines, and policies pertaining to education. Kazakhstan's national educational policies were examined to gauge the extent to which they were similar to policies identified in the ADB's education sector analysis. According to McNeely (1995: 485), an "examination of national educational policies in relation to those of international organizations can help clarify this relationship between state educational principles and the international system." Interviews were conducted with senior education officials and former Ministers of Education, local project personnel, local and international consultants, department heads at MOE, heads of national training and research institutes, and staff at the Ministry of Finance's unit on foreign aid coordination. Further, I conducted over 20 additional interviews with Kazakhstan's education professionals involved in development work with other agencies (e.g., Soros Foundation-Kazakhstan) to gauge local conceptions of aid and educational development. ADB officials interviewed for this study were permanently based in the ADB headquarters in Manila, Philippines and visited Kazakhstan on business trips for the Bank.

Although the present inquiry was qualitative and exploratory, some parameters were set to begin the inquiry. Semi-structured interviews that lasted between 40 and 90 minutes focused on how ADB officials and the recipients constructed the notions of development, reform, external assistance, and education. In particular, I attempted to understand the ADB's and aid recipients' educational policy frameworks, including discourses about the nature of educational process and educational change; the role of knowledge, learning, achievement, and schooling in society; values deemed important in the school system (e.g., equity, choice, local vs. central governance); the role of different actors (teachers, students, administrators, and the central government) in the educational process, and the role of foreign aid to education. Further, the interviews were aimed at understanding how the ADB staff construed the aid process, including the extent and nature of recipient involvement in the ADB-funded projects and the ADB's perceptions about the local knowledge (e.g., their understanding of aid recipients' formulation of educational priorities).

My access to actual agency-recipient negotiations and interactions was limited, as such negotiations rarely took place at the time of data collection. The analysis, therefore, was based on official and personal accounts of what took place, an approach that has some limitations. For example, it is difficult to identify accurately an organization's theories-in-use (assumptions that underlie agency practices) unless the individuals whose theories-in-use are examined are involved in the analysis through a deliberate self-reflection with the help of instruments intended to identify those theories-in-use. Thus, the validity of the theories-in-use I identified is more suspect than it would have been if

observations of agency-recipient negotiations and interactions had been possible. As a standard validity check in analyzing the data, I looked for negative cases and counterarguments that would refute my conclusions. Further, as study participants representing Kazakhstan requested that the tape-recorder be turned off, personal accounts quoted in the study are largely a reconstruction of notes taken during or after the interviews.

Results and Analysis

After analyzing the interview data and official documents, I examined the ADB's official evaluations of its educational lending and technical assistance in Kazakhstan, including evaluation of its technical assistance grants (ADB 2002a) and the first education loan to Kazakhstan (ADB 2002b). The objective was to assess whether and how the ADB's conceptions regarding development cooperation and circumstances, as well as issues raised during the initial data collection, had changed, given the cumulative, delayed nature of learning.

The study findings suggest that new aid modalities have not replaced traditional notions of knowledge transfer in the context of the ADB's educational lending to Kazakhstan. Educational policy dialogue in Kazakhstan was constrained by a sector study commissioned by the Asian Development Bank and conducted by UNESCO consultants with little local participation. Agency-driven sector studies do little to develop national capacity, yet continue to entrench recipients' dependence on external knowledge. Samoff (1999: 251) asserted that education sector studies, which development agencies commission to "inform, rationalize, and justify their assistance programs," are rarely based on systematic research, often represent a snapshot of the education system, and are fraught with risks of methodological limitations which are rarely addressed in these documents.

The ADB promoted an educational policy framework in Kazakhstan that resonates with educational agendas of other development agencies such as the World Bank. In its educational policies, the ADB emphasized an economic analysis of education and quantitative methods of measuring the success of a policy, the central role of basic versus higher education in economic growth, privatization in education, sector-wide educational financing, and use of a top-down model of educational change, with insufficient attention to the local context. Further, the ADB viewed policy dialogue as persuasion, and the Bank officials influenced policy discussions through cautions, predictions, recommendations, and empirical evidence from other countries' educational experiences, despite the ADB's assertions that its main objective was to "support the government's reform agenda" (ADB 2002a: 3). These findings are consistent with King and McGrath's (2004: 30) contention that a tension exists between the new language of knowledge in agencies and "a sense that old asymmetries of power remain largely in place."

An examination of development agencies' operations in developing countries remains imperative, as identifying, analyzing, and correcting discrepancies between goals and outcomes (Hurst 1981) are but a normal part of development. Such analysis is also a step towards "a genuine repositioning of power balance between Northern agencies and Southern partners" (King and McGrath 2004: 197).

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Georgian Connections of the Iranian Constitutional Revolution of 1905-1911

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The Iranian Constitutional Revolution (1905-1911) quickly transformed itself from a domestic phenomenon into a symbol of the universal struggle of all peoples for freedom and justice. Internationalists from different countries arrived in Tabriz and Rasht to give everything, even going so far as to sacrifice their lives, for the victory of constitutionalist ideas — just as if they were fighting for their own motherland and their own rights. In 1910 Tria (Vlasa Mgeladze), a well-known Georgian revolutionary and participant in the Iranian Constitutional Revolution, reported on the activities of the Caucasian internationalists operating in Iran, that the Persians, Georgians, Armenians, and Jews fought together under the same revolutionary flag (Tria 1911: 332).

The Iranian Constitutional Revolution has left its indelible trace in the history of political organizations and the development of political life of neighboring Transcaucasia. It found genuine support in both political and popular thought in Georgia and attracted Georgian society's lively and enduring attention. The Tbilisi and Batumi Social Democrat Committees, closely following the development of the Constitutional movement in Iran, became active participants in the movement from the beginning of the resistance in Tabriz. The first large group of Georgian internationalists arrived in Tabriz soon after Tabriz became a new center of organized constitutional resistance (Chipashvili 1983: 9). Their numbers grew gradually, and they soon constituted one of the most effective and important military corps among the revolutionary forces.

The subject of my current research project is the Georgian facet of Caucasian participation in the Iranian Constitutional Revolution. Present-day researchers as well as contemporaries have recognized Caucasian ties to the Iranian

constitutional resistance and, more generally, the political influence from Transcaucasia as one of the decisive factors in the revolution's progress (Afary 1996: 237; Bayat 1991: 252; Berberian 2001: 142-143; Chaqueri 1998: 89, 103; Guidor 1998: 303-304; Khachaturian 1998: 325; Tchilinkirian 1998: 233). However, there is a lack of research on Georgian involvement in the Constitutional Revolution. My research concentrates on such aspects as the ideological and practical attitudes of the Georgian revolutionaries toward the revolutionary movement in Iran; the organization and execution of assistance to the revolutionary groups in Iran's provinces of Azerbaijan and Gilan; Georgian revolutionaries' activities in Azerbaijan, Gilan and the Tehran expedition; and the identities and roles of the members of the Georgian groups who participated in the Iranian Revolution.

This research also examines the relationship between the Georgian revolutionaries on one hand, and the Baku Social Democrat organization and the Armenian groups in Transcaucasia and Iran on the other hand. Although this problem has been studied (Aliev 1965; Arutiunian 1955; Chipashvili 1983; Ivanov 1957; Kelenjeridze 1969), some aspects, such as the level of the involvement and the activities of the Batumi committee and the extent of the connections of the Georgian groups with the Armenian groups still require more study.

This research relies extensively on Georgian sources concerning the Iranian Constitutional Revolution. Various Iranian, European, and Armenian sources, memoirs of the contemporaries, letters and articles written by public and political activists are widely used in studies of the Constitutional Revolution in Iran. The use of Georgian sources is usually limited to a report by Tria,[1] which represents a small part of the extensive materials on the Iranian Constitutional Revolution that are available in the Georgian language. These include reports, diaries, and memoirs of the Georgian internationalist revolutionaries working in the constitutional resistance. Due to active involvement of a large number of Georgians in the events in Tabriz and Rasht, these sources address both the Azerbaijan and Gilan uprisings. Some of these materials have not been compiled and published in full even in Georgian. These sources can be very useful and valuable for the study of different aspects of the development of the Constitutional Revolution in Iran. Although the Georgian sources focus primarily on Caucasian involvement in the revolution, they also provide a large volume of insiders' accounts on local revolutionary groups, such as the Tabrizi and Gilani revolutionists, Dashnaks, and others, and their relations and collaboration with each other and with the Caucasians. These sources shed light on various developments in Rasht and Tabriz. Therefore, one of the most important goals of the project is to introduce and make available the Georgian sources, such as the memoirs of Sergo Gamdlishvili[2] and Apolon (Misha) Japaridze,[3] Georgian participants in the Rasht resistance, to the broader scholarly community through the compilation and translation of these materials into one volume.

In addition to memoirs, materials found in the Georgian print media of the time are also an important source for studying issues related to the Iranian Constitutional Revolution. By the early twentieth century, much of the Georgian press was independent. It actively promoted progressive and revolutionary ideas and closely followed every development of the Iranian constitutional movement. Newspapers, such as *Talgha*, *Isari*, *Amirani*, *Ali*, *Chveni khma*, *Chveni azri*, *Akhali skhivi*, *Momavali*, *Mnatobi,* and others, regularly reported on the events in Iran from 1906-1911. During the Revolution, many major newspapers published in Tbilisi had their own correspondents in Iran, who went through

[1] Tria, also known as Vlasa Mgeladze (1868-1944), was a Georgian revolutionary who participated in both the Russian revolution of 1905-1907 and the Iranian Constitutional Revolution, and a member of the Menshevik Party. In 1918-1920, he was a member of the government of the independent Georgian Republic. In 1921, after the occupation of Georgia by the Red Army, he emigrated to France. Tria's report "The Caucasian Social-Democrats in the Persian Revolution" was attached to the report of the 8th Socialist Congress in Copenhagen at Lenin's urgent request. It was published in 1910 and 1911 in Paris, and then republished in 1925 (Pavlovich and Irandust 1925: 109-116). Vlasa Megladze's complete memoirs were published in Paris, France in 1974 (Mgeladze 1974, vol. 3).

[2] Sergo Gamdlishvili (1882-1910) was a Georgian revolutionary and participant in the Russian and Iranian revolutions. He was executed by the tsarist authorities after his return from Iran.

[3] In his memoirs Apolon Japaridze recalls that he traveled from Tbilisi to Baku and then to Gilan with false documents under the Armenian name of Mikhail Tratiants from Bayazeti. Apparently Japaridze kept this name throughout his revolutionary activities in Iran. Japaridze's Iranian memoirs were published in Georgian as supplement to a book by G. Chipashvili (1970: 89-98).

the battles in Tabriz, Rasht, Qazvin, and later, the march on Tehran alongside the revolutionaries. They published their letters and reports with detailed and lively descriptions of the political and military developments that they witnessed.

The memoirs of Sergo Gamdlishvili (Gurji Sergo) and Apolon (Misha) Japaridze stand out among these materials due to the richness of detail they provide. The two men participated in and wrote about almost every major event from the time of Gilan uprising (February 1909) to the takeover of Tehran (July 1909). In his memoirs Japaridze recalls his arrival in Gilan in early November 1908 (Chipashvili 1970: 89-90):

> The Tbilisi committee sent Sedrak Zaridze, Kako Korinteli[4] and me to the Baku committee. Two days later we were sent to Resht aboard the steamboat Lenkoran. We had false documents stating that we were workers of the Nobel office, and had to report to Mamed Baghir, an accountant at the Nobel office. Mamed Baghir received us as office workers … To him we handed over everything we had brought on the steamboat, including arms. Mamed Baghir and I set up an underground arsenal of bombs and arms. After this, three-to-five people arrived on every trip made by the Lenkoran.

Starting with the description of the arrival of the Caucasian and other revolutionaries in Gilan, step by step the authors describe the activities of the representatives of different nations who came to support the constitutionalist movement in Gilan. The Georgian internationalists sent by the Tbilisi organizations were decisive figures in the takeover of Rasht, and instrumental in the military operations at Qazvin, Menjil, Rudbar, Yuzbashchai, Pachinar, and Ambu. Both sources provide detailed descriptions of the attack on the governor's palace in Rasht and the participation of various groups in it (Chipashvili 1970: 93-94; *Akhali skhivi* 1910c). Although the authors focus primarily on the Caucasians' revolutionary activities in Iran, they also report on the underground activities, political orientations, and strategies of other revolutionary groups in Gilan — the local revolutionaries, the representatives of Sattar Khan in Rasht, Sepahdar's followers, Dashnaks, Hnchakists, and others. For example, Sergo Gamdlishvili describes how Sattar Khan's committee provided 7,000 rubles to help the Gilan resistance and how Mirza Kerim Khan traveled to Baku to purchase arms with these funds (*Akhali skhivi* 1910b). Gamdlishvili and Japaridze describe also the development of political and ideological differences among these groups, which they would eventually overcome, uniting in battle for a common goal. Authors relate the united expedition on Tehran, the first meetings of the Gilanis with the Bakhtiaris, the battles in Shah Abad and Badamek, combat in Tehran and establishment of Constitutionalist control in Tehran. They draw personal and political portraits of Sepahdar, Yephrem Khan, Panov, and other personalities in the resistance whom they met and got to know in Iran. For example, Gamdlishvili describes a meeting between Sepahdar and the Georgian revolutionaries in which he participated (*Akhali skhivi* 1910c). Throughout the narrative the authors mention many Iranian, Georgian, Armenian, Azeri, Russian, German, and Jewish revolutionaries.

Although these memoirs contain a large volume of factual material, they are not a simple chronology of facts but an in-depth examination of the political, economic, and social situation in Iran. They analyze the impact of external and internal factors on the situation, and the role and mission of the various revolutionary groups inside and outside of Iran. Therefore, these memoirs are valuable material for studying the development of the political ideologies and outlooks of Georgian revolutionists of the period, insofar as the memoirs reflect the ideology of the political organizations with which the authors were associated.

The letters and memoirs of all the Georgian revolutionaries and correspondents reveal that their solidarity with the Iranian Constitutionalists and sympathy towards the Iranian people were genuine. Frequent contact between Iranians and Caucasians, a result of the high number of Iranian immigrants to Transcaucasia, and of work in Iran by Caucasian activists and correspondents, to use the words of one Georgian revolutionary, "ignited a flame of sympathies and simple human solidarity" in the Caucasians and urged them "to go to Iran on the very first request" (*Akhali skhivi* 1910a). Indeed, the Georgian groups do not seem to have ever hesitated in helping Tabriz and Rasht resistance, and they made every effort to deliver aid as promptly as possible. Soon after the first fierce skirmishes

[4] Sedrak Zaridze and Kako Korinteli were Georgian revolutionaries from Tbilisi sent by the Tbilisi Social Democrat Committee to Baku and Rasht to coordinate the transportation of people and arms to Gilan. Both were executed by the tsarist authorities in 1910 after their return from Iran.

between the Constitutionalists and the Royalists occurred in July, 1908 in Tabriz, a large group of Georgian revolutionaries from Tbilisi was already on its way to Tabriz to respond to the Tabrizi resistance request for assistance. A Georgian internationalist wrote in his memoirs that "the plight and the devoted and selfless struggle of Tabriz to save long-suffering Iran from the clutches of the enemy" created a deep feeling of solidarity among Caucasians and "many Caucasians immediately went to Tabriz and Resht and gave up their lives" (*Akhali skhivi* 1910a). The Georgians also constituted a majority of the Caucasian revolutionaries who arrived in Rasht during November-December of the same year (*Akhali skhivi* 1910a; Chipashvili 1983: 43).

Sergo Gamdlishvili, a young Georgian revolutionary and participant in both the Russian and the Iranian revolutions, noted in his memoirs: "All the torment, suffering, and hardship that the Caucasians and among them Georgians went through in Persia will be noted and recognized by the history of the Persian Revolution, if it is ever written" (*Akhali skhivi* 1910a). This hope, expressed by the dedicated internationalist who gave up his life at the age of 28 for the revolutionary ideas, urges us to address the issue of the contribution of the Caucasians to the Constitutional movement in Iran with the deserved attention.

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Selected Papers from the 2005 CESS Conference

Instructional Language, National Identity, and Higher Education in Rural Kyrgyzstan: The Debate at At-Bashy

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National identity and national language have been critical issues in the former Soviet Central Asian states both before and after independence, and negotiating these issues has been a primary undertaking of secondary education for almost a century. Another set of school-related issues in both Soviet and now post-Soviet societies involves social mobility, and in particular, the changing relationships between secondary education and university access. Struggles over instructional language and national identity, as well as how secondary education relates to higher education and social mobility, are particularly complex matters in the Kyrgyz Republic. My colleagues and I have undertaken fieldwork in eight rural secondary schools in different parts of Kyrgyzstan, where we have discovered important complexities and contradictions embedded within local understandings of language policy and practice, and where these matters also affect understandings about higher education and university entrance and success.[1]

[1] The researchers, sponsored by a John J. and Nancy Lee Roberts Foundation Fellowship, which is administered by IREX, worked with the Kyrgyzstan Teacher Excellence Award program, administered by ACCELS, in 2004-2005. All interviews at At-Bashy and Choko were conducted in April 2005, in English, Kyrgyz, and Russian. All names have been changed.

Research Design and Methods

We have focused upon how schools and those whose work and study there interpret and negotiate school and community life on a daily basis, and have used case study research methods. These include document collection, oral histories and ethnographic interviews (Merriam 1998; Spradley 1979). In this work we have concentrated on how each school has maintained its coherence and focus and even become stronger (in some cases) over the past decades, as opposed to looking only for weaknesses and problems that international assessments of Kyrgyz education typically dwell upon.

Because this was a qualitative study, we had very few hypotheses to frame our work. For example, we did not set out to specifically investigate issues in the language of instruction or national language matters in our schools. Nor were we specifically interested in connections between the universities in Kyrgyzstan and secondary education. But each of these themes and concerns emerged in virtually every school we studied between 2004 and 2005. Our forthcoming book discusses at some length these matters, as well as a host of other important social and educational themes (DeYoung, Reeves and Valyayeva 2006). In this article we present just a few narratives concerning interpretations of national language issues and their perceived relevance to learning and university

access. We use the voices of several local actors as data points.

Language of Instruction and National Identity

Russian language and culture increasingly came to dominate public life in most urban centers of the USSR by the middle of the twentieth century, particularly among those populations with aspirations for upward social mobility (Olcott 1995; Gleason 1997). Non-Russian rural populations, meanwhile, more typically spoke and were fluent in national languages, not Russian, even though Russian was a required subject in all schools of all republics (Korth 2004). All Soviet citizens were proclaimed to have had equal educational opportunities and accomplishments in the USSR, although this was most probably not true. Among the stated goals for secondary education was that everyone was or would soon be fluent in Russian, as well as their local national language and another international one (typically German or English).

After nearly 15 years of independence, we expected to find in our work that the national language was in ascendance in more rural parts of Kyrgyzstan, and Russian was less in demand or practice. This turned out to be only partly true. Even in Naryn Province of Kyrgyzstan, which is far removed from Bishkek and proudly proclaimed by locals to be the center of pure Kyrgyz ethnicity, we found a healthy debate about what it meant to be Kyrgyz, about strengths and issues in teaching in the national language, and about the relationship between higher education, Russian and Kyrgyz.

The At-Bashy Raion has 24 secondary schools, four in the raion center of At-Bashy; and 20 others in smaller surrounding villages. National education policy is to allow parents and students to choose a primary language of instruction (Russian or Kyrgyz), even though pupils are also required to take second-language training in the other official language. One of the four At-Bashy schools is a "mixed" school, teaching a full curriculum in both Kyrgyz and Russian. Two schools in "the center" teach in Kyrgyz; but the largest and reputedly strongest school in the raion — the Kazybek School — teaches in Russian only. Virtually every At-Bashy household is ethnically Kyrgyz, and Kyrgyz is reputed to be the primary language of everyday use.

We were curious in our research as to how and why a school in At-Bashy — proclaimed center of Kyrgyz ethnicity and traditional Kyrgz values — still taught in Russian. In our interviews, the school director informed us that the school had initially been constructed in 1929 (as the Lenin School) and included a large percentage of Russian children from local military and collective farms and factories on the frontier. During the 1960s and 1970s, many of these families began leaving, yet local Kyrgyz and other nationalities in the area still wanted their children to learn the language of interethnic communication: Russian. Enrollments recently have been about 1,600 students, but in 1987 there were 2,500 students.

Like virtually every other school in our study, Kazybek was proclaimed to be a good school, even though they were experiencing several resource problems. Kazybek teachers reported initial enthusiasm for study in Kyrgyz among Kyrgyz parents and teachers in other At-Bashy schools, but by the late 1990s this push waned, and more and more parents sent their children to Russian language schools. The lack of Kyrgyz language texts and other print materials was one reported problem, as was the realization that the universities they wanted their children to attend usually taught in Russian.

All the staff and all the teachers we interviewed at Kazybek claimed that their school was the best in the district, and that Russian as the instructional language was a primary reason for their success. And almost every school in our study, including Kazybek, gauged school success in terms of how many graduates went on to the universities in Bishkek or Naryn. One high-achieving student in our interviews made the case for his school's importance; and he seemed unconcerned that Russian was a threat to national identity, as some did. He had more utilitarian explanations:

> We will know Kyrgyz anyway, [since] we live in this environment, [but] we also need Russian to add to our native language. … For example, all our subjects — like geography — are taught in Russian. We only study Kyrgyz language in our Kyrgyz language class. In other schools, all the lessons are conducted in Kyrgyz. Even worse, [other schools] have Russian only once a week, and it is conducted [poorly]. [Those schools also] often lack materials (At-Bashy, April 2005).

Meanwhile, a young English teacher at Kazybek who had grown up in At-Bashy herself — but who wanted to move to Bishkek as soon as possible —

had a more complex and even painful view of the national language dilemma. Gulshat was upset to think that residents of Bishkek looked down upon people from the village, and considered the matter of language competence and preference as part of the issue:

> Our Kyrgyz mentality suggests that if you live in the village, you are not modern enough; you are old fashioned. After being at the university, I do not believe that. "Naryn is all mountains everywhere; and herds of cows are everywhere; and we are wandering between and among them." Bishkek inhabitants, all of them, think about us that way. Some even do not know where At-Bashy is. … In city schools, a lot of students — even Kyrgyz — speak only in Russian. This is a big problem, because Kyrgyz language is our native language, although Russian is also an official language. … And no one seems to take responsibility to answer why in the younger generation of Bishkek, almost everybody speaks Russian, even in [ethnically] Kyrgyz schools. This is becoming a problem (Gulshat, At-Bashy, April 2005).

On the other hand, Gulshat had aspirations to move to Bishkek one day; and school teaching was not her long-term career goal. She firmly believed that more than Kyrgyz fluency is required to be successful in the city:

> I think I am quite modern, because I know English really well. Just Kyrgyz is not enough for me. … To be considered to be modern, in our culture, you have to know no fewer than three languages, to be intellectually developed, and to understand the situation in the country (Gulshat, At-Bashy, April 2005).

City Values versus Village Values

Gulshat had an interesting grasp of the cultural implications and contradictions of schooling in Kyrgyzstan, many of them located at the nexus of language, rurality, tradition, and social mobility. On the one hand, she was from At-Bashy and was not ashamed of it. On the other hand, she was very worried that she herself might be kidnapped as a bride — as her older sister had been — and absorbed into a traditional local family before she would be able to flee to the city. She opined about both the opportunities and the perils of students in the city versus those in the village, also suggesting that city students were more active learners than rural learners. Language of instruction and cultural issues, she believed, were partly involved:

> There is a big difference between the kids who study in a rural school and kids in Bishkek. In urban schools, the students are freer: they do what they want; they do not ask anybody about anything. In rural schools we are completely dependant on parents, and there are a lot of things we do not know about. Maybe it is for the better? In city schools, the kids grow up quickly. They understand everything quickly, and … maybe it is harmful for them, because they grow up [more] quickly. [But] in rural schools they comprehend everything slowly, and are not in a hurry.
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> In city schools there are teachers who state their goals and they achieve these goals; but in rural schools the kids may not set the goals for themselves: no goals to where [they] are going. … Just last night I returned from a rural school in Akmuz. There the students obey and are afraid [of authorities]. … No yelling and screaming in the hall. And here, at our place, there is freedom: everything in such a Russian way. Everybody does what they want. [This] is good, because kids are developing themselves: they can set goals; they develop themselves. … They are becoming of well-rounded individuals (Gulshat, At-Bashy, April 2005).

Another ethnic Kyrgyz teacher who taught Russian at Kazybek previously taught in two different Kyrgyz language schools. Like Gulshat, Gulzhan linked language of instruction, inquisitiveness and parent involvement together:

> In Kyrgyz national schools, it is easier [for me] to teach Russian, but comprehension of the language by my students is more difficult. If you tell something to a kid, he will obey without delay; and kids will not express their opinions or defend their opinions, just do what you told them, and that's it. [But] in Russian language schools, kids defend their points of view; they can even add something better, or even change the direction of an assignment. … In sum, they are more or less — how to say — maybe more democratic? … I would say [this] is partly to do with the community where they live. You know, when we teach Russian, and start teaching Russian literature and Russian lyrics of freedom, it has its

> impact in child development. [Meanwhile], Kyrgyz [stories] also have the same freedom lyrics and also the same democrats and fighters [*akyns* and writers], but [it is not the same] (Gulzhan, At-Bashy, April 2005).

Higher Education and Language of Instruction

Narratives discussed so far suggest two competing notions about instructional language matters in At-Bashy. One is that Kyrgyz language is or ought to be the language of the Kyrgyz Republic, equating identity needs of the state with the culture of the titular nationality. Meanwhile, teachers and students in Russian language schools argue that Russian is the language of the city and of (greater) intellectual possibilities, which ought to be the focus of education. The debate about whether the goal of education ought to be to socialize local children into local communities, or to expand general knowledge and to equip children to leave the school as adults, is an old one. We have such philosophical disagreements in the West all the time (e.g., Kliebard 1986). But in Kyrgyzstan, the social and historical context pushes this argument also into another realm: that of higher education. Specifically, is university access some long-deferred right of citizenship, or ought it be restricted to those who demonstrate some sort of intellectual or academic talent?

Access to the university for the masses was an implicit promise of the USSR from the 1930s. As world socialism was achieved, more and more secondary school students would be enabled to attend university or other institutions of higher learning (Holmes, Read, and Voskresenskaya 1995). In the meantime, Soviet higher education became highly sought after as one strategy to avoid drudgery and difficult work in factories and fields (Dobson 1977). Glasnost and Perestroika reforms of the 1980s also promised better secondary and higher education opportunities (Eklof and Dneprov 1993).

Increased access to higher education was one of President Akaev's key promises, following Kyrgyzstan's independence (Akaev 2003). The number of higher education institutions in Kyrgyzstan mushroomed from essentially two universities in 1990 to more than 50 by 2005. Secondary school directors around the country could now promise graduates and their parents that they might be able to attend universities in modern Kyrgyzstan.

Virtually all of the schools in our study focused much of their energy on facilitating high grades for students and propelling them to universities. But of course, secondary school quality has been declining for want of resources since the mid-1990s. Shortages of teachers and materials in math and science were the norm in our schools, and seasoned professionals in both schools and universities have left the education system in pursuit of higher paying jobs in the private sector.

In and around At-Bashy, the issue of education quality as it related to university entrance emerged as an interesting topic, and instructional language was a sub-theme. Boris was a vocational teacher at Kazybek School, but had previously been a driver with work experience in many of the rural villages surrounding At-Bashy. He had little appreciation for the intellectual quality of these smaller schools, and not much either for recent college graduates. He echoed some of the themes voiced earlier:

> I think in Kyrgyz language schools there are fewer hours for learning Russian than in our school. What is happening is that those kids do not really comprehend [*ne usvaivaut*] Russian. … Also, with Russian as the language of instruction, our kids feel themselves less restrained [*raskovanno*] compared to the students studying in Kyrgyz schools. They have a different mentality. … In a Kyrgyz language school in the kolkhoz, this will never ever happen. There, kids will never raise an issue against the teacher. … In general, they are under the supervision of their parents around the clock, and under supervision of their teachers. They are as if under a hat [*pod kalpakom*] (Boris, At-Bashy, April 2005).

Kazybek School was proud to talk about its *Olympiad* (academic contest) winners and the number of its 11th graders who had finished and left for universities in Bishkek and Naryn. According to the school's assistant director for academics, 98 students would graduate from Kazybek School in 2005, over 80 percent of whom would be taking the national scholarship test entrance exam. She claimed that a strong Russian language program — among other things — was responsible for her school's success. In 2004, she said, 104 students graduated, and about 65 of them went on to the university.

We also spoke with the director of the Kyrgyz-language Choko village school, which

enrolled about 100 students. Fatima confided that her school's primary problem centered on staffing shortages, but she still insisted that her school was good; her teachers well prepared, and the learning accomplishments of her students were high. She also claimed that higher education was still a goal for most students even here in the village:

> Last year, 15 students graduated from our school. Nine of them were admitted to universities; half in budget [government scholarship] places, the other half in contract [private] departments. [Most of] our graduates want further study very much — to enter universities or other post-secondary specialized institutions. … [But] not everybody can go to the university. Parents cannot help them with money, so they work. But everybody wants to continue to study (Fatima, Choko, April 2005).

We imagined that one problem for her students wishing to go to the city and enter the university was their competence in Russian. Fatima was concerned that Russian was important at almost every major university, but her teacher of Russian was a local person and not fluent in Russian herself. She had no one else to speak to in Choko. Fatima, though, was pleased with the quality of her school and with parent support in the community. She was glad that she did not work in a bigger school in At-Bashy, where she thought there were many problems related to discipline.

Fatima and Boris (who had brought us to Choko) disagreed about the importance of independent thought, academic competence, and fluency in Russian, as prerequisites to university entrance and success. Boris had argued that when the community held its children too close and did not allow them to be independent or inquisitive, that limited education. To be "under the kalpak" was a bad thing. Fatima, on the other hand, believed that good students were those who obeyed their parents and their teachers. She claimed that maintaining order and discipline were primary goals of teaching, while other skills and learning strategies came second. Well behaved students were the ones who could be trusted and allowed to go off to a university in the city. And this was more easily accomplished in the Kyrgyz village where Kyrgyz was the language of instruction. With regard to poor language preparation for university, Fatima opined that lack of Russian fluency was only a minor obstacle that could be compensated for over time by good character and a hard work ethic. She argued:

> From my perspective, rural students are academically strong students and interested. In the city, of course, there is "civilization," and [city] students have better speech development than rural kids. But all in all, academic development and motivation is better among rural children. When our students enter Bishkek and Naryn [universities], the rule is if you studied better [and were better behaved] at [secondary] school, you study better at the university as well. The students that [sometimes] come here from Bishkek are weak students. That's what I think (Fatima, Choko, April 2005).

Conclusion

Space does not allow much discussion here related to the above themes. Our work tends to suggest, though, that the politics of language is not only a national theme, but also involves and affects school and community discourse at the local level, and clearly relates to issues in university entrance and success. Such themes are implicitly discussed in the debate over national scholarship testing in Kyrgyzstan (Drummond and DeYoung 2004), and are also topics we pursue in our forthcoming book.

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Central Asia's Restrictive Media System[1]

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Central Asian non-state media is trapped in a system of problematic and unfairly enforced laws. This paper argues that this increasingly paralyzing media situation is the fault of both the Central Asian governments and the non-state media outlets. On one hand, media controls have been engineered for the personal benefit of each country's political leadership — specifically, for the president and his family but extending to other members of the elite. In order to stay in power, the elites silenced opponents, and this silencing is the defining feature of the media environment, which in places resembles a "party press" environment, especially in Kazakhstan (Allison 2004). Currently, in all Central Asian countries, state-controlled media have a virtual monopoly on broadcast media and huge segments of print media. Because of governmental meddling in commercial enterprises, fewer businesses remain free of governmental manipulation each year, prompting ever-fewer businesses to advertise in non-state-affiliated media outlets. At the same time, most media outlets, state-controlled and independent alike, regularly disobey the existing laws because of legal illiteracy and negligence, as well as because of the highly corrupt Central Asian business/political environment, which often necessitates illegal practices. This business and media takeover and regulation is a systematic approach to media control, facilitated by journalists' illegal actions.

This paper is the result of a year-long study of press freedom in Central Asia for a post-undergraduate fellowship from Rice University. During this time, work was conducted in four post-Soviet Central Asian countries — Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan — including meetings with several hundred newspaper editors, TV and radio station producers, journalists, nongovernmental organizations, governmental bodies and press-freedom and human-rights groups. I conducted interviews usually in Russian, and occasionally in English, depending on the interviewee. In each country, I interviewed many of the journalists who experienced press-freedom violations as cited in monitoring conducted by groups like Adil Soz (Kazakhstan), Public Association Journalists (Kyrgyzstan) and Internews (Uzbekistan and Tajikistan). I also interviewed journalists from state-owned and state-affiliated media outlets to get a diversity of opinion. Like Peter Krug and Monroe Price's "Enabling Environment" paper (2000) and Ivan Sigal's (2005)

[1] This paper was produced during the author's term as Zeff Fellow, Rice University, 2003-2004. For a fuller evaluation of this topic, see the full-length version of the paper, available from the author. The paper explains recent draft media laws and important court cases and gives a full thematic evaluation of media legislation. Local NGOs deserve special acknowledgement: the Kazakhstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan offices of Internews Network, and the Kyrgyzstan NGO Public Association "Journalists." The author also thanks the journalist trainers Jack Ronald and George Krimsky of the International Center for Journalists.

and Eric Johnson's (1998) earlier reports on media law, this paper is based on a thematic approach. I devised a list of questions examining the following seven media law topics: media registration, frequency licensing, censorship, access to information, libel/defamation, taxes, and ownership/monopolies. To conserve space, I will not examine each of these topics individually but will instead briefly discuss the basic legislative environment, governments' selective enforcement and journalists' irresponsibility.

In examining regional media-law tendencies, I show that the governments of the region have shared similar trajectories of media development. However, I also consider recent events, like Uzbekistan's and Tajikistan's crackdown on media and Kyrgyzstan's revolution, to discuss the future of the media in Central Asia. I ultimately argue that although these changes seem significant, they are not changing the actual media system.

It is necessary to differentiate among the terms "independent," "privately owned" and "oppositional" when referring to players in the Central Asian media environment. While many newspapers and media are privately owned, few are independent. The term "independent" connotes a freedom of thought or lack of bias that is simply difficult to find in these countries, as media-outlet owners dictate content and slant to a large degree. Many privately owned media outlets are extremely pro-governmental because their owners are members of the ruling elite. On the other hand, there are several oppositional media outlets in each country, and many of these are owned by opposition politicians; thus, while their content is not pro-governmental, the journalists are still propagandistic tools of certain political figures (Krimsky 2002). If there are any truly independent media outlets in Central Asia, they are most likely to be found in smaller cities, where political stakes are usually lower.

As a regional trend, most Central Asian media laws follow the 1990/1991 USSR Law "On mass media,"[2] which, although replaced by later laws in most post-Soviet countries, granted more freedom than previous Soviet legislation but still contained significant limitations on press freedoms. Like the current laws, the 1990 law contained prohibitions of the "abuse of freedom," as well as other specific limitations on publication of materials that call for a change to the constitutional order. The 1990 law, however, forbid media monopolies (Article 7), an article that could be useful now.

Kazakhstan has an entirely new law "On mass media," adopted in 1999 and amended in 2001 (see fuller explanation of this law below), although sections of the 1999 law still mirror the structure and wording of the Soviet law. Kazakhstan almost passed a controversial law in spring 2004, giving the government more power to interfere in media outlets' affairs and calling for stricter ownership and editorial restrictions. Nazarbaev vetoed it, however, in a publicity stunt. Kazakhstan's government and media groups are currently wrangling about a new media law, but so far there has been more talk than action on this topic. In Kyrgyzstan, a newer law adopted under Akaev is even more similar to the Soviet law. Post-revolution legislation in Kyrgyzstan includes draft laws to turn the state-owned media outlets outside the capital into a "public" TV channel, but specifics of the law — like whether public or state TV will control the transmitters — remain problematic. Tajikistan and Uzbekistan have amended the 1990-91 laws and have passed additional laws regulating the media sphere, but most of the media law structure remains a monument to bygone Soviet days. Uzbekistan's media laws also include a long list of decrees "having the weight of law," which make it difficult to keep up with the current legal environment. The other countries use this tactic as well, but to a lesser degree. In Tajikistan, there has been no revision of the media laws in several years, despite long debates in parliament about these laws. In Uzbekistan, any new law usually requires more registration and more financial and political restrictions on media outlets.

Selective Governmental Enforcement

After analyzing all the segments of Central Asian media law — from monopoly law to censorship practices — a bleak picture emerges. These are not individual court cases or individual newspaper closings: all regulatory bodies are still fully state-run, and for the last 14 years, they have devised a complete system of biased law enforcement. Ivan Sigal writes of Kazakhstan, in his 2000 report for *Communications Law in Transition*, that the regulations in Kazakhstan have been crafted to restrict access to those in power and to force media

[2] For the purposes of this paper, I translate the Russian-language title of the law, Zakon "O SMI" as "Law 'On mass media,'" although some sources have translated the law as "On the media."

outlets into a "semi-legal state." Sigal writes this about Kazakhstan, but it is true of all four countries studied. There are essentially no repercussions for governments' actions, and they win almost all battles with opposition and independent media. While journalists are often guilty of the charges brought against them, that is only half of the story. Independent or oppositional journalists are guilty of the same infractions that pro-governmental journalists commit, but only the former are punished.

Although all Central Asian media laws forbid censorship, Uzbekistan had an official censor until May 2002, and the Ministry of Defense has required pre-publication review of all media reports concerning military issues. In all four countries considered in this study, self-censorship is pervasive, and most journalists say they cannot write about corruption, business dealings, health risks, real economic figures, ethnic problems, and gender issues (Morfius 2004). While some of these claims of censorship are exaggerated because of a lingering culture of fear, many journalists do face prosecution for writing these types of articles.

It is difficult to succinctly convey the level of pressure media outlets face from all sources. First, there is financial pressure, stemming from the many taxes required of all businesses, including the media. In Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, editors claim they have at least 10 to 15 taxes on their already-meager profits. Second, these journalists face a lack of available official information because laws forbid publication of "state and business secrets," as well as government activities pertaining to "national security." Even business ownership remains a closed topic, so the simplest business articles become almost impossible to write.

For the most persistent critics of each country's regime, the government adopts a series of attacks designed to entirely neutralize the outlet. The *Respublika/Assandi Times* office in Almaty has faced dozens of lawsuits, and its offices were fire-bombed in 2002. The 2002-2003 draft media law, which Kazakhstan's President Nazarbaev eventually refused to sign, included a provision specifically devised to thwart this paper: no media outlet would be allowed to have a foreigner as its editor in chief. *Respublika's* main editor, Irina Petrushova, is a Russian citizen, and she lives in Moscow because she is threatened with imprisonment if she returns to Kazakhstan. Difficulties for the Tajikistani independent newspapers *Ruzi nav* and *Nerui sukhan* are similar; they have faced invasive inspections and charges from tax inspectors, the Ministry of Culture and the court system (Kimmage 2004), which sentenced *Nerui sukhan*'s editor to a prison sentence in August 2005 (EurasiaNet 2005). Although theoretically *Ruzi nav* had acted within the confines of the media laws — even within the tax laws so frequently violated — the government's tactics lie even beyond their manipulation of media law. The newspaper is still closed. Teaching professional standards and correct legal practices to journalists rarely helps because the government can turn off their electricity, refuse to print the newspaper or harass their advertisers.

Irresponsible Journalism and Rule-Breaking

Central Asia's laws are written such that they are extremely easy to enforce against independent media, and these unfair laws are enforced one-sidedly. But in the past, journalists have not guarded against prosecution by following the laws or becoming financially independent. Journalists often disobey the laws and prepare unethical stories, and media outlets do not attempt to earn profits.

Illegal actions by media are sometimes intentional and sometimes inadvertent. Minor oversights, such as not sending "control copies" — copies of the paper they are required to send to the national library and various ministries — lead to registration revocation. Other violations are more intentional. Tax evasion is rampant. For the government, charging media outlets with back-taxes is a fast way to close them down; if a media outlet goes bankrupt after these fines, there is no court battle and thus no lengthy process. In addition, journalists' materials are frequently libelous by Western standards, and usually lacking many facts; they would not stand up in Western courts any more than they do in Central Asia. These are generalities, and not all Central Asian media outlets commit all of these infractions. But many commit one or more of them.

While not strictly a violation of any existing Central Asian media law, editors and journalists often violate international codes of journalism ethics by taking paid articles, also called "PR" or "ordered" articles, primarily from various politicians and businessmen, which either promote the requestor's business interests ("white PR") or criticize their opponents ("black PR"). There are no accurate estimates of how many stories in a newspaper or on

a TV or radio station are paid, and they are never marked as being paid-for, but the practice is widespread. Although supplemental income is necessary because of journalists' low salaries, this practice is public knowledge and has seriously harmed media outlets' credibility.

Some journalists and editors are in a cycle of giving and taking bribes to cover up their and others' infractions. This contributes to the corruption in the region, which they also complain about, and it too reduces their credibility. Tajikistan journalist Jovid Mukim bemoaned the situation, saying, "At any given point [the government] can criticize or punish a newspaper because everyone is corrupt."[3]

"Independent" and opposition papers — who generally classify themselves as "social-political" newspapers — are low-circulation newspapers, not only because they are oppressed but also because the general population is either unaware of or uninterested in the material they print. Most political newspapers do not contain the diversity of material that attracts an average reader, and these "social-political" newspapers adhere to a verbose style using long paragraphs. Kyrgyzstan's most popular newspaper is *Vechernii Bishkek* not because the newspaper has more professional news articles but because it has the most classified ads and a wider range of topics. One grant-funded newspaper in Kyrgyzstan is rumored to not even attempt to circulate all of the copies of a given edition, despite its already-low circulation.

Many media outlets show an aversion to running advertisements. Media laws stipulate that a newspaper can fill 20 to 40 percent of its print space with advertisements, and a broadcast station 10 to 30 percent of its broadcast time, depending on whether they are state or privately owned outlets. No media outlet — besides those dedicated exclusively to advertising — comes close to these limits. When asked, many editors complain that advertisers refuse to advertise in independent media because of state pressure. They claim that if a business advertises in privately owned media, tax inspections will ensue. While this is likely true in many cases, the low circulation of these social-and-political newspapers provides another explanation.

Finally, many Central Asian journalists are unprofessional in their articles and in their public behavior. Journalists often demand information from the information agencies of different ministries or businesses. If they are told to wait until the next day,[4] journalists claim they were deprived of this information, even when they do not return to collect it at the promised time. In press freedom monitoring reports, many complaints lodged are of this nature.

Conclusions

Central Asian governments are increasingly unlikely to change their laws to comply with international standards. Even if the laws were changed, most of the problem lies in the total dependence of the court system on the president and national government, which would not change. This factor by itself could allow the continued levying of exorbitant fines on media outlets in libel and defamation cases. Few figures' reputations are worth several billion dollars, so requests of such alarming amounts have the sole purpose of closing media outlets through bankruptcy. Decriminalized libel will not change this fact; only an independent judiciary will improve this situation — and this seems unlikely in the near future (Central European and Eurasian Law Initiative 2003: 2). In addition, equal rights should be granted to state-owned and privately owned media. Although such a provision may not immediately improve the situation, it would provide recourse in the law for appeal if independent and opposition outlets are not treated fairly. Furthermore, without an independent agency for licensing, registration and journalist accreditation, journalists will remain beholden to the government for their very right to work.

Uzbekistan has recently used far harsher tactics than its neighbors (except Turkmenistan) in dealing with the press, although Tajikistan's media also face renewed pressure in the run-up to 2006 presidential elections. Kazakhstan's media outlets face a continuing onslaught of libel and defamation cases. Printing presses refuse to print or distribute certain material from critical media outlets, which is a more overt example of pressure. Kyrgyzstan's media have the most hopeful situation, but recent articles by Institute for War and Peace Reporting and *EurasiaNet* cast doubt on President Bakiev's benign intentions for the media (Sadybakasova 2005).

In Kyrgyzstan, Bakiev has expressed some desire to rid the country of most of its state-owned

[3] Personal interview with Jovid Mukim, March 21, 2004. Dushanbe, Tajikistan.

[4] According to Central Asia's media laws, official entities have five to 30 days to respond to such requests, depending on the country.

media. The proposed laws on creating a public television channel are a promising development, if this plan actually eliminates state-controlled television in favor of a fairer public television station. Along these lines, in Azerbaijan, the public television station was recently commended for having relatively balanced coverage of the country's recent controversial election (Abbasov and Muradova 2005). In addition, a December 2005 Bakiev decree put two national state-owned newspapers, *Slovo Kyrgyzstana* and *Kyrgyz tuusu*, up for sale. Despite this, some fear that these newspapers will only be sold to entities with ties to the new elite (Orozobekova 2005). If Kyrgyzstan's other television stations remain or become controlled by Bakiev's circle, the revolution will have no positive result for the media.

Although all four countries worked to prevent regime change, such regime change has indeed happened — in Kyrgyzstan, in spring 2005. The remaining Central Asian countries will work to prevent spillover from those events — this is seen in Tajikistan's crackdown and in Uzbekistan's continually harsher policies. It is also possible that Bakiev, like other Central Asian presidents, will work to prevent regime change in the future, although he may have to work harder now that protest-driven revolutionary mentality has arrived in Kyrgyzstan. Thus, although it initially appears that the four countries have new and differing attitudes toward their media, there have been no major changes to the selective-enforcement system. There is no indication various branches of the government will stop harassing journalists, so there is no indication that this new era in Central Asian politics will change anything. Rather, regimes will continue to diminish the region's possibility of developing more independent media.

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Political Islam in Southern Kazakhstan: Hizb ut-Tahrir

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During the 1990s, the government of Kazakhstan came to believe that the country was immune to political Islam, due to its large territory, multi-ethnic and multi-religious population and the booming oil economy. This view has been challenged recently by the emergence of Hizb ut-Tahrir al-Islami (the Islamic Party of Liberation — hereafter Hizb ut-Tahrir) in southern Kazakhstan.

Hizb ut-Tahrir was founded in 1953 by Taqiuddin an-Nabhani, an Islamic scholar of Palestinian origin, in East Jerusalem. Hizb ut-Tahrir views itself not as a religious organization, but rather a political party whose ideology is based on Islam. Hizb ut-Tahrir is now a transnational organization with thousands of members worldwide, including Western Europe and the Middle East. The group aims at uniting all Muslim-populated territories into a single state, the Caliphate. The first emissaries of Hizb ut-Tahrir appeared in the southern Kazakhstan in 1998. Hizb ut-Tahrir now claims to have thousands of members in southern Kazakhstan.[1]

Hizb ut-Tahrir's members regularly distribute leaflets in southern Kazakhstan; most of them are written in Kazakh, Uzbek or Russian, a sign that the group targets all ethnic groups.[2] However, its leaflets usually deal with problems faced by Muslims in other countries (for example, Uzbekistan and Palestine), rather than Kazakhstan. The group is organized in cells of five people and usually members use nicknames for security reasons.

The Kazakhstan authorities initially ignored the group, but in the last few years have responded with repressive methods. In 2004 alone, Hizb ut-Tahrir members were seen distributing leaflets and other printed materials in more than 180 instances; as a result, Kazakhstan security services launched 111 criminal cases (*Embassy of Kazakhstan* 2005a). In March 2005, the city court of Astana granted the Kazakhstan Prosecutor General's request to declare Hizb ut-Tahrir an extremist organization and ban its activity in the country (*Embassy of Kazakhstan* 2005b).

Drawing on fieldwork conducted from September 2003 to January 2005, the article will show how social movement theories can help explain the rise of Hizb ut-Tahrir in southern Kazakhstan. Fieldwork included examining Hizb-ut-Tahrir's books and leaflets, and interviewing members, officials, and Muslim clerics.[3] Social movement theories focus on multiple aspects of the origins of collective action, including responses to mobilization of resources, responses to political opportunities and framing processes. Finally, the article will suggest that the group has utilized its ideology to mobilize support among religious Muslims in southern Kazakhstan.

[1] Personal communication with a member of Hizb ut-Tahrir in Shymkent, February 2004. The author estimates the organization to have about 1,000 members at the time of this research, with more sympathizers.

[2] Personal communication with Igor Savin, director of the NGO "Dialogue," Shymkent, Kazakhstan, February 2004.

[3] Research was sponsored by the Solomon Asch Center for Study of Ethnopolitical Conflict, University of Pennsylvania.

Social Movement Theory Applied to the Rise of Hizb ut-Tahrir in Kazakhstan

Three characteristics differentiate social movements from other types of collective behavior (e.g., crowds): a higher degree of internal organization; typically longer duration; and the deliberate attempt to reorganize society itself (Macionis 2001: 615). Hizb ut-Tahrir is a social movement, with all these characteristics in evidence: the group has a hierarchical structure of command; it has existed for about half a century; and it aims at radical political change. Although Kazakhstan has some unique features, it is still possible to analyze Hizb ut-Tahrir in that country using the same concepts found useful in analyzing social movements in other parts of the world.

Resource mobilization theory claims that social movements must be able to mobilize key resources if they are to emerge (Zald and McCarthy 1987). The ability of a group to challenge the authorities eventually would be determined by the extent to which it is in control of material and organizational resources, legitimacy and identity resources, and institutional resources (Hafez 2004: 19).

According to Kazakhstan's law, all mosques have to be registered with the Ministry of Justice and submit to the jurisdiction of the state-controlled Spiritual Administration of Muslims in Kazakhstan (SAMK). Nevertheless, it appears that over 100 of the 500 mosques in southern Kazakhstan are not part of SAMK (Rotar 2004). It seems that Hizb ut-Tahrir has utilized unregistered mosques as a resource for mobilizing support among the local population.

In addition, the group is relying on social networks and informal institutions. In southern Kazakhstan, as in most of Central Asia, Muslim men often form small groups that meet regularly for social events in *chaikhanas* (teahouses) and private houses. Hizb ut-Tahrir has used such informal networks as a resource for mobilization purposes.

Also, southern Kazakhstan constitutes an environment where Hizb ut-Tahrir could relatively easily acquire new human resources. The region has the highest population density in the country (17.1 people per square kilometer) and a population of almost 2 million, with young people under 30 forming the majority (National Statistics Agency 1999). Hizb ut-Tahrir's sources of revenue are unknown, but solid. It seems that membership fees are a major source of income for the group in Kazakhstan. It is also likely that the Kazakh branch of Hizb ut-Tahrir initially received some financial support from abroad.

The group has identity resources since it is an exclusive organization that has established strict criteria for membership. Only individuals who accept fully Hizb ut-Tahrir's aim and strategy are recruited by the group. Membership in close-knit cells, which provide mutual support, fits well with traditional regional social patterns. In this way, Hizb ut-Tahrir aims at the creation of a collective identity that engenders a sense of solidarity on the part of group members. In addition, the group possesses legitimacy resources, because it perceives itself as a selected and elite group, in effect an *ummah* within the *ummah* (Members of Hizb ut-Tahrir in Britain 2000: 79). Hizb ut-Tahrir in southern Kazakhstan may also have limited access to institutional resources; indeed, there are rumors that the group has infiltrated the local police and state agencies.[4]

Political opportunity theory focuses on the political environment outside social movements in order to explain their emergence. This theory claims that social movements appear when political opportunities open up (Tilly 1978). After winning the first free elections in December 1991, Nazarbaev became Kazakhstan's first president. However, the division of powers in Kazakhstan is highly problematic, because the judiciary is not really independent from the executive branch and the parliament has a mostly ceremonial role in the political system.[5] In addition, election laws restrict any real opposition parties from arising or mounting a campaign. Hizb ut-Tahrir has skillfully portrayed itself as the only true opposition group that can offer a concrete political and economic plan for the country's future by denouncing opposition parties as corrupt and as puppets of the Nazarbaev regime.

Following the collapse of Communist Party of Kazakhstan's patronage networks in the early 1990s, clan affiliation has become again an important factor in the political life of Kazakhstan. Clan patronage networks have been particularly strong in the southern Kazakhstan, fuelling inter-clan competition for state appointments (Schatz 2004: 106). For instance, there is competition between the *Dulat* clan from the Elder Zhuz and the *Konrad* clan from the

[4] Personal communication with a Kazakh security official in Almaty, Kazakhstan, May 2004.

[5] Personal communication with an OSCE official, Almaty, Kazakhstan, November 2003.

Middle Zhuz. The clan-based nature of the Kazakhstan's politics has marginalized some southern Kazakhs, as well as the Uzbeks and other ethnic minorities living in the region. On the other hand, Hizb ut-Tahrir has promoted its image as an organization that cares for the well-being of all Muslims, irrespective of clan affiliation.

Moreover, social movements often use frames to mobilize support (Goffman 1974). A frame is a mental map that organizes perceptions of social or political life. Frames give new meaning to people's lives. In addition, frames identify targets of blame, offer visions of a desirable world and suggest strategies for political change, and provide a rationale to motivate collective action. Hizb ut-Tahrir has framed the political, social and economic problems in the country as the outcome of secularism, Western cultural influence, and the absence of a strong universal Islamic state. The group calls for a return to an idealized religion-based community and promotes a utopian view of an Islamic state in which all problems would be banished by the application of the *Sharia*.

In order to make frames resonate, social movements must find consistency with the local culture. Hizb ut-Tahrir's frames are well received in southern Kazakhstan, because the local population tends to be more religious than in the rest of the country. There are two main factors explaining southern Kazakhstan's high religiosity. Firstly, the region's ethnic demography includes mostly Kazakh and Uzbek Muslims; secondly, southern Kazakhstan was populated by a settled agricultural population earlier than other regions and as a result Islam has deep roots in the region.

The frames adopted by Hizb ut-Tahrir have been successful in affirming people's commitment to the cause of the Islamic Caliphate, because they cement a sense of solidarity and common cause that generates meaning.

Hizb ut-Tahrir's Ideology as a Mobilizing Force

Most scholars have ignored the role of ideology in mobilizing collective action and they have conceptualized social movements as rational actors (Snow 1992: 135-136). Yet, ideology often performs multiple functions, including transforming grievances into a politicized agenda and providing a sense of collective identity.

Hizb ut-Tahrir's ideology is based on two beliefs. The first is that the Sharia should regulate all aspects of human life. The second is that a decent society can be achieved only within an Islamic state. The model for Hizb ut-Tahrir is the Islamic state that existed in the seventh century under the Prophet Muhammad and his first four successors. The new Caliphate would be led by a caliph, who would combine religious and political power, and who would be elected by an assembly (*Majlis al-Ummah*), which would in turn be elected by the people. The caliph would appoint an *amir* who would declare *jihad* and wage war against all non-Muslims.

There is no doubt that the collapse of Soviet Union has produced an ideological vacuum in Kazakhstan. Kazakhstan's authorities have attempted to fill this vacuum by fostering nationalism among ethnic Kazakhs. For this purpose, Astana has embarked on the Kazakhification of the state, favoring the titular group in the political and cultural fields. However, the nation-building process has not achieved the eradication of cultural differences among Kazakhs. Due to historical factors, southern Kazakhs have been linguistically, religiously and culturally under Uzbek influence, whereas Kazakhs from northern Kazakhstan and Almaty have been heavily Russified.

The concept of nation-statehood has relatively shallow roots in post-Soviet Kazakhstan and many Kazakhs share a feeling of nostalgia for the Soviet Union. It was not only the economic security they felt under communism; they also enjoyed the prestige of being citizens of the Soviet Union, a superpower that defeated Nazi Germany and challenged United States. Hizb ut-Tahrir's idea of an all-powerful Caliphate, powerful enough to challenge the West, is attractive to those born-again Muslim Kazakhs who have lost their collective self-esteem in the post-Soviet era.

The rise of Hizb ut-Tahrir in southern Kazakhstan has also an ethnic dimension. There are about 350,000 Uzbeks in southern Kazakhstan, representing about 20 per cent of the local population (National Statistics Agency 1999). The Uzbek minority is under-represented in state institutions and senior government positions are usually reserved for ethnic Kazakhs. The group has become popular among ethnic Uzbeks, because it does not emphasize ethnicity and promotes Muslim solidarity. Moreover, Hizb ut-Tahrir's vision of a

single Islamic state in Central Asia is appealing to ethnic Uzbeks who feel isolated from their compatriots in Uzbekistan, and feel concerned about their future in a Kazakh-dominated state.

Furthermore, the disintegration of the Soviet Union in early 1990s has created a "spiritual vacuum" in Kazakhstan, because, as ironic as it may seem, Marxism-Leninism was for many a form of religion. Indeed, the rise of Hizb ut-Tahrir has coincided with the rapid growth of religious self-consciousness among southern Kazakhstan's Muslims. Following the Soviet period, Muslims of southern Kazakhstan have been involved in a renewed quest for religious identity. The group appeals to those devout Muslims who need to believe in a coherent ideology that provides ready answers not only for practical issues, like gender relations, but also spiritual matters such as life after death.

Conclusion

The rise of Hizb ut-Tahrir in southern Kazakhstan has complex origins. Resource mobilization theory argues that the availability of resources can explain the rise of Hizb ut-Tahrir in Kazakhstan. Political opportunities theory claims that the group came into the political limelight because opportunities are available and the group responded rationally to maximize openings. According to framing theory, Hizb ut-Tahrir has framed its aims in ways that will generate a popular following. Yet, all social movement theories share a secular framework of perception and tend to ignore the importance of ideology as a mobilizing force in the post-Soviet Central Asia. The disintegration of the Soviet Union has produced an ideological vacuum among southern Kazakhstan's devout Muslims that, for some, has been filled by Hizb ut-Tahrir.

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The Kazakhs in the Muslim Rebellions of 1864-65

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Studies of the Muslim revolts against the Qing Empire, which occurred in northwest China in the 1860s, have focused on the Hui, or on the Taranchis (Uyghurs) and Dungans in Xinjiang (Kim 2004). However, we do not have much research exploring the involvement of nomadic peoples, like the Kazakhs (Qazaqs), Kyrgyz, and Kalmuks (Oyrats) in such activities. Analyzing the participation of the Kazakhs in the 1860s rebellions enables us to clarify the close relationship between the Xinjiang disturbances and border issues. At that moment in history, negotiations were conducted to decide the border between the Qing and Russian Empires in Central Asia, an area across which various peoples moved.

This paper analyzes Kazakh activities in Xinjiang in the 1860s and their relations with the Qing and Russian Empires. The evidence presented supports my argument that Kazakh migrations during the Muslim rebellions influenced relations between the Qing and Russian Empires, and especially their territorial negotiations and definition of a mutual border.

Background

The Kazakhs, whose khans had already sent envoys to Moscow since 1730, also sent delegations to Beijing beginning in 1757, thus establishing simultaneous diplomatic relations with both the Qing and Russian Empires. Elsewhere I pointed out the ambiguity of the Kazakhs' submission to the two empires (Noda 2005). A portion of the Kazakh pastures lay within the supposed border of the Qing government, covering the Balkhash watershed. Additionally, they were under the "tribute system" of the Qing Empire. The Qing government came to realize that "the Kazakhs had been claimed by both Qing and Russia" (*Chouban yiwu shimo* 1971: vol. 10, p. 52).

Kazakhs and Muslim Rebellions

With this historical background, we consider Kazakh activities in the 1860s. Both Russian and Chinese official documents reported that Kazakhs, as Muslims, were sympathetic to the rebellions by fellow members of their faith, whose uprisings began in 1862 in China's Shanxi and Gansu Provinces (TsGARK, f. 44, op. 1, d. 38257, l. 27). "Muslim rebels struggled jointly with fellow members of their faith, the Russian Kazakhs" (*Chouban yiwu shimo* 1971: vol. 49, p. 28). The Kazakh nomads were principally concerned with the struggles in northern Xinjiang: the revolts at Ili (Kulja) from 1864 and at Tarbagatai (Chuguchak) from 1865.

Tavārīkh-i khamsa-yi šarqī, a local Islamic source written by a Tatar mullah living in Tarbagatai (Xinjiang), gives us the most detailed description of Kazakh history in the region. This source narrates that many Kazakhs died as Islamic martyrs (*shahīd*) in the holy war (*ghazā*) (Qurbān ʻAlī Khālidī 1910: 318, 324), allowing us to assume the rebellions also had the characteristics of a Kazakh "holy war."

Despite their religious identity as Muslims, Kazakhs did not appear to have an ethnic or national identity. Kazakh clan groups took part in the rebellions separately. For this reason, it is difficult to identify the Kazakh nation as a whole in the rebellions. To put it concretely, the Baijigit and Quzay groups moved to the Tarbagatai region, and the Suan and Alban groups left for Ili to join in battles. A sultan[1] of the Alban group, Tezek, kept in frequent contact with Dungans and Taranchis of Ili (TsGARK, f. 3, op. 1, d. 372, l. 34ob-35; Khafizova 2002). Meanwhile, the Kerey group led by Aji Sultan moved to the southwest of the Altay Mountains, and even supported the Qing authority and cooperated with its collaborator Kungajalsan (*Kungazhalasan*) from the Kalmuks (Kataoka 1986: 107).[2] This group, thereafter, continued to subject itself to Qing authority until the Revolution of 1911. The diversity of these movements confirms that each group primarily depended on decisions made by their respective group chiefs. Each group's

[1] "Sultan" or "tore" means a descendent of Chinggis Khan, and thus a member of the Kazakh khan's family.

[2] He is also called Chagan-gegen.

migrations are described in detail in memoirs by Russian officers G. Geins and Gutkovskii (TsGARK, f. 44, op. 1, d. 38257, l.2-34).

Kazakh Migrations and the Border Problem

As mentioned above, several Kazakh groups participated in the rebellions in northern Xinjiang. Importantly, at the same time, the Qing and Russian Empires were conducting negotiations about the region's border. The Chuguchak Protocol on the demarcation of the Russo-Chinese boundary (Skachkov and Miasnikov 1958: 46-49) was concluded on September 25, 1864, complementing the 1860 Treaty of Beijing.[3] As a result, in the Tarbagatai and Ili regions, the new boundary ran along the line of the Chinese permanent outposts (*changzhu kalun*), which used to be located on the inner side. That is, the border was moved towards the east and Kazakh pastures were divided by the two Empires. Details were to be discussed in further negotiations. Notably the area around Lake Zaisan was transferred to Russia (Babkov 1912: 372).[4] Additionally the fifth article of the 1860 Treaty provided that the subjecthood of people should be decided depending upon the state to which their lands belonged. For example, the Kazakhs who had had their pastures within Russian territory were supposed to become subjects of the Russian Empire.

Chinese documents published in *Chouban yiwu shimo* state that, since the beginning of the 1860s, Russians tended to cross the supposed boundary into Qing Empire territory. Russia had constructed the Kopal and Vernyi fortresses in the Semirechye region by 1854, arrayed troops close to Ili, and occupied Qing outposts. The Russian army occupied the Borokhujir Outpost near Solon cantonments in July 1864 (*Chouban yiwu shimo* 1971: vol. 28, p. 5). The Russian army was also advancing to the north, to the Chingistai Outpost under the direction of the general of Khobdo (Mongolia) (*Chouban yiwu shimo* 1971: vol. 16, p. 1). This Russian advance drove Kazakhs to Qing territory, while due to the disorder caused by the rebellions in Xinjiang, other Kazakhs fled from China to the Russian Empire. Regarding these migrations, the Russian bureaucrat and orientalist Aristov observed, "Russian authorities could not possibly cut off relations between the Kazakhs of Ili and the Russian Kazakhs" (Aristov 2003a: 283). This means that, after the conclusion of the Protocol, Kazakhs in both Empires remained closely connected to each other and moved back and forth across the border. Such Kazakh migrations caused disturbances in the border area, particularly during the winter of 1864-65, when Russian troops temporarily withdrew from the border area around the Ili region. Russian local authorities attempted to keep the Kazakhs in Russia, within their own territory (Aristov 2003a: 279).

Several Kazakh groups whose sultans petitioned the Russian authorities moved to Russia and avoided the disorder in northwest China. For instance, in 1865, Buteke Sultan of the Quzay group complained to the Russian local administration that, after the battles between the Dungans and the Chinese, his group became uneasy and he had heard of the peaceful situation in the Russian Empire. For this reason, he decided to come to Russia (TsGARK, f. 15, op. 1, d. 153, l. 25ob.). In addition, Han Chinese and Mongols, like the Kalmuks and Torguts, often attacked Kazakhs, especially the Baijigit group, claiming that Kazakhs were responsible for the Muslim revolts in Xinjiang: in 1867, Kungajalsan Lama led a punitive expedition to exterminate Kazakhs following the order of the Qing Grand Councilor in charge of Outer Mongolian military affairs (*canzan dachen*) (*Chouban yiwu shimo* 1971: vol. 51, p. 3; TsGARK, f. 44, op. 1, d. 38257, l. 21). As a result, Kazakhs sought refuge from the Qing administration. The migrations of Kazakhs explain that they also recognized the newly drawn boundaries and the Russian territory. A request by the heads of the Baijigit group written in September 1865 contains the following text: "The agreement was concluded between the Russian and Chinese emperors, which provided that our summer and winter pastures belong to Russia" (TsGARK, f. 15, op. 1, d. 133, l. 2). The Russian general, probably G. A. Kolpakovskii, also believed that the Zaisan and Bakht areas and the Baijigit group were under Russian rule (*Chouban yiwu shimo* 1971: vol. 51, p. 1-2).

These circumstances required the Qing Empire to control Kazakh nomads according to the 1860 Treaty and 1864 Protocol. Otherwise, the local Qing administration could not demand that Kazakh criminals fleeing to Russian territory be returned to Qing, as provided for in the eighth article of the 1860 Treaty (Skachkov and Miasnikov 1958: 37). As an example of how the Qing Empire tried to

[3] For the text in Chinese, see Yuan 1963.

[4] Chinese scholars believe that the Russian movement towards the Zaisan region went against the Protocol (*Xinjiang shehui kexueyuan minzu yanjiusuo* 1980: 86).

maintain control over Kazakhs, the Qing government ordered Kazakh sultan Aji of the Kerey group to protect a hedge against the Russian invasion and overcome the temptations of Russia (*Chouban yiwu shimo* 1971: vol. 16, p. 22-23).

Russo-Chinese Relations and the Kazakhs

Aside from border conflicts, there were two other problems between the two empires. The first problem was that the Qing Empire requested Russian troops. The General of Ili (*Yili Jiangjun*) had repeatedly asked the local Russian administration for help, since the Ili fortress (*Huiyuan cheng*) was surrounded by Muslims during the rebellion in 1864. As the Russian scholar Moiseev has noted, up to that point, Russia's policy was not to intervene in the internal affairs of the Qing government(Moiseev 2003: 77-78). Thus, the Russian government refused its requests several times.

The second problem was the issue of Chinese emigrants fleeing into Russian territory (Aristov 2003b: 250; Moiseev 2003: 87-88).[5] The emigrants primarily consisted of the Kalmuk, Sibo and Solon people, who, under attack by Muslim rebels, fled to to Russia. The local Russian authority created committees to address this problem and negotiated with the Qing Empire's counterpart, the General of Ili, and the central government through the minister in Beijing. Because the Qing government regarded these emigrants as its subjects and had requested their return to the territory of Qing, negotiations focused on settling the costs of their accommodations and the return trip to China. In fact, many of the emigrants remained in Russia and some even converted to Russian Orthodox Christianity (TsGARK, f. 44, op. 1, d. 3, l. 278ob.).[6] This process reinforced the Qing Empire's recognition of the boundary between the "Russian" and the "Chinese" territories. The recognition of the boundary determined by the Protocol of Tarbagatai was a gradual process. For instance, in the Tarbagatai and Khobdo regions, it would take three complementary protocols signed between the two empires, to make the Protocol of Tarbagatai a reality.[7]

In conclusion, I draw attention to the following points: First, in this period, "Russian Kazakhs" and the "Qing (or Chinese) Kazakhs" were defined. In other words, Kazakh nomads were divided into two groups (Babkov 1912: 353). The Russian and Qing governments began to recognize the newly demarcated border mutually through their reactions to the 1860 Treaty and the 1864 Protocol, including managing the problem of Kazakhs migrating across the boundary. Paradoxically, the above-mentioned migrations of nomads (Kazakhs at the northern and Kalmuks and others at the southern boundary) helped to stabilize the border between Russia and the Qing Empire.

Second, the Muslim rebellions in Xinjiang, to which the Kazakhs' migrations were strongly related, marked the turning point of Russian policy towards Chinese Turkestan. After the formation of the Turkestan Governor-Generalship in 1867, the border problem was transferred to the Governor-Generalship's domain (TsGARK, f. 44, op. 1, d. 3, l. 278ob.) and management began to reflect the intention of Tashkent. Gaining a foothold in the disorder of Xinjiang, Russia, in rivalry with Great Britain for influence in this region, attempted to intrude actively into the internal affairs of the Qing Empire. There is no doubt that this resulted in the Russian occupation of the Ili region in 1871. Thus, when researching the history of this region at that time, we cannot ignore the activities of such nomads as Kazakhs and the role of the Russian Empire behind them.

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[5] Paine seems to describe this incident from the Russian viewpoint (1996: 119).

[6] In Modern China there is a critical perspective to the effect that emigrants suffered from Russian mistreatments (Xinjiang shehui kexueyuan minzu yanjiusuo 1980: 87); however, the emigrants petitioned to remain within Russia (TsGARK: f. 22, op. 1, d. 52, l.42).

[7] The Uliasutai and Khobdo Protocols in 1869, the Second Tarbagatai Protocol in 1870.

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Allegiance to Tsar and Allah: Crimean Tatars in the Russian Empire, 1783-1853

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This paper explores the question of whether or not a Muslim could be accepted as a loyal subject of the Russian Empire, particularly in the southern borderlands, where the Romanov and Ottoman empires struggled for dominance in the Black Sea region and the Caucasus. The central theme of the paper is the tension between religious and political identity. Based on the nature of the sources, it focuses less on establishing whether the Crimeans were in fact loyal to the Russian sovereign — or to the tenets of Islam, for that matter — than on the way their actions and words were interpreted by Russian officials in Tavrida province (i.e., Crimea and adjoining territories).

Immediately after Empress Catherine II proclaimed the annexation of the Crimean Khanate on April 8, 1783, Grigorii Potemkin — the so-called "viceroy of the South" — began implementing his carefully devised plan for establishing Russian rule. One of the most critical challenges he and his lieutenants faced was to secure the allegiance of the Crimean population. Potemkin therefore insisted that the military commander of Tavrida province "ascertain who among the residents of the peninsula harbors ill intentions toward Russia and who receives us favorably. We must examine each individual, especially those who wield power and influence over the masses, rather than simply taking the sum of their opinions" (*Zapiski imperatorskago Odesskago obshchestva* 1881: 262). Meanwhile, Russian military officials administered a formal oath of allegiance to the entire population. "The oath should reflect the terms of the [annexation] manifesto," Potemkin instructed. But just as important, it must reflect "the customs of the Muslims, such as the kissing of the Quran" (*Zapiski imperatorskago Odesskago obshchestva* 1881: 266).

The oath of allegiance, duly adapted for Muslims, was administered in early July. Beys (heads of elite clans), mirzas (members of the lesser, or service nobility), members of the ulama, and Tatar deputies were summoned to attend the ceremony ("Raporty" 1783a: 70). "I submit myself in eternal subjecthood and accept the blessing of being as one people before the empress," each proclaimed. "I therefore swear in the name of the One Lord and All-powerful God, and the prophet Mugamet [Muhammad]… to try not only to fulfill Her [Catherine's] sublime will, but also to sacrifice my soul and life for Her Highness." As proof of the legitimacy of their oath, each Tatar kissed the Quran ("Raporty" 1784: 74).

Potemkin was pleased, and wasted no time announcing the oath-taking to Empress Catherine. However, the issue of Tatar loyalty to the Russian monarch had by no means been resolved. In time it became apparent that many mirzas had failed to attend the ceremony. Some excused their absence by citing outbreaks of plague in their villages, which prevented them from traveling ("Raporty" 1783b: 37). Others were not so diplomatic. In late July, military governor Igel'strom reported that members of the Mansur clan refused to take the oath because "it was against their law to succumb to [a Christian ruler] without an outpouring of blood" ("Raporty" 1783a: 118). Russian officials even questioned the loyalty of those who did swear the oath, for they remained unconvinced that Muslims, whose right to look to the Caliph in Istanbul for spiritual guidance was acknowledged in the 1779 convention of Aynali Kavak, would stand by their pledge to the Empress.

Rumors of Sheikh Mansur and the Perils of Religious Ritual

In the spring of 1787, as relations between Russia and the Ottoman Empire deteriorated, rumors began to circulate in Crimea about — in the words of Governor Kakhovskii — "the false prophet Mansur" and his immanent arrival in Crimea, where he would deliver the former khanate from Russian rule ("Pis'my" 1877: 289). This "false prophet," known as Sheikh Mansur, or Ushurma, had styled himself a holy warrior and the leader of a rebellion in Chechnya against the expansion of the Russian Empire into the Caucasus since 1785 (Bennigsen 1964; Aleksandrov 1919). Rumors of his appearance set local Russian officials on edge, particularly after the Ottoman Sublime Porte declared war on Russia in August. Throughout the autumn the governor's staff nursed fears of a revolt.

In January 1788, the governor received reports that Tatars in several villages in Perekop and Evpatoria districts had been praying and fasting for three days and sacrificing black horses, oxen, and rams. Alarmed by what he saw as a display of Muslim fanaticism, Kakhovskii promptly announced that the Tatars had "disobeyed Muhammad's law." Moreover, in their supposed "deviation from the prescribed terms of prayer, fasting, and sacrifice," Kakhovskii discerned a betrayal of the Russian state and a "violation of their oath of allegiance" (Krichinskii 1919: 4-5).

The governor dispatched two trusted Tatar members of the provincial government in early February to investigate the provenance of the rumors and rituals (Krichinskii 1919: 5). Meanwhile, Megmetsha bey Shirin (the highest ranking Tatar member of the provincial government) presented his own report. The prayers, fasting and sacrificial rites, Shirin bey explained, had been carried out according to the instruction of an influential local mullah and were meant to mark "the birth of the new [year]" ("Pis'my" 1877: 294). To be sure, the New Year was celebrated throughout the Islamic world on the first day of *Muharram* (*Ashir ay*), the first month of the Islamic calendar. Megmetsha bey Shirin failed to point out, however, that the services under investigation did not coincide with the Islamic New

Year, which had fallen in early October 1787. Nor did they coincide with the traditional Crimean celebration of the agricultural new year, which would not be held until the vernal equinox (Lindsay 2005: 255-256).

There is no evidence that Kakhovskii occupied himself with the intricacies of the Islamic calendar, and Shirin bey's testimony would likely have been accepted had it not been contradicted by several persuasive sources. First, under interrogation several mullahs admitted that they led the prayers at the bidding of a "strange dervish" who had revealed a prophesy about Sheikh Mansur. The reports of the two Tatar deputies confirmed the story of a Sufi of foreign origins. According to Megmet aga Balatukov, the dervish had attended the funeral service of a wealthy local Tatar. At the conclusion of the service, he proclaimed that "the conquering sword of Islam [i.e., Mansur]" would henceforth triumph over the infidels. Word of the prophesy spread quickly, Balatukov informed the governor, and similar ceremonies were being carried out by Muslims from the Caucasus to the Arabian peninsula in hopes that Allah would grant victory over Russia to Sultan Abdulhamid I (Aleksandrov 1919: 27; "Pis'my" 1877: 288).

The connection between Mansur and those who participated in the prayer services was clear to Kakhovskii. He accused 56 mullahs, sheikhs (leaders of Sufi orders), and qadis (judges) of Perekop and Evpatoriia of two distinct but related crimes: first, spreading the seeds of revolt through the Mansur rumors, and second, leading the Muslim people in the practice of what he saw as a fanatic, deviant brand of Islam. In other words, the mullahs were creating "bad" Muslims — the kind that made bad subjects. Some were sent to do hard labor in internal provinces for two years, before their permanent exile from Tavrida province. Others were exiled abroad immediately ("Pis'my" 1877: 292-294). Even those who were not involved in the Mansur rumors or the related religious rites were nevertheless summoned to Simferopol, where Russian officials evaluated their "political unreliability" (Krichinskii 1919: 9).

The Threat of Holy Water, 1823

Twenty-five years later, nearly all of southern Russia was plagued with drought, and Crimea's misery was compounded by locusts. Food and fodder ran short, and in desperation Colonel Agmet bey Khunkalov, one of the most prominent members of the local elite, requested permission to send his brother, Isliam bey, to their family estates near Istanbul. There he would obtain, according to a document in the provincial marshal's chancellery, "water" to help ease the suffering in Crimea. The provincial marshal and governor readily approved his petition in late summer and provided him with the necessary documentation ("Po proshenii" 1823: 1-6).

When Isliam bey returned a month later, he was accompanied not by barrels of fresh water, as Russian authorities may have anticipated, but by 11 Sufis clothed in white. Isliam bey had in fact traveled to the site of a holy well that, according to Crimean legend, yielded water capable of restoring lands laid waste by locusts and drought. Isliam bey and a servant, the sheikh of the Sufi lodge at the holy well, Ali Efendi, and ten dervishes therefore arrived at the port of Feodosiia bearing 13 copper vessels of holy water back to Crimea. The water, it was believed, when spread about the earth, would produce innumerable starlings. The starlings would hatch in springtime and eat the locust larvae buried in the soil before the latter could unleash a new wave of destruction (Aleksandrov 1918: 187).

Sheikh Ali and the Sufis traveled to every town and many villages. Everywhere they were honored by large crowds that followed them to the local mosques, where they held special prayer services. Russian officials, and Governor-general Vorontsov in particular, regarded the unfolding situation with consternation. "Although the government must not hinder the Muslims in the practice of their customs and religion," Vorontsov wrote to Governor Naryshkin, "I believe it to be entirely judicious for local authorities to avoid facilitating [the Sufis' procession], and for the police to avoid any semblance of participation in the rites" (Krichinskii 1919: 12-13).

Despite Vorontsov's misgivings, all reports culled from the various district chiefs indicated that the Sufis had indeed come for purely religious purposes: neither they nor the Crimean Muslims were violating Russian law in any way. One official even reported that the visitors were having a positive effect on local morality: Tatar men were spending less time in cafes drinking and more time in mosques praying.

But in March 1824 Naryshkin sent a small contingent of police to Bahçesaray to secretly observe Sheikh Ali's movements. The men did everything short of "dressing in Tatar clothes" in order to maintain a low profile and collect information from the mosques and coffeehouses. But

they found no evidence to support the governor's suspicion that the Sufis were laying the groundwork for an anti-Russian uprising. Nevertheless, the police commander recommended removing the Sufis immediately: it was simply too risky to tolerate the continued presence of these influential men from abroad. Sheikh Ali Efendi had no choice but to comply with the subsequent Russian "request" that he and the ten Sufis leave for Odessa — and the ship to Anatolia — immediately (Aleksandrov 1918: 189-190; Krichinskii 1919: 13-14).[1]

Whereas the political threat of Sheikh Mansur had been quite real, it seems strange that Vorontsov and Naryshkin found credible the idea that 11 Sufis had come from Anatolia to organize a rebellion. In fact, the governors may have been as concerned with the nature of the ritual itself as with the provenance of the Anatolian sheikhs. After all, rain prayers and prayers to protect crops against rodents and locusts were not formally part of Islamic tradition: they were Muslim rituals in the sense that they were performed by Muslims and incorporated many Islamic elements. Such Islamicized rituals commonly took place among Muslim populations of the Volga-Ural region, Novouzensk, and Siberia. However, members of the ulama, particularly those who drew salaries from the Russian government, often denounced such rites as "innovations," or deviations from "orthodox" Islam (Frank 2001: 260-267).

The documents in the Simferopol archive do not mention the position of the Tavrida Mufti, but for their part, Russian officials determined that the brand of Islam practiced in this instance was decidedly unorthodox. And because it was in the best interests of the empire to insist on a brand of Islam uncontaminated by local "innovations," let alone by the prescriptions of Ottoman sheikhs, the governor called upon the police, as Robert Crews puts it, "to guarantee correct practice and belief" (2005: 9).

Dangerous Texts

Under Nicholas I, Russian officials dedicated considerable effort to defining and enforcing "correct practice" among the empire's Muslims. In the late 1820s the central government issued numerous opinions and decrees on such topics as the inheritance of property under Muslim law, the appointment of qadis, and the procedures for proper burial of the dead. In each case, the ministers solicited the opinions of the Tavrida and/or Orenburg Muslim Spiritual Authorities. The Tavrida Mufti was particularly adept at grounding his opinions in the Quran and Sharia, and Russian officials found this approach very appealing.[2]

Of course, creating an orthodoxy based on the written word inevitably necessitated the elimination of rival, deviant texts. Mufti Seit Dzhemil Efendi (1829-1849) fulfilled this task with great aplomb. In early January 1833 the Mufti informed Governor A. I. Kaznacheev (1829-1837) that he had recently learned of numerous "dangerous" books and manuscripts in the possession of the Crimean Muslim population. Many of the books had been inherited by their present owners. "And now those who rightfully own these manuscripts interpret them incorrectly and pronounce these interpretations to the common people," warned the Mufti, who "have been greatly excited by what they heard… They discuss these things endlessly. Due to their ignorance and that of many mullahs, something unpleasant may come of this. Therefore the inherited texts and any others which came into their hands after annexation must be removed from the possession of all Muslims, mullah and common Tatar alike" ("O komandirovanii" 1833: 1).

The governor immediately approved Seit Dzhemil's plan to destroy all books and manuscripts that "went against both law and reason" and inspired (in his words) "absurd interpretations that threatened to harm the honor of Russian Tatars." The Tatars were, after all, "*loyal subjects of the tsar*," whose

[1] In February 1836 Tsar Nicholas I confirmed the Committee of Ministers's decision to prohibit the admission of dervishes (specifically from Astrakhan and western Siberia) into Russian subjecthood. See *Polnoe Sobranie Zakonov [PSZ] II* tom 11, otd. 1, 133-134 (No. 8881, "O vospreshchenii prinimat' dervishei v poddanstvo Rossii").

[2] *PSZ II* vol.1, No. 386 (2 June 1826, "O dopushchenii razdela imenii, ostavshikhsia posle Magometan, po ikh zakonu"); *PSZ II* vol.1, No. 690 (23 November 1826, "O poriadke opredeleniia Kadiev v Krymu"); *PSZ II* vol. 5, otd.1, No. 3559 (March 27, 1830, "O predostavlenii rassmotreniia i resheniia del mezhdu Magometanami, o nepovinovenii detei ikh roditeliam, Magometanskoi dukhovnoi vlasti, po obriadam i zakonam sego dukhovenstva"); *PSZ II* vol. 5, otd. 1, No. 3659 (May 13, 1830, "O neotstuplenii ot obshchikh pravil pri pogrebenii Magometan").

allegiance must not be compromised by the same brand of treacherous mullahs who led them to believe the prophesies regarding Sheikh Mansur ("O komandirovanii" 1833: 2).

By December, the Mufti and Qadiasker, together with the Muslim Spiritual Authority, had succeeded on their own initiative and with the full approval of the Tavrida Governor and the Minister of Internal Affairs in confiscating all "dangerous" manuscripts from the Muslim clergy and Tatar population. Once word arrived that they were destroyed — burnt in a spectacular ceremony — the Minister of Internal Affairs awarded the Mufti a gold medal complete with a portrait of the Emperor and an inscription reading "for zealous loyalty" (Krichinskii 1919: 34-35). The state had found its champion of Orthodox Islam and, perhaps, its guarantor of good and loyal Muslim subjects.

Conclusions

What preliminary conclusions can we draw from this study of the Russian perceptions of Islam in Crimea? First, the integration of the Crimean Khanate into the Russian Empire clearly did not end in 1783 — it was, in fact, an ongoing, complex process that extended well into the nineteenth century. Second, while Russian officials were more concerned with political loyalty than religious homogeneity, in their perception, the Crimean Tatars' Muslim identity compromised their ability to act as loyal subjects. Muslim leaders — be they Crimean mullahs, Chechen sheikhs, or Anatolian Sufis — were perceived as threats to the political stability of the province. Finally, Russian officials nevertheless found a way to resolve the apparent contradiction between allegiance to tsar and Allah: by sponsoring Muslim institutions that in essence both created and enforced "orthodoxy," they were able to neutralize — or at least mitigate — the perceived political threat of Islam. Crimean Muslims willing to practice what Russian officials considered orthodox Islam could in fact be accepted as loyal subjects of the empire.

On a broader level, this paper contributes to our understanding of a Russian Empire remarkable as much for its flexibility as for its repressive tendencies. It was a work in progress, constantly shaped by encounters with the borderlands and the identities of those who inhabited them. The history of Islamic peoples within this empire is of direct and continuing relevance to our knowledge of Central Eurasia in the nineteenth century and beyond. Perhaps most important, further study of the political and cultural role of Islam in Crimea, the Caucasus and Central Asia has the potential to provide scholars with a useful analytical tool for recovering the voice and power of subject peoples.

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Sleeping With the Enemy: Exogamous Marriage in the Shahnameh of Ferdowsi[1]

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The *Shahnameh* has been viewed as an epic paean to the Persian state from the time of its conception. The Persian nationalism derived from this text largely springs from the conflict between Iran, Turan, and Tus in what is referred to as the mythical period. Dick Davis writes that "as with most epics, the celebrated are defined as being in conflict with their neighbors with whom they do not share ethnicity" (1992: xv). However, in this paper I explore how Iran and her neighbors do share bloodlines throughout the mythical section of the epic and how marriage ties with the enemy affect relations at home in Iran. In contrast to the stories in prominent newspapers about Central Asian men stealing brides, at the heart of the Shahnameh of Ferdowsi are stories of brides kidnapping husbands.

[1] The author thanks Paul Losensky and Nancy Glick.

When one takes into account the anthropological belief that in less complex societies, defined as being non-urban and pre-industrial, "kin ties are of utmost importance and indeed may form the basis for the organization of a society" (Aceves 1974: 120), the fact that the Iranian royalty in the Shahnameh persists in not only sleeping with the enemy, but in marrying the enemy, becomes quite significant. Without defined kinship or lineage a bride's role in a foreign culture is also undefined. In the Shahnameh the Iranian husband's family is not willing to be related to the family of the non-Iranian bride because "Where there exists a strongly unilineal system with minimal recognition of secondary lines of descent, the spouse's kin-group are, prior to the marriage, not kin of any sort and, therefore, may be regarded as politically or symbolically dangerous" (Aceves 1974: 139). Partially because of this, despite sharing historical and mythical bloodlines, the Iranians and the "other" do not view each other as family but as enemies.

Feraydun is the fourth king in the Shahnameh and with his story begins the divergence from what Michael Fischer has termed the "meiotic" or undifferentiated period of lineage (Fischer 2004: 76). Feraydun is the son of Abtin, a descendant of the great Jamshid and Faranak, a foreign woman who falls in love with Jamshid when he visits her family's court. Feraydun won his crown by overthrowing the evil Arab Zahhak, an outsider. Instead of choosing Persian brides for his sons and cementing his ties to Iran, Feraydun chooses brides from Arabian Yemen for them. The Yemeni princesses are given new Persian names, effectively turning them into Persians.

The three sons of Feraydun all prove to be unsatisfactory in various ways, cementing the hatred of, yet longing for, the people in the lands bordering Iran. This is not due to their maternal ancestry, as most of the kings in the Shahnameh prove to be unsatisfactory. While some scholars argue that the bad princes and kings are unsatisfactory due to their foreign blood, I argue that many of the good ones are also of partial foreign descent. Feraydun divides his kingdom into three sections; Rum and the west were given to Salm, China and Turkestan to Tur, and Iran and Arabia to Iraj. Feraydun makes these choices because he "wanted the world to remain a place of joy and civilized order, and I divided it between my three sons" (Ferdowsi 2000: 61). The older brothers wage war against the younger, splitting the realm and ending Feraydun's hoped-for time of joy and peace, causing Feraydun to swear vengeance on the foreign neighbors, his sons. In this episode the furthest a bride is sought is Yemen, but from this time forth all brides are sought in the areas of Tus, the land east of Iran, and Turan, the land north of Iran, from what are enemies but can now also be considered extended family.

Zal, a champion of the Persian royal family, marries Rudabeh, a descendant of the evil Zahhak. Zal strays into Kabol on an extended hunting trip, Rudabeh schemes to meet Zal, and they swear eternal love. The one stumbling block is Rudabeh's ancestors. Rudabeh does not understand why a distant ancestor should come between the two lovers: "If Zahhak was unjust, how is this my sin?" (Ferdowsi 2000: 97), introducing a common refrain of the foreign wives in the Shahnameh. Sam, the father of Zal, wonders "How can two lineages as disparate as fire and water be mingled?" (Ferdowsi 2000: 100), a metaphor for the joining of two lands and two historically warring families. However, priests tell Sam that the child of Zal and Rudabeh, Rostam, will be the pride and salvation of Iran: "Before his name, inscribed on every seal, / Iran and Rum and India will kneel" (Ferdowsi 2000: 101). The marriage hinges upon the offspring ruling all three lands, Iran, Rum and India, and the subjugation of Kabol. After the wedding Rudabeh and her mother move to Zabolestan, effectively removing the offspring of Mehrab, Rudabeh's father and the King of Kabol, and the woman who had produced the continuation of the line of Mehrab, to Iran. The dubious bloodlines of the women cannot be erased, but they can be cleansed by living in the land of Iran.

Rostam is the overarching hero of the Shahnameh. He is famous for being stubborn, wayward, and slow to obey the kings of Iran. This is referred to as Rostam's *az* and *bishi*, his pride and excess. Dick Davis, in *Epic and Sedition*, writes that the *az* and *bishi* "come, I believe, from Rostam's maternal ancestry; if on the one hand he is the son of Zal, and is thus born to serve the Iranian monarchy, he is also the son of Rudabeh, a direct descendant of Zahhak" (Davis 1992: 57). Rostam feels obliged to serve the monarchy due to his paternal bloodlines, but due to his maternal bloodlines he feels justified to do so in any way he sees fit. The mix of demon and king is for the benefit of Iran, as Rostam recognizes evil and is therefore the first to rush in and vanquish it.

Rostam echoes his own conception in the story of Tahmineh, the mother of Sohrab. Rostam, like his father, wanders too far while hunting in the land of

Turan. Tahmineh of Semengan, a princess in her own right, knows that Rostam is the enemy, and that he has feasted under her roof and should therefore be inviolate, but Tahmineh never asks Sohrab to marry her, and only requests that she bear the child of the great Persian warrior. In this case, the mixed bloodline leads to the death of the offspring, as Sohrab dies at Rostam's hand while attacking Iran under the battle flag of Turan, in an attempt to find and join forces with his unknown father. It can be hypothesized that Sohrab's tragic death, compared to the less tragic deaths of others of mixed lineage, is because the Persian Rostam does not seek Sohrab's birth and because Sohrab is not raised in Iran by Iranians.

Kavus is the only king to actively pursue his own bride outside of his own land, instead of the foreign bride pursuing her chosen spouse. Kavus is also depicted as one of the most ineffectual kings in the Shahnameh. He demands the hand of Sudabeh of Yemen after conquering her father who refused to pay him homage, an extreme form of war reparations. Now that Sudabeh is married to a Persian she is also a Persian. Due to this change of nationality through marriage Sudabeh's loyalties also change and she warns Kavus of her father's evil intentions. Marriage is seen by both sides as the ultimate form of conquest, as both kings fight for Sudabeh. Sudabeh views her marriage, even though it is to the man who destroyed her country, as stronger than ties of blood to her own family.

The majority of the marriages between two Iranians are not referred to as marriages. The description of the relations between the parents of Zal are typical of this type of union: "At last a beautiful woman of his entourage became pregnant by him" (Ferdowsi 2000: 85). Only twice does Ferdowsi place emphasis on a marriage or marriage attempt between an Iranian man and woman. One, the incestuous marriage between Bahman and Homai, leads to Bahman's death and civil unrest, and the other leads to the death of the hero Seyavash. Seyavash is the son of Kavus and the stepson of Sudabeh. Sudabeh falls in love with Seyavash and attempts to marry him to a Persian woman of her entourage, but Seyavash says no to the marriage because he was "thinking that it would be wrong to choose a wife from among his enemies" (Ferdowsi 1998: 20). Rather than marry a woman whose loyalties lie towards Sudabeh, who is still considered by the Persians to be an outsider, Seyavash leaves Iran for the land of his enemies. In Turkestan Seyavash marries Farigis, a daughter of Persia's enemy Afrasyab, and chooses a new father, effectively becoming a Turanian: "When he crosses over into Turan and is welcomed by Piran we are told, 'Seyavash becomes a son and Piran a father'" (Davis 1992: 112). Afrasyab initially says no to the union, because "A child that comes from Kavus and Afrasyab will mingle fire and flood; how can I know whether he will look kindly on Turan?" (Ferdowdsi 1998: 55). When Afrasyab chooses to believe that Seyavash is plotting against him, Farigis fights for her husband by saying that in choosing to marry her he chose Turan over Iran: "Seyavash abandoned Iran and, with all the world to choose from, made his obeisances to you; he renounced his crown and throne and father's goodwill for your sake" (Ferdowsi 1998: 79), and is therefore innocent of any plotting. Seyavush is killed and Iran attacks. The offspring that will destroy Turan is Kay Khosrow, the most benevolent of the Iranian rulers.

It does not matter whether one is guilty: the fact that a person chooses to live outside of his or her homeland, in the cases of Seyavash and Sudabeh, makes their virtue questionable. The person who brings a foreign spouse into the country is not questionable, but the foreigner will always be. Fire does not mix with water. Dick Davis believes that Piran, the wise man of this story, arranges the alliance because he tired of the constant warfare: "his arrangement of Seyavash's marriage to Afrasyab's daughter is made in the specific hope that the alliance will prevent further bloodshed between the two countries" (Davis 1992: 68). The ensuing war between Khosrow and Afrasyab encapsulates the situation between Iran and its enemies, as it is a war between family members:

> Between grandfather [i.e., Afrasyab] and grandson [i.e., Khosrow], two kings,
>
> I do not know why there should be such a battlefield
>
> Two kings and two such bellicose countries
>
> Two armies brought face to face. (Davis 1992: 68)

However, despite his ongoing desire to become part of the family of Afrasyab, Seyavash foretells his own death at the hand of Afrasyab. Even during his greatest triumph, Seyavash believes that fire and water cannot mix.

Marriage to the enemy is successful in the story of Bizhan, but only after extreme hardship and retirement from political life. Bizhan finds Manizheh

in Erman, between Turan and Iran. He meets her for two reasons; he is protecting his homeland from a foreign threat, and because the evil Gorgin is plotting to harm Bizhan by introducing him to the beautiful Turanian, Manizheh. Manizheh, the daughter of Afrasyab, sees Bizhan, falls in love with him, and modesty leaves her. This is similar to the stories of Rudabeh and Tahmineh, both of which also end with the woman achieving her goal after propositioning the hero. The lovers spend three days together, but when Bizhan attempts to leave, Manizheh drugs him and kidnaps him. Afrasyab, the father, is particularly angry to find that a Persian has enjoyed the hospitality of his home and puts Bizhan in a pit to humiliate the Persians, making Manizheh his jailer. The lovers have nothing; she is an exile in her own land, and he is in forced exile from his land. After rescue and ensuing battle they return to Iran where the marriage is welcomed, and Khosrow tells him to adore Manizheh and treat her well. Manizheh had placed a prince of Iran higher in importance than her own land. I question if the romance of Bizhan and Manizheh might have followed the same unfortunate lines of the story of Sudabeh if it were not for the fact that Bizhan effectively retires from the story and politics at this point, avoiding the further vicissitudes of life.

The bride might end in lamenting her circumstances in her new society, but Pavry writes that it is through action and not passive spectating that the foreign brides prove that they are worthy of Persian husbands. They are "examples of women not content to remain passive spectators in the armed struggles and rebellions which surround them" (Pavry 1930: 104), a fine match for husbands who ride off to battle evil and injustice. Strong rulers will come from these unions.

Marriages in the Shahnameh between Iranians and the enemy have hope, so long as they are sought by the man, and are between an Iranian man and a foreign woman who is willing to give up her homeland. Dick Davis believes that much of the Shahnameh dances around the highly coded system of manners present in Iranian society: "Such niceties of course loom large in such a delicately coded society as that recorded in the Shahnameh" (Davis 1992: 154). Much of the play of power in the story revolves around who is following the correct path of protocol and why, as an outsider is unlikely to know the correct manners to follow. When a marriage occurs between two cultures at odds, there is bound to be contention. In the Shahnameh, so long as the Persian is the one with power, he can do as he pleases. Seyavash is the best example of what will fail; he leaves Iran as an exile, marries in order to leave his family behind, and never returns to Iran. He dies alone. When diverse populations are in close proximity and have literally become blood relations, knowledge of social mores is necessary to avert conflict. Dick Davis relates the story of Seyavash to that of the nation of Iran at the time of its writing: "It is almost as if Ferdowsi wishes to present the Turks in the best possible light while still seeing them as Iran's natural enemies and the destroyers of a national hero" (Davis 1992: 179).

The Shahnameh was written about Persian domination of Central Asia, but the marriages in the Shahnameh have long been used in an attempt to reduce or at least comprehend the conflict when Iran itself is ruled by an outsider. According to Michael Fischer, Juvaini himself used the intermarriages and mixed bloodlines as a diplomatic allusion when speaking to his Turkic rulers about how Iran could be justly and generously ruled by outsiders (Fischer 2004: 75). Hating the enemy is not a simple thing when the two cultures have intermarried and live side by side. Rostam and Khosrow are the greatest examples of why the marriages in the Shahnameh work between Iranians and foreigners; the mixed bloodlines produce the epic's greatest heroes and bring a possibility of peace under foreign rule.

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Reports on Research Conditions

Report on the State of Library Conditions in Uzbekistan

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Background

My research began in 2002 when I was invited as a consultant to advise the libraries at the Uzbekistan State World Languages University (WLU) in Tashkent.[1] My interest in Central Asia is an expansion of my long-standing involvement in international librarianship with Russia and other countries of the former Soviet Union since 1990 (Spain 1996, 1997).

My findings are based on my English language database research prior to and following my travel to Uzbekistan, and on visits to five of WLU's eight libraries, the Alisher Navoi National Library, the Fundamental Library of the Uzbekistan Academy of Sciences, the Hamkorlik Library (a private English language research library, modern in design and technology, developed by Partners in Academics and Development) — all in Tashkent, and Bukhara's Abu Ali Ibn Sino Regional Universal Scientific Library. Further information was gained from my attendance at the "Central Asia 2002: Internet and Library-Information Resources in Science, Culture, Education, and Business" conference held in Bukhara from October 14-18, 2002, and my contacts in Uzbekistan, notably with Dr. Marat Rakhmatullaev, executive director of the Uzbekistan Library Association (ULA).

Research Process

The focus of my trip was to assess library needs at WLU.[2] Because I speak neither Uzbek nor Russian, the US State Department grant provided for interpreters to assist me throughout my visits. My meetings with the librarians in Uzbekistan confirmed that the condition of WLU's libraries and the additional libraries I visited appear, to a lesser or greater degree, to be the norm. Many of the libraries reflect the inner workings of methods and practices still based on the Soviet system. My conclusion regarding the libraries at WLU was that the American model of librarianship would be difficult to adopt if the academic curriculum at WLU continues to be based on Soviet-style education.

Research Results

Even without designing a survey to assess more than 15,000 libraries in Uzbekistan (Rakhmatullaev 2002), it is certain that libraries in Uzbekistan need considerable improvements. Until Uzbekistan's libraries are better funded, even obvious needs

[1] My three-week travel was an extension of the ongoing formal relationship between Northeastern University (NU) and WLU — a relationship initiated by Professor Nicholas Daniloff of NU's Journalism Department through authorship of a four-year grant from the US State Department. The purpose of the grant, which ended August 2004, was to introduce American style fact-finding journalism to the students and faculty of WLU through exchanges, teaching, and publications. The grant was extended to assist WLU's libraries. The trip was sponsored by the Central Asian-American Partnership for Academic Development, a non-governmental international organization located in Tashkent, which has sponsored programs in Uzbekistan since 1999 (http://uzngos.uzsci.net/en/activity/027.html).

[2] WLU is a language-oriented institution with an enrollment of over 6,000 students and 680 faculty members located on three campuses. WLU is evidently less well financed than some of the universities in Uzbekistan and consequently has greater needs. The courses are centrally planned, and students have few elective courses throughout their four years of study. Their system of education is based on the Soviet style and is fairly regimented. The British Council has developed WLU's webpage (http://uswlu.freenet.uz). Little information was publicly available to foreigners about WLU except a dated, but attractive booklet given to me by an Uzbek delegation visiting Northeastern.

cannot be met. The mentality inherited from totalitarianism pervades the majority of Uzbekistan's libraries. Their needs are similar to what Russian libraries faced following the break-up of the Soviet Union. Libraries in Uzbekistan are approximately ten years behind the best libraries in Russia in technical practices and modern concepts of user services. Russia was fortunate to have strong, progressive library leadership and a Ministry of Culture that studied Western achievements and implemented national library policies. "The situation brought about a thorough reappraisal of the very foundations of Soviet librarianship" (Kuz'min 2001: 231). Risk-taking was possible in the new Russia, which appeared to be forming a Russian-type democracy. Uzbekistan adopted a conservative approach to its reforms. Russia benefited from numerous Western scholars using, studying, and writing about the Russian libraries, publicizing their needs abroad. In contrast, Central Asia remained unknown to most, investigated by few.

Marketing. Most libraries do not have web pages or online catalogs. The best overview of Uzbekistan's libraries is provided through the ULA's website at http://ula.uzsci.net, but just a few libraries are represented and the information is not always up-to-date. Within Uzbekistan, printed library information is minimal. American library users are accustomed to a plethora of library handbooks and newsletters describing library hours and services, but these are not commonly produced in Uzbekistan. Printed subject bibliographies and lists of recent acquisitions were the most prominent library handouts that I found in Uzbekistan. Creating an image of success through publications is not yet high on the priority list of Uzbekistan's library achievements.

Respect and Esteem. An Uzbek librarian makes the equivalent of $15-25 a month — two to three times less than university professors. She (most librarians in Uzbekistan are female) has not been trained in the latest methods, her library may not have computers and if it does, qualified technical specialists are often lacking to keep the computer systems up-to-date and operating. She is not as professionally involved. Writing professional articles and attending conferences are less common. Librarianship is a job rather than a career, and any small amount of money helps the family survive. She may work the standard eight to ten hours a day, six days a week. She will be required to retire at age 55. If she has a professional library degree, it was received from one of two library schools in Uzbekistan — the A. Qodiri Tashkent State Institute of Culture, or the Tashkent College of Culture. During our interview, the library school dean of the Tashkent State Institute of Culture emphasized the need for a progressive library curricula and training of its teachers in modern methods. Due to the low esteem of librarianship in Uzbekistan, the field is not attractive to many.

Public Services. Students do not usually check out books, but use them in the library in exchange for their passports. Notes are taken by hand. Few photocopy machines are available for public use. Students consult the card catalog for library holdings. Few libraries have online catalogs and if they do, they are only for recent acquisitions. Retrospective conversion of catalog holdings has yet to take place in most of the libraries. Because a card catalog does not normally indicate holdings in branch or consortium libraries, and interlibrary loan is not handled electronically, knowledge about a book's location throughout Uzbekistan is not possible. In Tashkent, two years ago at least, the head librarian of a major university would bring a list of the needed books to the monthly meeting of academic library directors for distribution among their staff, followed by motor vehicle delivery of the books.

Collections. Library periodicals might not be bound in permanent volumes due to lack of funds. There is not a range of sophisticated electronic databases to select and print out articles. Since the larger percentage of published research in the world is produced by English-speaking countries, Uzbek libraries participating in the eIFL (Electronic Information for Libraries) project benefit. Through eIFL, a humanitarian service provided by EBSCO, Inc., developing nations have access to over 3,170 full-text English language and several Russian journal titles at a fraction of the normal price. Some libraries have access to Russian produced databases. There are a number of local efforts in Uzbekistan to develop specialized databases of published journal literature and other resources, but national databases of information are lacking. Consequently, the countrywide information base cannot yet be shared.

Researchers might notice a dearth of current imprints, multimedia materials, and reference books, with many titles out of date. A strength of Uzbek libraries is their rich collections of historical books and rare manuscripts. Funds, equipment, and professional expertise to digitize and preserve them for shared purposes are in the rudimentary stages.

Automation and Standards. Many library operations in Uzbekistan are routinely done by hand. The catalog cards are prepared with a typewriter, after consulting one of several Russian cataloging standards. There is no uniform cataloging method practiced in Uzbekistan. The fortunate library (over 20 in Uzbekistan) has purchased a subscription to IRBIS — a Russian-based automated library system that includes modules for acquisition, cataloging, circulation, users, and administrators — or to another integrated library system. Russia has set a precedent which might be considered by Uzbekistan. Russia joined the United States' OCLC (Online Computer Library Center) in 1995 and developed a Russian version of the MARC record, enabling electronic cataloging, and bibliographic record-sharing among OCLC members (Shraiberg 1995). The OCLC worldwide database integrates over 30,000 libraries, which could include Central Asia among its 82 country members.

Relationships. An Uzbek academic librarian is not as involved as her American counterpart in departmental activities, committee work, selecting resources to support faculty research, or working with a "liaison" faculty member on issues jointly faced by the academic community and the library. Out of her library budget, she purchases the textbooks requested by her faculty for their students. The students do not challenge her expertise daily with questions at the "reference desk" (which did not exist in most of the libraries I visited) regarding the best resources for their term papers, citation of references, formulation of a research strategy, critical reading, or evaluation of Internet information.

Library Instruction. Library tours are common, but group sessions on how to use the card catalog, compile a bibliography, select the most appropriate books, narrow down a topic, or formulate a research question are not the norm. Several universities have opened American Centers or designated computer rooms that are separate from the library. Technology specialists rather than librarians are teaching the students intelligent use of the Internet. A professional gap exists between librarians and computer specialists. Unfortunately, one successful American Center located at the WLU was recently closed, due to the current political conflicts between the US and Uzbekistan.

Outreach and Professional Development. The Uzbek librarian has a close relationship with her staff, but communicating with colleagues in other regions is not as common. She may not have e-mail access. In Uzbekistan, a modern professional library and information science literature base has yet to significantly develop. Librarians have little incentive to publish, and what they do publish rarely reaches the Western world. Development and production of at least one core library and information science professional journal would provide a forum for issues and concerns. Uzbek librarians currently publish in *Biblioteka* — a Russian library science journal published monthly in Moscow; information scientists publish in *Campes Journal*, a computer journal published in Tashkent.

Lack of funds and meager salaries prevent opportunities for professional development and travel to conferences. Exposure to new ideas would undoubtedly inspire Uzbek librarians to improve their libraries, including rewriting job descriptions, developing strategic plans, and developing a more business-like approach to librarianship through updated organizational, administrative, and managerial methods.

Ultimately, Uzbekistan will decide if it wants to be transformed into an information society by becoming part of an international information network, to remain isolated, to adopt a middle-way approach — associating primarily with culturally-similar countries — or another model. Currently, Uzbekistan is moving away from the West and embracing Russia and China. Gradual fulfillment of its library and technology needs is a long road, but should lead to the development of a professional librarian identity, so that librarians will be able to answer key questions: "What does it mean to be a librarian in Uzbekistan and how are our libraries unique?" "What kind of libraries do we want?" "What are our values?"

Positive Happenings

A fundamental step for libraries in Uzbekistan was the formation of the Uzbekistan Library Association (ULA) in October 1999, which includes 15 regional associations and 84 member libraries.[3] Notable also is the Association of Women Librarians of the Samarqand region, established in September 1999. Another achievement is the changed status of the Alisher Navoi Library from a state to a national library (since 2003) allowing it to receive additional funding. For instance, the Alisher Navoi National Library opened up an eIFL Training Center,

[3] See http://ula.uzsci.net.

financed by a grant from the Eurasia Foundation, applied for through ULA. The development of the Central Asian component of the eIFL-Net Multi-Country Consortium for countries in-transition[4] — now provides libraries in Central Asia with electronic databases and additional services at a substantially reduced rate.[5] Eighty-four academic and government-related organizations in Uzbekistan are members of the eIFL Central Asia consortium.

Through a Soros Foundation grant, the Fundamental Library of the Uzbek Academy of Sciences in Tashkent received computerized equipment and other resources to set up an in-house IRBIS Training Center.[6] Further, the Fundamental Library was one of several in Uzbekistan to receive hundreds of books through the now finalized "Pushkin Bicentenary Project for Books and Libraries."[7] More than 30 Uzbek libraries and universities participated in the Pushkin Project, receiving approximately 40,000 of the "best" Russian books. A highly important event, partly financed by the Soros Foundation (prior to closure of its Tashkent office) is the establishment of the Central Asia International Library and Internet Conference, held biennially, with three conferences to date in Samarqand, Bukhara, and Tashkent.[8]

At the government level, two of Uzbekistan's seven "State Working Groups" organized in 2003 focus on reforming library activity, by developing computerization and information technology projects. A "Law on Library Science of the Republic of Uzbekistan" is pending approval by the Uzbek Parliament. Its purpose is to protect libraries and librarians, and promote library and information technology development. "The Concept of Library Development to the Year 2010," being prepared by members of the State Working Groups and to be endorsed by the Cabinet of Ministries and Uzbek Parliament will outline new strategies for implementing the best library practices of foreign libraries, promote international cooperation, develop library standards, and provide legal protection. On the local level, a German library specialist, Prof. Dietmar Kumar, supported by the Goethe Institute, lecturing at the Tashkent State Institute of Culture's library school for two years, is offering opportunity for Uzbek librarians to publish for pay in the German library journal, *Bibliotek IT*.

During July 2005, the Alisher Navoi National Library was to receive a grant of $50,000 from the US Embassy in Tashkent to create a "USA Corner." President Karimov's October 2005 trip to Malaysia resulted in negotiations with the Malaysia National Library to construct a new building for the Uzbekistan National Library. This project will include a Digitization and Restoration Center for Uzbekistan's valuable and rare literature.

The ULA recently received a grant from the Eurasia Foundation for $9,000 to hold seminars with library leaders across Uzbekistan and Parliament members. Dr. Rakhmatullaev reports, however, that as of October 2005, plans previously made with a number of US foundations and the US Embassy to improve libraries have stopped. Additionally, the Eurasia Foundation approved closure of its Tashkent Regional Office, effective March 6, 2006.[9] Rakhmatullaev and others hope the situation is temporary and that relations between the US and Uzbekistan will improve. During November 2005, the Uzbekistan National Library received a gift of 100,000 books from Russia.

In certain regions of Uzbekistan, library development is rapidly progressing. In Jizzakh (Jizzax), the repair of the Regional Public Library is funded by the local government totaling $170,000. The library is to be automated, connected to Internet, and its librarians trained in IRBIS. The State Commission on Library Reform has proposed an "open access" mission for the public libraries, and reorganization of the structure of Uzbekistan's public libraries, including to whom they report, causing heated discussion. A new library for the Khorezm (Xorazm) Mamum Academy is opening soon in Khorezm Province. Since 2003, the Asian Development Bank has embarked on projects to improve the school libraries in Uzbekistan, with a

[4] A non-profit advocate organization developed by the Open Society Institute, EBSCO, and others.

[5] See http://ula.uzsci.net/eifl/en/eifl.php and http://www.eifl.net.

[6] IRBIS is the preferred automated integrated library system.

[7] A project of the Soros Foundation: http://www.osi.hu/cpd/spf/10'97.html. The Soros Foundation — Open Society Institute — which provided significant funds for library development in Uzbekistan from 1996 through April 2004 is sorely missed since its registration was revoked.

[8] See http://www.eifl.net/docs/INFORM_conference.doc.

[9] The Eurasia Foundation has worked in Uzbekistan for 12 years, donating more then 22 million dollars since 1993 for various civic-oriented projects, including the libraries. This closure is an important loss for Uzbekistan.

recent proposal aimed at computerizing 900 Uzbek school libraries. The ULA is deeply involved in these and other projects.

It is hoped that these broader achievements and further projects will open doors to improve the basic functions and ordinary practices, which must take place in hundreds of Uzbek libraries. Much depends upon the value that Uzbekistan decides to place upon its libraries, which appears to be increasing.

Conclusion and Recommendations

The important contribution of my research is to point out the little known needs of Uzbekistan's libraries. I recommend librarians in Uzbekistan to study not only the American system, but also Russian and Chinese ones. Russian and Chinese librarians have made great strides and benefited from numerous exchanges with American libraries, including the Library of Congress, but a closer affiliation should occur with Uzbek librarians. The American Library Association's Central Eurasian Subcommittee of the American Library Association's International Relations Committee is interested in collaborating with Uzbekistan on grant writing projects. Further affiliation with the International Federation of Library Associations, the Russian Library Association, and similar groups are recommended. Consortium development is a fairly new concept in Uzbekistan to be further explored.

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Reviews

Lena Jonson, *Vladimir Putin and Central Asia: The Shaping of Russian Foreign Policy*. New York: I. B. Tauris, 2004. XII + 256 pp., 3 maps, bibliography, index. 1850436282, $75 cloth.

Reviewed by: **David W. Rivera**, Lecturer in Russian Studies, Hamilton College, Clinton, N.Y., USA, drivera@hamilton.edu

This book provides a detailed and informative analysis of Russian policy toward Central Asia from Putin's rise to power in 1999 through 2004. Written by an accomplished scholar, it represents an impressive piece of research and provides useful information for those interested in the international politics of the region.

After an introductory chapter, Chapter Two recounts the history of Russia's nineteenth-century conquest of Central Asia. Chapter Three reviews Yeltsin-era policy toward the region. Entitled "Central Asia Lost," it documents the steady deterioration of Russian influence in these states, especially Uzbekistan. The next two chapters constitute the book's substantive core. Chapter Four introduces the first of two "policy changes" around which the entire book revolves: Putin's decision in August 1999 "to make the issue of anti-terrorism the top priority in Russia's relations with the Central Asian states and to make it a platform for the development of military and security cooperation" (p. 63). According to Jonson, Russia's efforts to enhance military cooperation with the Central Asians met with some success. Another of the chapter's central theses is that from 1999 to 2001 Moscow maintained a firm determination to prevent outside powers, including the United States, from gaining any kind of strategic foothold in Central Asia.

Chapter Five, the longest chapter in the book, analyzes the second of Putin's policy changes: his decision to cooperate with the US war against the Taliban even to the point of accepting an American military presence in Central Asia. In Jonson's schema, "By his September 2001 policy turn, Putin inverted his 1999 anti-terrorist agenda by extending it to include Western states as partners in Central Asia" (p. 86). On the other hand, Jonson also argues that Moscow simultaneously increased its level of diplomatic and military activity in the region in order to counter US influence. The chapter also surveys the participation in the Afghan war by Russia and each of the Central Asian states and traces the evolution of both Russia's and America's military cooperation with the latter through 2004. Chapter Six presents an interesting discussion of several sets of domestic factors that contributed to the formulation of Russia's foreign policy under Putin. Chapter Seven examines domestic politics and state-society relations in Central Asia, including the role played by Islamic fundamentalism. The concluding chapter assesses explanations of Russia's policy changes of 1999 and 2001 derived from three bodies of international relations theory: realism, bureaucratic politics, and constructivism.

Although each of these chapters contains useful information, this book is not without shortcomings. For instance, it is not always documented as thoroughly as one would wish. In particular, Jonson too often attributes views and motives to Russian policy-makers without providing supporting evidence. Second, the reader should be advised that Russian policy toward Kazakhstan is not analyzed in this book, only that toward Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. The third and most significant shortcoming is that even though "Vladimir Putin" is in the title of this book, the reader gains little insight into the man and what makes him tick. This shortcoming is most apparent in Chapter Six, where Jonson demonstrates that Putin made the choice to cooperate with the United States notwithstanding overwhelming opposition from Russia's foreign policy establishment. However, the chapter sheds little or no light on the thinking and calculations behind Putin's decision or why he was such an iconoclast on this issue. In this regard, only four of the chapter's 93 footnotes refer to speeches or writings by Putin himself.

Although this shortcoming might have been corrected in the final chapter, where Jonson attempts to explain Russian policy, the analyses there only compound the problem. Jonson largely dismisses explanations based in bureaucratic politics or constructivism and instead finds most support for realist explanations drawn from Robert Gilpin's classic *War and Change in World Politics*: namely, that Russian policy resulted from the country's weakness vis-à-vis the United States and its need to reduce international commitments (such as preventing opposing great powers from establishing a presence in former Soviet territory). The structure of the international system, both in Central Asia and globally, "gave Putin no choice" but to pursue "a policy of appeasement" toward rising American power (pp. 173-4). However, two serious problems with such a conclusion stand out. First, demonstration of this thesis would require a substantive discussion of power indices and the military capabilities of these states — especially capabilities deployable in Central Asia — yet Jonson fails to provide it. Second, explanations drawn from realism are not consistent with the fact that the bulk of the Russian foreign policy elite strongly disagreed with Putin's decision of 2001 — disagreement to which Jonson herself returns in this very chapter. They should have understood the implications of Russian weakness equally as well as the President, yet in fact they did not agree that Russia's interest in cooperation with the United States and the defeat of the Taliban outweighed its interest in keeping the US out of a nearby area of vital interest. In short, some kind of domestic- or individual-level explanation is clearly needed here, yet Jonson fails to provide it.

Nevertheless, even though this book fails to provide a convincing explanation of Russia's "turn to the West," as many have called it, its strengths greatly outweigh its weaknesses overall. It pays great attention to detail, it is highly informative, and its descriptive analyses are, as far as this reviewer can detect, completely accurate. Although it will not be particularly useful to either theorists of international relations or those interested in President Putin as a leader, it should be read by both scholars and policy-makers working on either Russian foreign policy or the foreign policies of the Central Asian states.

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Sally N. Cummings (ed.), ***Power and Change in Central Asia***. New York: Routledge, 2002. viii + 158 pp., index. ISBN 04152555856, $90.00.

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The toppling of Kyrgyzstan's President Askar Akaev in March 2005 and the May 2005 unrest in Andijon, Uzbekistan, raise many questions about the viability of the current Central Asian regimes and the paths of transition that they will follow. It could not be predicted that President Akaev would be the first of the post-independence Soviet leaders to fall, nor was it certain that he would be unseated the way he was and with such little bloodshed. Many policymakers were caught off guard and must now be further concerned about the viability of the regional leadership.

In light of recent events in Central Asia, one thing that policymakers and observers of the region need is a thorough analysis of the region's leaders, including descriptions of how the leaders came to and maintain power, and a typology of the regimes that enables analysis of the attributes of their hold on power and what the nature of a future transition might be. *Power and Change in Central Asia* offers valuable insights as it aims to answer some of these questions in a comparative fashion, with separate chapters on the presidentialism of each of the five regimes. However, the book was published in 2002, and the chapters appear to have been written before the events of September 11, 2001. Therefore, through no fault of the authors, some of the information is dated.

In her introduction, Cummings explains that the book will emphasize process or agency — where leaders have many choices about how to operate even with some limitations, rather than structure — where all the leader's actions are beholden to the environment. Cummings makes the point that the

weakest of the presidents is Tajik President Emomali Rakhmonov, partly due to the level of infighting among the regime's elites. However, by this standard, Rakhmonov should have fallen first. If Cummings is right about Rakhmonov's standing, he could be the next to go, especially since there are presidential elections in Tajikistan next year. Cummings' observation about the relative unity of Kyrgyzstan — that it should lead to a smoother transfer of power — seems to have held true in the aftermath of Akaev's overthrow. One can say that though much property was destroyed, few lives were lost and the main violence lasted only for a few days. This stands in contrast to Uzbekistan, where the bloody Andijon events may represent the precursor to an eventual violent transition in that country.

In his chapter on empire's aftermath, Dominic Lieven argues that the prevailing world system is the most important factor in determining the fate of former colonies, rather than the ruling imperial power or the manner in which power was ceded. Taking this logic further, he claims that Russia is no threat to the international system or to the independence of the Central Asian states. Moscow does not have the resources or the willpower to create empire again, and in any case, the prevailing world system of interlinked economies and globalization neither legitimizes empire politically nor allows it to prosper economically.

Lieven then posits that, unlike the vassal states of some other empires, the eventual countries of Central Asia received some political preparation for self-rule. At the end of the chapter, Lieven notes that Russia and China desire stability in the region, but that the current corrupt regimes may lead to further Islamic extremism. This would seem to beg the question of whether supporting the regimes actually leads to stability and whether Russia and China should rethink their strategy.

John Ishiyama, writing on transitional institutions and the prospects for democratization, employs the idea of neopatrimonial authoritarian states (as opposed to other types of authoritarian states) where the leader relies on personal patronage for power. He categorizes the Central Asian regimes into four types, depending on two factors: 1) how mobilized/participatory the president's support is; and 2) how competitive/plural are the political entities within the government. Ishiyama also includes a graph chart that allows the reader see the spatial positioning of the various types of Central Asian neopatrimonial regimes. On the basis of these factors, he predicts that Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, falling into the type of competitive one-party states, stand the best chance for democracy, while oligarchic Tajikistan's best chance for change comes from the top.

The Kyrgyzstan call has turned out to be correct, but Ishimaya's claim that Karimov in Uzbekistan would call out to the opposition to participate in the government in a time of crisis has been proven wrong so far. Most worryingly, he predicts that change in Turkmenistan can only come from outside forces.

In her chapter on Kazakhstan, Cummings points out that while Nazarbaev has built his power base, he has not legitimized authority because of the multiethnic population, among other reasons. His legitimacy, therefore, derives from the ability to parcel out riches. While the regime is heavily based on patronage, Nazarbaev has also brought technocrats into managerial positions in the hope that this would improve the economy and legitimate his rule. By doing so, Nazarbaev has done more than other regional leaders to give Kazakhstan an elite in which outsiders have had a chance to become rich. A tension has resulted between the technocratic/ business elite, which acquired riches from privatization and other ventures, and the political elites, who are increasingly narrowly defined and dominated by family members. It would seem, however, that in Kazkahstan there is no threat of a color revolution anytime soon as the country is relatively prosperous and the oil wealth allows potential opponents to be bought off.

In his chapter on Kyrgyzstan, Eugene Huskey describes the traditionally deferential attitudes toward political and social authority in Kyrgyzstan, although one could argue these have changed with the overthrow of Akaev. It will be interesting to see how deferential the populace will be to new leader Kurmanbek Bakiev. Huskey also notes that in the 1995 presidential elections, Akaev was helped to victory by the support of ethnic Uzbeks and Russians from the south, who perhaps feared southern Kyrgyz power. Therefore, with regard to the current regional tensions in Kyrgyzstan, one should not assume that the south is uniform in opinion and wholly automatically supports the southerner Bakiev.

Muriel Atkin's article on Rakhmonov describes how the Tajik president came to power as a compromise candidate because of elite infighting,

and has remained in power only with the military and moral support of the Russians. She calls him the most ineffectual leader in Central Asia. These points are all valid; however, one could argue that the situation in Tajikistan contributes to the stability of his regime and strengthens his hand. Alone among Central Asians, the people of Tajikistan have seen the darkness of civil war and appear to prefer the current peace to conflict. There will be presidential elections in Tajikistan in 2006 and it will be interesting to see if that argument plays out or if the population finds it easy to rebel as in Kyrgyzstan.

Cummings and Michael Ochs, in their chapter on Turkmenistan, point out that Niyazov introduced his cult of personality as a way of overcoming the tribalism of Turkmen society and creating a new, patriotic ideology. However, societies such as Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan faced similar problems, but did not travel that road. In partial answer to the above question about leadership, it would seem that this kind of rule was not predestined for Turkmenistan, but that Niyazov happened to obtain power and happened to have such a personality. Like Ishiyama, Ochs and Cummings feel that change from below is very unlikely and in fact that change would have to be forced from outside. Because it seems that moves from outside will not be forthcoming anytime soon, if Niyazov's health holds up he may still have a long reign.

In his review of the situation in Uzbekistan, Roger Kangas remarks that practically all changes of power in the area currently constituting Uzbekistan in both the Soviet and pre-Soviet eras were to due to battles among the elite, perhaps owing to regionally-based clan loyalties. One can infer from this that the struggle to succeed Karimov will be also be waged among the elite and reflect regional alliances. But the recent Andijon events and other protests suggest that the population might be intent on having a greater say in who their next leader is, regardless of elite opinion.

A larger question is which type of leadership matters and which is most important? One school of thought says that President Akaev actually had little power and the country was largely run by a group of elites. Therefore, it can be argued that the study of the collective elite may be even more important than that of just the President when looking at leadership. Another important question is what type of regimes would have existed in each country had they had different presidents and would the regimes still have fit the same typologies? Cummings would claim that as process is more important, someone like Turkmenbashi was not preordained for Turkmenistan. An even stronger question is whether Central Asian culture is responsible for these regime types? Would Central Asia have had these regime types had they had not experienced Russian and Soviet rule? While the various authors have different opinions on this topic of cultural relativism and determinism, it seems safe to say that, judging by neighboring countries such as Pakistan and Afghanistan, the regimes might not be so different.

The inclusion of voices from the region itself would have added another perspective to these issues. Also, the book is a little too technical for the general public. Otherwise, though there is a danger in using this book solely for predictive purposes, this is a book that will have great utility as the themes presented are all still relevant. Policymakers and students of the region would do well to read this for clues to the region's future. After reading the book, one will be very familiar with the similarities and differences among the leadership styles of the five regimes.

Anita Sengupta, *Frontiers into Borders: The Transformation of Identities in Central Asia*. New Delhi: Hope India Publications, 2002. 224 pp. maps, tables, bibliography, index. ISBN 8178710161, $20.

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The borders of the Soviet Central Asian republics have long fascinated historians and social scientists studying questions of national identity and state formation. The Soviet "national delimitation" of Central Asia in 1924 was a prime example of nation-formation by state fiat. National territories with clearly defined borders were created virtually overnight in a region whose inhabitants did not historically link ethnicity with statehood or culture with territory. As Anita Sengupta points out, the indefinite frontiers of the premodern era were

replaced by the sharply defined borders characteristic of the modern state.

Frontiers into Borders is an investigation into how the creation of borders and national territories transformed — and simultaneously failed to transform — identities in the region. The first two chapters are primarily historical, dealing with pre-Soviet identities in the region and the Soviet "national delimitation" of Central Asia. The last two chapters are more contemporary, dealing with the consolidation and politicization of national identities, regional integration, and ethnic conflict in post-Soviet Central Asia. The author focuses primarily on Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, with occasional references to the other republics.

Sengupta stresses the fluidity and complexity of identities in Central Asia prior to the Soviet intervention and the ways in which premodern identities were affected by the creation of national territories. She argues that the delimitation was problematic because "people actually lacked any significant awareness of themselves as culturally distinct groups" (p. 16). Focusing primarily on the divide between future Tajiks and Uzbeks, she notes that there was a tremendous amount of cultural and linguistic mixing as well as intermarrriage between these two ostensibly distinct ethnicities. Moreover, she argues, both the Tajik and Uzbek "nations" were made up of many diverse components that lacked common origins or a common sense of destiny. Sengupta also argues that the relationship between identity and territory in Central Asia was not as straightforward as Soviet authorities liked to believe. Ethnic groups did not occupy clearly defined territories, nor did people conceive of a territory as constituting a "homeland" for a specific "national culture." Since "homelands and identities were shared and overlapping" (p. 45), the drawing of ethnographic borders and the creation of national territories posed numerous difficulties.

Sengupta goes on to examine the changes wrought by the Soviet system of borders and territories. In general, she notes, Central Asians have accepted the Soviet system of ethnic classification and the association between territory and culture. Today, each state in the region is seeking to carve out its own distinctive historical legacy, while nationalist scholars seek to establish continuities between the ancient inhabitants of the "homeland" and those who live there today. Yet these efforts are often stymied by the overlapping and shared nature of pre-Soviet history. Sengupta describes conflicts between post-Soviet Central Asian nations over who "owns" a certain aspect of the past, such as the dispute between Tajiks and Uzbeks over which group has the right to claim the Samanid heritage. She also examines the marginalization of ethnic minorities, such as Bukharan Jews, Russians, and Tajiks in Uzbekistan, who now find themselves living within a homogenizing nation-state that is not their own. Finally, Sengupta argues that local and regional identities continue to have great importance, although these identities were in many cases transformed by Soviet rule.

This book makes a number of important and valid points about identity in Central Asia. One can hardly fault the author's fundamental argument that it is problematic to impose the nation-state on a region with complex and overlapping identities. Much of what she says about the fluidity of identities in Central Asia is generally accepted among scholars of the region. Sengupta covers a great deal of ground, touching on subjects as diverse as the relationship between identity and territory, the current historiography of Central Asia, prospects for regional and extra-regional economic integration, the roots of the civil war in Tajikistan, and the status of ethnic minorities within each state. Yet her wide-ranging and nuanced discussion does not quite cohere into an overarching argument or a distinctive, original contribution. Moreover, for a work that seeks to examine the impact of the Soviet creation of borders, there is not enough consideration of the broader context of Soviet nationality policy or indeed the whole Soviet period in Central Asia. Finally, there is a tension in Sengupta's analysis between her focus on the complexity and artificiality of identities and her tendency in practice to speak of them as organically existing groups. For example, after discussing the difficulty distinguishing Tajiks from Uzbeks in the pre-Soviet era because of high rates of bilingualism and cultural mixing, she argues that the Tajik republic was "more artificial" than the Uzbek republic because Tajikistan failed to include some of the important "Tajik cultural centers." To be fair, this is not a problem unique to Sengupta; all scholars of Central Asia must struggle to avoid imposing present-day national categories on earlier periods. The aura of inevitability that surrounds today's nation-states is perhaps the most striking result of the transformation from frontiers into borders.

Feride Acar and Ayşe Güneş-Ayata (eds.), ***Gender and Identity Construction: Women of Central Asia, the Caucasus and Turkey.*** Leiden: Brill Press, 2000. xviii + 358 pp. ISBN 9004115617, $105.

Reviewed by: **Zohreh Ghavamshahidi**, Professor, Political Science and Women's Studies, University of Wisconsin-Whitewater, Wis., USA, ghavamsz@uww.edu

This book answers some of the most important questions regarding post-Soviet economic and social reforms: what is the role of the new states in shaping women's roles and status in public life? What are the cultural changes in family, education and religion? How do women acquire self-identity and redefine their role in the midst of economic transition? What are the main socio-economic and cultural consequences of globalization? Do women benefit from it?

In the short introduction, the editors, Feride Acar and Ayşe Güneş-Ayata, discuss the book's theoretical and methodological foundations. Here two important points stand out. First, they create linkages between global socio-economic issues and the local issues, such as culture, family structure and the position of women. They explain the relevance of understanding how changes in economics and politics affect social stratification and culture in general and women's position in particular in Central Asia, the Caucasus and Turkey. Second, they emphasize the importance of interdisciplinary work and the application of diverse methodologies in answering the above questions. This is demonstrated in their choice of contributors. The rest of the book consists of four sections and a concluding chapter.

The first section focuses on economic transition and the development of the global market and their impact on gender issues in the former Soviet Union and Turkey. The three authors, Lourdes Beneria, Valentine Moghadam and Meltem Dayıoğlu, argue that economic transition within the context of the global market in this region has increased inequality and mal-distribution of wealth, with a more severe impact on women than men. The comparative analysis of classical theory of market economy and the current trend of economic transition is a central part of their arguments. This comparison shows that female participation in the labor force is motivated by need rather than by profit, a marker of market rationality in classical theory. The authors suggest alternative ways of organizing the socio-economic and political spheres, based on non-hegemonic theories of market rationality. Market and economic activities must be subordinated to the needs of communities. In Turkey inadequate schooling for women is the main reason for low labor participation in urban areas. Promotion of schooling and providing child care for working women as long- and short-term policy goals may increase their labor participation.

In the second section Nuran Hortaçsu, Sharon Baştuğ, and Olcay İmamoğlu discuss the impact of socio-cultural changes on the private sphere. The notion that industrialization and the associated value of individualism satisfies individual needs within the conjugal family is challenged by the results of a survey from Ashgabat, Baku and Ankara. The survey shows shows that predominant cultural values, and not the level of industrialization, define the variations in family function, types of family, the position of women, and marital relationships within families. A second study of Turkmenistan shows that patrilineal decent and patrilocal residence determine family structure where women are greatly valued as wives and mothers and devalued as daughters and sisters. Brideprice, indirect dowry, and the wedding as a rite of passage for women, are central to the cultural reproduction of this system. The Turkish marriage study of 456 families from three socioeconomic classes shows that socioeconomic development, higher level of education, and age of marriage play a role in the emergence of modern marriages, where couples seem to be more satisfied than in arranged marriages.

In section three, Azade-Ayşe Rorlich, Nükhet Sirman and Farideh Heyat analyze how discourse can play a dynamic role in changing gender roles and relations, and transform family structure. The contextual analysis of women's journals in the Russian empire reveals the recognition by Muslim reformist (Jadid) writers of the importance of women's emancipation and the dynamic role women play in national identity construction. This recognition challenged the images, constructed in Russian colonial literature, of Muslim women as submissive and passive. Contextual analysis of oppositional discourses in the early Ottoman empire revealed unequal relations of power among men, and

constructed new models of masculinity and femininity. Middle class men and women, through novelistic discourse, set the stage for the transformation of family from large and complex households to a nuclear family structure, and defined a new model of masculinity and femininity linked to love for fatherland and the nationalist project.

In the last section, Colette Harris, Ayşe Saktanber, Asli Özataş-Baykal, Nayereh Tohidi, Dilarom Alimova, Nodira Azimova, and Seteney Shami discuss gender and the construction of national identity. Women in post-Soviet Tajikistan have three different kinds of identities. First, a public identity which was born out of the Soviet modernization agenda. Second, a private "ideal" feminine identity of "good" women which requires women's submission to men and to parental domination. The third is their "real identity" where women use maneuvers for resistance at home and outside the home. In Uzbekistan, gender plays a central role in nation-state building. Women are very active in *mahallas* (neighborhood communities), however there is a rigid sexual division of labor. Characteristics expected of Uzbek women, such as modesty, chastity, tenderness, sacrifice, orderliness, cleanliness and hard work, are expressed in mahalla discourse and the activities supported by the media and paternalistic state policies. The new definition of femininity which provides the bases for national identity and new national Uzbek women is constructed through Islamic training and education. In post-Soviet Azerbaijan, the role of women in society is one of the targets of predominantly nationalist and male elite who are attempting to redefine the ethno-cultural and national identity of Azerbaijan. They emphasize women as custodians of national codes of conduct and traditions. The relation of domination and subordination among women in the North Caucuses is the focus of the last chapter. The author argues that memories are transmitted and tradition is constructed by domestic performances of rituals reinforcing domestic and kinship hierarchies. The older women (in-laws and grandmothers) hold power over daughters, daughter-in-laws and other younger female. This is how their identity is asserted.

This volume presents valuable information about the region and introduces diverse methodologies and approaches to the study of women's issues. The empirical research in this book supports the argument that the Soviet Union and Turkey took major initiatives to shape women's role in public life as strategy of modernization. The policies prioritized women's education, and encouraged their integration into socio-economic and political spheres. However these secular policies did not eradicate gender discriminatory culture at home, which led to women's double burden.

As the editor themselves agree, an overview and analysis of political dimensions from women who live in these countries is lacking in the present volume. I enjoyed this book, yet a couple of criticisms can be made. First, there is overlapping information about Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan. This can create confusion among non-scholarly readers. Second, an additional approach is needed by the editors in order to foster a dialogue with activists and policy makers in these countries in addition to scholars. Although I may not agree with some of the polemical positions made in this book, I appreciate the suggestive introduction to the social and political and cultural consequences of global capitalism in this region. This book also invites more empirical research for the understanding of gender-specific impact of global capitalism. I recommend this book as supplementary readings for Area Studies and Women Studies faculty and students.

Kira Van Deusen, *Singing Story, Healing Drum: Shamans and Storytellers of Turkic Siberia*. Montreal/Seattle: McGill-Queens University Press/ University of Washington Press, 2004. xix + 205 pp., map, 32 photographs, glossary, bibliopgraphy, index. ISBN 0773526161 (cloth), 077352617X (pbk), $25.00 (pbk).

Reviewed by: **Margaret A. Mills**, Professor, Department of Near Eastern Languages and Cultures, Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio, USA, mills.186@osu.edu

This attractively produced and written study effectively negotiates the territory between personal memoir and ethnographic monograph. Van Deusen is a performing storyteller, whose interest in performance and in the cultural practices and ideologies supporting the various kinds of narrative performances she encountered on several short research trips to in Turkic Siberia (Tuva and Khakassia) over a period of years, leads her to a

mode of investigation and presentation which is both ethnographically systematic and experientially positioned. The book can be read with profit by those with ethnographic interest in post-Soviet cultural recovery processes in Turkic Siberia, in shamanic religious and healing practices in general, and in socially contexted studies of oral narrative performance. It is also very interesting as an example of reflexively positioned ethnographic writing.

The book begins with a personal vignette of illness and recovery from sunstroke, a healing mediated by a visit to a sacred site in the company of a Khakassian shaman colleague. This experience is recounted with a vivid sense of place, a wry sense of humor and minimal hype. All the individual shamans and storytellers appearing in the book are carefully profiled, with considerable samples of their personal experience narratives or family and professional history included. Their personal histories are effectively woven into the distinctive histories of the cultural pressure on Tuva and Khakassia during the Soviet period. This pressure had a more profound dampening effect on shamanic practice in Khakassia than in Tuva, for historical reasons recounted in the book. The alternation between general histories of the two republics and personal histories of living individuals presented, of their families and other practitioners, gives a human face to the cultural history. A major theme of the book is the assessment of shamanism as a set of healing procedures both for individuals and for the participating community in general. While talking about cultural recovery in the form of revitalization of shamanic practices in these small and culturally endangered populations, however, Van Deusen does not delve into the more general question of population scale and the problematic politics of cultural nationalism.

The narratives presented, generically speaking, are a combination of personal experience narratives, oral history, folktale, legend and anecdote. These renderings in English are clear, if somewhat low-key in style. Part of the stylistic flatness of the narratives may have to do with the translation process, which as the author explains, mainly involved working through Russian, even as the author worked to acquire some competence in the relevant Turkic languages. She does not discuss the stylistics of performance in normal social contexts, but relies on the rich implications of story content to convey a sense of the storytelling process. One could wish for more analysis of performance styles from an author who is herself a performer, but the narrative content is itself very intriguing, and usually thoroughly explicated. Spiritual geography is outlined with appropriate narrative illustrations. There are also examples in English, with commentary, of *algysh* (traditional sung shamanic prayers, in verse), including a prayer for a new drum, and a "Shaman's Prayer to the Mountain." While musical notation is not provided, one chapter discusses at some length "the Power of Sound," the means by which music provides entry to the spiritual world. This process is illuminated with recounted legends. One gets a sense of the teaching of shamanic beliefs and practices through stories told, as a traditional method of instruction, though it is also clear that Van Deusen and her shaman and storyteller colleagues shared analytic discussions as well. The physical tools of shamans are well illustrated with photographs, supported by discussion of where tools come from, how they are used in practice, and where they go after the shaman's death or retirement from practice. The shaman's drum, as a living presence connected with the shaman's own life, is of central interest. The relationships between shamanic experience and its narratives, and the inspirational and performance processes of storytellers, which likewise may involve dangerous interactions with the spiritual world, are explored and illustrated with further narratives. Van Deusen notes the high social status accorded storytellers in general and epic singers in particular in the Turkic cultures of Central Asia. Her bibliography cites about 100 sources in Russian and English, one recording and several websites, and is offered as a guide for further reading.

In all, this is a satisfying and reader-friendly account, adding a carefully constructed, non-self-aggrandizing experiential dimension to the large research literature on shamanism. It is rich in quotations of performed texts. Though the translations generally do not convey the vibrancy of oral performance, this is an occupational hazard in the written presentation of verbal art. The author's own presence in the account is handled with discretion and always offered to the reader as a resource for understanding both what is observed and the limits of such understanding for an outsider. The book will interest general readers as well as those with more exposure to the topics of shamanism, story performance, and/or Soviet and post-Soviet cultural history.

Feroz Ahmad, *Turkey: The Quest for Identity*. Oxford: OneWorld Publications, 2003. 222+xviii pages, 2 maps, index. ISBN 1851682414, $19.95 (pbk).

Reviewed by: **Tolga Koker**, Visiting Assistant Professor of Economics, Hamilton College, Clinton, N.Y., USA, tkoker@hamilton.edu

This book, by Feroz Ahmad, a long time scholar of Turkey whose contributions to Turkish studies are considerable, compiles Ahmad's vast knowledge of Turkey into a short history. Most recent books on Turkey, both academic and journalistic, focus topically on "Islamism" or "the Kurdish issue," and conceptually on "civil society" and "identity."[1] These books generally repeat the same "factual" developments, but are marred by weak theoretical frameworks.[2] Unfortunately, Ahmed's book has the same problems. Following the current trend, the book is misleadingly subtitled "The Quest for Identity." Almost nowhere in the book except in the Preface (a couple of pages) is the question of identity discussed, let alone presented within a theoretical framework. Like other books in its publication series, a more proper subtitle would have been "A Short History."

The book consists of seven chapters; the first three are on the Ottoman period and the remaining four on the post 1919 era. In the first three chapters, approximately one third of the book, Ahmad summarizes Ottoman history first from its establishment (around 1300) to the beginning of the westernizing reforms (1789); then the reform period until the constitutional revolution of 1908; and finally, the next 11 critical years (1908-1919) in the formation of contemporary Turkey. Without falling into the trap of orientalism, these chapters, rich in detail, cite the "important" events one after another in a very colorful way with some minor material mistakes. For example, Ahmed writes: "The opening of the Lycée of Galatasaray in 1868 … was followed by other foreign religious institutions, such as Robert College" (p. 35). In fact, Robert College was chartered four years before, in 1864.

Aside from these trivial points, my major concern about the book is this: neither in these background chapters nor elsewhere in the book do we find a sustained, unified theoretical framework. Ahmad's usually very short, partial explanations are always functionalist in essence, and he offers no mechanism that explains the rise and/or fall of the empire, let alone present Turkey. For this reason, the sub-text of some explanations reads as mere justifications. The text focuses on "what happened," at the "top" level, and for Ahmad the object of history is the state/society (mainly state) without a state/social theory, and the people are just mere subjects. He rightly spends a chapter on the second constitutionalist period (1908-1918) to lay a strong background for the later chapters on the Republican years. Yet, he misses some good opportunities to make an argument about turning multiple identities into one seemingly "Turkish" national identity.

The four chapters on the Republican era are divided in a very traditional way: "Kemalist era (1919-1938)"; "Towards multi-party politics and democracy (1938-1960)"; "Military guardians (1960-1980)"; "The military, the parties and globalization (1980-2003)." Favoring the second constitutional period, Ahmad discounts the role of Kemalist reforms in the making of new Turkey. The last three chapters are very rich in describing the political panorama in the country. He elegantly incorporates many saws of the day such as "Pasha factor;" "the cunning fox" (the nicknames for President İnönü); *ortadirek* or central pillar (referring to middle class); "got things done" (President Özal's motto for economic liberalization), etc. These chapters also absorb the main popular (usually leftist leaning) explanations from the literature in Turkish on post-war Turkey. He does not question their contextual origins, however. This blinds him in many ways. The chapter on "Military guardians (1960-1980)" reads, for example, as if the first military coup in 1960 was "progressive" for Turkey while the later two (1971 and 1980) were somehow "regressive." For Ahmad, the conservative parties, first the DP and later the others, "exploited religion for political ends." He even claims that the voters overwhelmingly (91.37%) approved the 1982 Constitution without liking it, just to end the military

[1] For instance, see Shankland (1999). For journalistic works, see Pope and Pope (1998), Howe (2000) and Kinzer (2001).

[2] Exceptional books that present a specific theoretical framework in discussing Turkey include White (2002), Navaro-Yashin (2002) and Yavuz (2003).

regime and restore civilian rule. Such claims are debatable at best.

Ahmad's explanations of economic conditions lack expertise. Even though he accurately describes the economic developments, as a non-economist he makes some crucial mistakes. He argues that the devaluations during the Second World War resulted in inflation (p. 103). This is quite impossible in a relatively closed economy even with some new liberal measures. The real reasons for the inflation between 1938 and 1946 were rationing and production bottlenecks due to increasing input costs. He literally translates so-called *hayalı ihracats* of the 1980s (i.e., illegal refunds on the value-added taxes from exported commodities) as "phantom exports." In the literature, they are commonly referred as "fictitious exports." He also writes: "… the lira sank to 1,700,000 liras. [sic]" The "per USD" is missing. And so on.

A couple of words on Ahmad's style are in order. He prefers not to use any references or bibliography. There are only a few suggested (but unannotated) readings at the end of each chapter. All these prevent the enterprising reader from following up factual references and checking on sources. The book also has no heading for the cover picture. (It looks like Sultanahmet Mosque in Istanbul.) Aside from these trivial things, Ahmad exemplifies professional authorship.

The book is quite limited in terms of audience. It only provides good background information for undergraduate classes on the Middle East. In graduate classes, it may serve as a good starting point to criticize the existing classical literature on Turkey before covering the new theoretical perspectives about the region. For a scholar of Turkey, however, *Turkey: The Quest for Identity* does not go beyond nicely compiling factual developments. Staying within its course in presenting a short history, it has (perhaps intentionally) made no new contribution to the literature on Turkey. It does, however, reflect the labor and professionalism that Feroz Ahmad has long invested in studying Turkey, and, all in all, it celebrates the intellectual labor of his era.

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George Lane, *Early Mongol Rule in Thirteenth-Century Iran: A Persian Renaissance*. London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003. xiii + 330 pp., maps, glossary, notes, bibliography, index. ISBN 0415297508, $114.95 (cloth).

Reviewed by: **Scott Levi**, Assistant Professor, Department of History, University of Louisville, Louisville, Ky., USA, scott.levi@louisville.edu

In the year 1254, Hülegü, grandson of Chinggis Khan (d. 1227) and brother of Möngke Qa'an (r. 1251-59), led a sizeable Mongol force southward from the Eurasian steppe toward Persia. Hülegü and his troops traveled at a leisurely pace, crossed the Amu Darya in January of 1256, and then, through alliance and conquest, rapidly established the foundations of the Il-Khanate, the Mongol state in the Middle East. Received wisdom characterizes the early decades of the Il-Khanid era as a tumultuous continuation of the earlier Mongol conquests, essentially defined by Hülegü's sack of Baghdad and execution of the final 'Abbasid Caliph, al-Musta'sim

(r. 1242-58). Muslim peoples are presumed to have suffered under "heathen" Mongol rule until they finally found reprieve under Ghazan Khan (r. 1295-1304), the first of the Il-Khans to embrace Islam.

In this volume, George Lane exposes this scholarly tradition as a fiction at least partly based upon uncritical readings of the self-interested propaganda of Rashid al-Din, Ghazan Khan's own Grand Vizier and author of several important historical works. Lane forcefully argues for a dramatic reinterpretation of the early decades of Il-Khanid rule, and his volume's nine chapters address various aspects of the political and cultural history of Il-Khanid Persia during the reigns of the first two Il-Khans, Hülegü (1256-65) and his son Abaqa (1265-82). Almost from Hülegü's arrival, the peoples of Persia — Muslim and non-Muslim alike — began to enjoy a period of stability, peace and prosperity that Lane labels "a Persian renaissance."

Lane has accessed an impressive array of historical literature to support his thesis. His sources include: both official and unofficial histories from within the region and beyond, some well-thumbed and others more obscure; a wide variety of later sources that provide valuable information drawn from earlier works now lost to us; and an impressive corpus of poetry and Sufi literature. Lane has taken great care to scour these sources in search of corroboration, to detect and weigh biases, and to compensate for these biases whenever possible by balancing semi-reliable accounts of "sycophantic insiders" with the likes of Juzjani, who wrote his rather hostile history of the Mongol conquests while living in exile in the Delhi Sultanate.

Lane's first order of business is to demonstrate that Hülegü arrived in Persia not as a conqueror bent on destruction but as a much anticipated ruler intent upon building a state. Persia had been under Jochid authority since the early Mongol conquests, although it served as little more than winter grazing grounds for Golden Horde troops. As the Jochid rulers of the Golden Horde focused their attention elsewhere, Mongol governance over the lands to the south faltered and the population suffered the lawless exploitation of parasitic governors. Lane's evidence suggests that it was, indeed, Persians who first requested that Möngke Qa'an solidify Mongol control over Persia by building "a bridge of justice" (p. 16) across the Amu Darya so that they too might enjoy the peace and security of the Mongol Empire. The full circumstances surrounding Möngke Qa'an's decision to dispatch his brother to Persia — and Hülegü's decision to stay on permanently — remain uncertain, but it is reasonably sure that it was at least partly based on a rivalry between the sons of Tolui (Möngke, Hülegü and Qublai) on the one hand and the Jochid rulers of the Golden Horde on the other. In any event, Lane argues that Hülegü arrived in Persia determined to eliminate the Isma'ili threat and to "restore justice, stability and prosperity, to claim his inheritance and to found a dynasty" (p. 18). By establishing his first capital at Maragheh, in Jochid Azerbaijan, Hülegü made clear his intention to do this at the expense of the Golden Horde (p. 41).

An especially important aspect of Lane's discussion is his lengthy and detailed comparative analysis of three Il-Khanate provinces: Kirman, Herat and Shiraz. Here the reader finds valuable local histories as well as fascinating case studies of how the Il-Khans governed through largely autonomous local powers, and why some local areas flourished under Mongol rule while others floundered. The Qutlugh Khanids of Kirman and the Kart dynasty of Herat both recognized the opportunities afforded by embracing Hülegü's authority. They proved their loyalty and enforced the rule of law, and their provinces grew strong and prosperous in the secure and predictable environment of the early Il-Khanate. At roughly the same time, the celebrated Persian poet Sa'di, who earlier had fled Shiraz, heard of Hülegü's arrival and returned to his beloved homeland in anticipation of the peace and security that would result. The Türkmen Salghurid rulers (1148-1287) of Shiraz had also early on declared their loyalty to Hülegü and earned his patronage, but the dynasty quickly descended into a "culture of corruption" (p. 124). The Salghurids' short-sighted and oppressive policies effectively undermined the rule of law, and Sa'di's hopes met only with disappointment. While Mongol rule in Persia brought prosperity to most, their inability to govern effectively through the Salghurids illustrates both the limits of Mongol leadership at the local level and the limits of Lane's "renaissance."

The second half of the volume focuses attention on several ways in which state patronage encouraged the cultural efflorescence and religious dynamism characteristic of early Il-Khanid Persia. The first of these is a fascinating study of the Juwayni brothers, two members of an influential and powerful Persian family who used their position in the Mongols' service to fund artistic creativity and myriad public institutions, including mosques, madrasas and Sufi *khanaqahs* [hostels], as well as

hospitals, pharmacies and insane asylums (p. 197). No individual personifies this golden age more than the celebrated scholar Khwaja Nasir al-Din Tusi (1201-1274), a highly regarded, if controversial, astronomer who flourished under his Mongol patrons. Next, Lane's study surveys the literary life of the Il-Khanate and describes the fertile cultural climate that produced such figures as Jalal al-Din Rumi, Rashid al-Din, 'Ata Malik Juwayni, Sa'di, and Safi al-Din Ishaq, the founder of the Safavid Sufi order. Of particular interest here is Lane's criticism of the widely accepted belief that the rise in popularity of Sufi orders in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries was the direct result of a corresponding rise in spirituality caused by the overwhelming trauma associated with Mongol rule and the end of the Caliphate. Contrary to this, Lane argues that, Muslim scholars under Mongol rule were freed from the constraints of a corrupt and spiritually bankrupt Caliphate, and therefore enjoyed the liberty to approach their theological pursuits with increased vigor and without political interference (p. 254). Sufi orders were quite vibrant even prior to the Mongol conquests and Sufi khanaqahs did indeed spread across Il-Khanate Persia, but this had more to do with an increase in patronage and mobility than any presumed spiritual crisis.

Lane's study is well researched and convincing, but the author's profound admiration and respect for his subject has occasionally led him to overcompensate in his effort to set the record straight. Thus, his assertions that, after suffering some 150 years of "anarchy" following the decline of Seljuk authority, Hülegü's "effectively secular" administration ushered in a "Persian renaissance" may be taken as literary hyperbole (p. 254-55). An effort to ground such generalizations more firmly in the appropriate historical contexts would have strengthened his discussion. It might also be observed that, while Lane clearly sets out to focus on the Il-Khanate, he has perhaps missed an opportunity to explore the obvious and potentially fruitful comparison between the Il-Khanate under Hülegü and Abaqa, and the coterminous establishment of the Mongol state in China under Hülegü's brother, Qublai.

But these are minor criticisms. In addition to illuminating an important and understudied period in the history of the Mongol Empire, George Lane effectively establishes that Perso-Islamic society flourished in the early years of the Il-Khanate; it is long since time that the labeling of Hülegü as "the scourge of Islam" be dismissed. Scholars and students with an interest in the history of the Mongol Empire, medieval Persia and the Middle East, and more generally the political and social history of the Islamic world will benefit from reading this important work.

Alisher Ilkhamov and Liudmila Zhukova (eds.), ***Etnicheskii atlas Uzbekistana***. Tashkent, Uzbekistan: Institut "Otkrytoe Obshchestvo," 2002. 451 pp., ill. (some col.), ports., col. maps. ISBN 5862800107. Out of print.

Reviewed by: **Shoshana Keller**, Associate Professor of History, Hamilton College, Clinton, NY, USA, skeller@hamilton.edu

This "Ethnic Atlas of Uzbekistan" is not really an atlas, although it does have some good maps. Instead it is a curious but useful reference guide to the many ethnic groups living in contemporary Uzbekistan. The twenty-member authorial team, working under the auspices of Soros's Open Society Institute, aimed to produce a book that would interest both scholarly and general readers. Accordingly, the guide combines detailed essays on the ethnographic history of the Uzbeks with personal portraits, stories, full-color photos and essays on ethnic cultural centers and cemeteries. For those who read Russian the guide fulfills most of its goals, although academics may find the lack of consistency and full scholarly apparatus frustrating.

The book is divided into three sections: a dictionary of ethnic minorities in Uzbekistan, a comprehensive study of the origins of the Uzbeks themselves, and a miscellany of articles, photo essays and maps. The most interesting section for scholars is the long (84 pages) essay on the Uzbeks written by Alisher Ilkhamov, with an appendix on the game *ulak* or *ko'pkari* (polo with a dead goat) by Salimjon Iuldashev. Ilkhamov combines historical, anthropological, and linguistic approaches to describe the development of Uzbeks as a nation, from Uzbek Khan in the fourteenth century to the post-Soviet period. This is an impressive synthesis of Russian (Imperial and Soviet) and Western scholarship, which draws from a wide range of work

and is not overly constrained by ideology. In contrast to the Soviet and post-Soviet ethnogenesis tradition, which teaches that the Uzbek nation has existed in one form or another from ancient times, Ilkhamov writes: "It would be naive to represent the formation of the Uzbek nation as an 'objective' natural-historical process" (p. 288). He charts the many tribes from Turkic and Mongol origins that have contributed to the Uzbeks, and adds detailed prose descriptions of the most influential tribes. He uses some demographic data from 1989 and 2000, but most of his data come from ethnographic studies of the 1920s and earlier. His discussions of the history of the category "Sart," the development of the modern Uzbek language and dialects and the creation of the Uzbek republic are detailed and balanced. For Western scholars there is nothing really new here, and his bibliography is not as comprehensive as one would like, but it is marvelous to have all of this material in one place.

Ilkhamov's Uzbek colleagues, however, have angrily challenged his analysis on the basis of a fundamental difference over theoretical foundations. This debate can be followed in recent issues of *Etnograficheskoe obozrenie*, (2005: 1) and *Ab Imperio* (2005: 3; and 2005: 4).

The dictionary of ethnic minorities is fascinating to browse, but quirkily inconsistent. There are over 70 entries, from Austrian to Japanese (in Cyrillic alphabetical order). Each entry begins with a definition of the group, including self-designation, linguistic category, and religion. Population statistics are provided from two to six census data sets from 1897 to 2000, apparently chosen on a random basis. While not all groups have been present in Uzbekistan throughout the twentieth century, that does not account for all of the data gaps. Data from the 1939 census surface only a few times: they are used for the Kyrgyz and Karakalpaks, but not the Kazakhs or Turkmen. Data from 1937 are not used at all, even though they have been available since the late 1980s. The texts also vary widely. The entry on Americans consists of biographies of the 1920s boxing entrepreneur Sidney Jackson and the African-American cotton farmer John Golden. There is no attempt to look at the African-American refugees as a group, and nothing on the new cohort of Americans, mostly Peace Corps volunteers, that has settled in Uzbekistan since 1992. Whether the tiny American (or Belgian or Japanese) populations should even be considered as "ethnic groups" of Uzbekistan is a question the editors do not raise. The long entry on Jews is a systematic survey of six different Jewish subgroups, including the Karaites (population 55 as of 1989). Some entries include photographs and copies of personal letters, while others are very dry. Several are little more than lists of famous individuals from the given population. Each entry ends with a bibliography but, disappointingly, the citations are virtually all for Russian-language works. Even entries on the Ukrainians, Tatars and Tajiks refer to no works in those languages or in Western languages.

The reader will find maps in the final section of this atlas, 15 pages of full-color maps that show the geographic distribution of Uzbeks and the most important minority groups within the country. This section also includes a breakdown of the entire population based on the 1979 and 1989 censuses and many color photographs of ethnic cemeteries and groups.

While this "ethnic atlas" is an odd-ball compilation of material, it does provide much useful information and some insight into the state of independent Uzbek scholarship in these difficult times. Despite the fact that the Uzbek government forced the Open Society Institute to close in April 2004, one hopes that the Soros Foundation will continue to make this book available.

Conferences and Lecture Series

International Workshop on Xinjiang Historical Sources

Matsuzakaya Honten, Hakone, Japan, December 12-14, 2004

Reported by: **Jun Sugawara**, Aoyama Gakuin University, Tokyo, Japan, sugawara@uighur.jp, **Yasushi Shinmen**, Chuo University, Tokyo, Japan, shinmen@tamacc.chuo-u.ac.jp, and **James A. Millward**, Georgetown University, Washington, D.C., USA, millwarj@georgetown.edu

The goals of the International Workshop on Xinjiang Historical Sources, convened for two days in December 2004 at Hakone in Kanagawa Prefecture, Japan, and funded by the Tokyo University of Foreign Studies Research Institute for Languages and Cultures of Asia and Africa (ILCAA), the Fukutake Science and Culture Foundation, and the Japan Society for Promotion of Science, were to create a basic environment from which to advance Xinjiang historical research through facilitating the sharing of information on the use of historical sources, and to promote discussion of new directions in Xinjiang history.

In a session dedicated to Turkic Historiography, Uyghur specialist Amanbek Djalilov [Jalilov] of Uzbekistan Academy of Sciences and Yasushi Shinmen of Chuo University (Tokyo) presented their research project involving the *Ilawa* [appendix] to Muhammad Sharif's Turkic translation of the *Tarikh-i Rashidi*. Djalilov has studied Xinjiang historical sources based on manuscripts held by the Institute of Oriental Studies, Uzbekistan Academy of Sciences, and Shinmen has worked mainly on 19th-20th century Xinjiang history and Central Asian history, and is a responsible party of the Japan Association for Central Asia Studies (http://www.jacas.jp). The *Ilawa* brings the contents of *Tarikh-i Rashidi* up to Muhammad Sharif's own time in the 19th century. It sheds light on the historical circumstances of Kashgaria in the 17th-19th centuries, for which historical sources have been seriously lacking. Djalilov introduced an outline of the supplement as a historical source, and Shinmen discussed the activities of the Begs in the 18th-19th centuries based on this source.

Minoru Sawada of Toyama University, Japan, who is researching the activities of the Makhdumzadas in Eastern and Western "Turkistan," and who has conducted fieldwork in the Ferghana Valley, presented a comparative study of the 22 extant manuscript copies of an important 18th century historical source by Muhammad Sadiq Kashghari, the *Tazkira-i khwajagan*. According to Sawada, by comparing the chapters on Khwaja Afaq, it is possible to determine that six manuscripts held by institutions in London, Paris, and St. Petersburg are the most reliable.

Timur Beisembiev of the Institute of the Oriental Studies in Kazakhstan helped illuminate the history of Central Asia in the 18th-19th centuries through his work on the Persian chronicles of the Khoqand [Kokand, Qo'qon] Khanate and Chaghatay manuscripts, including his research of the *Tarikh-i Shahruhi*. Beisembiev argued that despite their significant value for the study of 19th century Xinjiang, the Khoqand chronicles are seldom used. He then introduced material relevant to Xinjiang history contained in the *Tufhat at-tavarikh-i khani*, a chronicle in Persian by Mulla Awaz Muhammad Attar. This source is rich in information on the incidents of the early to mid-19th century — from the invasion of Kashgaria by the Makhdumzadas to the early activities of Yaqub Beg — a period that has so far lacked historical sources in local languages.

Jun Sugawara from Aoyama Gakuin University of Japan gave a presentation on the qadi documents he has collected in Kashgar. He discussed the sales of old documents, such as Islamic court documents, on today's Xinjiang antiques market, and evaluated their scale, classification, and value as historical sources. Sugawara is involved in the development of the Interactive Database of Xinjiang Historical Sources (Chaghatay manuscripts and publications) within the research activities of the Online Resources for Inner Asian Studies (ORIAS) project, a subproject of

ILCAA and Grammatological Informatics based on Corpora of Asian Scripts (GICAS) in Japan (http://www.gicas.jp/orias/).

Hodong Kim of Seoul National University in Korea, provided detailed explanatory notes on seven 17th century Moghulistan Khanate era edicts. Next was Thierry Zarcone of Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS) of Paris, a researcher on Sufism in Central Asia whose methodology combines fieldwork with textual studies. Zarcone drew upon the testimonies of Sufis belonging to extant branches of the Naqshbandiyya, Khafiyya (Thaqibiyya) and Jahriyya (Qadiriyya) in Xinjiang, and introduced the family lineages (*silsilanama*), certificates (*ijazatnama*), and manuals still kept by them to this day, to examine the lineal positions of modern Sufis in Xinjiang. Takahiro Onuma of Tsukuba University, Japan, who conducts research on border regional administrative issues of the 18th-19th century Qing Dynasty, analyzed a set of administrative documents in Chaghatay Turkic and Manchu. The documents, drafted in 1801 by the Kashgar Hakim Beg and addressed to the *Canzan Dachen* [Qing Grand Councilor in charge of Manchu Military Affairs] of the same region, reveal a cross section of administration and the social and economic conditions of contemporary Kashghar.

A session devoted to "Qing Dynasty Documents" began with a presentation by Nicola Di Cosmo of the Princeton Institute for Advanced Studies, a researcher in Manchu and Mongol studies. Di Cosmo's paper outlined prior use of the voluminous Manchu sources for Xinjiang studies, and examined the direction that Xinjiang historical studies should take, touching on technical and methodological issues. Li Hua of Osaka University of Economic and Law in Japan, concentrated on the social and economic history of the Chinese northwest in the Qing Dynasty based on Chinese and Manchu sources. Her paper focused on new information regarding Hui migrants in Xinjiang included in the *Manwen Lufu*. These materials include case studies of jade stone smuggling, crime and other problems, and also detailed indication of trends in Islamic *Xinjiao* [new teachings] which rose in popularity from the 18th century.

Laura Newby of Oxford University in England, a scholar researching Xinjiang administrative history and diplomacy towards Khoqand, presented a general introduction to the study of Qing Dynasty Manchu sources and consideration of their value to Xinjiang and Qing studies. Following a detailed overview of the holdings of China's First Historical Archives concerning Xinjiang, she explored the concrete case of negotiations between the Qing and Khoqand. Professor Sunao Hori of Konan University, Japan, has long been at the forefront of Xinjiang social and economic studies in Japan. His paper concerned his lifework on the Yarkand oases under Qing administration, based mainly on the *Ohki Document*. He reviewed the data and theories concerning Yarkand administrative structure, irrigation, local society, and expansion of oases. He had mobilized new resources, including satellite imagery, in this work.

The final session of the Workshop, "Field Research and Xinjiang History," consisted of presentations on Xinjiang historical research using methodologies somewhat different from traditional textually-based studies. These include memoirs, oral history, and ethnographic fieldwork. Ablet Kamalov of the Institute of Oriental Studies in Kazakhstan, an ethnic Uyghur who has studied in Tashkent and St. Petersburg, has been actively conducting research in the US, Central Asia and Europe. He introduced several memoirs by Uyghurs living in former Soviet territories, which were finally made public after the collapse of the USSR. He discussed how these memoirs help resolve historical issues concerning the Eastern Turkistan Republic of 1944-49.

Ildikó Beller-Hann, a Hungarian anthropologist trained in Britain and now working at Martin Luther University in Germany with extensive field experience in Xinjiang, presented a paper that began with a definition of historical anthropology. She subsequently examined the value of such sources that she herself terms "unusual," including ethnographic articles written for a Swedish missionary by an early 20th century Uyghur, travelers' memoirs and fieldwork interviews. As a concrete example of the use of these sources, Beller-Hann examined the status of social welfare in pre-People's Republic of China (PRC) Xinjiang local society and social shifts before and after the onset of PRC rule.

James A. Millward, a specialist in Qing Dynasty border regions from Georgetown University, considered the potential for an environmental history of Xinjiang. Millward sees environmental factors such as long-term climate change, water-use, wind patterns, and deforestation, as a neglected area in Xinjiang historical studies. In addition to suggesting ways to tease environmental

information from existing textual sources, Millward proposes that data from such technical methodologies as mitochrondrial DNA analysis, paleopollen analysis, glaciology and remote sensing of land forms can enhance understanding of the region's history. As a concrete example, he showed how the Han, Tang and Qing epochs of most intense Chinese involvement and *tuntian* [frontier military-agricultural colony] in Xinjiang corresponded to eras that were relatively cool and wet periods in Xinjiang history, when run-off water supplies were more ample than at other times.

This Workshop demonstrated that historical sources for 18th-20th century Xinjiang are remarkably varied, a fact rooted in the unique characteristics of Xinjiang history — although the Uyghurs and other Turkic Muslims are the main groups populating the area, they have been administered by the Qing Dynasty, the Republic of China (ROC), and the PRC with continued major influence from adjacent Central Asian states, Russia, and the Soviet Union. As research on Xinjiang continues, scholars must collectively, if not individually, strive to master the rich historical sources now scattered throughout the world. In that sense, this Workshop was an opportunity not only to present individual research, but to consider ways to coordinate research efforts in the future. The Workshop was a significant milestone, given that there has seldom, if ever, been such an opportunity to exchange Xinjiang historical information on such an international level. The organizers, Tatsuo Nakami of ILCAA, James A. Millward, Yasushi Shinmen, and Jun Sugawara, look forward to preparing an English language volume of the revised Workshop papers in the near future.

The International Workshop on Privatization, Liberalization and the Emergence of Private Farms in Former Soviet Countries

Tbilisi, Republic of Georgia, June 21-22, 2005

Reported by: **Ayal Kimhi**, Associate Professor, Hebrew University, Jerusalem, Israel, kimhi@agri.huji.ac.il

The purpose of this US Agency for International Development (USAID)-funded workshop was to promote discussion on the process of land reform and other rural development policies in the Republic of Georgia and its neighboring countries. After the meltdown of the USSR and Georgian independence in 1991, the agricultural sector in nearly all of the former Soviet republics, including Georgia, underwent a severe crisis, which resulted in the destruction of the productive ability of collective and state farms. A process of land individualization (both privatization and leasing) has since then been in effect in the universe of post-communist states. However, the process in Georgia and many of the other southern tier transitional states of the former USSR has been relatively slow, and various institutional factors have imposed considerable limitations on the functioning of the land market.

The first part of the workshop dealt with the results of the particular research project on the topic in Georgia, while the second part included presentations dealing with similar issues in neighboring transitional states. The workshop was well attended by local academics, legislators, and administrators. The first part started with the presentation by Joseph Gogodze of Conjuncture Research Center (CRC) in Tiblisi on the results of a survey conducted in 2003, with the aim of examining the situation of individual farms in Georgia in comparison to results of an earlier survey conducted in 1996. The basic issues investigated were the progress of the land individualization process, and its consequences for the development of the agricultural sector in Georgia, and more generally for the well-being of farm families and rural poverty in that country. The survey found significant changes in the farm sector since 1996. In particular, average landholdings have increased considerably, from 0.9 hectares in 1996 to 1.6 hectares in 2003 (78 percent rise), mainly through leasing of land plots. Gogodze are reported that there has been more specialization, with some farmers not producing at all and others expanding. It was also found that profits and income have deteriorated markedly, and many producers no longer sell their produce on the market. Those producers who leased land were much more likely to sell their produce on the market and they also had higher incomes and relied less on off-farm income and social assistance

payments. Still, fewer than 15% of the farmers lease land. Furthermore, the survey found that while the average age of the rural population has increased, the level of schooling has declined. This indicates a possible "brain drain" process of selective out-migration. Another worrying implication related to lowering incomes, according to Gogodze, is the increase in the incidence of child labor. The presentation concluded by indicating the potential for increased volume of land transactions, and a continued specialization process that should enable successful farmers to acquire more land for improving the economic well-being of their families even in a period of depressed produce prices.

The next three presentations dealt with empirical analyses of the potential impact of land reform on farm and on off-farm incomes. Ayal Kimhi of The Hebrew University presented an analysis of cropland allocation decisions, input allocation decisions and crop yields. The results implied that changes in Georgian agriculture, and in particular land reform, have potential implications to both cropland allocation and crop yields. For example, a farm that increases its cropland will likely increase the fraction allocated to wheat, hence wheat cultivation will likely increase. However, the increased cultivation of wheat will lead to a lower yield due to an inverse relationship between size and productivity in its cultivation. Given that average cropland (in the sample population of the study) did not change between 1996 and 2003 (roughly 0.7 hectares), the reason for the emergence of the inverse relationship could be due to other factors that became unfavorable to agriculture over the years. This indicates that, as has been found elsewhere, land reform is a necessary but definitely not a sufficient condition for agricultural development. These results, according Kimhi, point to several potential avenues for further investigation. One is the increase in land fragmentation. Another is the aging of the farm population. Third, the availability of infrastructure services such as water, electricity and roads could be increasingly critical factors of agricultural productivity. Finally, in the long run, farmers' education could be a key factor for agricultural development in Georgia.

Next, Ofir Hoyman of Hebrew University of Jerusalem presented an analysis of the labor allocation decisions of farmers in Georgia and their sensitivity to the progress of land reform. The results indicated that the off-farm labor market is not functioning optimally. Physical strength seems to be more rewarding than human capital, wages in part-time off-farm work surpass the wages in full-time jobs, and the opportunities for female members of the farm-household are much lower than those for males. The results also indicate that the off-farm labor decisions are sensitive to the situation in the land market. Possession of a land document decreases off-farm labor participation, indicating that a land document increases farmers' confidence in their ability to make a living through farming and therefore reduces their tendency to seek alternative income sources. The quality of land also has a negative effect on the probability of working off the farm, and the same is true for the index of farming efficiency. Another of Hoyman's findings was that off-farm income serves as a self-insurance mechanism against farm income risk.

Later, Giorgi Kalakashvili of CRC Ltd., dealt with the effect of off-farm income on rural income inequality in Georgia. Kalakashvili found that off-farm income is inequality-decreasing and adding it to farm income makes total income more equal across households. Less than half of farm families in Georgia have off-farm income. It is likely that an increase in off-farm income will decrease overall household income inequality. In the second part of the workshop, Astghik Mirzakhanyan of the United Nations Development Program (UNDP-Armenia) talked about rural poverty in Armenia. The rural population according to Mirzakhanyan fared better than the urban population in the first years after liberalization. Since then, urban poverty gradually has decreased while rural poverty has remained roughly the same. Economic growth simply has slipped by Armenia's rural families. As a response, the Armenian government has announced a new five-year program to support the agricultural sector. The program aims to address two important obstacles for agricultural development: irrigation and rural roads.

Next, Victor Moroz (UNDP-Moldova) spoke about the grim situation in Moldova's agriculture, which has suffered significant drops in productivity and yields since the early 1990s. This is in part a result of the restructuring of agriculture that is still underway. Rural poverty has become a serious problem. To remedy the situation, Moroz advocated a combination of continued development of the agri-food sector, strengthening rural institutions, and creating off-farm employment opportunities. In the longer run, attention should also be given to increased competitiveness of Moldovan farmers in international markets. This requires investments in information systems and in human resources, and

improvements of institutional conditions. On a similar note, Alexandru Stratan of the State Agricultural University in Moldova presented a perspective on the situation of Moldovan agriculture following land reform. He emphasized the lack of financial resources that are necessary for the catching up of farmers under the new configuration agricultural sector in Moldova.

Finally, Andrey Nedoborovskyy of the Institute of Agricultural Development in Central and Eastern Europe (IAMO, Halle, Germany) talked about the challenges facing individual household agricultural plots in the Ukraine. Occupying just 13 percent of Ukraine's agricultural land, household plots produced almost 60 percent of the country's gross agricultural output in 2003. This seems to have been due to their ability to obtain inputs from neighboring large enterprises at no cost or at very low prices. The ability of household agricultural plots to function independently and grow, according to Nedoborovskyy, will depend on the development of infrastructure such as markets for inputs, output and credit.

Overall, the workshop served its goal of discussing issues of mutual concern to many transitional states. If anything, it confirmed that despite the slow pace of land reform, the experience of progress in land reform, that has yet to be fully accompanied by necessary market and infrastructure developments, seems to be fairly universal among the states of the former Soviet Union. Both organizers and participants of the Workshop have hoped that this academic gathering will help to put these issues high on the agenda of local policy makers and international organizations.

2005 Middle East and Central Asia Politics, Economics, and Society Conference

University of Utah, Salt Lake City, USA, September 8-10, 2005

Reported by: **Jennifer Taynen**, Asian Institute, Munk Centre for International Studies, University of Toronto, Toronto, Canada, jennifer.taynen@utoronto.ca

Academics, government employees, NGO workers, and interested members of the public, converged on the University of Utah in Salt Lake City during September 8-10 for the "2005 Middle East and Central Asia (MECA) Politics Society and Economics Conference." For the three years that it has run, the mandate of this event has been to promote research and dialogue on a wide array of topics related to the two great regions of the Middle East and Central Asia. The theme for this year's proceedings was "Authoritarianism and Democracy in the Age of Globalization," which, as was demonstrated by the diversity of the scheduled program, proved an applicable jumping-off point for a plethora of subjects related to regional studies in the respective areas. The breadth of topics covered in the 35 panels and as many as 120 individual presentations echoed the diversity of the participants themselves, who came from a dozen countries, as well as institutions across the United States.

Concurrent with the MECA Conference was the "US-Iran Relations Conference: Regional and Global Dynamics," originally slated for Ankara, Turkey, in May 2005, but which was merged with the MECA Conference. A noteworthy event was the 13th Annual Reza Ali Khazeni Memorial Lecture in Iranian Studies (held annually at the University of Utah), which was delivered by Prof. Ehsan Yarshater, director of the Center for Iranian Studies at Columbia University and editor of the *Encyclopedia Iranica*. Yarshater, considered an intellectual icon in Iranian studies, gave a succinct and moving lecture on the "Persian Phase of Islamic Civilization."

Prof. Stephen Zunes of the University of San Francisco and Middle East editor for *Foreign Policy in Focus* (http://www.fpif.org) was the speaker for a plenary session. Using the specific example of the ongoing Iranian case, Zunes dissected the goals and current state of US foreign policy related to nuclear non-proliferation. Zunes, who is the author of *Tinderbox: US Middle East Policy and the Roots of Terrorism*, criticized the "alarmist rhetoric" of the US on Iran's nuclear program, calling such communications "one-sided" and misleading to the American public. He noted, among other things, that

despite Iran's attempt to build a nuclear program, it has, along with Syria, Jordan and Egypt, for years called for a nuclear-free zone in the Middle East. Zunes advocated "a law-based, region-wide program of [nuclear] disarmament."

Another plenary speaker was Prof. William O. Beeman of Brown University, author of *The "Great Satan" and the "Mad Mullahs": How the US and Iran Demonize Each Other*. Beeman laid out an impressive anthropological analysis — an often overlooked perspective on political conflict — of the roots of US-Iran relations. Among other noteworthy points, Beeman expressed his belief that the conflict between US and Iran cannot be understood without delving into the Persian cultural nuances of *qahr* [enmity and disengagement] and *aashti* [reconciliation], of which success in the latter (in Iranian and most Middle Eastern cultures) often requires mediation by a third party.

A third plenary event was a panel discussion on "Authoritarianism and Democracy in the Middle East and Central Asia," with panelists Profs. Zunes and Beeman, in addition to Dr. Shireen Hunter of Georgetown's Center of Muslim-Christian Understanding. This panel was chaired by Prof. Mohiaddin Mesbahi of Florida International University. Discussion by the panelists on the theme was rather broad, with nearly all choosing to delve into the various causes and effects of US foreign policy on the two respective regions. Mesbahi, for example, emphasized that Washington's foreign policy towards the two regions has been multidimensional with a variety of overarching approaches (Hobbesian, Kantian and Lockean) coming into play depending on the issue, time, and crisis at hand.

Among the noteworthy panel presentations was one by Mrinalini Menon of the University of British Columbia who presented a paper titled "Problems and Prospects for Chinese Perceptions of Security Multilateralism in Central Asia: The Role of the SCO (Shanghai Cooperation Organization) in the New 'Great Game.'" This paper, part of Menon's graduate thesis, proved an original examination of the SCO's significance, both to China's international security objectives, and as a gauge by which the international community can assess Beijing's perceptions of internal and external threats. Menon was particularly interested in China's choosing to pursue multilateral agreements like the SCO over a series of bilateral agreements. She examined the multilateral dynamics of the SCO, but also stressed the political, economic and military dominance of China within this group. Finally, she put forward some possible reasons for China's choosing this strategy for regional hegemony, and what some of the regional and global implications of this choice might be.

Payam Foroughi of the University the Utah presented a paper titled "'White Gold' or Women's Grief? Gendered Cotton and Disparity in Central Asia: Solutions for Tajikistan." This paper was the result of short-term field work for an international NGO (Oxfam Great Britain) with projects in rural Tajikistan. Foroughi examined the way in which agriculture (and more specifically, cotton production) has become the domain of women, as the majority of working-age men have left rural areas of Tajikistan in search of better employment opportunities in other CIS countries, mostly Russia. The paper looked at the social, economic and political implications that this demographic shift, along with monopolistic policies and forced cotton production, has on Tajik agrarian society. Through focus groups and interviews with local women, Foroughi identified concrete ways in which this vulnerable group could be empowered. Despite the poignant nature of the subject matter, Foroughi ended his presentation on a positive note, by listing a series of concrete suggestions for improving the conditions of the mostly rural female cotton workers of Tajikistan and their households.

Prof. Elizabeth S. Hurd of Northwestern University gave an informative presentation titled "The United States, Iran and the Politics of Secularism in International Relations." Hurd suggested that traditional Western government and academia emphasize the significance of religion in states where political and religious institutions are intertwined, but fail to give due consideration to the impact of secularism on democratic Western societies. She argued that secularism, far from being a point of neutrality from which to assess religious states, is powerfully ingrained in the Western psyche and creates as binding a frame of reference as that found in religious states. To illustrate her argument, Hurd used the case of relations between the US and Iran, challenging the idea that secularism is without a proselytizing agenda, and cited the US and the Western world's assumption of its own neutrality as having been a fundamental component in exacerbating political tension between the US and Iran.

Those interested in learning more about this year's conference program, or who have inquiries concerning the 2006 conference, are encouraged to refer to the conference website at http://www.utah.edu/meca.

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Post-Soviet Islam: An Anthropological Perspective

Max Planck Institute for Social Anthropology, Halle, Germany, June 29 - 30, 2005

Reported by: **Krisztina Kehl-Bodrogi**, Max Planck Institute for Social Anthropology, Halle, Germany, kehl@eth.mpg.de

The goal of this conference was to bring together local and foreign anthropologists and other social scientists working on issues relating to Islam in the former Soviet Union. The organisers, Krisztina Kehl-Bodrogi and Johan Rasanayagam, both of Max Planck Institute (MPI) for Social Anthropology, are themselves conducting research on Islam in contemporary Uzbekistan within the framework of the group "Religion and Civil Society in post-Soviet Eurasia," which was established at the Institute in 2001. The aim of the event was to discuss questions frequently addressed in internal seminars in the wider framework of a conference in order to compare differing experiences as well as to explore possible commonalities of post-Soviet context. Fourteen scholars working in Denmark, England, Germany, Poland, Russia, USA, and Uzbekistan were invited to participate in the conference, which was funded by the Max Planck Institute. To facilitate discussions, papers were circulated in advance to the participants.

One section of the presentations dealt with the relationship between state and religion from an anthropological point of view. Among other noteworthy presentations, Johan Rasanayagam of MPI drew on recent fieldwork to discuss the effects of state power on every-day religious practice and the processes of defining Muslim orthodoxy in independent Uzbekistan. His paper was complemented well by the presentation of Nazif Shahrani of Indiana University who focused on the efforts of a group of reformist *ulama* to reclaim Islamic beliefs and practices, and the Uzbek government's violent reactions to the group's activities. Both papers pointed to continuities between the Soviet and the new Uzbek state's policy towards Islam and Islamism. Paying particular attention to the ongoing conflict with Russia, Anna Zelkina of the School of African and Oriential Studies (SOAS), University of London, discussed the role of Islam in the social and political life in Chechnya.

Edmund Waite of the Institute of Education, University of London, addressed the challenge posed to local religious practices such as shrine visitations, memorial festivals and the like, by the rise of reformist Islamic ideologies among Uyghurs in Xinjiang, China. Addressing the question of orthodoxy, Waite's paper offered a good basis for comparison with Rasanayagam's findings in Uzbekistan and contrasted well with the research of Saulesh Yessenova of the University of British Columbia, Canada, who discussed burial practices and shrine visitations as part of the ethnic and Islamic identities among the Kazakhs. Two further presentations addressed shrines and shrine pilgrimage in Uzbekistan from different points of view. Focusing on a particular shrine in the province of Khorezm (Xorazm), for example, Krisztina Kehl-Bodrogi (MPI) showed how a holy site reflects overall social, political, and religious factors characteristic of the greater society. And on the basis of field data from Samarqand, Maria Louw of the Aarhus University, Denmark, investigated the meaning of sacred places from the viewpoint of the individuals engaged in them.

Focusing on post-Soviet changes in wedding rituals, particularly the institution of the "wedding speaker" as a religious figure, Julie McBrien (MPI) addressed processes of reinterpretations of religion and identity among Uzbeks in Kyrgyzstan. Her paper contrasted well with the presentation of Pawel Jessa of Adam Mickiewicz University, Poland, which dealt with a new religious movement in Kazakhstan, aiming at the "spiritual purification" of Kazakh society. Gusel Sabirova of the Institute of Sociology, Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow, analysed biographical narratives as a means of identity construction for Tatar women visiting Quranic courses in Moscow. Her paper was a good supplement to the presentation by Deniz Kandiyoti (SOAS) who, on the basis of field data from Uzbekistan and Afghanistan, gave a more macro-level analysis of Islam and the politics of gender. Focusing on female religious authorities (*bibi-khalife, otin-oyi*), Habiba Fathi of the French Institute for Central Asia Studies (IFEAC) in Tashkent discussed the religious life of Muslim women in several Central Asian societies. Also, Amir Navruzov of the Institute of History and Ethnography in Daghestan discussed the influence of transnational Islamic networks on institutions of higher Islamic education in Daghestan. And Shamil Shikhaliev also of the Institute of History and Ethnography, Daghestan, explored the peculiarities of Sufi rituals in the northeastern Caucasus and argued that Sufism plays an important role in shaping Muslim identity in contemporary Daghestan.

The conference proved a highly favourable environment for bringing together anthropologists and social scientists who specialize in Islamic issues in contemporary Central Asia and the Caucasus. Discussing a wide range of topics in the course of two days, the participants were able to elaborate many similarities in the current developments in the field of post-communist Islamic studies. While many developments are clearly a heritage of the common Soviet past, Islam in the successor states of the former Soviet Union is exposed to global influences as well. As Richard Tapper of SOAS pointed out in his concluding remarks, it will be promising for future projects to relate Islam in this part of the world with processes going on elsewhere in Muslim societies.

The VIIth Congress of the International Council for Central and East European Studies

Berlin, Germany, July 25-30, 2005

Reported by: **Sebastian Peyrouse**, French Institute for Central Asia Studies (IFEAC), Tashkent, Uzbekistan, sebpeyrouse@yahoo.com

On July 25-30, 2005 in Berlin the VIIth Congress of the International Council for Central and East European Studies (ICCEES) was held. This international scholarly association was founded in 1974 as the first international and multidisciplinary conference of scholars working in this field, which covers the areas from Eastern Europe to Russia and Central Asia. The VIIth Congress was organized by the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Osteuropakunde under the direction of Professor Thomas Bremer (Westfälische Wilhelms-Universität in Münster). The congress of this association, which is held every five years, included about twenty papers on Central Asia. Among the researchers presenting on Central Asia, most were from Europe and the former Soviet Union, and some were from the United States.

Three panels were organized on the history of Central Asia. The first one was dedicated to N. Il'minskii. Two papers were presented, one by Isabelle Kreindler (University of Haifa, Israel) about Il'minskii's system and its impact on the Kriashen, the Chuvash and the Kazakhs, and the second one by Robert Geraci (University of Virginia, USA) about Il'minskii's influence on Russian-Muslim relations. The second panel on history grouped Adeeb Khalid (Carleton College, USA), with a paper entitled "The Territorialization of Bukhara, from the Origins to Uzbekistan," Stephane Dudoignon (Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, France) on the dialectics of "Watan" among the Muslims of Russia at the eve of the WWI, and Christian Noack (Universität Bielefeld, Germany), working on the

spatial dimension of Muslim identity in late imperial Russia.

The third panel was about relations between Russia and Kazakhstan in the 19th century, with Steven Sabol (University of North Carolina, USA) on the Kenysary Kasymov revolt and Russian expansion into the Kazakh Steppe (1837-1847), Beate Eschment (Universität Halle-Wittenberg, Germany) about the Russian image of the Kazakhs in the 18th-19th century, and Sebastien Peyrouse (French Institute for Central Asia Studies, Tashkent, Uzbekistan) about the Orthodox Church mission in the Kazakh Steppe (1881-1917). Alexander Morrison (All Souls College, Oxford University) dealt with the central question of imperial history, the search for narrative collaborators by the conquering power, and the consequent re-creation of local elites. Nikolay Goroshkov (Voronezh State University, Russia) presented a paper on Jadidism and the influence of Ismail Gasprinskii's thinking on the Tatars during the 20th century.

The second main topic concerning Central Asia was the geopolitical situation, the Russian and international presence in the area. Viatcheslav Amirov (Academy of Sciences, Moscow) presented a paper about the new Russian economic and energy policy in Central Asia. Russian energy issues in Central Asia were also treated by Pavel K. Baev (International Peace Research Institute, Oslo, Norway), focusing on the two energy resources republics, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan. A third paper, presented by Lena Jonson (Swedish Institute of International Affairs, Stockholm, Sweden) analyzed recent shifts in Russia's policy towards Tajikistan and the implications for Russia's relations with Afghanistan. Roger E. Kanet (University of Miami, Coral Gables, USA) discussed the US challenge to Russian influence in Central Asia and the Caucasus and Neil MacFarlane (Oxford University, United Kingdom) focused on the interaction between international community objectives and Russian interests in Central Asia.

A third topic was linked to the issue of the Central Asian state development. Irina Morozova (International Institute for Asian Studies, Leiden, Netherlands), dealt with the current concern of reevaluating Central Asia's development for the last fifteen years. Regine Spector (University of California, Berkeley) investigated the rise of informal trade networks in post-Soviet transition economies. Manuela Troschke and Andreas Zeitler (Institute of Eastern Europe, Munich, Germany) studied privatization and corporate governance in Central Asia through two cases, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan.

Issues of nation-building, especially in Kazakhstan, were the focus of a number of papers. Assel Rustemova (Kazakhstan Institute of Management, Economics and Strategic Research, Almaty, Kazakhstan) addressed the impact of the Kazakh polyarchic state building on the evolution of the national idea. Steven Sabol (University of North Carolina, USA) dealt with the ethnic issue in Kazakhstan and the Kazakhification of public life in the country. Gulnara Dadabaeva (Al Farabi Kazakh National University, Almaty, Kazakhstan) studied the problems of formation of cultural identity in modern Kazakhstan and nationalism as a possible vehicle of resistance to global cultural trends. Natalia Poyasok (Marc Bloch University, Strasbourg, France) clarified how external political life influences Kyrgyz state policies regarding such issues as nationhood.

Finally, a group of papers addressed Central Asian societies. Swietlana Czervonnaja (Nicolaus Copernicus University, Torun, Poland) focused on the ethnic minorities issue and especially on Crimeans Tatars in Ukraine. Gulnara Kuzibaeva (Tashkent National University, Tashkent, Uzbekistan) dealt with the demographical changes in the post-Soviet Central Asia and their policy implications. Dina Wilkovsky (Humboldt University, Berlin, Germany) studied some aspects of the revival of Islam in Kazakhstan and their internal and external factors. Cynthia Werner (Texas A&M University, USA) proposed a very original analysis of memories and experiences of Kazakh villagers living near the Semipalatinsk nuclear test site.

The ICCEES Congress is a rare opportunity for scholars from Europe, the United States and the former Soviet Union, who specialize in Central Asia, to gather. The next Congress will be held in Stockholm in 2010.

Energy Program Asia Conferences: Challenges of Post-Soviet Transition in Kazakhstan; Security of Energy Supply in China, India, Japan, South Korea and the European Union: Possibilities and Impediments

International Institute for Asian Studies, Leiden, Netherlands (April 8, 2005); Clindendael Institute, Hague, Netherlands (May 20, 2005), and Leiden University, Leiden, Netherlands (May 21, 2005)

Reported by: **Lisa Daniels**, Energy Program Asia, Leiden, Netherlands, lisa.daniels@gmail.com

Energy Program Asia (EPA) was initiated by its director, Mehdi Parvizi Amineh, in late 2004 at the International Institute for Asian Studies (IIAS) in Leiden, Netherlands, in cooperation with the Clingendael International Energy Program (CIEP) of The Hague, Waseda University in Tokyo and the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. EPA's research agenda is to study the effects of the global geopolitics of energy supply on the main energy consuming countries of East and Southeast Asia (China, India, Japan, and South Korea), examining regional and national strategies for securing energy supplies from the Persian Gulf (Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Iran, United Arab Emirates and Kuwait) and the Caspian region (Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Iran and Russia). As part of a number of EPA conferences to be held in Europe and Asia, the Second and Third International Conferences of Energy Program Asia evaluated East and Southeast Asian energy supply security relative to the Caspian and Persian Gulf regions in the 21st century.

The Second International Conference of EPA, in cooperation with the Embassy of the Republic of Kazakhstan in Brussels, brought together policy-makers, journalists, academics and diplomats to address Kazakhstan's state of affairs, particularly in relation to its oil resources. Kazakhstan, one of Caspian's five littoral states, is the second largest state in the former Soviet Union and the largest among the newly formed Central Asian republics, in terms of land mass, and oil production and reserves. The conference focused on the following questions: What are the links between economic and political reform in Kazakhstan? How is it that in theory there is a direct connection between market economy and democratization, while empirically this connection is much more tenuous, varied and complex?

The first panel, chaired by CIEP Director, Coby van der Linde, began with Kazakhstan's Director of the Department of Nuclear Energy and External Relations of the Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources, Almaz Tulebayev, who addressed priorities and basic perspectives of Kazakhstan's energy complex. Then, Xiaoning Wang of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) debated issues of energy supply security in China and Kazakhstan. Kazakhstan's Deputy Minister of Industry and Trade, Zhanar Aitzhanova, discussed the competitiveness of Kazakhstan's economy and its relation to the global market. The theoretical issues dealt with by this panel related to the correlation between successful development and political and economic reforms in Kazakhstan in a world of interconnected global markets, with a primary focus on the role of Kazakhstan's oil and gas resources.

The second panel, chaired by Amineh, opened with Alexey Volkov, Kazakhstan's Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, who discussed modern foreign policy challenges facing Kazakhstan and strategic partnerships. He spoke of macroeconomic reforms and moves toward political and economic liberalization, as well as the importance for Kazakhstan to meet European Union (EU) development standards to achieve its goal of integration into EU markets and association with the wider EU project. Anthony van der Togt of Netherland's Ministry of Foreign Affairs then addressed Dutch and EU policy priorities regarding Kazakhstan, including support for its political and economic transition, WTO (World Trade Organization) membership and dialogues regarding equitable distribution of income generated by energy resources. Gideon Shimshon of Webster University closed the panel with a discussion of political impediments to democratization in Kazakhstan, including governmental corruption, and lack of accountability and systemic trust. The conference concluded with a round table discussion of the challenges of economic reform and political democratization in contemporary Kazakhstan, chaired by Gerd Junne of the University of Amsterdam. This discussion connected many of the

preceding issues, beginning with the "consecutive realization of democratic reforms" presented by Yermukhamet Yertysbayev, Political Advisor to the President of Kazakhstan. Yertysbayev spoke to many transitional issues facing Kazakhstan such as pluralism, civil society, and threats to democratization. Finally, Mirzohid Rahimov, IIAS Visiting Research Fellow, presented similarities and differences among transition challenges in Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan.

One month later, the Third International Conference of the EPA, in cooperation with CIEP, assembled academics and diplomats to debate potential development of a shared perspective on geopolitical, economic and energy related issues in East and Southeast Asia. The conference primarily addressed the following questions: will rivalry between the main Asian energy consumer countries — China, Japan, India and South Korea — as well as the EU and US, over Persian Gulf and Caspian energy production become an obstacle to energy supply security? What are the strategic scenarios of these countries to secure projected energy supplies? How can producer-consumer dialogues and regional cooperation mitigate internal security risks?

Following an introduction by Wilbur Perlot, CIEP, the first day of the conference examined the central themes from a global and Asian outlook. The first session, chaired by EPA Director Amineh, commenced with Reinaldo Figueredo, Director of the United Nations Global Programme on Globalization, Liberalization and Sustainable Human Development. Figueredo's discussion focused on international developments regarding globalization and geopolitics. Of particular importance was his assertion that energy security is not simply an issue of efficient and uninterrupted supply sources, but also how energy is encompassed as an engine of growth through energy services. CIEP Director van der Linde then extended the geopolitical discussion into the realm of energy supply security, expanded upon by Henk Houweling of the University of Amsterdam, who spoke to post-Cold War geopolitics and security. The second session, chaired by Stanislav Zhiznin of Russia's Department of Economic Cooperation of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, included a discussion of market-oriented reforms in China's energy industry, as well as a discussion of Japan's energy supply security in the geopolitical context — respectively presented by Shi Dan, Director of Beijing's Energy Economic Research Center, and Yu Shibutani, Director of Energy Geopolitics, Ltd., Japan. The main arguments of these sessions focused on various ways in which energy policies and industries in primary Asian consumer countries, given current geopolitical realities, can be adapted in favor of supply security.

Day two of the conference further examined Asian energy supply security and geopolitics. The opening session, chaired by Energy Geopolitics Director Shibutani, began with Kurt Radtke of Waseda University's Institute for Asia and Pacific Studies (IAPS) who spoke of East Asian "dreams of great power" and energy security. Frank Umbach of the German Council on Foreign Relations then presented several geopolitical challenges and implications of Chinese, Indian, Japanese and South Korean energy dependence on the Caspian and Persian Gulf regions. Jung-Hoon Lee of IAPS discussed Korea's energy supply security, followed by analysis of China's growing economy and energy consumption, presented by OPCW Director Wang. The session's final speaker, Wang Limao of Beijing's Institute of Geographic Sciences and Natural Resources Research, further debated considerations for China's long-term oil security. Overall, the speakers in this session dealt primarily with the development and implementation of global strategies when facing non-traditional security issues, such as energy supply. In general, the session concluded that more open and diversified supply systems provide greater security and increased cooperation in the region will greatly contribute to its stabilization and common prosperity.

The second session, chaired by Figueredo, addressed consumer relations with producing countries. Michal Meidan of the French Institute of International Relations opened with a discussion of China's energy supply security relative to Middle Eastern resources, followed by Hama Katsuhiko of Tokyo's Soka University who analyzed China's economic and energy policies toward Central Asia and Russia. Katsuhiko discussed the internationalization of China's energy strategy which began in 1994 through the 2004 construction of oil and gas pipelines from Kazakhstan. CIEP's Femke Hoogeveen then discussed the EU's relations with Middle Eastern producer countries. The final session, chaired by Radtke of IAPS, brought together each of the conference's main themes. Fraser Cameron of the European Policy Centre spoke of Asian geopolitics and the place of Europe, followed by questions and answers led by CIEP's Perlot and closing remarks by Amineh. To conclude, in an environment of serious geopolitical

competition for energy resources, the two primary producer regions — Persian Gulf and Caspian — could easily become further destabilized with increasing external pressures and intensification of conflicts over control of global oil and gas; the likelihood of which must be factored into energy supply security strategies of the major consumer countries of East and Southeast Asia.

The Second and Third International Conferences of Energy Program Asia were conducted as part of its overall and ongoing research project. In addition to the specific substantive input obtained from the conference contributors, these conferences also helped identify main points of interest and implications for the future direction of EPA's research. EPA currently has four more conferences planned and scheduled for the next two years: In January 2006, it will organize a conference in cooperation with CIEP in the Hague with the tentative title "Energy Security in the European Union and Central Eurasia," followed in June with a conference in cooperation with the Energy Economic Research Centre of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences to be held in Beijing: "The Global Cooperation on Energy Efficiency and its Impediments." EPA will also organize a November 2006 conference to be held in Almaty, Kazakhstan, in cooperation with the Kazakh Embassy in Brussels, provisionally titled: "Asian Energy Consumption and the Caspian Region: Implications for the European Union Energy Use." In 2007, a conference is planned with a venue of Tokyo in cooperation with the Institute for Asia and Pacific Studies of Waseda University and Energy Geopolitics, Ltd. The results of the said conferences as well as EPA's additional research activities will be published in a series of three books in 2007: *Energy Supply Security and Geopolitics in China, India, Japan and South Korea*; *The Implementations of Geopolitics of Energy Supply Security: Possibilities and Impediments for Conflict and Cooperation (US, EU, China, India, Japan, South Korea)* and *Towards the Global Cooperation on Energy Efficiency*.

The 11th Annual Central and Inner Asian Seminar (CIAS)

University of Toronto, Canada, May 13-15, 2005

Reported by: **Duishon Shamatov** and **Bolor Legjeem**, Central and Inner Asian Studies, University of Toronto, Toronto, Canada, duishon@yahoo.com

The University of Toronto's annual *Central and Inner Asian Seminar* has become a favorite forum for many scholars who specialize or have interests in Central and Inner Asia. This year's theme was "Traders and Trade Routes of Central and Inner Asia: The 'Silk Road,' Then and Now."

The conference brought together more than 30 speakers from 15 countries and blended a wide range of interests. Historical discussions were closely connected to the illustrious Silk Road past, including theories about the its origins and growth, and the role of traders during the Russia-Britain rivalry in the region known, a competition of hegemonies known as the "Great Game." Discussions of contemporary situations sometimes caused some heated controversy due to the political and economic interests involved.

Four fascinating papers focused on current economic and trade issues that have the potential to affect the future of the Central Asian republics. Levent Hekimoglu of York University's Centre for International and Security Studies downplayed the often-touted oil and gas reserves of these republics, suggesting that they contained a very small percentage of the world's future energy needs, and were not therefore offering the potential economic salvation that many have hoped for. Martin Spechler of Indiana University agreed, while Faridun Odilov of Samarqand Regional Chamber of Commerce (Uzbekistan) disagreed, and argued that these energy reserves would be significant for the foreseeable future. Spechler argued for a gradual reform of the Uzbek economy, while Rokhat Usmanova-Kerns, an independent scholar from Virginia offered an overview of attempts being made by some Central Asian governments to achieve economic reform by assisting in the development of small and medium businesses.

Craig Benjamin of Grand Valley State University (Michigan) traced the origins of the Silk Road back to as early as 138 BCE with the Han

envoy Zhang Qian's journey to Central Asia and his report to the Emperor of China on political and mercantile opportunities to be had in the region. Benjamin stressed the historical significance of the classical adventure of Zhang Qian and argued that through his work, Zhang Qian brought China out of millennia of relative isolation into its subsequent position of centrality in Silk Road exchanges. Domenico Catania and Claudio Rubini, archaeology scholars from Bari University, Italy, explained how the Silk Road trade routes changed settlements in Central Asia. They gave an example of Samarqand as a process of urban morphogenesis, tracing the history of its development over a long period of time, and explaining the effects of trade opportunities on the city.

Sessions about anthropology and religion in the countries situated on the Silk Road, included a presentation by Cathy Kmita of York University about the shamanic dance "Andai" in Inner Mongolia. She discussed the healing effects of the dance as well as its role in shaping Mongolian identity, and even demonstrated the "Andai," encouraging the audience to join in the performance. Patrick Hatcher of University of Chicago talked about religion as one of the most important commodities carried along the Silk Road. He argued that the Islam-bearing traders were not merely tradesmen but also played authoritative roles as scholars or princes, creating an amalgamated religious "ideal type."

The sessions about current trade issues, in particular related to energy and politics, drew great attention and sometimes controversy. Issues of regional cooperation, security, and international integration were raised along with views about the struggle for political and economic power. Mostafa Abtahi, a professor from Iran, gave an assessment of transportation of natural resources to the market via the closest ports, considering the land-locked situation of the region. Pinar İpek from Ankara's Bilkent University gave a critical account of how the new trade routes of Central Asia via the pipelines crossing vast and mountainous regions to access energy markets have become both sources of cooperation and rivalry between and among the local and regional as well as global actors. She argued that the "myth" of the "Great Game" is often misleading in understanding the realities of the strategic interaction process that is taking place among the new traders of energy resources in the region.

Maryna Kravets of University of Toronto spoke about the less documented trafficking of eastern European slaves to the Ottoman Empire through the Crimean Khanate. She examined some previously unused Crimean and Ottoman sources to reconstruct the slave traffic from the Crimean Khanate to Istanbul and analyzed the nature of the slave trade, including numbers of slaves exported, their gender, age, ethnic composition, and prices. An independent ethnic Kazakh scholar, Jazira Asanova from Toronto, discussed the role of education as a vital means of bringing knowledge of free trade and market ideas to the transitional and newly democratizing countries of the region. Her paper contributed a solid empirical case to a growing theoretical literature on how international assistance shapes local contexts, and pointed out the dangers of lack of understanding and dialogue between foreign and local actors. Asanova raised issues of ownership, sustainability and setbacks. She focused on general tendencies among development agencies to pay little heed to recipients' priorities, to devalue local knowledge, and to fail to learn from past mistakes, thus leading to a lack of recipient ownership and control of development projects. She called for more dialogue and cross-cultural understanding to create effective partnership between development agencies and local actors.

Duishon Shamatov and Sarfaroz Niyozov of the University of Toronto explored the hardships caused by the collapse of the Soviet system, internal conflicts, and the economic transition period with a focus on teachers turned traders in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. They argued that because of the miserable wages and worsening living conditions, shortly after the break-up of the Soviet Union many teachers in Central Asia were forced to leave behind their teaching occupation and move to market trading and commerce, or emigrate to Russia in seek of employment. The conference sessions ended with a colourful presentation by Daniel Waugh, who accounted for the continuity and change in the trade of Xinjiang into the early 1920s. He argued that despite the disruptions of the traditional trade patterns caused by the newly established Soviet power in Central Asia, there is interesting evidence about the ways in which the historic networks continued to operate.

The papers presented at the 2005 CIAS will be published in the forthcoming volume of *Toronto Studies in Central and Inner Asia*. Should CESR readers wish to find out more about either this annual event or the Seminar's publications, they may

consult the CIAS website at http://www.utoronto.ca/cias, which also includes photos of the conference. Alternatively, readers can contact Gillian Long at gillian.long@utoronto.ca.

About the

Central Eurasian Studies Society

The CENTRAL EURASIAN STUDIES SOCIETY (CESS) is a private, non-political, non-profit, North America-based organization of scholars who are interested in the study of Central Eurasia, and its history, languages, cultures, and modern states and societies. We define the Central Eurasian region broadly to include Turkic, Mongolian, Iranian, Caucasian, Tibetan and other peoples. Geographically, Central Eurasia extends from the Black Sea region, the Crimea, and the Caucasus in the west, through the Middle Volga region, Central Asia and Afghanistan, and on to Siberia, Mongolia and Tibet in the east.

The CENTRAL EURASIAN STUDIES SOCIETY's purpose is to promote high standards of research and teaching, and to foster communication among scholars through meetings and publications. The Society works to facilitate interaction among senior, established scholars, junior scholars, graduate students, and independent scholars in North America and throughout the world. We hold an Annual Conference, and coordinate panels at various conferences relevant to Central Eurasian studies. The Society also works to promote the publication of peer-reviewed scholarship and other information essential to the building of the field.

The CENTRAL EURASIAN STUDIES SOCIETY is a not-for-profit organization incorporated in Massachusetts.

We invite anyone who shares these interests to become a member and participate in our activities.

To become a member of CESS or join the mailing list for occasional announcements concerning CESS activities, visit the website or contact the address below. Annual dues range from gratis to $50, depending on income. CESS publications, the Membership Directory, conference paper abstracts and other information are available online at: http://cess.fas.harvard.edu.

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Central Eurasian Studies Review

CALL FOR CONTRIBUTIONS

CESR offers scholars, researchers and educators engaged in the study of Central Eurasia a review of current research, recent publications, scholarly meetings and new educational resources. We encourage contributions which reflect the regional and disciplinary breadth of the field.

Brief descriptions of each section follow. For more complete descriptions and submission instructions, please read the Information for Contributors on the CESR webpage: http://cess.fas.harvard.edu/CESR_contribution.html. **Contributors are urged to read CESR's format guidelines and transliteration tables carefully before submitting articles**.

Perspectives: state of the field pieces and interdisciplinary assessments of scholarship in Central Eurasian studies. The editors seek proposals for pieces that discuss and analyze the practices and changes in Central Eurasian studies in various national contexts, and pieces that compare developments and transformations in the construction of knowledge about Central Eurasia internationally. Length may vary. Contact Robert Cutler with proposed topics, rmc@alum.mit.edu.

Research Reports: 1) reports on findings and methods of on-going or recently completed research; or 2) conditions of doing research in Central Eurasian studies (up to 1,500 words). Contact: Jamilya Ukudeeva, jaukudee@cabrillo.edu.

Reviews and Abstracts: reviews (800-1,000 words) and abstracts (150-250 words) of books and other media (e.g., films, websites, CD ROM encyclopedias) of scholarship in all social science and humanities disciplines in Central Eurasian studies. Contact: Shoshana Keller, skeller@hamilton.edu.

Conferences and Lecture Series: summary reports (500-1000 words) of conferences and lecture series devoted to the field of Central Eurasian studies as well as reports about selected panels on Central Eurasian studies at conferences held by professional societies in the humanities or social sciences. Contact: Payam Foroughi, Central-Asia@utah.edu.

Educational Resources and Developments: materials which will help develop an informed public awareness of the Central Eurasian region, such as ideas on curriculum development; discussions of teaching methodology; descriptions of specific courses (with links to their syllabi); reviews of textbooks, films, electronic resources; discussion of public education undertakings. Contact: Marianne Kamp, mkamp@uwyo.edu.

Deadlines for submissions: Summer issue — April 1; Winter issue — November 1.

Seventh Annual Conference of the Central Eurasian Studies Society

September 28-October 1, 2006
University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Mich., USA

The Central Eurasian Studies Society (CESS) will hold its Seventh Annual Conference at the University of Michigan, Sept. 28-Oct. 1, 2006. The subject matter of the conference includes all fields of social sciences and humanities. For the purposes of the Central Eurasian Studies Society, the geographical extent of Central Eurasia reaches from the Caucasus, Black Sea and Middle Volga in the west to Tibet, Western China and Mongolia in the east, and from Iran and Afghanistan in the south to regions of Siberia in the north.

The host departments for the conference will be the Center for Russian and East European Studies, the Center for Middle Eastern and North African Studies, and the Department of Near Eastern Studies. The keynote speaker will be Dr. Juan Cole of the University of Michigan.

The conference program will be available on the CESS Conference website in late summer. Several hundred papers are selected for inclusion in the program. The conference is open to all who want to attend, whether or not they are CESS members or are presenting at the conference.

For further information, including registration costs and housing possibilities, visit the conference website at:

http://cess.fas.harvard.edu/CESS_Conference.html