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American Studies is a diverse and dynamic academic discipline, and this is both an asset and an obstacle in the production of an undergraduate journal. Our effort to display the best of this discipline was a collaboration which many individuals helped bring to fruition.

Firstly, we would like to thank everyone who contributed to this year’s edition of the Journal. We believe our final selection represents a cross-section of outstanding American Studies students writing from the diversity of methodological perspectives that are required to better understand the American experience. We received an unprecedented number of submissions this year, and to choose papers that complement one another from a pool of excellent submissions, we relied on an outstanding group of undergraduate students. We are endlessly grateful to our editorial board—Arielle, Maia, Emily, Aubrey, and Matt—for their enthusiasm and willingness to put their significant talents to use on the Journal. We would like to thank Matt, in particular, for designing the final product. A very big thank you also goes to Nigel Soederhuysen who helped out tremendously with the final stages of the production process. Without his hard work this year’s journal would not look anything like what you have in front of you. To Emily and Maia—we are confident that you will make wonderful co-Editors in Chief next year, and we are thrilled to be able to leave next year’s edition in your extremely capable hands.

All of our work would be for naught without the enduring support of the Centre for the Study of the United States and the U.S. Consulate General in Toronto. Our sincerest thanks go to Stella Kyriakakis, for her copy editing and constant willingness to help, and to Elspeth Brown, for her guidance and encouragement. We are especially grateful to the U.S. Consulate General in Toronto, and in particular, Joan Sumner, for their continuing support of the Journal. Without their contribution, the Journal’s production would not be possible, and we feel privileged to have been able to work with them.

And finally, we would like to give a special mention to Arielle Arnold-Levene. If the fates had conspired differently, it would be her writing this acknowledgment. Set to be the Editor-in-Chief for this year, she, unfortunately, had to scale back her responsibilities for personal reasons. We endeavoured to fill her shoes as faithfully as possible, and hope that this edition of the Journal lives up to her expectations.
CFI’s Industrial Bulletin: Creating Company Spirit, or Constructing American Culture?

Allegra Fryxell

“A square deal for each and all,” proclaimed the logo of the Colorado Fuel and Iron Company (CFI) beneath an inventive re-interpretation of CFI’s acronym as “Co-operation, Friendship and Industry.” However, CFI’s effusive optimism about corporate relations was complicated by the competing interests of stockholders, directors, officers, and employees included under the umbrella of “cooperation.” The workforce of Colorado Fuel & Iron Company was certainly small in size compared to that employed by U.S. Steel, General Motors, or Ford, but CFI was nonetheless pioneering the field of industrial relations in the 1920s.

CFI’s circular logo was printed in every issue of the company magazine, *Industrial Bulletin*, which was created in response to the highly publicized Ludlow Massacre of 1914 at CFI’s coal mine in Ludlow, Colorado. From 1919 to 1929, the company strove to improve labour-management relations using the *Industrial Bulletin*. While the *Bulletin* functioned as a mouthpiece for management, it also formulated an “American” identity that privileged certain ways of life at the expense of others—often the traditions and identifications of Mexican and European immigrants, who made up a significant portion of CFI’s workforce. Through language and skill development classes, photographs of architectural improvements, and articles relating to citizenship rights, white Protestant traditions, landscape identification, and personal improvement, CFI engaged in a managerial project that sought to discipline the cultural practices of workers in order to inculcate a form of “Americanism” that made these workers amenable to the aims and interests of CFI’s owners and managers.

The Colorado Fuel and Iron Company was formed through the 1892 merger of the Colorado Coal Company and the Colorado Fuel Company. It became the first large steelmaker in the Midwest, employing fifteen thousand people (ten percent of the state workforce) and producing thirty percent of all coal mined in Colorado. Its sister company, Minnequa Steel Works at Pueblo, Colorado, produced two percent of all American steel. In 1903, CFI came under the direction of the Rockefeller family. John D. Rockefeller
Jr. served on the Board of Directors, leading CFI against the United Mine Workers of America in 1913 to 1914. As the majority shareholder, Rockefeller responded to the bloody aftermath of the Ludlow strike by enforcing an “Employee Representation Plan” (ERP) designed to encourage cooperation between labour and management.

The ERP, alternatively known as the “Industrial Representation” or “Rockefeller Plan,” was designed as a “union-avoidance strategy” to increase publicity for CFI whilst ensuring minimal interference in their conditions of employment. Rockefeller hoped the ERP would improve industrial relations (and hence CFI’s productivity) by introducing new channels of communication, while simultaneously reifying the labour/management distinction. Workers did gain significant benefits through negotiation between their elected representatives, each of whom represented one hundred and fifty employees, and management. Each “joint meeting,” called by the company president at least once every four months, was divided into four committees—Safety and Accidents; Recreation and Education; Sanitation, Health, and Housing; and Industrial Cooperation and Conciliation. Employee representatives also had the power to initiate joint meetings to discuss complaints.

CFI’s first foray into employee publications, *Camp & Plant* (1901-1905), was superseded by *Industrial Bulletin* in 1915, as part of Rockefeller’s master plan to improve industrial relations. Under the supervision of Dr. R. W. Corwin from the Sociological Department, *Camp & Plant* promoted assimilation through social activities at Colorado mining camps and Minnequa Steelworks. It educated employees about cultures within CFI’s workforce, and published articles in German, Spanish, and Italian to ensure effective communication. In this way, *Camp & Plant* overtly focused on different ethnicities within CFI’s “community” and specifically labeled workers as American, Southern European, Eastern European, or Mexican based upon their language of choice. In contrast, by the 1920s, CFI’s management used *Industrial Bulletin* to disseminate the company’s labour policies. There was no discussion of ethnic “primitivism” or recognition of alternate languages; all articles were printed in English, and individuals were rarely identified by their country of origin (“German,” “Spanish,” etc.). In tandem with its welfare programs and the ERP, the magazine ostensibly served to demonstrate that the dispersed corporation was personally concerned about its employees. However, this discourse of corporate welfare was implicitly supported by a “racial project” that sought to redefine CFI workers as patriotic citizens, and in the process, constructed a culture perceived to be authentically American.

Inspired by the successful labour relations of British and European firms like Cadbury Brothers, Boots, and Pilkington glass, American companies including Ford, General Electric, Bethlehem Steel, and Tennessee Iron & Coal began to look for ways to inculcate “company spirit” among employees. Mills and mines like those of CFI were often far from “established communities,” which made it easier to develop community spirit distinct from municipal activity or solidarity within ethnic neighbourhoods. CFI’s paternalism was well-publicized in the wider American press, for the company had provided nursing services at a central hospital since 1882, established kindergartens in
company towns since the 1890s, set up reading rooms and musical groups, and pioneered a Sociological Department in 1901. Historians have thus focused on *Industrial Bulletin* as a vehicle for the ERP and welfare policies, evaluating its efficiency within the framework of company or independent labour unions. As a consequence, they have glossed over the broader political agenda embedded within *Industrial Bulletin* as a whole.

CFI’s *Industrial Bulletin* followed a standard format, only diverging from this archetype for special features. It was usually thirty-two pages in length, slightly less than 8½ by 11 inches in diameter, and printed on glossy paper, making its presentation similar to that of a contemporary magazine. Front and back covers included a splash of monochromatic colour, but text was printed in black on a white background. Each issue typically included an introductory article linked to the cover illustration, photograph, or special feature. This was followed by a number of articles interspersed with photographs of company buildings, workers, managers, and their families, as well as advertisements for company products (such as Diavolo Coal) that served to tie geographically isolated units like the Minnequa Steel Plant or Wyoming coal mines with other sites, while acquainting workers with aspects of the company unknown to them (for example steel-making, coal refining, iron ore extraction, mule husbandry, and so on). The editors usually included an article about the Colorado countryside, explaining the history of a particular landmark or how an area came to be owned by CFI. These sections might also feature vacation spots and photographs of new factories, dwellings, or equipment. Safety was a major concern, as CFI management published at least one article or cartoon in every issue reminding workers to be careful to avoid accidents in the workplace. *Industrial Bulletin* also posted internal promotions and obituaries on a regular basis. From the mid-1920s, one of the last pages of the magazine included the “Business Barometer,” a map indicating business and farm conditions across U.S. states as reported by CFI representatives.

In its role as a mouthpiece for management, *Industrial Bulletin* operated as a top-down company organ. Its content was controlled by the president’s Industrial Representative, who was CFI’s highest-ranking personnel executive. In 1927, consultants Curtis, Fosdick, and Belknap encouraged CFI to allow employees to publish their own material in order to avoid “the impression that the Bulletin was controlled by the company.” A report by the well-known labour relations analyst Elton Mayo criticized *Industrial Bulletin*’s questionable veracity and exclusively managerial content: “the minutes are extensively gerrymandered, speeches deemed unwise are taken out, [and] occasionally statements that have not been made are put in.” However, management was not worried about its blatant “gerrymandering.” While consultants and external sociologists fretted about the publication’s bias, CFI continued to use *Industrial Bulletin* as a tool to extol its vision of the ideal American workforce. World War I had transformed the company’s ethnic-and-separate model of the workplace to a melting pot in which “descendents of practically every nationality may be noted.” Contemporaries noted that the “inevitable blend that comes to mind as one reads the name is that of ‘American.’” Less than one third of CFI employees were native-born Americans, and, by 1923, over fifty-four
nationalities were registered on its payrolls. The largest group of foreign-born workers was Mexican, followed by Italian, German, Austrian, Greek, Polish, Swedish, Japanese, and Chinese. Industrial Bulletin literally and visually established an idea of American citizenship based upon loyalty to the company and national culture, which was assumed to be that of white, Protestant Anglo-Saxons. Instead of focusing on diversity, company publications in the 1920s underlined unity across employment, region, and ethnicity.

Annual Reports on the Joint Committees under the Employee Representation Plan similarly celebrated the cooperation between labour and management in professional life. Positive employee responses that highlighted the firm’s benevolent attitude were particularly significant in light of questions about Industrial Bulletin’s journalistic integrity. Yet, as historian Lee H. Scamehorn succinctly summarizes, “Labour disputes in 1917, 1919, 1921-22, and 1927-28 suggested that the miners were at least indifferent, if not hostile, to the Industrial Representation Plan.” After the National Industry Recovery Act gave workers the right to organize, the three-to-one vote in 1933 favouring an independent union indicated that the ERP was not perceived as a sufficient organ to ensure employee welfare. An unnamed employee representative underlined its impotence during an interview with an industrial consultant: “Under the Industrial Representation Plan, you are like a General without an army.” Yet, during the 1920s, the Bulletin never expressed the apathy, and at times dissatisfaction, among workers that has been retrospectively identified by Scamehorn and other historians. Instead, the magazine sustained the appearance of harmony between labour and management (despite manifold strikes) buttressed by the “generous” ERP. One miner, William Gilbert, was quoted as saying that the industrial plan was a success because all employees belonged to “one industrial Organization. I claim it is where we belong—labour and capital.”

If labour and capital belonged together, it was quite clear that whites and non-whites did not. The freedom of speech between employee and employer that was formally enshrined in the ERP did not improve relations between white management and black or Mexican employees. In March 1920, John D. Rockefeller donated money to build a YMCA clubhouse at Minnequa that included a bowling alley, cafeteria, swimming pool, library, gymnasium, and soda fountain, in addition to pledging $10,000 per annum for activities at the Pueblo steelworks and Coloradan mining camps. However, this building was designed exclusively for white workers, and CFI’s African-American employees were relegated to the less impressive “Coloured Y.” Some black miners tried to register their complaints through the ERP, which had been designed to address inadequacies in employment conditions. William Dow, a miner from Rouse, Colorado, complained about segregation at his local YMCA on 26 March 1919, but it seems unlikely that this appeal was resolved in his favour. Despite making up the majority of CFI’s workforce, minorities were also conspicuously absent in the ERP. An Industrial Bulletin cover featuring ERP representatives at the Joint Conference meetings of 1928 included four black men out of ninety-four representatives. Only twenty-seven Mexican representatives were elected between 1915 and 1928, and generally held office for only a single term, in contrast to the
many whites who participated and were routinely re-elected. The Bulletin’s questionable veracity and biased viewpoint ignored the unequal participation in company life within CFI, underscoring the inadequacy of both the ERP and Industrial Bulletin in improving conditions for ethnic minorities.

CFI tried to combat labour hostility after the Ludlow Massacre by projecting the image of a corporate community using Industrial Bulletin. Classes, edifying quotes from American intellectuals, safety advertisements, company picnics, and the Employee Representation Plan all contributed to the formation of an integrated company culture that was seen to be intrinsically “American.” Contemporaries believed that employee publications would “combat foreign propaganda and re-educate workers,” thus assuming that workers required “re-education” due to their natural tendency to subscribe to contagious “isms.”26 Although the Employee Representation Plan was its primary focus, Industrial Bulletin encouraged a particular form of American citizenship through corporate loyalty that attempted to replace ethnic identity with “proper” American attitudes and rituals. The majority of CFI’s workforce was not native-born, and, as previously noted, the company had problems with communication and labour efficiency. As historian David Nye has observed about General Electric’s in-house magazines, Industrial Bulletin never depicted work, despite this being the reason for its existence. Instead, employees were photographed at leisure, playing baseball, bowling, picnicking, gardening, or showing off their modern homes.27 The implicit understanding that such activities would mould “American” values underwrote the company’s attempts at education and productive leisure. Although Industrial Bulletin was ostensibly about improving labour relations, articles and photographs relating to U.S. history, American landscapes, folk song and dance, sports, food, personal improvement, and holidays reveal management’s assumption that better workers, and better communication with workers, could only emerge through education about American culture and subsequent integration into American cultural life by diminishing ethnic differences. Assimilation could also fashion compliant workers, a boon for industrial productivity.

CFI’s district meetings were a subtle form of reeducation that started in 1922, featuring a combination of lectures and recreation such as community sings followed by school class programs, short lectures (particularly on workplace safety), comedy skits, sewing classes, and musical bands—all culminating in movie reels that continued past midnight.28 By the 1927 “Community Meeting Number,” such meetings were celebrated as an “accustomed part of the community life” that joined children with parents, and workers with supervisors.29 This cultivation of community ideology through leisure emphasized the general importance of family. Like many early-twentieth-century employers such as Sears or Endicott Johnson, CFI embraced the family as the basic unit of its corporate community.30 Donning a paternal guise, managers hoped to ameliorate the corporation’s image and increase productivity. Expressing an active interest in employees tempered managerial discipline, simultaneously enshrining the employer’s fatherly right to make important business decisions and to intrude into employee homes, as the stability of both
corporate and private families were considered interdependent. CFI children and wives were encouraged to attend classes, and their achievements were celebrated in community meetings. Families were prominently featured in photographs of company picnics or in cover designs depicting idealized white couples with their outdoorsy offspring. Vacations were particularly targeted as family affairs:

The automobile makes it much easier than ever before for the entire family to have an occasional outing together—and usually with moderate expense—a matter which all of us are obliged to keep in mind. ...Such experiences bind families more closely together and leave living memories, among the happiest of a lifetime.

CFI's imagery privileged white nuclear families of flapper-like wives, strong husbands, and athletic boys and girls in a natural environment. Photographs of employee families, typically taken at picnics or festivals, both represented and reproduced the “family as social fact,” which, as Elspeth Brown argues, ultimately served to project “heterosexual, reproductive normativity.” Dissolving the distinction between company and home life was also a strategy to produce workplace harmony: as historian Angel Kwolek-Folland points out, “If the corporation was a family, it could not also be an alien, pitiless, or evil force in American society.” CFI was not alone in promoting this idea of the company as “The Happy Family.” Other welfare capitalists, such as Metropolitan Life Insurance, also developed images of kinship in bulletins and newspapers to develop family loyalty to the firm. Nostalgic for an illusory nineteenth-century society of middle-class, white Americans, CFI sought to construct its own twentieth-century version of “corporate domesticity” that privileged white American-ness. Like Ford, CFI's Americanization programs intruded into its employees’ privacy in attempts to improve domestic life. The company's familial harmony also “derived from a clear sense of hierarchy and duty,” reinforcing gender and class differences. Men and women had distinct responsibilities; family unity was achieved through hard work and the fulfillment of one's duty. Industrial Bulletin's photographs and drawings disseminated CFI's vision of respectable, deferential employees, and in the process, authenticated its conception of American culture.

CFI education programs engaged in a process of cultural formation by representing and organizing social structures of an American type to encourage the assimilation of its ethnic workforce. Although employees were predominantly Mexican, Italian, and Austrian, the social activities and visual representation of CFI workers idealized hegemonic standards of heterosociability, behaviour, and historically Protestant traditions in the U.S. Historian Fawn-Amber Montoya has observed that “New Mexican” crossing the border to work in Colorado mines were initially rejected by CFI officials who refused to accept Nuevos Mexicanos as Americans because they were “ethnically different.” By 1919, however, the company's perspective had changed: management began to edify immigrants as citizens or “good Americans” through company culture like the beautification project.
This focus on assimilation through voluntary associations and activities reflected a wider change in popular notions of race during the 1920s. The combination of wartime nationalism, the rise of the Second Klan, the Red Scare of 1919-1920, and the desire of war refugees to enter the United States encouraged a “hyper-nationalism” in American society. This movement, known as “100 per cent Americanization,” initiated a total “assault on foreign influence in American life.” In 1924, Congress passed the Johnson Reed Act, which limited the number of immigrants allowed into the United States to 155,000 per year, and established a quota system that favoured northern Europeans. The Immigration Act limited citizenship and significantly increased the proportional allotment for ethnic whites, at the same time as it reified non-whites while avoiding “explicit racial language.” Southern and Eastern Europeans, considered members of the “Mediterranean race,” were included within the pantheon of whiteness, but excluded from the predominantly Anglo-Saxon, Protestant American identity by the use of a new term, “ethnicity.” The majority of CFI’s workforce was composed of these ethnically white, yet culturally un-American immigrants, who worried company officials dedicated to the construction of an efficient, cooperative firm. As culture came to be understood as overshadowing biology as the primary determinant of social behaviour, “ethnicity itself provided a paradigm for assimilation.” The process of “whitening” CFI’s European immigrant workforce was transformed from the abstract to the tangible. “Countless quotidian activities” informing popular opinion, such as family picnics, field days, or simply reading Industrial Bulletin, normalized the values that CFI management actively sought to create. The omission of ethnicity within the pages of Industrial Bulletin could not efface, and in fact spoke to, the “hyper-conscious” awareness of ethnic differences within the CFI community.

CFI’s attempts at Americanization were subtler than the hysteria published in the wider U.S. press. A 1925 issue of Industrial Management voiced the fear that “socialism, communism, and other “isms” [were engaged] in a ceaseless effort to destroy the present order of things,” specifically noting that American “civilization” was being safeguarded by employee publications. Although this Americanization program at CFI donned the guise of labour harmonization, the recurring desire to re-educate workers according to normalized standards of white American citizenship is evident in the Industrial Bulletin, as the processes of “becoming white” and “becoming American” were intrinsically interrelated. It is difficult to assess the extent to which this racial agenda was successful, however. David Nye has pointed out that company records indicate that workers at General Electric showed widespread enthusiasm for Americanization strategies in 1917, yet he also suggests that this could have been the result of GE management’s “veiled order” for immigrants to attend. Setting aside this historical dilemma, it is nevertheless useful to analyze Industrial Bulletin as a company magazine that encouraged corporate integration through assimilation within the social and political context of the 1920s.
As at General Electric, English language classes were an integral part of CFI's agenda for assimilation. The Morley, Colorado Community Meeting from 1927 enthusiastically reported that ten first-graders sang “Howdy Do My Partner” in perfect English at the evening gathering, a feat particularly remarkable because half the class had been unable to speak English at the beginning of term. Articles highlighting English instruction for workers’ children were routinely published in Industrial Bulletin, and they emphasized the need for proper language skills to succeed in the corporate world. The magazine’s rare use of colloquialisms served to reinforce the distinction between “un-cultured” immigrants, and respectable, “acculturated” American citizens, thus encouraging the formation of the latter type, which Industrial Bulletin articles showed to overwhelmingly occupy management positions. The miscellaneous items at the end of the November 1922 issue satirized this dichotomy. In “Heard Around the Lester Store,” an Italian conversed with a mine clerk in non-standard English. In addition to his categorical label (“the Italian,” not “Italian-American”), the man’s grammar and ignorance conveyed his ethnically inferior status in comparison to the eloquent, knowledgeable, and tacitly white clerk:

Italian to Mine Clerk – “Meester Boss, whatsa deesa polar bear?”
Mine Clerk – “Why, it’s a bear that lives around the North Pole.”

Italians were not the only minority to be ridiculed in the magazine; African-American slang was also lampooned. A separate column on the same page parodied a black soldier trying to better his position: “Coloured rookie: ‘I’d lahk to have a new pair of shoes, suh!’” Another joke highlighted the vernacular English of Eastern Europeans. While it accentuated the limits of the token representative’s knowledge, the joke also mocked Cohen’s dubious commitment to the Jewish religion, which traditionally prohibits the consumption of pork:

Cohen (entering delicatessen [sic] store): “Gif me some of that salmon.”
Proprietor: “That’s not salmon, that’s ham.”
Cohen: “Vell, who asked you what it was?”

These examples of mocking speech patterns through ethnic or racial stereotypes underscore the limits of company harmony. While the logo preached “cooperation,” the back pages of the Industrial Bulletin contemptuously derided immigrants who failed to adopt white American standards of address. Indeed, historians Esch and Roedinger have suggested that “race-management,” or the “extraction of production” within the workplace, coexisted with scientific management as a “complementary” strategy. Management’s explicit awareness of its “racial knowledge,” manifested in CFI’s segregated recreational facilities and racist jokes, linked its modern techniques to the “management of work under slavery.” CFI management thus actively shaped the U.S. racial system that it believed itself to merely be expressing. Connected to frequent announcements for language classes, such caricatures established standards of behaviour that privileged Anglo-American citizenship.
The representation of racial difference in the publication also served to create a sense of white solidarity: at a time when immigration was rising, CFI used *Industrial Bulletin* to fortify its vision of American culture—a culture that had no place for the ethnic “other.”

Community identity was also visually constructed through the architecture of mining towns, which were typically erected in areas that were previously uninhabited. CFI publicized its new dwellings and industrial sites by broadcasting “new installations” to all employees through photographs in *Industrial Bulletin*. Regular issues on “beautification” featured articles and photographs celebrating aesthetic progress. And “progress” it certainly was, as CFI suggested that work was enjoyable—and more efficient—whenever surroundings were made attractive, as was shown in the October 1924 issue “Progress in Beautification.” These “vast improvements” not only inspired “object lessons” for the rest of the company, but also highlighted the cooperation between employees and departmental management. Personal stories from officers like Personnel Manager L.V. Selleck at the Minnequa Steel works and John E. Rogers of the Denver office boasted of positive mutual interaction. Photographs emphasized the natural, environmental character of Minnequa steelworks, featuring sundials, elegantly trimmed lawns, and alfalfa fields surrounding the Company stables. All these images presented a stark juxtaposition with the industrial landscape of the metallurgy plant.

If this was not impetus enough, the magazine also printed testimonials linking architectural order with social improvement reminiscent of the Progressive Era discourse on urban sanitization. By canvassing employee wives, the company indirectly publicized its community outreach. Mrs. Fred Baker from Primero, CO, for example, was quoted as having replied:

> Children who are reared in an atmosphere of attractive home surroundings are better physically, mentally, and morally than those who are reared in ugly, sordid, and unsanitary conditions. ‘A Clean body creates a clean mind,’ therefore, in time, making better men and women.

Mrs. Baker’s emphasis on mental and moral improvement through pleasant surroundings, both at work and at home, was reiterated by Mrs. J.D. Cribbs from Florence, CO, who added: “the beautifying of home surroundings encourages thrift, better morals, and self-respect.” CFI’s rhetoric of “beautification” was thus not directed at the public eye, but rather at the internal eye of employees and their families. Improving efficiency by creating a clean and wholesome environment was not only important for increased productivity, but also to inculcate an appropriate—and implicitly Protestant—ethic in its workers. Orderly camps and homes were also necessary to combat disease and contagion spread by squalour. Urban sanitation was thus linked to social betterment, and by erecting new buildings CFI entered the business of constructing “clean minds.”
Employee improvement, both financial and moral, was offered as a route to fabled American success. Workers were exhorted to conduct themselves according to traditional Christian values, such as extending friendship and charity to others: “For is not Friendliness the thing of all things that is most pleasant in this world? Sometimes it has seemed to me that the faculty of reaching out and touching one’s neighbour where he really lives is the greatest of human achievements.”

On a practical level, employees were warned to guard themselves against rampant speculation. Management extolled the notion that the “only way to save money is to save it.” Tables showing money deposited in weekly amounts from one dollar to ten dollars lent a scientific polish to the merits of compound interest. While financial guides blurred the distinction between management and labour by effacing real socioeconomic differences with the rationale that it is not what one earned, but what one saved, that counted, they also served to reinforce Victorian ideals of thrift, ambition, and discipline.

Industrially Bulletin was thus rife with rags-to-riches stories that appeared to demonstrate how saving inevitably led to great success. According to this fable, the meteoric rise of company executives could “well serve as an inspiring object lesson to young men who desire to cast their lot in the steel industry, and who are willing to apply themselves to their work patiently, persistently, and intelligently.” But, saving did not only entail success. Fortunately for management, it could also improve performance. A man who saved a little money as he went along could “always put a little more into his work than the fellow who [was] constantly worrying about his personal finances.” This rhetoric of advancement through hard work and thrift aligned with Protestant values and encouraged employees to invest in CFI in the long-term.

Crafting clean minds required more than sanitary homes and Protestant morals, however. English classes were merely one facet of CFI’s comprehensive education system that included elementary through high school. An entire issue of Industrially Bulletin was devoted to “Our High School and College Students,” picturing a road leading to a temple emblazoned with “Knowledge.” This blatant imagery reinforced the company policy of encouraging night classes for men, women, and children. Educating the entire family, and particularly the children, was an important element of CFI’s contribution “toward the future of our Nation.” Paying lip service to national welfare did not obscure the message that education was equally important to secure CFI’s future prosperity. Professor W.E. Holloway, Superintendent of the Rockvale, Colorado schools, asserted that the most important aim of education “should be to teach the dignity and importance of work.” Campaigns directed at workplace safety encouraged children to remind their fathers and older brothers about being careful on the job: “Catch ’em young’ is right when we are to do anything with the boys and girls who are growing up to take our places,” one writer opined. He suggested mining camps follow the lead of St. Louis and set up “safety leagues” to train children in first aid and personal hygiene, as well as to teach them “I will nots” like playing with matches.

Hoping to improve its workforce, the company also subsidized vocational training for men, and encouraged women to attend sewing and cooking classes in order to create a better home environment. Food was an important element in community identity, as Anglo-American recipes for “wholesome” dishes frequently graced the back pages of the company periodical. Industrially Bulletin’s meager records of class attendance render it difficult to gauge the extent to which families and individuals engaged with these opportunities. A rare table
documenting enrollment at Minnequa indicates that citizenship, English, and shop mathematics were the most popular for men. The teenage and junior girls’ clubs show the highest enrollment, however, suggesting that CFI’s edification program was particularly successful with the younger generation. Ethnic patterns are almost impossible to analyze, although a single Steel Works’ list of women who signed up for cooking classes at the local YMCA overwhelmingly features Italian and Eastern European surnames, an indication that these ethnicities were most likely to participate in cooking seminars.

Skill training was merely one side of CFI’s wider attempt to acquaint its community with American patterns of living. The CFI “Cooperative Educational Institute” explicitly stated that citizenship (the first subject of its program) was “vital and essential.” Since the United States was a democracy, “All people must be trained in the duties of citizenship and brought to a full realization of their responsibilities as citizens.” Anxieties about employee ignorance with regard to American traditions suffused attempts to inculcate respectable citizenship in the face of social decay. Articles warned that American civilization was “in danger of being undermined by the failure of our people to observe the laws of our country and the community in which they live.” Enlightening employees and their families about the prerogatives of U.S. citizenship was thus intended to protect hegemonic interests; if workers followed the sage wisdom of their managerial elders, they would no longer pose a threat to the social order.

Patriotism was encouraged through a wide range of activities at CFI, including Protestant traditions like Christmas and Easter services, as well as Halloween dances, and sportswear fashion shows put on by fifth and sixth-graders. The Fourth of July was a particularly celebrated day, during which employees were encouraged to participate in American rituals like folk dancing, Hollywood films, and sports such as baseball, boxing, swimming, and wrestling. Industrial Bulletin also reprinted an article from the Daughters of the American Revolution about appropriate uses of the U.S. flag: “There is a right way to do things. There is also a wrong way. Sometimes we intentionally do things in the wrong way because we do not just exactly know the right way. This is often true in the use of our Nation’s flag.” Readers—assumed to be doing things “the wrong way”—were advised that the flag was raised at sunrise and lowered at sunset, that it must always precede other flags in a parade, that it could not be allowed to fall, that it could never be worn as part of a costume or decorate any kind of furniture, and so on. After delineating the proper use of this patriotic symbol, the company then advised its employees and their wives to exercise their democratic right to vote: “Our company’s employees, whether as wage-earners or representatives of management, and also the women in our homes, who are entitled to vote, all have the very definite patriotic duty to perform this year.”

Informal lectures on the American flag, “white” cultural activities, and obligations of citizenship did not take the form of classroom education, yet nonetheless, encouraged loyalty to, and identification with a wider nation that was united by history lessons. In the early days of Rockefeller’s ERP, children walked in parades at company-sponsored field days dressed as historical figures from the American southwest. Many issues printed famous quotations from the Founding Fathers, such as Abraham Lincoln’s “Gettysburg
Address” or George Washington’s “Farewell Address.” The February 1927 issue cleverly associated liberty with citizenship, tying “American-ness” to CFI’s progressive Employee Representation Plan through Washington’s words:

Citizens by birth or choice, of a common country, that country has a right to concentrate your affections. The name of AMERICAN, which belongs to you, must always exalt the just pride of patriotism. The independence and liberty you possess are the work of joint councils and joint efforts, or common dangers, sufferings, and successes. 85

Washington’s address insinuated that CFI’s joint representation committees were a direct legacy of U.S. independence, and moreover, subsumed ethnic differences within American identity past and present. The quotation encouraged patriotism within the CFI community, blurring distinctions between region, position, and ethnicity through the pride of being “AMERICAN” above all else. The emphasis on cooperation through “common dangers, sufferings, and successes” shared by management and labour alike also served a prescriptive function, encouraging workers to accept managerial authority.

This essay has attempted to outline the elusive facets of “Americanization” embedded in Industrial Bulletin’s corporate message of cooperation. The magazine served as a forum for both managerial opinion, and the dissemination of an ideal American citizenship based on language, history, leisure activities, and comportment. The racial project implied in the company’s desire to train an efficient, responsive, and satisfied workforce privileged certain subjectivities over others, mocking ethnic stereotypes, and encouraging assimilation through community activities under the aegis of corporate welfare. Although management’s paternalistic vision of “cooperation” was inherently one-sided, testimonials by workers grateful for new homes, community events, and ambulance services indicate that CFI’s agenda was relatively successful. 86 Circulating its vision of an ideal corporate “family,” CFI literally and pictorially constructed the American culture that it appeared to merely represent.

Endnotes

1. Greg Patmore and Jonathon Rees, “Employee Publications and Employee Representation Plans: The Case of Colorado Fuel and Iron, 1915-1942,” Management & Organizational History 3 (2008): 260. There is an interesting Canadian twist to this story, for the ERP was actually designed by future Prime Minister William Mackenzie King at Rockefeller’s behest.
4. Angel Kwolek-Folland, Engendering Business: Men and Women in the Corporate Office, 1870–1930 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994), 160. Kwolek-Folland applies this reification to the union of Metropolitan Life agents, whose Employees Fidelity Organization “embodied the conflicted nature of white-collar unions: it simultaneously set employees apart, even as it asserted their fidelity to the company.”
5. Rees, “What If a Company Union Wasn’t a ‘Sham’?,” 460-61. According to Rees, the minutes from most of the joint meetings “read more like gripe sessions than dialogues.”


14. Ibid. Quoted from a report by Elton Mayo outlining the questionable veracity of the text: “The minutes are extensively jerrymandered, speeches deemed unwise are taken out, occasionally, statements that have not been made are put in.”


17. Roland Marchand, *Creating the Corporate Soul: The rise of public relations and corporate imagery in American big business*, 16.

18. Rees, “What If a Company Union Wasn’t a ‘Sham’?,” 457. Rees uncovered no documentation indicating that Dow’s complaint had been registered and resolved.


20. Ibid., 80. The Rockefeller Plan was formally abandoned on December 13, 1933, when CFI entered into a contract with the United Mine Workers of America.


26. Steinmetz also called Bolshevism an “industrial sickness” that was infecting America.


41. Michael Omi and Howard Winant, Racial Formation in the United States: From the 1960s to the 1990s (New York: Routledge, 1994), 55-56. Omi and Winant define “racial formation” as the “socio-historical process by which racial categories are created, inhabited, transformed, and destroyed.” This process is situated in historical “projects in which human bodies and social structures are represented and organized.” They refer to nationalism as a means by which hegemonic standards can oppress forms of difference within a geopolitical state like the U.S.
44. Matthew Frye Jacobson, Whiteness of a Different Color: European Immigrants and the Alchemy of Race (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1998), 96-97. The notion of a “reforged, consanguine Caucasian race” encompassing “Nordics, Alpines, and even Mediterraneans,” who had formerly been distinguished by Nordic white supremacism, emerged in response to the “rising tide of colour,” following World War I. Jacobson argues that the integration of certain non-Nordics under the Caucasoid umbrella was made explicit in Lothrop Stoddard’s The Rising Tide of Color against White Supremacy (1920), and Reforging America (1927).
47. Jacobson, Whiteness of a Different Colour, 110.
48. John Higham, Strangers in the Land, 234. Historian John Higham argues that “[u]ntil the twentieth century, native Americans had not supposed that national homogeneity depended, necessarily or desirably, on social pressures to assimilate the immigrants,” assuming that assimilation “would follow readily enough from the general institutions and atmosphere of American society…”
50. Eric Margolis, “Western Coal Mining as a Way of Life,” Journal of the West 24 (July 1985): 44. Margolis found this attitude was still extant when he interviewed miners decades later.
65. CFI, “Health and Disease Both Contagious,” Industrial Bulletin (21 January 1921): 12. The choice was stark, as employees were asked: “Do you stand for cleanliness and health, or do you stand for untidiness and disease?”


68. Mandell, The Corporation as Family, 32.


74. CFI, ‘Catch ’Em Young,” Industrial Bulletin (June 1927): 22.


76. Marchand, Creating the Corporate Soul, 16. Marchand argues that workers’ wives were taught to be “frugal housekeepers” and “skillful cooks” at CFI’s “model cottages.” Quoting the Chicago Tribune, he notes that these cooking schools were “brainchild” of “the wise men of the Colorado Fuel and Iron Company’s sociological Department,” who thought the best way to get rid of drunkenness among employees was to ameliorate their alimentary and private lives: “to a hungry man the attractiveness of home begins at the table.”


78. CFI, Industrial Bulletin Community Meeting Number (January 1927): 5.


85. Montoya, “From Mexicans to Citizens,” 34.

Poker, Chainsaws, and Drugs: Snapshots of America in the 1960s

Jonathan Boerger

The following is a collection of three metaphorical snapshots depicting the relationships between the American government and certain segments of the population. These snapshots attempt to characterize and describe American government actions and policies in situations in which issues of security are the focal point. A trend of militarization becomes acutely apparent in government interactions with American citizens ranging from indigenous peoples from remote rural areas, to impoverished urban dwellers, to middle-class suburbanites. The snapshots of these groups compose a family portrait that illustrates how Uncle Sam got what he wanted—at least in the 1960s.

A Stacked Deck: High Stakes National Security

The American government and several indigenous groups in America are engaged in a high stakes poker game that features national security as the prize. The strategy, secrecy, mistrust, and risks of high stakes poker describe the relations of these groups of key players, and illustrate their historic interactions. National security refers to a range of concerns and values at stake, including religious sites, political security, economic well-being, and environmental sustainability. The game of high stakes poker illustrates how the United States government developed nuclear arms as a threatening trump card against the Soviet Union while also gaining an unfair advantage by abusing indigenous peoples. In addition, all the players of the game maintain secrecy and pass on their knowledge generationally—along with the issues and risks inherent to the game.

The U.S. government pursued the development of nuclear arms from the end of the Second World War and throughout the Cold War as a “trump all” approach to national security. However, the nuclear arms “ace” was also pursued by the Soviet Union. The nuclear trump cards of these nations ultimately proved to be more useful as mutual threats than as cards that could be used to create a “winning hand” of national security. However, the nuclear weapons were unnatural weapons, meaning they were created through the manipulation
of nature (splitting the atom), as opposed to using naturally occurring elements. The risks and consequences of “stacking the deck” through this atomic manipulation were often absorbed not by the American government, but by the indigenous groups whose lands were appropriated for nuclear testing and development. We now know that “cheating” nature has consequences (i.e. radioactive fallout and waste), and that somebody must pay the penalty.

In addition, the American government began the game with unfair advantages: it exceeded the “maximum buy-in” by appropriating others’ “chips,” and did not even allow indigenous groups to enter the game until an advanced stage. In other words, the U.S. government took land from indigenous peoples and used it for its own purposes, without considering indigenous viewpoints or their rights to ownership and use of their lands. For example, the Tewa people of the Pajarito Plateau in New Mexico have had many of their sacred religious sites appropriated by the government for nuclear research. One Tewa resident relates the power imbalance, saying that although his people have the right to use a sacred site, they no longer own it. The resident claims, “It’s always the anthropologists, archaeologists, and engineers that have the legal advantage.” Similarly, another Tewa spokesperson expresses that his mistrust of the government is justified because of fifty years of silence from the government regarding health issues related to the Los Alamos National Laboratory. The abuse the Tewa and other indigenous peoples have suffered at the hands of the U.S. government continues to affect relations between these groups as they attempt to achieve their own national security.

The American government has also maintained its advantage by “bluffing.” It effectively diverts attention from its own national security efforts through the juxtaposition of certain military bases with indigenous peoples. Valerie Kuletz relates her experiences touring the China Lake weapons research center in California, saying that there, “the camera was forbidden,” while in neighbouring Death Valley (where the Timbisha band of the Western Shoshone live), “everyone photographs the desert as they are meant to.” Thus, indigenous peoples paradoxically serve as a tourist diversion from government secrets, yet remain greatly marginalized from American society. Clearly, the game has not been entirely fair.

Secrecy has always been an element of this high stakes game of national security. Knowledge is power, and everyone involved in the game knows it. All the players keep their cards well hidden, but they also pass them on to successive generations. The Tewa have ancient stone kivas and mysterious religious rituals, while the government possesses its esoteric nuclear science and weaponry with secrecy. However, what is no secret is that something must be done with the thousands of tons of nuclear waste that will also be inherited by many generations to come. The storage of nuclear waste is an issue that the American government and indigenous peoples alike will have to consider as a crucial factor of their national security. For the government, it is simply an unwanted by-product they wish to dispose of. For indigenous groups, it is more complicated. Nuclear waste storage constitutes both a threat to religious sites and human health, and a potential source of income that may help them procure economic security. Regardless of the outcome, the game goes on with no possibility of folding out for any player.
Chainsaw Renovations: Applying Military Knowledge and Expertise to Urban America

The application of military knowledge and expertise to domestic urban issues in America in the 1960s was like hiring lumberjacks wielding chainsaws to remodel homes and refinish fine antique furniture. Like the image and noise of a chainsaw, military tactics provided police forces and politicians with conspicuous ways to visibly counter issues of urban unrest. However, rather than helping to revitalize derelict inner-city cores, the use of militarily inspired strategies resulted in more destruction than socially constructive results—just as chainsaws are designed to take apart and not build up. Ultimately, the real beneficiaries were the corporate and military “lumberjacks” employed by the government.

More than three hundred urban upheavals between 1965 and 1968 made it clear to American politicians that something had to change in their management of the swelling ranks of city dwellers. The very name of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 hints that control was a key element of government strategy. President Richard Nixon betrayed the real motive of crime control when he stated: “I say that doubling the conviction rate in this country would do more to cure crime in America than quadrupling the funds for [Hubert] Humphrey’s war on poverty.” In other words, Nixon would rather have had more people in jail than fewer people suffering from poverty. People in jail are (relatively) easy to control. Empowering people to live free from poverty is in many ways the opposite of control (although in line with capitalist free market rhetoric). Given that chainsaws excel at removing unwanted portions, yet are not easily applied to constructive efforts, the “chainsaw” of military knowledge and expertise was, therefore, employed.

To find ways of controlling urban populations, the government turned to the military. In the late 1960s, Milwaukee Mayor Henry Maier called for the assembly of the “domestic equivalent of the military Joint Chiefs of Staff,” with the goal of “win[ning] our war against ghetto conditions.” What Maier was really saying was that they needed organized, visible power to crush the threats they perceived in cities. This power display was like bringing a chainsaw into a home to remodel and restore antique furniture—no subtle, tedious sanding required. It communicated loudly (if not clearly) that the government was present and in charge. It was also part of the scheme to instill a certain amount of fear in the American public about uncontrolled lawlessness, as well as a tactic of intimidation aimed at those the government considered to be its enemies. As military knowledge and expertise were used to institute domestic local control, new technologies like police helicopters and Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) teams were developed. The police helicopter was a visible and audible tool (or weapon) that reminded everyone who was in charge.

Rather than using the principles of an outdoor tool like a chainsaw (i.e. military knowledge that was internationally applicable) to create new tools like handsaws or table saws that would have indoor applications (such as domestic urban education, healthcare, and social programs), the government simply hired “lumberjacks with chainsaws,” and set them loose on the remodeling and refinishing of urban areas. Derelict urban cores were literally clear-cut to make way for new highways and convention centres.
developing tools and strategies that would restore what was already there and help those disadvantaged by poverty by giving them the new tools and training needed to, in a sense, renovate their own homes, the government hired others to do the work.

However, considering that by the mid-1970s it was understood that military expertise had not improved the quality of life or municipal services, the real beneficiaries of the militarization of urban planning and policing were companies like Bell and Hughes, which was selling one hundred and twenty police helicopters per year by 1972. Other military and weapons corporations benefitted similarly, as they could simply sell their “chainsaw” military products and knowledge for local home use, rather than investing in technologies and strategies that would effectively benefit the disadvantaged residents of urban America. Thus, the use of military “chainsaw” expertise and knowledge in urban America was clumsy, and even horrific, at times—certainly not what could be termed “urban renewal.”

(Too) High on Fear: Government Drug Experimentation

The United States government has used its power to sensitizie and desensitize its citizens to the nation’s militarization and its effects, much like a doctor conducting drug experiments on a patient. Envisioning American government-citizen relations as a manipulative doctor-patient relationship allows us to see how the seemingly contradictory sensitization of American civilians in the mid-1950s (government efforts to instill a manageable amount of fear in the population), and the desensitization of American civilians that began during the Vietnam War (government attempts to differentiate hyper-militarized war veterans from civilians) were both part of government strategies to manipulate the body of the American populace to respond to their will: to see themselves as American heroes and guardians of freedom while seeing others as potential—if not outright evil—threats.

During the Cold War mid-1950s, the American government injected the country with an addictive, fear-based, adrenaline-like drug that would cause its citizens to be more aware of the dangers of nuclear war and support the nation’s militarization. The government “doctor” realized that in order for the American public (the patient) to come on board with its increasing militarization of American culture, it would have to be motivated by fear. Federal Civil Defense Act (FCDA) director Val Peterson called for a demonstration that would “scare the American people out of their indifference.” Peterson’s wish was granted when the government enacted Operation Alert, a national civil defence simulation exercise that acted out a potential World War III nuclear attack on American soil, complete with city evacuations and mock bombs. Essentially, the government realized that it needed to motivate American civilians to increase their productivity while also accepting the increasing militarization of their society. Therefore, a healthy dose of fear was prescribed. The trick was to inject the American people with enough fear to motivate them, without overloading their system and creating actual mass panic. In a way, this government experiment was as if they had drawn the attention of the American public to an object they were already aware of (nuclear weapons), and injected them with adrenalin to produce a stress/fear response. The public was then told that the
object in view was the source of their fear, but that everything would be fine—as long as the doctor was the one holding the weapons. Thus, the desired patient response was produced through government manipulation.

However, government strategies had to change in the late 1960s and early 1970s, as they had to deal with returning Vietnam War veterans, many of whom found it difficult to readjust to normal life. From the government's viewpoint, Vietnam War veterans were American citizens who had become too desensitized to militarized violence. Many veterans found they could not leave the fighting in Vietnam; some veterans even killed friends and other civilians, thinking they were still in Vietnam. Startlingly, it was not until 1979 that Congress officially recognized Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) as a “valid medical condition,” authorizing Veterans Administration hospitals to treat it. Why such a long wait? The reason is not simply that psychological research and diagnosis take time. Vietnam War veteran Brian Winhover states that after his belated PTSD diagnosis, he realized he was “normal for what [he] went through.” This statement reveals what the government realized and tried to control: any American could be an unstable threat of violence if they were traumatized enough. Consequently, the government wanted to dissociate these veterans from the rest of American society. In other words, the government “doctor” took the American “patient’s” hand, numbed it with Novocain, and convinced the patient that it was no longer part of his body. Telling the patient to turn his head away, the Doctor used the completely numbed and desensitized hand to put out a fire. When feeling had returned to the hand and the patient saw it, the doctor told the patient that his hand had been burned by someone else, an “evil other.”

Thus, the American government has used the experimental drugs of fear and vilification to manipulate the American people into accepting militarization, seeing unknown others as evil, and themselves as the forces of good. As this process continues during the “War on Terror,” it seems that these experiments have proven that fear and vilification are, in fact, highly addictive. Once again, we are forced to ask: what will be passed on to future generations?

Endnotes

2. Ibid.
3. Ibid., 139.
9. Ibid.
15. Ibid., 13. In 1973, using “no-knock” warrants, two Office of Drug Abuse Law Enforcement (ODALE) detachments vandalized two American homes, holding the owners at gunpoint while verbally threatening and abusing them. One traumatized victim had to be evacuated to the local psychiatric ward.
17. Ibid., 470-471.
19. Ibid., 60.
20. Ibid., 69.
Benjamin Franklin, eighteenth century revolutionary American, seems far removed from Thomas Hobbes, seventeenth century English advocate of “absolute sovereignty.” However, a closer look at their writings shows that the two are surprisingly similar in their assertions about freedom and morality. Franklin’s worldview in his *Dissertation on Liberty and Necessity, Pain and Pleasure* (1725), is based on necessity and the denial of human free will, which echoes Hobbes’ claim in the *Leviathan* that Man is nothing more than a beast, ruled by the laws of nature. Franklin later repudiated the *Dissertation* and upheld freedom by emphasizing the existence of morality and personal agency. Likewise, Hobbes says that men *freely* emerge from the state of “war of all against all,” and *freely* adhere to the morality of the resulting commonwealth. There is an apparent inconsistency in the work of both Hobbes and Franklin; but in fact, both are consistent with their initial denial of freedom. By advocating an arbitrary, materialistic, utilitarian notion of morality, they prove that “freedom” for them is not true freedom at all.

Franklin directly denies human freedom in his *Dissertation on Liberty and Necessity, Pain and Pleasure*. A creature, he says, “can have no such Thing as Liberty, Free-will or Power to do or refrain an Action.” He argues this based on the proposition that God, being all-powerful and all good, cannot permit evil things to happen. If God wanted evil to exist, God would not be good; and if he were not able to prevent evil, he would not be all-powerful. Franklin says, “there can be nothing either existing or acting in the Universe against or without [God’s] Consent: and what He consents to must be good, because He is good: therefore Evil does not exist.” Thus, everything we do must be good because all our power comes from God and we depend upon his will. Even if a person were to steal a horse, says Franklin, he is acting “according to Truth” because he is “naturally a covetous Being, feeling an Uneasiness in the want of [another’s] Horse, which produces an Inclination for stealing him.” The key words for Franklin here are “naturally” and “Inclination.” Acting “according to Truth” is mere inclination because we cannot act contrary to what our natural
make-up demands. Franklin states that the only “freedom” we have is the freedom of an inanimate object: a “heavy Body … has Liberty to fall, that is, it meets with nothing to hinder its Fall, but at the same Time, it is necessitated to fall, and has no Power or Liberty to remain suspended.” In other words, we can only act according to necessary laws of nature, and so we are not free. According to Franklin, this creates a wonderful balance in the moral as well as in the natural system. Everything runs like clockwork.

Franklin’s rejection of freedom is a direct echo of Hobbes’ *Leviathan* (1651). Hobbes says that “Liberty, and necessity are consistent: as in the water, that hath not only liberty, but a necessity of descending by the channel.” Like Franklin after him, he compares our liberty to the liberty of an inanimate object. Similarly, he would agree with Franklin that everything directly proceeds from God’s will. Hobbes says that every act of our will, any inclination, comes as a result of a chain of causality, the first cause being God: “[T]he liberty of man … is accompanied with the necessity of doing that which God will… [Men] can have no passion, nor appetite to any thing, of which appetite God’s will is not the cause.” Like Franklin, then, he would agree that this is a perfectly balanced moral system. Men are puppets of the divine will. From this, Franklin would conclude not only that we are not free, but also that we can be nothing but good, since God is completely good. Hobbes, however, does not admit to absolute “good” or “evil.” Simply put, “good” is whatever we are attracted to; and “evil” is whatever we are revolted by. According to this logic, if I am equally revolted by a pile of garbage and by a foul murder, both are equally evil.

Our natural attractions and revulsions are at the basis of our freedom, according to Hobbes. His concept of “voluntary motion,” which he calls “animal motion,” diminishes our freedom to the “freedom of beasts.” In fact, we apparently share with beasts both “deliberation” and “will”: the roots of a voluntary act. Hobbes insists that our will is nothing but the end result, the “last appetite” of “deliberation,” which is a series of “appetites, and aversions, hopes, and fears” that comes to mind when faced with a decision. Beasts have a “will,” just as we do, as the last appetite of their “deliberation.” The words “deliberation” and “will” are not generally associated with “beasts,” since our human rationality would seem to play a key role in weighing utility and making choices based on *understanding* versus *instinct*. Hobbes, therefore, is denying human rationality by arguing that our very rationality is only one more effect in a chain of causality. The Hobbesian “will” is not really *free*. As Frederick Copleston says, Hobbes’ theory of necessary causes and effects “at once rules out all freedom in man, at least if freedom is taken to imply absence of necessity.”

In his *Dissertation*, Franklin takes this materialistic necessity to its obvious consequences: if there is no freedom, there is no morality. “If there is no such Thing as Free-Will in Creatures,” he writes, “there can be neither Merit nor Demerit in Creatures.” Kerry Walters says that Franklin was much more consistent than other deists by affirming this. According to Walters, Franklin “clearly saw that the standard, deistic insistence on uniform and deterministic natural law dealt a mortal blow to the possibility of free will and moral responsibility.” Because we act according to nature, we cannot be responsible
for what we do. If we act according to inclination, we are simply acting according to the truth of our nature. Serial killer Michael Wayne McGray would be relieved to hear this. In an interview, he said that for him killing is “almost a hunger. It's something I need. I have to have that physical release. When I kill, it's a big high for me.”

Franklin's example of horse stealing pales in comparison with this man's “inclination.” According to Franklin, we are not responsible for what we do, and whatever we do is essentially good. Hence, Michael Wayne's sick behaviour becomes “acting according to truth.” In effect, Franklin's interpretation of what it means for all creatures to be “equally esteem'd by the Creator,” means it does not matter what we do. There is an almost exact parallel of Franklin's thought in Hobbes' *Leviathan*. For Hobbes, we are equal to the beasts in our “rationality,” which is similar to all creatures being “equally esteem’d by the Creator.” Moreover, in the Hobbesian state of nature, nothing can be “unjust.” We are ruled by our passions, and especially by the passion of self-preservation; but these passions, being natural to man, are “in themselves no sin”—and “[n]o more are the actions, that proceed from those passions.”

For Hobbes, too, we have no moral responsibility—at least in the state of nature—and thus, no real freedom without any real consequences.

Accordingly, it is logical to conclude that that both Hobbes and Franklin deny human free will, and hence, moral responsibility, but Franklin complicates this by repudiating his *Dissertation* in his *Autobiography* (1771-1790). He says that he realized his earlier piece was “not so clever a Performance as I once thought it; and I doubted whether some Error had not insinuated itself unperceiv'd into my Argument.” He determined after this point that “Truth, Sincerity, and Integrity in Dealings between Man and Man, were of the utmost Importance to the Felicity of Life,” and he resolves to practice these virtues as long as he lives. Although he became a “thorough Deist” early in life, he “began to suspect that this Doctrine tho’ it might be true, was not very useful” when he found that injuries done to him and done by him to others seemed to prove a distinction between vice and virtue, at least in practical living. He does not find his deism very “useful,” and this odd phrasing foreshadows his later views on morality. Indeed, although he repudiates his *Dissertation*, his modest description of the work also reveals some lingering utilitarian ideas with regards to morality. He says that his “printing this Pamphlet was another Erratum,” but all that comes before that phrase shows his pride in the work. He describes the document as a “little metaphysical Piece,” showing fondness with a diminutive expression. He also gives the full title, which is an odd thing to do if he repented its appearing at all. He notes details as to who he inscribed it to and how many he printed. The principles in the pamphlet “appeared” to Mr. Palmer to be abominable, which leads us to suppose that Franklin did not agree. Moreover, the pamphlet helped him to be recognized as a “young Man of some Ingenuity.” He clearly “got something out of” writing this work, and is hardly repentant. Douglas Anderson points out that although Franklin regretted the “printing” of the document, he does not say he regretted writing it. His new promotion of moral perfection, meanwhile, shows that he at least thinks that he has left the *Dissertation* far behind him. It is clear that Franklin admits freedom by admitting morality—which is a very different position from the *Dissertation*, however fond of it he may have been.
Franklin evinces a belief in freedom, by stressing man’s potential to reach perfection. In his *Autobiography*, he says that in his “bold and arduous Project of arriving at moral Perfection” he would try to “conquer all that either Natural Inclination, Custom, or Company might lead me into.” In other words, the Hobbesian laws of nature, and Franklin’s own ideas about “acting according to truth” are forgotten here. He finds the project very difficult, since “Inclination was sometimes too strong for Reason”; but he does want “Reason” to win over “Inclination,” showing a non-Hobbesian view that rationality is greater than a simple effect in a causal chain of several inclinations. Furthermore, he argues that rather than having a mere theoretical idea of being virtuous, one needs to struggle to break old bad habits and form new good ones. As J. A. Leo Lemay says, Franklin “succinctly expresses a philosophy of belief in the individual, a philosophy that allows for the extraordinary accomplishments of mankind.”

Hobbes, too, seems to advocate an “extraordinary accomplishment of mankind” through the creation of the commonwealth out of the state of nature. Men freely agree to create a commonwealth based on reason. Copleston explains that, for Hobbes, “reason” seems to operate separately from all those passions that incline us one way or another, and shows how “the fundamental desire of self-conservation can be made effective.” As a result, “reason suggesteth convenient articles of peace, upon which men may be drawn to agreement. These articles, are they, which otherwise are called the Laws of Nature.” Hobbes implies that men are thus free to seek out ways to preserve themselves, and in this way, “man is not merely a creature of instinct and blind impulse” because “there is such a thing as rational self-preservation.” In order to preserve himself, which is every man’s fundamental good, a man should be willing to “lay down this right to all things; and be contented with so much liberty against other men, as he would allow other men against himself.” The commonwealth is then effectively formed, “as a real unity of them all, in one and the same person, made by covenant of every man with every man… as if every man should say to every man, I authorize and give up my right of governing myself… on this condition, that thou give up thy right to him, and authorize all his actions in like manner.” We later see that this act of submission is “both our obligation, and our liberty” because there is “no obligation on any man, which ariseth not from some act of his own; for all men equally, are by nature free.”

Therefore, we can only submit to this covenant because we are free. Hobbes insists upon this point, saying that the commonwealth is created by the voluntary acts of men towards each other. This seems directly contrary to his theory of necessary causes and effects. How can man be free if he is mechanically determined by materialistic causes that preceded his very “freedom”? The explanation lies in Hobbes definition of freedom: “LIBERTY, or FREEDOM, signifieth, properly, the absence of opposition; by opposition, I mean external impediments of motion; and may be applied no less to irrational, and inanimate creatures, than to rational.” “Freedom” is just as materialistic for Hobbes as everything else. He goes so far as to say that, “from the use of the word free-will, no liberty can be inferred of the will, desire, or inclination, but the liberty of the man; which
consisteth in this, that he finds no stop, in doing what he has the will, desire, or inclination to do.”36 Freedom is by no means internal, but only an external absence of impediments on the determined movements we experience from necessary causes. As Copleston says, “for Hobbes mechanistic determinism has the last word, in the human as in the non-human sphere.”37 It is difficult to discern in this case why men have the privilege of rising out of the state of nature and beasts do not. Perhaps Hobbes distinguishes between “deliberation and will” on the one hand (apparently common to both men and beasts), and “reason” on the other—“reason” being the faculty that indicates how we human beings can endeavour peace. However, Hobbes says it is our voluntary submission that renders the commonwealth possible, which again includes the role of the will. In any event, it is clear that men create commonwealths and animals do not. He does not explain exactly why this is, but one explanation could lie in his elaboration of morality within the commonwealth—a morality that is non-existent in the state of nature, which is where men are presumably equal to beasts. Morality, after all, implies freedom, as Franklin makes clear.

Interestingly enough, Franklin’s concept of freedom also continues to operate in a world of materialistic necessity, even though he advocates morality. As suggested above, there is evidence that Franklin did not absolutely repudiate the ideas in his Dissertation. Necessity still plays a significant role for him in human actions. In the Autobiography, for example, he writes that in his youth he was preserved from “any wilful gross Immorality or Injustice that might have been expected from my Want of Religion.” Anything he did, he argues, was caused by “Necessity” from his “Youth, Inexperience, and the Knavery of others.”38 Lemay downplays Franklin’s insistence on necessity by saying that “the necessitarian notes [in the Autobiography] are deliberately minor.” Lemay argues that Franklin’s idea of the American Dream “rests firmly upon the belief in man’s free will.”39 With all due respect to Franklin’s American Dream, Franklin himself makes the “necessitarian notes” deliberately major. He insists twice in the above-quoted passage that his actions at this time were not wilful (both times italicized). Later in the Autobiography, he excuses his weakness in eating cod when he had determined not to do so from thinking that killing fish was a “kind of unprovok’d Murder.” The cooked fish smelled so good, that after balancing “some time between Principle and Inclination,” and then remembering that this particular fish had eaten other fish, he “din’d upon Cod very heartily”—doing to the fish what the fish had done to others. He remarks, “So convenient a thing it is to be a reasonable Creature, since it enables one to find or make a Reason for everything one has a mind to do.”40 Franklin is being tongue-in-cheek here. He excuses himself on the basis of Reason, but he clearly considers that this situation had something of necessity in it, as well. His elaborate description of the circumstances (the good smell of the fish frying), and his reference to the “Knavery of others” (the fish eating other fish), show that he is excusing himself from wilfully eating the fish. He believes his inclination was too strong for him. Lemay quotes a letter from Franklin to his son after the Revolution, in which it is clear that Franklin considers necessity a principal part of our lives: “Our Opinions are not in our own Power; they are form’d and govern’d much by Circumstances, that are often as inexplicable as they are irresistible.”41
How then does this “necessitarian” view fit in with his views of morality and free will? Mark Twain can give us some insight into Franklin's philosophy. Twain amusingly harangues Franklin for making life miserable for boys. Franklin’s “everlasting aphorisms” are always jumping out at a boy, for “[i]f he wants to spin his top when he is done work, his father quotes, ‘Procrastination is the thief of time.’ If he does a virtuous action, he never gets anything for it, because ‘Virtue is its own reward.’” Franklin’s own aphorism, then, would make his goal of moral perfection appear rigid and rather selfish. If virtue is its own reward, there is no higher purpose for being virtuous then simply to be virtuous, and find satisfaction therein. Although Anderson would have it that virtue is a means for Franklin to the end of happiness, this end is still selfish in Franklin’s own way of seeing it. Franklin’s aim is really nothing more than an experiment to see if he can reach the perfection that belongs to a human being. As he says in his “Junto Query on Human Perfection” (1732), “I suppose the Perfection of any Thing to be only the greatest the Nature of that Thing is capable of… [I]f there may be a perfect Oyster, a perfect Horse, a perfect Ship, why not a perfect Man? That is as perfect as his present Nature and Circumstances admit?”

In the nature of things, there is allowed a certain degree of perfection, which Franklin is determined to achieve. For instance, in his Autobiography he is rather disgruntled by perpetually failing in the virtue of order, but on the whole, he says he is a “better and happier Man” for the experiment, seeing that it has yielded good results. He compares the end result to a process of improving one’s writing: “As those who aim at perfect Writing by imitating the engraved Copies, tho’ they never reach the wish’d for Excellence of those Copies, their Hand is mended by the Endeavour, and is tolerable while it continues fair and legible.” D. H. Lawrence finds this attitude repugnant. “I am a moral animal,” he writes, “But I am not a moral machine. I don’t work with a little set of handles or levers.”

Franklin’s morality is certainly a little bit like a machine. It works according to the balanced clockwork of his earlier Dissertation, where he says, “How exact and regular is every Thing in the natural World! How wisely in every Part contriv’d!… Can we suppose less Care to be taken in the Order of the moral than in the natural System?” There is a useful necessity at work in the moral system of the Dissertation, for the world works so smoothly without the messiness of human free will. This same kind of necessity is at work in his system of moral perfection. Morality, even in appearance only, will work societal wonders. Franklin recounts in the Autobiography how he endeavours to practice humility. He cannot “boast of much Success in acquiring the Reality of this Virtue,” although he “had a good deal with regard to the Appearance of it.” As he changes his manners to suit the Appearance of humility, he realizes quickly that it is quite advantageous to appear humble. “The Conversations I engag’d in went on more pleasantly,” he says. “The modest way in which I propos’d my Opinions, procur’d them a readier Reception and less Contradiction… I more easily prevail’d with others to give up their Mistakes and join with me when I happen’d to be in the right.” In other words, virtue is its own reward, but its side effects are marvellously useful, according to Franklin. Morality becomes as useful as his deism was not. Utilitarianism, likewise, is essential to Hobbes’ view of morality in the commonwealth.
Hobbes’ idea of moral responsibility directly depends on the creation of the commonwealth. He says that men’s passions are not sinful, and neither “are the actions, that proceed from those passions, till they know a law that forbids them: which till laws be made they cannot know: nor can any law be made, till they have agreed upon the person that shall make it.” In other words, only when laws are made, can we have “notions of right and wrong, justice and injustice.” Thus, Hobbes advocates an arbitrarily established morality. Although in his view of necessary cause and effect we are neither free nor responsible for our actions in the state of nature, somehow we become responsible once we have given over our rights to a sovereign and allowed that sovereign to make the rules. We become answerable to a “made-up” morality. Thus, his morality is arbitrary because it is based on whatever the sovereign wills. Moreover, for Hobbes, “moral philosophy is nothing else but the science of what is good, and evil, in the conversation, and society of mankind. Good, and evil, are names that signify our appetites and aversions.” Just as Franklin engages in pleasant conversations under the appearance of humility, Hobbes insists that “good” and “evil” are confined to “conversation” and “society.” Again, good is determined simply by what we are attracted to—by the pleasantness of a thing. Morality is a societal need. In fact, once a person can no longer protect himself, he should not be “moral” any longer. “[H]e that should be modest, and tractable, and perform all he promises, in such time, and place, where no man else should do so, should but make himself a prey to others.” Moral virtues are simply what make for peace.

Likewise, Franklin’s morality is an incentive to keep men in order. Walters argues that Franklin’s morality and religious convictions were “made-up” and utilitarian. He says that Franklin was convinced that “the conventionalities of traditional religion serve as socially necessary checks on human behaviour [sic].” The evidence he produces is strongly in favour of this argument. Franklin says, “if Men are so wicked as we now see them with Religion what would they be if without it?” He also writes that religious belief “will [always] be a Powerful Regulator of our Actions, give us Peace and Tranquility within our Minds, and render us Benevolent, Useful and Beneficial to others.” Franklin continues to use that word “useful.” Indeed, religion and morality are as useful for him as a clock is useful in keeping balance and peace in one’s life.

All of this implies that Franklin’s initial ideas of freedom are still potently present later in life, and still as potently Hobbesian. He denies human free will in light of determinism, but he later implies a denial of free will in light of a utilitarian morality. We can experiment with perfection, but ultimately, all I need to do is engage in pleasant conversation. All I need to do is make sure that my inclinations make for peace. In the end, we are still only acting “according to Truth.” But, what truth? Franklin’s morality is just as arbitrary as Hobbes’. If morality is simply a necessary machine for social order, freedom has no true role to play. It is only the freedom of experimentation in finding the limits of one’s nature. For Franklin, as for Hobbes, man is no more than a beast—limited by inclination.
and laws that demand an egoistical, utilitarian way of interacting with the world. Because they are grounded in a materialistic this-world mentality, their “freedom” can never be truly “free,” since it is simply made-up. The serial killers in the world are indebted to Franklin and Hobbes, for their behaviour is only a social nuisance; it is not really wrong.

**Endnotes**

2. Ibid., 59.
3. Ibid., 58.
4. Ibid., 59.
5. Ibid., 60.
6. Ibid.
7. Ibid., 61.
9. Ibid., II.21, 137-138.
10. Ibid., I.6, 32.
11. Ibid., I.6, 37-38.
19. Ibid.
20. Ibid.; Later in the *Autobiography*, Franklin notes an incident that shows his repudiation of every human action being directly willed by God, and therefore, good. In the account, some natives become intoxicated, and then apologize for raising a ruckus. A certain Orator “endeavour’d to excuse the Rum, by saying, ’The great Spirit who made all things made everything for some Use, and whatever Use he design’d anything for, that Use it should always be put to; Now, when he made Rum,’ he said, ‘LET THIS BE FOR INDIANS TO GET DRUNK WITH. And it must be so.’ Franklin adds, “And indeed, if it be the Desire of Providence to extirpate these Savages in order to make room for Cultivators of the Earth, it seems not improbable that Rum may be the appointed Means. It has already annihilated all the Tribes that formerly inhabited the Seacoast” (102). D. H. Lawrence unfairly criticizes Franklin for this passage, arguing that Franklin really did believe the “extirpation” of the natives a God-willed thing (294). However, Franklin is clearly being ironic and tongue-in-cheek by quoting the Orator’s dogmatic style as he does, and by smoothly pointing out the devastating effects of the rum introduced by the “Cultivators of the Earth.”
21. Ibid., 34.
22. Ibid.
23. Ibid.
26. Ibid.
32. Ibid., II.17, 112.
33. Ibid., II.21, 141.
34. Ibid., I.14, 86.
35. Ibid., II.21, 136-137.
36. Ibid., II.21, 137.
38. Franklin, Autobiography, 46.
43. Anderson, “The Art of Virtue,” 24; In his Autobiography, Franklin shows that he considers virtue an end in itself by proposing a book to show people how to be virtuous: “I should have called my Book the ART of Virtue, because it would have shown the Means and Manner of obtaining Virtue” (74). He is not proposing means to more means, but means to an end—the end of being virtuous.
45. Franklin, Autobiography, 73.
50. Ibid., II.29, 211.
51. Ibid., I.15, 104.
52. Ibid., I.15, 103.
53. Ibid., I.15, 94.
Bayard Rustin: “The Oneness of the Human Family”

Dora Chan

Long before Martin Luther King, Jr. became a national icon in the civil rights movement, before Rosa Parks made her historic refusal to give up her seat for a white bus passenger, and before non-violence became the main instrument of the civil rights movement, another young man was, in a hundred quiet and peaceful ways, trying to put an end to racial intolerance and injustice. Widely described by his contemporaries as a world-class humanist, Bayard Rustin was a black, civil rights activist who played an instrumental role in organizing the 1963 March on Washington, DC. He was an advisor to Martin Luther King, Jr. in the tactics and morality of non-violence, and a fierce advocate of social equality for all. He was arrested twenty-four times throughout his life in the struggle for civil and human rights, spoke at numerous functions, and wrote copiously on ways to build a better world. Yet, he has not become a household name like other civil rights leaders of the era, largely because he worked behind the scenes and kept in the background. A brilliant tactician and organizer, Rustin was rarely in the limelight because of his early communist sympathies, and because he was openly gay.

Rustin would argue that his social activism sprung from his Quaker roots, and the values of mutual respect, love, and understanding taught by his grandparents. Before he died, he said,

“The racial injustice that was present in this country during my youth was a challenge to my belief in the oneness of the human family… but it is very likely that I would have been involved had I been a white person with the same philosophy.”

Until the last decade of his life, Rustin would also argue that sexual orientation was a private matter that did not play a role in his activism. His belief in the “oneness of the human family” accounted for his involvement in a range of social justice issues, including the labour movement, the plight of refugees, anti-Semitism, and racism, both within the United States and abroad.
While his Quaker upbringing and the values it instilled were undoubtedly central to his adherence to non-violence and his acceptance of diversity, it is clear from his writings, interviews, and speeches that his black identity and his homosexual identity also played an important role in motivating his fight for freedom and equality. He faced discrimination on multiple occasions: held back as a black man by systemic racism, attacked by other black leaders for building coalitions with whites, and scrutinized by both whites and blacks for being a homosexual at a time when it was morally and socially prohibited. These experiences gave him an understanding of oppression, and the psychological effects of discrimination that provoked him to act. His identity as a black, gay man influenced how he was perceived publicly, and in turn, these public perceptions shaped his involvement in the civil rights movement.

In a debate with Malcolm X in 1960, the host asked him if progress would require a “greater sense of racial identity.” He answered that it would because, “I believe it is quite impossible for people to struggle creatively if they do not truly believe in themselves.”

Similarly, in a 1987 interview in response to the question on how being gay affected the person he became, he answered that it was very important. “When one is attacked for being gay, it sensitizes you to a greater understanding and sympathy for others who face bigotry, and one realizes the damage that being misunderstood can do to people.”

Rustin’s activism drew from the understanding of mutual oppressions shared by different minority groups, however, his acceptance of his own sexuality as a gay man developed over the course of his lifetime. His black identity, on the other hand, was always a clear part of himself. Rustin has been described as having “a strong black identity,” and as “intensely proud of his Blackness.”

Growing up in West Chester, Pennsylvania, Rustin was exposed to Black American history, folk tales, and culture. He marveled at the legacy of his ancestors’ struggles against slavery, and their escape through the Underground Railroad. In his youth, he enjoyed singing Negro spirituals, and was keen to learn their origins and evolution in work songs and the blues. His travels to Africa in the early 1950s, gave him a newfound sense of pride in his African ancestry, and their culturally rich, ancient civilizations.

He felt that blacks in the U.S. and Africa were united by their common experiences of racial oppression. At the same time, he also distinguished between the plight of black Africans and of black Americans, arguing that while black Africans experienced racism through the brutality of imperialism and colonialism, “Afro-Americans [had] been concerned with it in the context of slavery, segregation, and social inequality.” This distinction also centrally played into his attitudes towards how to fight racial oppression within the United States. In the late 1960s, there was a growing sentiment that in order to regain a sense of black identity, black Americans needed to reach “back to Africa.” Contrary to this, Rustin argued that black identity could only be found in the “struggle for the establishment of the economic and social conditions” that would allow the development of true equality. The key was to remain engaged in the democratic system within America in order to improve black livelihood.
In this way, Rustin’s black identity was very much connected to his American identity. He believed that black Americans wanted what any other American wanted: “a job, decent housing, dignity, decent treatment, and an opportunity to educate [their] youth.” His democratic vision of an egalitarian society was connected to the American values of freedom and equality.

At the same time as he upheld certain American values, he was also outside the mainstream. As Jerald Podair describes it, Rustin was “a socialist in a capitalist nation, a black in a white nation, a pacifist in a militarized nation, and a homosexual in a homophobic nation.” Multiple authors have argued that Rustin actively tried to break away from the white person’s stereotypical view of what it meant to be black, or for that matter, American. He often encountered white audiences who were surprised that he was so educated, eloquent, and cultured. He spoke with a very distinctive “upper class British” accent, saying in an interview with writer Martin Mayer, “I fought for many years against being American—in my speech, in my manner, everything.” He was heavily influenced by western democratic principles, but he also took inspiration from Gandhian notions of non-violence that he learned through his travels to India.

Furthermore, he felt that while the black community was shaped by a common history, there were also distinct divisions within that community. Some of these divisions were within the civil rights movement itself, and in the late 1960s, a new force emerged that problematized previous philosophies of integration, non-violence, and democratic engagement. The “Black Power” slogan was popularized amongst various black activist groups, upheld by such leaders as Stokely Carmichael and Floyd McKissick. These younger leaders emphasized racial pride, argued against white racism, and saw the solution to their oppression in the creation of new and separate institutions for blacks.

Black Power was a rejection of the gendered image of the emasculated black man, an inheritance from the era of slavery when the white man took the black man’s woman as his mistress, and took away his right to provide for his family. The Black Panther Party sought to recreate a powerful identity of black men in an effort to reclaim the manhood that they felt the white man had stolen from them. While this line of thought is not one that dominated Rustin’s perception of whites, Rustin was not exempt from this interpretation. In 1968, in his “Reverberations” column in the New York Amsterdam News, he wrote on the case of LeRoi Jones, beginning, “In a million quiet ways, the majority of white Americans go about insulting the manhood of Negroes every day [emphasis mine].” Rustin was fundamentally concerned with the upholding of rights and civil liberties, and saw Jones’ trial as an example of an unfair judicial system at work that did not treat blacks with dignity or respect. The language he uses equates the unjust treatment of Jones as an affront to his “manhood.”
Even though Black Power proponents would argue that the only way to reclaim their manhood would be through violence and intimidation, Rustin would never have endorsed these tactics. Influenced by his Quaker upbringing, his work as a pacifist, and Gandhi’s teachings, Rustin sought to challenge the institutions of racism, and create a new masculinity through non-violence. He took a stance against racial segregation and in his travels across the country, acted “as a one-man civil disobedience movement.”

During WWII, Rustin was imprisoned as a conscientious objector for refusing to fight in the war. While he was there, he struggled against the segregated prison system. He was finally granted one day a week when he was allowed to visit the “white” floor, but on his first visit there a white inmate named Huddleston threatened him. When Rustin returned the following week, Huddleston began beating him, and though his friends rushed to help, Rustin told them there was no need. Eventually Huddleston stopped, “completely defeated and unnerved by the display of nonviolence.” Rustin won his victory, and from then on, there were no further restrictions to interracial visits. What this incident shows is not only Rustin’s unwavering belief in the power of non-violent resistance for social change, but also an assertion of an alternative masculinity to the aggressive, domineering presence conveyed by Huddleston.

Rustin was a vocal opponent of Black Power, criticizing it as harmful, and ultimately, isolating of the black community. Instead of denouncing whites as “the enemy,” he felt that change could only come about through integration and interracial coalitions. For Rustin, non-violent protest was the best way to achieve equality. He described the sanitation workers’ strike in Memphis, in 1968, as:

“…an illustration of the real power of black people, and an indication that one of the most effective ways of affirming their dignity and identity is by unifying behind and struggling in behalf of the issues that affect them [sic].”

As the movement shifted in the late 1960s, however, Rustin found it increasingly difficult to advocate for non-violence. He tried to encourage young blacks not to react with the same violence that had been used against them in times past, because he claimed, “we are a chosen people… chosen to help free everybody, black and white, from the curse of hate.” He saw that conditions in the ghetto continued to be neglected, and the psychological toll it was taking on young blacks who were tired of being ignored. For Rustin though, the root cause of racism was the economic structure of society, and no amount of violence would force the kind of change necessary to transform this system.

One of Rustin’s greatest criticisms of Black Power was that there was no clear and realistic agenda for change. At a meeting of the National Urban League in New York, Rustin's response to two young black men asserting the importance of black pride was, “Young gentlemen, I agree with you about the importance of pride in being black, but being black is not a program.” For him, white discrimination could not serve as the only
unifying factor, and certainly not as the only “model of belief for those blacks who wish
to abolish racism in America.”

He recognized the many differences within the black
community, but for Rustin, the greatest division was that of class. He argued that a full
economic program would be necessary in order to raise employment, the minimum wage,
and guarantee a steady income for lower-class blacks. This transition in his thinking
is captured best in his essay, “From Protest to Politics: The Future of the Civil Rights
Movement,” in which he advocates for the expansion of civil rights “beyond race relations
to economic relations, including the role of education in modern society.” He believed
that middle-class blacks would be instrumental in this transformation, and that “by
participating in the struggle to uplift their impoverished brothers, they (would) find their
identity and become liberated as human beings.”

In spite of the violent tactics used by the Black Panther Party, they also created positive
programs like the “Free Breakfast” program. However, Rustin makes no mention of these
accomplishments in his writings. Some would argue that it was racial pride which led to the
creation of Black Studies programs in many universities, which gave jobs to skilled black
professors, and rejuvenated interest in black American history. In contrast, Rustin was a
fierce critic of Black Studies, what he called “soul courses,” because he saw their creation as
a capitulation to demands “for black autonomy, separatism, and politicization of academic
life.” Rustin differed from the Black Power proponents about Black Studies, as well as other
programs that he felt would only lead to isolation of the black community.

Even though Rustin took issue with many of the ideas that Black Power espoused,
there were elements of their gendered rhetoric that still coloured Rustin’s perspectives. On
the plight of the Negro, he writes, “He is an American… His ancestors have suffered… He
has roots in this country…” etc. His conception of the black race was gendered as male.
Rustin was instrumental to the organization of the 1963 March on Washington, DC,
where notably no women spoke from the main platform. In the weeks leading up to the
march, the all-male organizing committee, including Rustin, decided that it would be too
difficult to find “a single woman to speak without causing serious problems vis-à-vis other
women,” and so they opted instead to have the chairman introduce the names of the black
female guests so that they could be “applauded, not speak, and then sit down.” Rustin
was not the only member of the panel, and there is no evidence whether he argued for or
against having a woman speak, but he was still part of a ten-person, all-male contingent
that upheld the notion that black men were the natural leaders of the race.

At the same time, Rustin was still interested in the advancement of the black community,
which included both men and women. He criticized the white feminist movement for focusing
too exclusively on aims that would not really help poor or working-class black women, calling
their goals “inadequate in that they are proposed in isolation from the broad social and economic
context of American life.” He argued that unless they began expanding their agenda to demand
changes that would affect the lives of lower- and working-class women, the women’s liberation
movement would “become just another middle-class foray into limited social reform.”
Rustin, with the aid of A. Philip Randolph, proposed a wider solution. In 1966, he announced the “Freedom Budget,” offering an ambitious economic program that sought to eliminate poverty within ten years by creating more jobs, raising the minimum wage, improving education, and providing lower-income housing. In an article published in the New York Amsterdam News in December 1966, Rustin declared that this plan would “remove the burdens from [the] backs of Negro women.” He went on to argue, “Women have had to shoulder too many burdens, and the budget would place responsibility on the shoulders of men where it belongs [emphasis mine].” This echoes the belief that the economic system set up by whites prevented black men from taking on their traditional breadwinner role, and that the “Freedom Budget” would allow the black man to reclaim his manhood, and fulfill the American dream.

The Black Power movement continued to hold on to the image of the strong, black male as one who would be ready to defend himself against his oppressor, by any means necessary. Black Power advocates emphasized the importance of a strong, black masculinity. They used “negative stereotypes of gay men as ‘weak,’ and they used homophobia to seal chinks in the armour of their manly image.” The black man’s emasculation was “reflected most clearly in black gay identity.”

The Black Panther Party never directly attacked Rustin for his homosexuality, but the atmosphere of intolerance was prevalent in wider society. It is perhaps the hostility that he faced in the black community that also led him to seek relationships with white men, who were also the visible face of the gay rights struggle. This is not to say that he hid his sexuality from the black community; in fact, those who worked with him knew, and the numerous attacks he faced for it made his identity all too public. As long as Rustin was not flaunting his homosexuality (i.e. not “coming on” to any young boys he met while traveling, not getting caught in any “lewd” acts, and not being promiscuous), he could remain part of the movement.

When his homosexuality was seen as a threat, Rustin was pressured to remove himself from the picture. Specifically, in 1953, when on a speaking circuit in Pasadena for the Fellowship of Reconciliation (FOR), he was arrested on a “morals charge” for performing oral sex with two white men in the back seat of a car. In 1960, when black Congressman Adam Clayton Powell, Jr. threatened to release a rumour that King and Rustin were sexually intimate, Rustin was pressured to resign his post with the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC). King himself never denounced Powell’s claim, nor did he defend Rustin.

In both of these cases, Rustin faced an unjust double standard. For heterosexual members of the FOR, meeting their future spouse in the course of their pacifist activities would have been seen as perfectly legitimate. For Rustin though, there was “little room for constructing a gay-centered personal life,” and when he did engage in casual relationships he was frowned upon. In the case of Powell’s accusation, Rustin faced hostilities for
being a homosexual, but there seemed to be little criticism of either King or Powell for their multiple sexual relations as “active womanizers.” As Rustin recalled, “Oh the crap that was going on in those motels as the movement moved from place to place was totally acceptable. The homosexual act was not.”

This denunciation of homosexuality, and the double standard Rustin faced ties back to the notion of black masculinity. Men like Powell and King took multiple female partners, but continued to be regarded as strong male leaders, while homosexuals, like Rustin, were relegated to the background. It has been speculated that Powell was “jealous of threats to his primacy,” and so sought to undermine King’s support by spreading this rumour. Rustin, who looked like the “essence of manhood” (tall, broad-shouldered, with an athletic build), projected a strong appearance as if these slights did not affect him. He continued to offer advice to King whenever he was asked for it, and they would eventually work together again on the 1963 March on Washington.

While Rustin did not write about his homosexuality publicly, the letters he wrote while serving his prison sentence as a conscientious objector reveal his struggles with societal stigma. In his correspondence with Reverend A.J. Muste, and with his partner at the time, Davis Platt (whom he referred to in the letters as “M” or “Marie”), he contemplated turning to heterosexuality and repressing sex. Ultimately, neither of these solutions was true to himself, and he gradually grew to accept his homosexuality. Reflecting on his experiences as a gay man later in his life, he said, “I find that it's very important for members of a minority group to develop an inner security. For in that way we become fearless.”

At a time when black homosexuals were considered the embodiment of black emasculation, Rustin defied this categorization, and refashioned his own masculinity through the use of non-violent resistance. His Quaker upbringing and worldview of the “oneness of the human family” was central to his sense of humanity. His experiences as a black gay man also influenced his understanding of oppression and spurred his activism. Until the end of his life in 1987, Rustin never gave up his dream that one day all peoples would live in freedom and equality. When asked how he remained hopeful in the face of overwhelming obstacles, he answered, “God does not require us to achieve any of the good tasks that humanity must pursue. What the gods require of us is that we not stop trying.”

Endnotes
21. Whether Huddleston threatened him because he was angry about Rustin’s challenging the colour line or because Rustin was gay is not clear from John D’Emilio’s account.
31. Rustin, “The Role of the Negro Middle Class,” in *Down the Line*, 276.
34. Podair, *Bayard Rustin*, 141.
35. Rustin, “Feminism and Equality (1970),” in *Time on Two Crosses*, 237. An example of this would be his suggestion that they expand demands for legalized abortions to demands for socialized medicine.
42. D’Emilio, *Lost Prophet*, 197.
43. Podair, *Bayard Rustin*, 43.
44. Rustin, “*Time on Two Crosses*: An Interview with George Chauncey, Jr. (1987),” in *Time on Two Crosses*, 302.
45. Podair, *Bayard Rustin*, 42.
49. Ibid. 289.
“PBSUCCESS” and the Bay of Pigs: The Dangers of Precedent

Conor Doyle

“If the agency had not had Guatemala, it probably would not have had Cuba.”
—E. Howard Hunt

Only a week before the failed landing at the Bay of Pigs in early 1961, President Kennedy admitted to an advisor: “I’m still trying to make some sense out of it!” Fifty years on, historians remain in search of a satisfactory explanation for this extraordinary fiasco. Indeed, in the annals of the Cold War—which has never lacked its share of uncertainty or intrigue—the Bay of Pigs occupies a category all its own. It has since become a byword for military or intelligence failures so spectacular as to defy rational explanation. In accounting for the Bay of Pigs, historians have alternatively stressed the inexperience of the Kennedy Administration, a tendency in Washington to doubt the ability or resolve of Castro and his forces, the incompetency or ambition of primary actors, and the fatal misunderstandings which existed between the CIA and the White House. Some psychologists like Irving Janis have even attempted to explain it through so-called “group-think theory.” Though all of these theories remain indispensable to our understanding of the Bay of Pigs, they focus too narrowly on the failure of the operation itself. In fact, the Bay of Pigs was a failure not just in organization and execution—but a deeply flawed enterprise from its earliest conception. What follows is an attempt to answer that perennial question that attends all such spectacular disasters: what were they thinking? In the case of the Bay of Pigs, extensive research suggests a single origin for most of the operation’s delusions and misjudgements. This essay will attempt to expose the many compelling links between the Bay of Pigs and a 1954 CIA operation in Guatemala that ousted that country’s left-leaning President Jacobo Arbenz. “PBSUCCESS,” the agency’s code-name for the Guatemala affair, has not been totally neglected by historians. Yet, most are content simply to stress the similarities between the operations, and pursue the connection no further. This study will prove that no consideration of the Bay of Pigs is complete without due regard for the Guatemalan precedent. My purpose then is to consider the two operations in relation
to each other, beyond the obvious resemblances. The conclusion is straightforward: the assumptions and strategy behind the Bay of Pigs can be traced conclusively to the CIA’s experience in Guatemala seven years earlier.

The circumstances behind the Cuban invasion and its litany of errors are well-known, and need not be related here. The CIA’s involvement in the 1954 coup, however, has been rather eclipsed by later events—so, it is, perhaps, useful to begin with a summary of that episode.

After Jacobo Arbenz won the 1950 national election in a veritable landslide, his inauguration marked the first peaceful transfer of power in the one hundred and thirty-year history of the Guatemalan Republic. Six years earlier, the popular coup which installed Juan Jose Arevalo to power had successfully ended the country’s tradition of military dictatorship. Arevalo’s populist platform eschewed political dogma or ideology, but may reasonably be termed “progressive nationalism.” He promised reforms to the country’s political structure and a modernization of its antiquated economy. Furthermore, one of his first acts as President was to draft a liberal constitution that gave primacy to individual rights and liberties while echoing—in a peculiar historical irony—Jeffersonian ideals of popular sovereignty. Arevalo’s presidency should not be romanticized, since his was a fragile and chaotic experiment with democracy that only barely survived dozens of coup attempts. Yet, when he left office in 1950 (honouring a constitutional restriction of a single six-year term), Guatemala was an encouraging novelty in a continent replete with juntas and strongmen.

After assuming office in 1950, Arbenz transformed his predecessor’s mostly tentative reforms into an all-encompassing legislative program. Though Arbenz had always rejected Communist dogma, his rhetoric was often couched in vaguely Marxist terminology. This alone was cause for grave concern in the State Department during the height of the Red Scare. Yet, the Rubicon was crossed, it seems, in June 1952 by the passage of Decree 900. The bill allowed for limited and strictly-regulated expropriation of uncultivated land in the Guatemalan countryside. Arbenz, a wealthy landowner himself, had proposed the measure to encourage the country’s progression to a modern capitalist economy. From Washington, however, it bore all the worrying hallmarks of a Communist takeover.

The actual reach and influence of the Communist movement in Guatemala is a fascinating subject, and has been examined at length elsewhere. What is more significant to this essay is the shifting American assessment of the Guatemalan Revolution and its ideological bearings. As late as 1952, a confidante to President Eisenhower visited the country and reported back: “Yes, Guatemala has a small minority of Communists, but not as many as San Francisco.” Yet, this appraisal was made before the expropriation bill and probably belies the considerable and disproportionate influence the small Communist party had over the labour movement. In any case, Arbenz’s continual drift leftwards was starting to provoke considerable alarm in the American press. One Congressmen seemed
to reflect the prevailing mood when he declared: “We cannot permit a Soviet Republic to be established between Texas and the Panama Canal.” The anxiety over the Panama Canal was, of course, ludicrous and probably a creation of the sensationalist press. Yet, the fear that informed it was ubiquitous: in Cold War parlance, the fall of Guatemala to an “alien despotism” would inevitably result in an “expandable beachhead” for the intrusion of Communism in to the hemisphere.

It may be so, then, as historian Cole Blasier has argued that “there has never been convincing evidence that the Guatemalan Communists... dominated the Arbenz Government.” In the age of McCarthy, however, accusations of Communism carried no burden of proof. Indeed, in a remarkable coincidence, the Cold War “duck test” (“Then he opens his beak and quacks like a duck. Well, by this time you have probably reached the conclusion that the bird is a duck...”) was actually coined in a speech given by the American ambassador to Guatemala. In 1952, nobody who mattered in Washington was inclined to make fine distinctions on the “Communist issue” and in any case, the ambitious agrarian reforms in Guatemala more than satisfied the “duck test.” In sum, Arbenz’s precise sympathies and allegiances are debated to this day, but the mere suggestion of Communist infiltration in the Americas was untenable in Washington.

So by 1953, the Eisenhower administration had identified the Arbenz government as essentially Communist, and thus, intractably hostile to American interests. Guatemala required a regime change, but American treaty obligations now made a reversion to “gunboat diplomacy” impossible. It is impossible to determine when exactly the CIA was given license to engineer the removal of Arbenz, but recent studies have pointed to a National Security Council meeting of August 12, 1953, as the likely origin. “PBSUCCESS” quickly developed on several fronts. First, the agency began to provide funding and munitions to Castillo Armas, a rebel leader operating in the jungles along the border with Honduras. This included the covert delivery through Nicaragua of several obsolete American bombers. Meanwhile, the agency hired a former actor named David Atlee Phillips to run “The Voice of Liberation”—a CIA cover operation that posed as a rebel radio station broadcasting anti-Arbenz propaganda in to Guatemala. Finally, the American Embassy, aided by the agency’s station office, began a campaign to give resources and encouragement to anti-Arbenz factions in the army and government. Armas’s long-threatened invasion began on the morning of June 18, 1954. The liberating “army”—no more than five hundred mercenaries and peasants—was in truth a rather hapless group. Indeed, they were nearly routed by local militias on the very first day of the operation. Yet, the news of the invasion—its scale greatly exaggerated by CIA propaganda efforts—spread panic throughout the country. Convinced he faced an army revolt and a possible American invasion, Arbenz resigned and fled into exile. Eleven days later, after intense American-led machinations in the capital, Armas finally took office. For Guatemala, it marked a tragic end to the brief democratic experiment, and the beginning of decades of oppression and civil strife.
In his memoirs, CIA director Richard Helms—who played no role in “PBSUCCESS,” but observed it closely—called the Guatemala operation “a squeaker.”\textsuperscript{13} Nothing we now know about 1954 contradicts this judgement. It was a rare triumph of luck over common sense and probable outcomes. Yet, in its immediate aftermath, “PBSUCCESS” was hailed as an unmitigated success—a glorious example of “rollback,” to borrow another entry from the Cold War lexicon. Even in the Press—where American involvement was assumed but not explicitly announced—the mood was exuberant. One California Senator was quoted as saying: “Democratic forces... were able to overthrow a Communist government once it had been established in power.”\textsuperscript{14} This short sentence has the remarkable distinction of being false on three counts (Armas was far from democratic, and Arbenz was hardly Communist or “established in power”), but it reflected the popular reaction to events in Guatemala. More importantly, however, the myth of “PBSUCCESS” had begun to take hold in Washington, and especially at Langley.

Piero Glièjes, a talented historian who has written on both “PBSUCCESS” and the Bay of Pigs, has said:

It is my very strong impression that the CIA thought it was a great success. When the operation succeeded they were so elated that they forgot the many ways that they knew it could have gone wrong. So in the culture of the CIA, in the world of the CIA, what remained was a tale of great success without any awareness of how flawed the operation had been.\textsuperscript{15}

A review of the available evidence bears out Glièjes’ assessment. It seems the CIA had forgotten completely just how close the entire episode had come to failure. As he tried to persuade Kennedy on the merits of the Cuban operation, the CIA Director Allen Dulles told President Kennedy: “I stood right here at Ike’s desk and told him I was certain our Guatemala operation would succeed, and, Mr. President, the prospects for this plan are even better than they were for that one.”\textsuperscript{16} This was an astonishing and brazen lie, as the Director himself had been forced to admit to Eisenhower that the operation’s chance of success was no better than twenty percent.\textsuperscript{17} It appears such revisionism in the CIA’s collective memory began almost immediately.

A cable from CIA headquarters to the station chief in Guatemala City a month after the coup thanked him for a performance that “surpassed even our greatest expectations,” and noted that the operation was “already well known and fully appreciated in all important quarters of government.”\textsuperscript{18} Those associated with the project soon witnessed a dramatic improvement in their career prospects. Tracy Barnes, for instance, was awarded the Distinguished Intelligence Medal and offered the coveted role of West German Station Chief. Later, his wife would recall, “After Guatemala it was, ‘You can have any job you want! You can own the world!’” The minor miracle the agency had appeared to have accomplished in Guatemala, coupled with an earlier success in Iran in 1953 gave rise to a can-do spirit in the agency. Even Director Dulles, a man not generally inclined toward the clandestine world (“dull, duller, Dulles” went an agency joke)
would say after “PBSUCCESS”: “Make no mistake... there’s a legitimate and growing market for covert action.” The legend of the Guatemala episode was good for the esprit de corps, but can now be blamed for planting some very dangerous illusions. At least some within the CIA saw through the hype. Ray Cline, then a promising intelligence analyst wrote later: “The trouble with this seemingly brilliant success was the extravagant impression of the CIA’s power it created... [it suggested that] the CIA could topple governments and place rulers in power at will.” Meanwhile, agency veteran Richard Drain observed: “PBSUCCESS was a success, through dumb luck more than anything else.” A toxic mixture of an exaggerated sense of accomplishment and illusions of omnipotence made for what one agent called “a heady wine.” Indeed, no less an observer than Kim Philby would remark snidely of “PBSUCCESS,” “It went to their heads.” Yet, this was an altogether minority view. The prevailing judgement seems to have been that the CIA did rather well for itself in 1954, and, if called upon, would be ready for an encore. The significance of these delusions would become evident shortly.

Equally important was the perception created elsewhere in Washington, particularly in Eisenhower’s White House. After the CIA had completed its withdrawal from Guatemala, the President hosted a debriefing attended by all the national security principals, White House staffers, and even the First Lady. After hearing a full (if slightly “sanitized”) account of the operation, Eisenhower shook his head in amazement: “Incredible. You’ve averted a Soviet beachhead in our hemisphere.” By then, the mythology of “PBSUCCESS” was firmly established. It was now assumed by all involved, according to diplomat Thomas Mann, that any emerging Communist threat “could be dealt with to some degree like the Guatemalan problem was dealt with.”

Enter Fidel Castro. The “Maximum Leader,” as he would become known, had been leading a guerilla movement against Cuban dictator Fulgencio Batista since early 1954. Batista, a military caudillo of the type then ubiquitous in Latin America, had led an oppressive regime which denied most individual liberties, and kept in place the island’s traditionally extreme class differences. When the United States finally withdrew its longstanding support, Batista’s defeat to Castro’s “26th of July Movement” became imminent. Facing only minimal opposition, the rebels seized the capital and took over the government on January 1, 1959. Accepting Castro’s assurance of democratic elections, Eisenhower welcomed the regime change in Cuba, and extended diplomatic recognition in short order. Indeed, a certain optimism began to surround events in Cuba. An early State Department analysis read: “With regard to his position on communism and the cold war struggle, Castro cautiously indicated that Cuba would remain in the western camp.” It was not to last. Eisenhower wrote on his own copy of the memo: “We will check in a year!” For in addition to exhibiting the autocratic tendencies of his predecessor, Castro’s platform of “fidelismo” had taken on a decidedly Marxist look. As in the case of Arbenz, it is now pointless to debate Castro’s ideology in 1959. It remains only to note that by mid-1959 the self-proclaimed “utopian socialist” had, according to one intelligence estimate, “a pro-Soviet, anti-American stance.” The passage of an agrarian reform law—which, like Arbenz’s, provided for the expropriation of land—seemed to confirm the worst fears in Washington.
The issue of land expropriation has proven problematic in assessing American motives in both Guatemala and Cuba, and invites a necessary digression. The assumption behind this essay has been that the extreme response by the American government to perceived Communism in Latin America was informed by the dominant Cold War ethos of the time. That is to say, that the presence of a Soviet-compliant state in the hemisphere was considered an intolerable breach of the Monroe Doctrine that could well precipitate a “domino effect” in Latin America. An alternate narrative has enjoyed a certain vogue among leftist historians, and warrants a brief discussion. The theory, advanced most notably in the case of Guatemala by Schlezinger and Kinzer, holds that such interventions were merely reactionary imperialist responses to the seizure of American-owned land. It is certainly true, in the case of Guatemala, that Arbenz’s reforms included the expropriation of thousands of acres owned by the American United Fruit Corporation. In the case of Cuba, much of the country’s economy was American-owned—including ninety percent of the telephone and electric services, and fifty percent of the railroad network. Most, if not all of these industries were nationalized under Castro’s reforms. Yet, it is simply misleading to claim that in either case Washington’s anti-communism was a pretext for advancing American business interests. United Fruit’s connections in the White House and State Department during the 195’s are well-known, but the expropriated land in Guatemala was all uncultivated, and its loss unlikely to effect the company’s total stock. Similarly, plans to oust Castro by covert means commenced before wholesale expropriations, and not as a response to them. In any case, it is worth considering the following remark contained in Eisenhower’s memoirs: “Expropriation in itself does not, of course prove Communism; expropriation of oil and agricultural properties years before in Mexico had not been fostered by Communists.” In sum, the seizure of land in Guatemala and Cuba was a grave concern for policy-makers—but only to the extent that it seemed to confirm Communist tendencies. There is no evidence to support any explanation for “PBSUCCESS” and the Bay of Pigs which gives US private interests anything more than a secondary role.

Throughout 1959, Castro’s seemingly inexorable drift toward communism continued unabated. By the fall, discussions had begun in earnest on how to effect regime change in Havana. Finally, in early 1960, Castro’s regime was declared implacably hostile and “beyond redemption.” In other words, policy-makers now confronted almost the exact same dilemma that had troubled them in 1953. We have seen already how the solution devised for Guatemala had become recognized as a viable model for future “interventions.” The remainder of this essay will prove just how much the Bay of Pigs disaster owed to that apparently flawless precedent.

The CIA’s first substantial involvement in plans to remove Castro occurred at a meeting of the Special Group on January 13, 1960. This informal and highly secretive committee oversaw all covert activity by the United States Government, and had given the imprimatur to “PBSUCCESS” seven years earlier. The essence of the plan presented by
Dulles was simple: guerilla infiltration combined with psychological warfare, or Guatemala all over again. The similarities are even more striking in the proposal presented to the president on March 16th. Entitled, “A Program of Cover Action Action Against the Castro Regime,” it outlined four primary courses of action:

• The first requirement is the creation of a responsible, appealing, and unified Cuban opposition... outside of Cuba... [to] serve as a magnet for the loyalties of the Cubans....
• So that the opposition may be heard and Castro's basis of popular support undermined, it is necessary to develop... a long and short wave, gray broadcasting facility...
• Work is already in progress in the creation of a covert intelligence and action organization within Cuba...
• Preparations have already been made for the development of an adequate paramilitary force outside of Cuba.  

Stripped of the references to Castro and Cuba, the above is a fair and adequate summary of “PBSUCCESS.” This is hardly surprising, considering we now know that CIA officers referred frequently to Guatemala while drafting the proposal. Equally revealing is the President’s response to the proposal. Recall the strong impression that “PBSUCCESS” appeared to have over Eisenhower when he was briefed in 1954. The following is taken from the minutes of the March 17th meeting at the White House: “Mr. Allen Dulles said that preparation of a para-military force will begin outside Cuba, the first stage being to get a cadre of leaders together for training...The President said that he knows of no better plan for dealing with this situation.”

The document contains no explicit reference to Guatemala, but there is sufficient evidence to suggest that the memory of “PBSUCCESS” had rendered Eisenhower more sympathetic to covert action. This is crucial, since though President Kennedy has been assigned the preponderance of the blame for the Bay of Pigs, the scheme was an inheritance left for him by Eisenhower.

One agent described the mood at Langley in early 1960 this way: “Their first reaction was God, we’ve got a possible communist here; we had better get him out just the way we got Arbenz out.” So in its conception, the Cuba operations had closely mirrored the thinking behind “PBSUCCESS.” The same would hold true for its execution.

After receiving presidential approval, the first order of business was to assemble a task force to oversee the operation. This responsibility fell to Richard Bissell, the agency’s new Deputy Director for Plans—the office which oversaw the CIA’s covert operations. Bissell was an OSS veteran who had been recruited as Dulles’ special assistant just before “PBSUCCESS.” He played only a marginal role in the Guatemala affair, but acknowledged later that it would serve as an “analogy and precedent” for the Cuba operation. To that end, he began to assemble the veterans of “PBSUCCESS” for a reprisal of their former roles in overthrowing Arbenz. The first to be recalled to Washington Jake Esterline,
another OSS veteran who had learned the art of guerilla warfare in Burma during WWII. After heading the successful Guatemala task force, he had been rewarded with the job of station chief in Caracas. Now, Bissell offered him the chance to return to Langley to draft the agency’s plans for the Cuban invasion. Years later, when asked by a CIA staff historian if his Guatemala experienced had influenced his selection, Esterline replied: “Yes, I was a headquarters officer in charge of Guatemala. I would think that is one of the reasons.”

Another recruit was Tracy Barnes, a gentleman spy who had been second-in-command during “PBSUCCESS.” Despite questions over his abilities, Barnes was appointed Bissell’s assistant, and would serve as an influential adviser on the task force. Thus, the three most senior case officers in charge of the Cuban operation had served in similar capacities during “PBSUCCESS,” and were now positioned to attempt a carbon copy of the 1954 coup. The pattern extended to the lower ranks, as well. One of the first field agents to be recruited was David Atlee Phillips, who had run the “Voice of Liberation” service during “PBSUCCESS,” a CIA cover operation posing as a pirate radio station run by rebels in the jungle. When briefed on his new role, Phillips was told to replicate “the Guatemala scenario.”

Another new recruit was William “Rip” Robertson, a former U.S. Marine turned soldier for hire. He had been stationed in Honduras by the CIA to train Armas’ tiny rebel army, but was later fired for ordering the bombing of a British freighter during a blockade of a Guatemalan port. Still, he was recalled for the Cuban operation, and would later serve aboard the ships that transported the brigadistas to the Bay of Pigs for their failed landing. Meanwhile, in Miami, the CIA began to recruit members of the Cuban exile community to join the brigade now training in the jungles of Guatemala. This job was assigned to E. Howard Hunt (of later Watergate notoriety), and Gerry Droller (alias “Frank Bender”) who had both served as field agents during “PBSUCCESS.” Joining them was the most unusual spy of them all. William Pawley was a self-made millionaire best known as the force behind the famed “Flying Tigers” in WWII. During “PBSUCCESS,” Pawley—an ardent anti-communist and Cold Warrior—had secretly managed the transfer of obsolete aircraft to Armas’s rebel army in Honduras. Now, he would assist in the recruitment and screening of Cuban exiles wanting to join the cause.

After the failure at the Bay of Pigs, the CIA’s internal postmortem noted that many of those involved had been drawn from the agency’s middle ranks, spoke little Spanish, and collectively had almost no knowledge of Latin American affairs. Yet, the majority had one thing in common besides mediocrity. It was the single, formative, shared experience of the Guatemalan coup of 1954. As Hunt later recalled, “It was done for the same reason because we had a successful precedent... We had no trouble in assuming our prior roles, knowing what it was all about, knowing what we could do and how to do it.”

So the CIA had devised an operation to replicate its success in Guatemala, and reassigned the agents responsible to make sure of it. The result, in retrospect, seems all too predictable. The almost inevitable failure of “PBSUCCESS” that only luck had averted would now come to pass in Cuba, only on a much grander scale.
Wayne S. Smith, a diplomat in Havana who later worked with the CIA before the Bay of Pigs, would recall of the time: “I mean there was this sort of hubris everywhere, and the mythology of the Guatemala operation was part of it. Fundamentally, we didn’t take this country seriously. We just didn’t take Cuba seriously.” 39 This attitude, as we have seen already, was perhaps the most malignant effect of “PBSUCCESS.” It had given those involved a sense of mastery over events—even over people of whom they were totally ignorant. Through its strictly bipolar worldview, the United States did not understand Guatemalans, and could perceive no complexities beyond “ally” or “Communist.” It should have paid for this ignorance—instead the CIA was lucky, which only made matters worse. As one agent remarked many years later: “Allen Dulles, Bissell, and so on were marked by the experience of World War II: the US always wins! Then the Guatemala thing stumbled to success. It reinforced the feeling that anything the U.S. did would succeed.” 40 The word was probably unfamiliar then, but the attitude of the CIA after Guatemala may quite aptly be termed “ethnocentrism.” Indeed, one agent went as far as to observe that “PBSUCCESS” may well have failed if it had not been for “the idiotic Latin attitude that gringos are all powerful.” 41 These unfortunate prejudices existed long before “PBSUCCESS,” but within the CIA, the Guatemala episode seems to have confirmed them. Indeed, in the preparation for the Bay of Pigs it was not uncommon for agency memos to include phrases like, “...they say it is a Cuban tradition to join a winner.” 42 Furthermore, many of the assumptions behind the Bay of Pigs were so irrational that historians still debate how they ever gained any purchase. For instance, much of the declassified material seems to have predicted a wholesale desertion by Castro’s forces and mass uprisings in the countryside. Yet, every intelligence-gathering agency in the US Government—including the CIA’s Board of National Estimates—knew the true extent of the loyalty to Castro. In retrospect, the assumptions held by Bissell and the others were clearly spectacular misjudgements. Yet to those ignorant of Cuba, and consumed by the false memory “PBSUCCESS,” was it really too much to expect history to repeat itself?

In other ways, the influence of the Guatemala affair gave rise to an abundance of wishful thinking, which in turn affected practical aspects of the operation. For instance, the final landing plan (Operation Zapata), stranded the Cuban brigade on isolated beaches surrounded by impenetrable marshland, and thus, with nowhere to escape. Interviewed years later, Bissell explained there was no “plan B” because he had assumed that “things were bound to happen” just as events had worked themselves out in Guatemala. 43 For years afterwards, historians have pondered how so many brilliant minds could take leave of their judgement simultaneously. The answer is now clear: they were under a “Guatemala complex.” So, the primary influence of “PBSUCCESS” was most likely psychological. This is difficult to quantify, but its importance cannot be stressed enough. How else could the CIA have convinced themselves that a full-scale invasion was within their competency? Cuban Brigade 2506 was expected to launch an amphibious landing at night—something never before attempted, even in WWII. 44 Yet, because Guatemala had succeeded, the CIA could simply not envision failure. McGeorge Bundy would later observe that the CIA men
were “wrapped in their own illusions.” I submit that this fatal over-confidence can be traced directly to “PBSUCCESS.” Instead of conducting a rational analysis, the CIA chose to believe their own legends; which in turn bred hubris, ethnocentrism, and a complete inability to recognize truths obvious to everyone else.

Another product of this mindset was the dangerous tendency to treat Fidel Castro as another Jacobo Arbenz. Indeed, the entire Cuban operation was predicated, as Bissell would later admit, “on the assumption that, faced with that kind of pressure, [Castro] would suffer the same loss of nerve.” This was supremely ridiculous to anyone remotely familiar with the “Maximum Leader.” Even Richard Nixon was forced to concede after meeting Castro in 1959 that, “The one fact that we can be sure of is that he has those indefinable qualities which make him a leader of men.” After fighting a desperate, three-year guerilla struggle in the mountains, Castro was not ever likely to “loose his nerve” at the hint of a struggle. Yet, if the CIA was operating on the Guatemala template—as indeed the evidence suggests—the assumption that Castro would follow Arbenz in to exile would have seemed perfectly reasonable. But even as the CIA was assuring Eisenhower and Kennedy that Cuba would be another Guatemala, Castro was actively ensuring this would not be so. Indeed, there is considerable evidence that both Fidel Castro and his confidante Che Guevara were also effected by the events in Guatemala. In a speech to welcome the exiled Arbenz on a 1960 tour of Cuba, Guevara told the audience that the Guatemalan coup had taught the leaders of the Cuban Revolution “to go to the root of the matter and to behead those who hold power and their lackeys at a single stroke.” This was an oblique reference to the policy of purging the military of conservative or anti-Castro factions, thereby preventing a barracks revolt of the sort that forced Arbenz to resign in 1954. Again, as Wyden notes, anyone prepared to draw serious comparisons between Arbenz and Castro was dreaming in technicolor: “Guatemala only succeeded by the narrowest of margins... Arbenz had but a very limited force to support him as opposed to Castro, whose two hundred thousand-man army and militia were rapidly increasing in both quality and strength.” The available evidence—even in 1960—was a stark contrast with the possibility of Castro “loosing his nerve” like Arbenz in 1954. So it is perhaps worth asking: how could the CIA have been so dreadfully mistaken about Castro? The answer, I suspect, lies in those responsible for designing the operation. Virtually from its conception, the CIA resisted input from other government agencies, and kept cooperation at a minimum. At one early meeting, Dulles snapped at a State Department official who ventured tepid criticism of the project: “You are not a principal in this!” The result was that branches of government that could offer more realistic assessments of Castro—like the State’s Bureau of Inter-American Affairs—were silenced. In their absence, senior CIA officials—many of them, as I have shown, veterans of “PBSUCCESS”—were left to make decisions without oversight, relying only on each other to approve their own judgements. In this environment, even glaring falsehoods like the task force’s under-estimation of Castro could appear credible and persuasive.

Another key aspect of “PBSUCCESS” which the CIA hoped to replicate in Cuba was so-called “plausible deniability.” This was, of course, the principle attraction of projects like the Bay of Pigs—it offered the potential for a military-style intervention without
the usual diplomatic fallout. Like much of the mythology of “PBSUCCESS,” it was also totally illusory. Robert Armory, a CIA officer not involved in the Cuba task force, later encapsulated the absurdity of “plausible deniability” in a memorable outburst:

You can’t say that fifteen hundred Cubans got together in a sort of Michael Mullins Marching and Chowder Society and acquired aircraft and ships and ammunition and radios and so on and so forth all by their little selves. The American hand would clearly show in it.51

Yet this was precisely what the agency was proposing. The assumption that American complicity in Cuba could be denied because it had worked in Guatemala was, like most of the CIA’s thinking, terribly misguided. For one, “PBSSUCCESS” was a relatively small-scale operation in a Central American hinterland that seldom, if ever attracted the world’s attention. Furthermore, unlike the Cuban exiles’ brigade, Castillo Armas’s rebel army existed long before the CIA decided to supply and fund it, and thus, could not be presented as an American proxy force. Still, even with all these considerations, it could not be said that “PBSSUCCESS” had achieved “plausible deniability” in its own right. Indeed, it was only through the cooperation of the American press—and the publisher of The New York Times, in particular—that the operation was not completely exposed.52 Even afterwards, though American complicity could never be conclusively established, international opinion was unanimous in condemnation. Four years later, Latin America still seethed at a blatant spectacle of “Yankee imperialism.” A scheduled tour of eight South American countries by Vice President Nixon had to be called off over concerns for his safety.53

So “plausible deniability” had been stretched beyond all credible limits as a cover for the Guatemala operation. It is yet another example of the power of the “PBSSUCCESS” legend that in 1961, the CIA was still invoking the same doctrine to assure President Kennedy that American complicity could be hidden in Cuba. Yet, they failed to add that the proposed undertaking was far larger in scale than “PBSSUCCESS” had ever been. Furthermore, because of the recruitment process, the entire scheme was an open secret in Miami—where Castro’s agents were well entrenched. Finally, Castro had a crucial advantage that Arbenz had lacked: the use of the Soviet intelligence network. The result, of course, was that American involvement in the Bay of Pigs could never be denied—plausibly or otherwise, and Kennedy never even tried. To be fair, it was the White House—which, unlike the CIA, had political implications to consider—that had insisted on “plausible deniability.” Yet, this myth originated within the CIA, and particularly, with its operations in Iran and Guatemala. The consequences of this “hocus pocus”—to borrow Bissell’s term—on the operation itself was that the Cuban brigade was denied crucial logistical support, in the vain hope of it appearing less American.54

So far, this essay has shown that the Bay of Pigs invasion was conceived in the image of Operation “PBSSUCCESS,” and came to resemble its predecessor in its objectives, key personnel, and fundamental assumptions. The influence of Guatemala, however, extends
even further. It can be shown that while the CIA was drawing wildly inaccurate inferences from “PBSUCCESS,” it had also failed to recognize what had actually worked in 1954.

Recalling the Guatemala operation years later, one agent involved stressed the importance of the “PSYOPS” campaign, adding: “And the actions of that bastard [Ambassador] Peurifoy and Station Chief John Doherty were really key.” During 1954, the two led a massive infiltration campaign into the Guatemalan officer corps with a single goal: divide and conquer. It was classic intelligence work—CIA operatives met with indecisive colonels, and prodded toward action as a means of self-preservation. In Cuba seven years later, this was plainly impossible. To begin, Castro had quickly set about purging the Cuban army of any officers who might have been persuaded to revolt. Furthermore, any effort to replicate the “K-Program” of 1954 would have been nearly impossible to control from Washington, since the Havana Station’s cables had been cut by the regime, and very little communication existed with agents on the ground. Finally, according to one CIA study, the army was overwhelmingly supportive of Castro, and the possibility of converting it was simply “too remote to consider.” That the Cuban operation was allowed to proceed without any communication with an underground network or intelligence assets in the country is indicative of the mythology that had developed around “PBSUCCESS.” After that episode, CIA chiefs had convinced themselves that Arbenz “cracked” because of the perceived threat of Armas’s invasion. In truth, Arbenz resigned because he was faced with a classic barracks revolt—precipitated, in part, by undercover CIA operatives.

A final example of the CIA’s misinterpretation of “PBSUCCESS” is the issue of air cover. Any sensible analysis of the Guatemalan coup would not fail to appreciate a single, fatal weakness in the Arbenz government: the lack of a functional air force. In fact, the existing air force had been grounded by Arbenz after the “Voice of Liberation” aired an appeal from a Guatemalan pilot who had deserted with his plane. The result was that the rebel aircraft could cause mayhem by strafing army barracks and trains carrying troops to the front. The effect was to create a widespread perception of imminent defeat which almost certainly hastened Arbenz’s departure.

To be fair, throughout the preparation for the Bay of Pigs the CIA had always demanded that air-strikes eliminate Castro’s modest air force before the landings. Yet, clinging to the impossible hope of “plausible deniability,” President Kennedy cancelled planned D-Day bombings of the air fields. Granted, this was Kennedy’s decision alone, and made exclusively with political considerations in mind. Yet, the CIA’s acquiescence in allowing the landing to go ahead with Castro’s air force intact suggests they did not fully grasp how important air supremacy had been in “PBSUCCESS.” In the event, Castro’s Soviet-made T-33s and Sea Furies pinned the helpless exiles on the beaches, shot down the obsolete B-26s that had been sent to provide air cover, and sunk part of the convoy carrying the brigade’s ammunition and supplies. The CIA’s inability to fully appreciate the significance of air supremacy suggests that, while being completely over-reliant on “PBSUCCESS” as a model, it was also guilty of not fully understanding the operation it had attempted to replicate.
This essay was not intended as a complete account of the failure at the Bay of Pigs. Whole volumes have, and no doubt will continue to be written in that vein all attempting to make sense, like Kennedy, of perhaps the most baffling episodes in the entire post-war period. I would be remiss not to note here that there are other, equally compelling reasons behind the operation’s failure. Attention must be paid to the ambition and the inexperience of some central actors, the anti-Castro campaign rhetoric of the Kennedy Administration that bound it to a reckless course of action, and the fundamental inability of the CIA and the White House to understand each other’s motives and perspectives. Finally, there was a dominant Cold War mindset which, at all times and in men of all nationalities, had the effect of inverting reason and making sheer insanity seem logical and judicious. None of these factors can be easily discarded. Instead, this essay has tried to further our understanding by exposing an influence which historians have curiously neglected.

In sum, this essay has demonstrated the following: Operation “PBSCUCESS” was a fortuitous long-shot, that nonetheless entered agency lore as an unblemished triumph. When the opportunity presented itself to replicate this “success” in Cuba, the CIA reassigned senior officers to their former roles. The Guatemala episode, therefore, became a powerful determinant over the crafting of a plan which became known as the Bay of Pigs landing. Perhaps inevitably, the Cuban operation took on the same flawed assumptions that informed its predecessor. Meanwhile, Fidel Castro—whose interpretation of the 1954 coup was rather closer to the truth—took drastic measures to ensure he would not suffer the fate of Jacobo Arbenz. Finally, the CIA exhibited through its Cuban strategy a fundamentally mistaken interpretation of “PBSCUCESS,” and the reasons for its outcome.

It remains only to ask, by way of conclusion, the following: how much of the failure at the Bay of Pigs can be attributed to “PBSCUCESS”? The answer, it seems, is a great deal more than it has ever been given credit for. Reflecting on the Bay of Pigs, Bundy observed “I think the men who worked on this got into a world of their own.” Of the numerous illusions and misjudgements which shaped that world—like a sense of omnipotence and the impossibility of failure—a great many of were derived from a single falsehood. In the last analysis, to borrow Meyer and Szulc’s apt phrase, “they were beguiled by a false analogy.”

To understand that analogy is, I submit, to have a far clearer understanding of the Bay of Pigs itself. It is time “PBSCUCESS” was rescued from the footnotes. We cannot hope to make sense of the Bay of Pigs without it.

Endnotes

3. Ibid., 489.


8. Ibid., 138.


25. Ibid.


34. Wyden, *Bay of Pigs*, 22.


43. Ibid., 31.


49. Wyden, *Bay of Pigs*, 323.


Psychiatric Therapy and Digital Space: an Analysis of the Architectural Implications of Virtual Iraq

Douglas Robb

Formalist paradigms of art and architecture in the twentieth century, such as those espoused by Clement Greenberg and Colin Rowe, have tended to contribute to the segmentation of the five senses: touch, hearing, sight, smell, and taste. This separation is not limited to the realm of culture-production, but rather has become a pervasive feature throughout society. “Paintings are offered for the eyesight alone, hi-fi listening is targeted only at the ears, synthetic perfumes and chemical food enhancements are provided for the ‘base’ senses of smell and taste, and emollients, tanning regulators, and synthetic fibres address the touch and appearance of skin.” While this formal differentiation provides artists and architects with a “set of positivist protocols that can produce isolated sensations,” it has contributed towards the disaggregation of the individual’s total perception. For example, the structure and legibility of Cartesian geometry in western architecture appeals to our visual register, yet fails to (explicitly) engage the four remaining senses; Freud attributed this ocular primacy to the visual range of early *homo erectus*. An architecture prejudiced towards a single sense is limited and static, and fails to engage with its occupants in a sensually holistic way. The architectural criticisms of Anthony Vidler challenge the conception of space as a mere “passive container of objects and bodies,” and posits a “relative, moving, dynamic” architecture which reacts and responds to its environment. Drawing upon the work of spatial theorists such as Deleuze and Guattari, as well as contemporary advancements in digital rendering technologies, Vidler explores the fluid relationship between biological entities and the built environments in which they live.

Quoting the work of August Schmarsow, Vidler defines this type of “warped space” as “a psychologically intuited space. The sense of sight is joined to the residues of sensory experience to which the muscular sensations of our body, the sensitivity of our skin, and the structure of our body all contribute.” This integration of the “formal with the psychological” is not only relevant to architecture, but also has numerous applications in the development of psychiatric medicine and therapeutics. As the “progressive internalisation
of technology.6 collapses the divide between the real world and virtual space, mental health professionals are beginning to reject traditional talk-therapies in favour of new digital technologies. In 2007, the United States Department of Defence introduced *Virtual Iraq*, a virtual-reality exposure therapy program designed to treat Iraq War veterans afflicted by post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD).7 This software allows computer programmers to digitally recreate spaces and scenarios from a patient’s memory, complete with sounds, scents, movements, and even temperature fluctuations. The patient is then immersed within this environment through an advanced computer-human interface, where they may re-live traumatic experiences as a form of habituation therapy. *Virtual Iraq* is essentially a custom-made video game comprised of infinitely dynamic architectural spaces; it effectively follows Vidler’s theory of warped space to its teleological conclusion. As people increasingly inhabit on-line spaces through customisable avatars and social networking sites, “the human psyche and soma are revealed by the apparatus of science and art to be mutually constitutive realms.”8 Thus, *Virtual Iraq* not only opens new channels in the field of psychiatric therapy, but also embodies tremendous implications for the future of architectural development.

Following in the Freudian and Lacanian psychoanalytic traditions, Vidler states that individuals and the built environment exist in a dynamic and reciprocal tension, each informing the other. Just as buildings and cities are the product of human design, so too are humans influenced by the architecture which surrounds them. The body/space dialectic begins at an early age as young children orally and tactiley differentiate between their bodily selves and the physical environment. Once the boundaries of self-conception have been established, individuals are further influenced through the subtle organisational logics of *habitus* ingrained within the very fabric of society (and by extension, a society’s architecture).9 Deleuze and Guattari refer to this form of organisation as *striated space*,10 wherein people and spaces are co-dependant upon one another for meaning and relational identity. Evidently, a fundamental relationship exists between an individual’s perception of architecture (Freudian *projection*) and architecture’s influence over an individual (Freudian *introjection*).

Vidler explores this concept through an analysis of Maurice Barré’s biography of Blaise Pascal. In 1654, Pascal experienced a near death experience when the horses pulling his carriage plunged off a bridge at Neuilly-sur-Siene, nearly taking the carriage cart with them. Although Pascal emerged from the incident physically uninjured, Barré concluded that he had experienced “a great interior tragedy.”11 The thought of crossing a bridge reduced Pascal to a state of paralytic fear, and “he could no longer look at water without falling into a great rage.”12 The experience psychologically traumatised Pascal, causing him to project his anxiety upon the architectural signifier of “the bridge,” and the images associated within the bridge schema. Barré’s assessment corresponds to Vidler’s belief that fear and anxiety often manifest themselves in architecture and the urban environment, obscuring the relationship between the individual subject and the spaces they inhabit.
The manner in which Barré compiled his biography is particularly relevant within the context of *Virtual Iraq*. Barré travelled to the physical sites in which Pascal had lived so that he could accurately recapture the essence of Pascal’s memory through “encounters with the traces of history.” This method is similar to the process of Lacanian psychoanalysis, which relies on object-individual relations as a means of understanding the “Self.” A similar process is used by American military psychologists in order to induce PTSD sufferers to divulge information about the events they have experienced. Much like Pascal’s bridge, these traumatic memories are typically linked to spatial or environmental cues, “such as trash blowing across the interstate or a car backfiring.” The psychologists then use *Virtual Iraq* software to reconstruct the event, and slowly immerse the patient back into a virtual version of their memory. By engaging with their trauma over and over again in a fully interactive digital environment, the patient may become habituated to the source of their PTSD, thus eliminating the anxiety associated with that particular event.

The therapeutic success of *Virtual Iraq* in clinical trials reinforces the profound conflation between the body, the mind, and architecture. This anthropomorphic reading of architectural space is not a new phenomenon; the correlation between Grecian temple columns and the human body can be traced back to Vitruvius. However, the spaces within *Virtual Iraq* are unique in that they are entirely reliant upon the generative force of human memory made tangible through the capabilities of modern technology. According to Vidler, “the metaphoric relations between animation as a digital technique and animation as a biological state are, by process of conscious literalization, deployed in the service of an architecture that takes its authority from the inherent ‘vitalism’ of the computer-generated series.” Although the architecture of *Virtual Iraq* is a mere simulation, it is experienced as a corporeal reality by virtue of advanced computer technologies. The mind (or monad, in Deleuzian terminology) receives stimulation from each of the five sense receptors, creating the impression of an actual place which really exists in cyberspace. This kind of architecture represents a radical divergence from traditional genre categories: it is a construct which is not physically built, an electronic world experienced through biological sensation.

This type of space can be described through Deleuze’s concept of the fold in relation to the Baroque House (appendix 1), which Vidler explores towards the end of *Warped Space*. The fold is an abstract concept which is simultaneously disseminated and specific, immaterial and physical. It may, perhaps, be best understood as a type of threshold which separates oppositional states of matter, such as internal and external, or virtual and actual. Topologically, the fold is an amorphous plane which exists in a constant state of flux. As one side of the threshold moves and changes based on its present conditions, so too must the opposite side adjust in accordance. The fold is, therefore, the point of mediation within a dialectic, such as the divide between mind and body, or between the body and space. Deleuze conceptualises the fold through the analogy of the Baroque House, which consists of a closed upper and an open lower floor with five openings. The floors are connected by curtains which fall through the ceiling of the lower floor. “Evidently, the five openings
represent the five senses, the five curtains their receptors, and the closed upper room a kind of mental space [monad], based solidly on the lower physical body.” Within this analogy, the divide between the two floors may be interpreted as the fold, with the five senses acting as conduits between the actual world of experience and the virtual world of the mind.

Most traditional architecture exists as an immobile structure, forcing people to adjust to its programmatic form. In this case, the dialectic between body and space across the threshold of the fold is unidirectional. However, in the digital world, the relationship between the body and space becomes multidirectional. The Baroque House provides a useful tool for conceptualising this type of architecture experienced in Virtual Iraq. Within the digital space, every aspect of the environment becomes dynamic:

“A sandstorm could be raging (the patient can turn on the windshield wipers to beat it back); a dog could be barking; the inside of the vehicle could be rank. Giving the therapist so many options—dusk, midday; with snipers, without snipers; the sound of a single mortar, the sound of multiple mortars; the sound of people yelling in English or Arabic increases the likelihood of evoking the patient’s actual experience, while engaging the patient on so many sensory levels that the immersion in the environment is nearly absolute.”

Within this environment, the threshold of the fold becomes exponentially more permeable. In other words, the patient undergoes a mental transition based on their sensory experience, while the architecture of that experience may be infinitely edited based on the patient’s feedback.

Upon a review of the Baroque House, Vidler states that “our monads are no longer closed interiors that contain the entire world; they are opened up, prised open.” Virtual Iraq makes use of this statement by quite literally transforming a private, individual memory into a physical and tangible reality. While this has obvious applications towards the way architects design buildings, one must also question the implications with respect to one’s experience of space. The architecture of virtual reality is not fixed to a physical site defined by lines of longitude and latitude. Rather, it exists as a formless aggregation of programming codes which may be accessed from any place, provided one has the sufficient hardware. This is an architecture viewed through screens, yet “the screen is not a picture, and it is certainly not a surrogate for a window, but rather an ambiguous and unfixed location for a subject.” Given its ability to “transport” an individual to any number of digital sites, virtual architecture may thus be viewed as a form of subject-creation. For example, Virtual Iraq is designed to return the subject of the patient to the subject of the soldier for the purposes of psychiatric therapy. In this instance, the virtual site takes on the role of utmost importance, for “we are incapable of imagining experience without our embodied selves; experience is always of the embodied self. And embodied self if always somewhere in particular, in a place.”
The importance of emplacement for subject-creation within virtual space is congruent with Vidler’s overarching view of architecture in the post-postmodern context. For Vidler, the technological developments of the 1990s created the potential for an architecture which exists in dynamic relation to its inhabitants. This desire for interactive space can be traced back to the atopia of the postmodern era, and the associated malaise “rooted in the placelessness that is the logical outcome of the modern experiment.” By reintroducing the human element back into architectural production, Vidler seeks to combat the sense of displacement evoked through the sterility of postmodernism. It is somewhat ironic that this goal of conscious emplacement is so successfully achieved by Virtual Iraq, given that the architectural spaces within the program do not exist in any particular place per se. However, these virtual sites do succeed in fully engaging their inhabitant, thereby creating a powerful sense of place within the nebulous void of cyberspace.

No longer must people be bound to physical spatial co-ordinates; rather, the individual may be transported to any number of possible sites, and any number of possible subjectivities. This not only has implications for the types of environments which can be built, but also for the kinds of effects these environments will have on the people who experience them. Virtual Iraq was designed specifically for therapeutic purposes; however, fully immersive digital space may also be employed in numerous other ways, such as simulation training, education, or travel and tourism, to name a few. While these spaces currently exist beyond the reach of the average consumer, the technological promise Virtual Iraq holds tremendous potential for the future of architectural development, and the spatial embodiment of human consciousness.

**Endnotes**

2. Ibid., 8.
4. Ibid., 4.
5. Ibid., 2.
12. Ibid., 23.
13. Ibid., 24.
14. Following the contemporary guidelines outlined in the *Diagnostic and Statistic Manual of Mental Disorders*, Pascal would, in fact, meet all six criteria for post-traumatic stress disorder.
17. Ibid., 220.
20. Ibid., 8.
22. Ibid.
Sinners in the Hands of an Angry Gore: Jonathan Edwards’ Legacy Today

Emily Estelle Belanger

Jonathan Edwards’ “Sinners in the Hands of an Angry God” has become a classic of American literature because it encapsulates the spirit of The Great Awakening. Published in 1741, it appeared at the peak of the puritan, Calvinist surge in religiosity across the United States. Edwards himself, raised in an evangelical household, and composer of one of the most famous sermons in American history, was evidently a master of the kind of rhetoric that convinces people to act differently because they are terrified not to.¹ In eighteenth century America, the target was lapsed Christians, and the great threat was that of God’s wrath. The impact of this kind of message is not entirely replicable in a modern context, as advances in science and the trend towards secularization have shaken the authority of religious doctrine in the collective consciousness. However, by looking at the way that contemporary environmentalists address an audience, it is clear that Americans are still very vulnerable to personal reproach as a means of inciting conversion to a cause.

In order to see how Edwards’ approach has evolved over time, it is important to remember that, more than any other nation, America still has many influential Fundamentalist Christian denominations that hold some sway over politics and public discourse. However, even if it is a country where many religiously conservative citizens would gladly lend Edwards an ear if he appeared on the lecture circuit, the U.S. has not escaped the increasing influence of secularization. Organized religion has had to adapt to changing values in order to retain its membership. For Fundamentalists, this has translated to heightening religiosity to the level of a fever; for the most part, though, the largest Christian denominations have softened their doctrines, and have begun to advocate more symbolic readings of scripture. Taking this into account with the increasing number of people who subscribe to no faith at all, it is obvious that a figure like Edwards could no longer evoke the hyperbolic response that he did during his lifetime using religious rhetoric. Hell is now a territory much more remote than it was once believed to be.
However, this does not mean that the current generation of Americans is immune to the type of ideological guilt-tripping that Edwards employs. Despite their dissimilar messages, I see a strong parallel to Edwards’ technique in Al Gore’s environmental crusade, particularly as evinced in the 2006 documentary, An Inconvenient Truth. Their similarities are not immediately obvious—there is a great difference between Puritanism and PowerPoint, and society’s instinct is to focus on the distinction between Gore’s “hard” facts, and the intangible God that Edwards evokes. Even though the assertions of scientists seem to have more empirical weight than the Bible, in both cases, the dynamic that is created between speaker and audience is the same. Edwards and Gore both present themselves as experts on a subject, the former having poured over the Bible, and the latter having traveled to “the North Pole, the South Pole, the Amazon...” to confirm reports of environmental crisis for himself. Edwards’ adherents must rely on belief and faith in believing these expert citations of scripture, but no more so than Gore’s do to trust graphs and images of ecological phenomena that they have not seen with their own eyes. Though it might seem ridiculous to say that Hell is as much a fact as global warming, these two sweaty penalties are presented with equal authority.

However, being convinced of a speaker’s expertise does not stir up the emotional connection necessary to inspire conversion, leading both figures to manipulate the power of fear. It goes without saying that Edwards has the greater gift for being ghoulish; Gore is very far away from threats that anyone will personally “…crush out your blood, and make it fly, and it shall be sprinkled on His garments.” (Edwards 414). Nevertheless, in his presentations, Gore uses many similar methods to alarm his audience. Instead of hellfire, he draws on the destruction of “our ability to live on planet Earth, to have a future as a civilization,” which, while not graphic, is chilling enough if taken seriously. While Edwards makes everyone nervous by telling them that feeling healthy does not mean that they will not eventually be sent to hell, Gore employs the more modern threat of unseen disasters looming over our heads, even at one point using the gruesome image of an unwitting frog in slowly boiling water to symbolize his sluggish audience. While he is not quite as specific or vivid in his threats of destruction, the impact of Gore’s Truth hinges on how frightened his listeners are, much as Edwards’ effectiveness relies on the fear of God’s callous vindication. Both orators are perceptive men who see that stubborn Americans are best motivated by a sense of impending personal danger.

Additionally, it would be a misconception sourced in modern televangelism to imagine that Edwards and Gore are distinct from one another in delivery. “Fire and brimstone,” has become synonymous with yelling and spitting, but accounts of Edwards’ original delivery describe his level tone, one much closer to Gore’s disarmingly casual manner than to our modern conception of what constitutes the delivery of a Fundamentalist Christian sermon. This likeness is significant, as the number of Americans who consider themselves impervious to religious propaganda, the type that ridicules Creationism in the classroom, often exhibit a self-congratulatory attitude of intellectual superiority. Although this is not the venue to engage in the “Science vs. Religion” debate, it
is nonetheless essential to remember that the “objective” science of the secular community is often sensationalized and secondhand, and that the legitimacy it promises—to the exclusion of all other beliefs—may be grossly exaggerated. Indeed, for all its modern enlightenment, American sensibilities have not changed so much since the paroxysm of The Great Awakening. Were he of a slightly mellower disposition, Edwards’ sermon could very well have been titled, *An Inconvenient Truth About Hell (I’m Looking At You, Natural Men)*, and Al Gore is still just a guy who seems like he knows what he is talking about while scaring a bunch of people who know in their hearts that they *do* run the tap while brushing their teeth.

**Endnotes**

The Influence of the U.S. Armed Service on Two Presidential Assassins

Ariel Garneau

On November 22, 1963, Lee Harvey Oswald fired three shots at John F. Kennedy, the president of the United States, who was parading through the streets of Dallas, Texas. On October 29, 1994, Francisco Martin Duran, dressed in a trench coat in order to conceal his weapons, approached the North lawn of the White house, and proceeded to fire at a group of men dressed in suits, presuming the president was amongst them. In the case of Oswald, the president was shot and killed, forever changing the course of history. In the case of Duran, no one was injured, and Duran is currently serving a life sentence in jail. Both men came from low-income families. Both lacked a stable father figure growing up. Both men had been in the U.S. armed services. Both men wanted to kill the president. When reading through the profiles of presidential assassins, there are a number of cases where the assailant had received military training at some point in their life. Samuel Byck had been in the U.S. army from 1954-1946. Guiseppe Zangara had served in the Italian army before immigrating to the U.S. Lee Harvey Oswald was a U.S. marine radar operator from 1956 to 1959. Francisco Martin Duran was a medical specialist in the U.S. Army from 1986 to 1990. This paper will explore the effect the environment, training, and ethos of the U.S. armed forces had on the development of Lee Harvey Oswald and Francisco Martin Duran, and will conclude whether or not their experiences were fundamental to their capacity as assassins.

First, there will be a brief overview of the U.S. service: basic training; what life in the military is like; and how the recruit is trained to kill, including an examination of the distinction between those who will kill in the name of a greater cause, and those who enjoy the act of killing, defined as “sociopaths.” Secondly, the lives of Lee Harvey Oswald and Francisco Martin Duran will be examined up to their careers in the military, in an attempt to establish any correlations between their service and changes in character. The paper will end with the details of their assassination plot, in relation to their characters and military training.
The U.S. military, composed of three branches (Army, Navy, and Air Force), has trained countless young recruits, and transformed them into effective and ruthless killing machines for generations. Short of training and doctrine manuals from the respective periods, the current websites of each service provide insight into the timeless and everlasting character of each branch. They operate as sources allowing for the study of the respective branches’ ethos and operations, as well as training guiding principles. Although a great degree of all service members are not combat arms, such as infantry, artillery, or armoured (those who do the most “killing”), they must all pass through the same basic training when they are brought into the service.

As Ben Shalit describes in his seminal work, *The Psychology of Conflict and Combat*, “…The basic training camp was designed to undermine all the past concepts and beliefs of the new recruit, to undermine his civilian values, to change his self-concept—subjugating him entirely to the military system.” Basic training, among other things, is meant to break down the civilian recruit, only to build him back up in the image of “the soldier.” It also serves to introduce the recruit to the doctrine of their respective element. “Honor, Courage and Commitment” and *Semper Fidelis* become ways of life for young marines, while “This we’ll defend,” and the “Army family values” are the Army equivalent. They are very telling of the culture within which they exist, as they build the ethos of the service: one based on the principle of remaining faithful to your brother in arms, being self-reliant, and finding inner strength to persevere. These timeless concepts become ways of life, and an attitude. Life in the military is one of honour, duty, and country.

Along with ethos, comes the structure of life in the military, which is composed of regimented hard work, where everyone is held accountable for their actions to their superiors, and intelligence, quick thinking, as well as leadership and hard work are rewarded by promotion. The respective services only want the best and brightest leaders, and as such, choose to recognize and foster these leaders.

The daily structure and all-enveloping lifestyle that life in the armed services entails is seen by most as painful and unnecessary, if not downright unattractive to those who pose other options. However, for at-risk youth, the military offers a way out from a life of crime, and a chance at a new beginning, because promotion is based on your exploits within the service—not as a consequence of your socio-economic background. It offers young men and women a way to “make something” of themselves without having to pursue the traditional path of post-secondary education. Not only that, but it lauds the aggressive characteristics that troubled youths often possess, and attempts to harness their energy through institutionalized channels. If there is no spontaneous interest in the services from a troubled youth’s point of view, the penal system they may one day find themselves in may prompt him to think otherwise. As in the case of Francisco Martin Duran, who, because he was already an ROTC candidate when convicted of theft, was offered jail time or direct entry into the Army.
One of the main focuses of Basic training is teaching the recruit how to kill, while imparting the military's culture around the act in terms of rules and procedures. In the contemporary U.S. service this is done by conditioning the “flight” and “submit” options out of them, thus enabling “posture” and “fight” as natural responses to an aggressor or enemy. In a combat situation, this means killing the enemy. In basic training, this means shooting at human-shaped targets that pop-up from behind obstacles on the range. Like B.F. Skinner’s rats, as Lieutenant-Colonel Grossman points out in his work, *On Killing*, “…if the recruits do it properly their behavior is immediately reinforced when the target falls down. If he knocks down enough targets, the soldier gets a marksmanship badge and usually a three-day pass.” Proceeding as such throughout basic training, their reflexes for making a kill-shot become automatic, “…and the soldier then becomes conditioned to respond to the appropriate stimulus in the desired manner.” From the get-go, killing reflexes are exhaustingly trained into the recruit, and killing is in effect rewarded at an early stage in their development as soldiers.

Hitting a target in basic training is not the same as shooting someone on the battlefield. Those who excel at hitting targets might not enjoy the same response as shooting in “real life.” What motivates a soldier to shoot a human being, and to shoot at plywood, are very different. Basic Training can teach anyone to kill. Grossman argues, however, that there are those who are born with a predisposed temperament to killing, and within that group there are those who enjoy the act. We distinguish between them as follows: A soldier can shoot to kill purely in the context of their environment, and for no other reason. As Grossman states, “the soldier in combat is a product of his environment, and violence can beget violence.” A soldier can kill proficiently in battle purely based on endogenous factors such as the reality of combat. “This is the nurture side of the nature-nurture question.” Or, soldiers can kill in battle because they like it, using the reality of war merely as an excuse, “…he is also very much influenced by his temperament, or the nature side of the nature-nurture equation.” Grossman here distinguishes two different characters within the “natural killer.”

Military historian Gwynne Dyer, in his work, *War*, identifies a “natural soldier” as: “The kind who derives his greatest satisfaction from male companionship, from excitement, and from the conquering of physical obstacles. He doesn’t want to kill people as such, but he will have no objections if it occurs within a moral framework that gives him justification— like war. Whether such men are born or made, I do not know, but most of them end up in armies. …They are so rare that they form only a modest fraction even of small professional armies.”

Grossman further states that while, “There is strong evidence that there exists a genetic predisposition for aggression… There are also environmental processes that can fully develop this predisposition toward aggression: when we combine this genetic predisposition with environmental development we get a killer. But there is another factor: the
presence or absence of empathy for others. …The presence of aggression, combined with the absence of empathy, results in sociopathy. The presence of aggression, combined with the presence of empathy, results in a completely different kind of individual from the sociopath.” 19

The “sociopath,” as defined by Grossman, is a relevant type against which to base analysis of these two assassins, as it suggest that the act of killing may occur outside of “combat” if the necessary conditions (environmental and individual) are met.

The natural predisposition for aggression can be found in people who fought a lot as children,20 while the environmental factor contributing to aggression can be found as early as childhood in the neighborhood one grew up in, or as the case may be, later on, at the basic training phase of a service member’s life. When combined, the natural and environmental factors contributing to aggression in a human being can create a wholly different person. Society, however, keeps the environmental aspect of aggression in check most of the time. The armed service as a professional environment creates sociopaths, but only where the basic aggression and lack of empathy are already present. Alternatively, it can create “sheepdog” guardian types, who can be controlled, willing to “protect the flock,”21 instead. But what about when the soldier is not in combat, and their environment presents no immediate threat? There are also those who posit that sociopaths will be sociopaths, regardless of the profession they chose, but the military fosters their tendencies. In a study by Rod Lea and Geoffrey Chambers, geneticists at Victoria University in New Zealand22, they linked “violent male aggression to a variant of a gene that encodes for the enzyme monoamine oxidase A, which regulates the function of neurotransmitters such as dopamine and serotonin. According to the researchers, the so-called “warrior gene” is carried by fifty-six percent of Maori men, who are renowned for being “fearless warriors,” and carried by only thirty-four percent of Caucasian males. To further illustrate the results of the research, studies of World War II veterans suggest that very few men are innately bellicose. They found that ninety-eight percent of soldiers who endured sixty days of continuous combat suffered psychiatric symptoms, either temporary or permanent. The two out of one hundred soldiers who seemed unscathed by prolonged combat displayed “aggressive, psychopathic personalities,” the psychiatrists reported. “In other words, combat didn’t drive these men crazy because they were crazy to begin with.”23 Lea and Chambers’ study only ads fuel to the fire when it comes to the nature vs. nurture debate. The debate cannot be resolved in this paper, however, it is necessary to establish both sides’ main points when considering whether or not the armed services played a role in the development of Lee Harvey Oswald—the assassin, and Francisco ‘Frankie’ Martin Duran—the would-be assassin.

The military service can be a rewarding lifestyle for those who enlist, giving them purpose, a sense of duty, and a constant paycheck. Just as fast as it accepts you, the military can remove you from duty. Dereliction of duty, end of contract, and a court-marshal are just some of the ways that a contract can be terminated. The armed service, although it
institutionalizes violence, does not condone violence outside the parameters put forth. Nor does it endorse behaviour deviating from the moral code that recruits agree to, when joining the service. This brief snapshot of the U.S. military culture and ethos, as well as the differing opinions on the killing aspect, are necessary to understanding the experiences of Lee Harvey Oswald and Francisco Martin Duran.

Oswald’s early life is key to determining if he had sociopathic tendencies before his service, and if his military training had any impact on the execution of the assassination. The following reconstruction of his childhood and early years, stems from the Warren Commission’s report chapter seven, entitled “Lee Harvey Oswald: Background and Possible Motives.” Lee Harvey Oswald was born October 18, 1939, in New Orleans, to a single mother with two boys already. His father died two months before he was born, and according to the report, this had a significant impact on his mother Marguerite, and his brothers Robert and John Pic (both from a previous marriage). Shortly after Oswald’s birth, his mother had to work to support the family. She placed her eldest boys in an orphanage immediately, and in December of 1942, also sent Lee to the orphanage, who, until then had been cared for by his aunt and babysitters. His mother would later reclaim him and bring him to Dallas when he was four years old. About six months later, she would reclaim his brothers before marrying Edwin A. Ekdahl, in May of 1945. She would later send her two eldest to a military academy, where they stayed until the spring of 1948. Lee was too young and remained with his mother and her new husband, to whom he became very attached. At the commission hearings, John Pic testified that he thought Lee found in Ekdahl the father that he never had. Losing Ekdahl would have repercussions later on, affecting his ability to become attached to people, as Lee’s only father figure would soon leave the scene. Marguerite would divorce Ekdahl after a series of separations and reunions, in the summer of 1948.

Marguerite worked various jobs throughout Oswald’s childhood, leaving Lee to himself. His mother’s requests that he return home whenever not at school meant that he spent a lot of time alone. As such, he never developed what can be deemed adequate social skills. An indication of the nature of Lee’s character at this time was provided in the spring of 1950, while visiting his mother’s sister, where he refused to play with the other children his own age. Although Lee was not very social, he was a passable student in school, and showed no outward signs of violence or aggression at this stage in his life. However, all this changed in August of 1952, when the family moved to New York shortly after Robert joined the Marines, and they lived for a time with John Pic who was stationed there with the Coast Guard. They would not stay long because of an incident in which Lee allegedly pulled out a pocketknife during an argument with his brother’s wife. Lee refused to discuss the matter with Pic, whom he had previously idolized, and their relations were strained thereafter. This sudden violent outburst would begin a trend. When Lee was later teased at school, he would stay home, watch television and read magazines. This stage of his life would further his anti-social tendencies and lack of compassion for others. Refusing to go back to school, he was remanded to Youth House, a holding house for
children with psychiatric issues, before his mandated court appearance. He was in Youth House from April 16 to May 7, 1953, during which time Oswald was examined by the chief psychiatrist, Dr. Renatus Hartogs, and interviewed and observed by other members of the Youth House staff.\(^{29}\) Dr. Renatus noted that Lee liked to give the impression that he did not care for other people, but preferred to keep to himself, so that he was not bothered and did not have to make the effort of communicating. Oswald’s withdrawn tendencies and solitary habits were thought to be the result of “intense anxiety, shyness, feelings of awkwardness and insecurity.”\(^{30}\) His official report states,

“This thirteen year old, well-built boy has superior mental resources and functions only slightly below his capacity level, in spite of chronic truancy from school, which brought him into Youth House. No finding of neurological impairment or psychotic mental changes could be made. Lee has to be diagnosed as “personality pattern disturbance with schizoid features and passive—aggressive tendencies.” Lee has to be seen as an emotionally, quite disturbed youngster who suffers under the impact of existing emotional isolation and deprivation, lack of affection, absence of family life, and rejection by a self-involved and conflicted mother.”\(^{31}\)

The “passive-aggressive” tendencies should be noted, as they are a component of Grossman’s definition of a sociopath. Lee would also admit to fantasies about being powerful, and sometimes hurting and killing people, but refused to elaborate on them. The Oswalds left New York in January of 1954, and returned home to New Orleans, where Lee finished the ninth grade before he left school to work for a year. Then in October of 1956, he joined the Marines.\(^{32}\) Lee was not known to be aggressive by those around him, however the attack on his sister-in-law and Dr. Hartogs’ evaluation hinted at later developments. As he grew older he would become involved in fights. Voebel, a childhood acquaintance said that Oswald “wouldn’t start any fights, but if you wanted to start one with him, he was going to make sure that he ended it, or you were going to really have one, because he wasn’t going to take anything from anybody.”\(^{33}\) Voebel’s statement further underlines Oswald’s violent temperament in childhood, making the possibility of violence later on more probable. Growing up with two brothers at military college, and who later joined the service, Oswald was greatly influenced in his decision to join the Marines by his brother. Robert Oswald had given his Marine Corps manual to his brother Lee, who studied it until, “He knew it by heart.” According to Marguerite Oswald, “Lee lived for the time that he would become seventeen years old to join the Marines—that whole year.” As stated at the hearings, in John Pic’s view, Oswald was motivated to join the Marines in large part by a desire “to get out from under ... the yoke of oppression from my mother.”\(^{34}\) It would seem his childhood violent temperament and the broken family structure fed into each other, and his motivation to seek out an institutionalized family and structure. His difficulty in relating to other people, and his general dissatisfaction with the world around him continued while he was in the Marine Corps, consistently closing himself off to friendships and alienating others. While there is nothing in Oswald’s military records to indicate that he was mentally unstable or otherwise psychologically unfit for duty in the Marine Corps,
he did not adjust well to life in the service. He did not rise above the rank of private first class, even though he had passed a qualifying examination for the rank of corporal. In an undated statement to fellow Marine Powers, Oswald said: “All the Marine Corps did was to teach you to kill and after you got out of the Marines you might be good gangsters.” This statement is telling of Oswald’s complicated relationship with authority and violence, and his acceptance of being taught to kill is noted. Powers believed that when Oswald arrived in Japan he acquired a girlfriend, “finally attaining a male status or image in his own eyes;” this, apparently caused Oswald to become more self-confident and aggressive. After a series of incidents, accidentally shooting himself with an un-authorized pistol (for which he was court marshaled), and a drunken encounter with his sergeant (for which he was also court marshaled), he requested to be transferred to the Marine Corps Reserves in September 1953, supposedly to care for his sick mother. In reality he would defect to the Soviet Union, later dishonorably discharged from the Corps. As demonstrated, the key to understanding Lee Oswald’s actions later in life lies in his unstable early life. From the account of his early childhood, which led to a lack of compassion for others and his tendency to “finish” any fight he got into, it would seem that his service in the Marine Corps brought out the aggressive side of his personality, which had only slowly developed prior to his service. Thus completing the trifecta of characteristics defining a sociopath, as per Grossman’s definition. If Oswald was an incomplete sociopath before joining the corps, he could now add “state trained killer” to his resumé.

Francisco “Frankie” Martin Duran shares a similar beginning in life with Lee Harvey Oswald, even though they are separated by thirty-one years in time and several presidents. Although they share several life experiences in common, Duran’s life is relatively unknown compared to Oswald’s. Even his family members do not remember that much about him. There are relatively few primary sources relating to his early life, as such, the details of his life before the assassination attempt are relayed to us through secondary sources such as newspaper articles published in the wake of the attack, and a select few scholarly works. Much can be said about the lack of information surrounding the attack, ranging from public disinterest to institutional suppression; unfortunately, it does not fall within the breadth of this paper.

Francisco Martin Duran was born on September 8, 1968, in Albuquerque, New Mexico, to Celia Duran. He was born in a “poor, often crime-ridden” neighbourhood, to a Hispanic family with five older brothers. Much of the time they lived below the poverty line. Frankie never knew his father; instead he knew only a succession of males who rotated in and out of his mother’s life. Much like Oswald, Duran would never have a father figure. Duran’s mother tried to support her sons as best she could as a cleaning lady, supplementing her income with food stamps and whatever other assistance she could get from the government. As Clarke and Lucente, the only scholars to do significant analysis on his early life, remark, “Family life was bleak in the small apartment in a neglected public housing project where she struggled to raise six fatherless children alone.” From the outset, Duran was not poised
for success. He was always a quiet, withdrawn child, and his behaviour did not change as he grew older. According to the Clarke and Lucente work, “Adam Rodriguez, the director of the centre (where he went to shoot pool), knew most of the boys who spent time there, but he had only vague recollections of Frankie.” The fact that people do not remember Frankie does not stop with the recreational center director. “When [Frankie] was growing up,” a girl in the neighbourhood said, “all his brothers, they’d hang around the community centre, but Frankie, he wouldn’t so much. He’d stay home with his Mom.”— This was a situation almost reversed from Oswald’s, who was forced to stay home. In 1986, when he graduated from high school, few of his classmates and teachers remembered much about him. “Except for the updated photographs that appeared in the high school yearbook each year, it was as though he made no impression on anyone, one way or another.” What can be described as his inability to connect with others is important when considering his actions later—another similarity with Oswald.

Frankie’s life starts to lead him on a different path when he joins the Junior Reserve Officer Training Corps (JROTC). “The JROTC program with its military trappings and rituals provided status and a sense of belonging to something he could be proud of in a life where such satisfactions were scarce.” Duran was clearly attracted to the structured way of life provided by the service, offering him an “out” from daily life in Albuquerque.

However even his drill instructors would remember little of him. “In the last seventeen years, I’ve seen six thousand kids come through the program,” says Irv Harris, a Sergeant Major. “This guy didn’t even ring a bell, to be honest with you. I was surprised even to hear he’d been in the ROTC.” The fact that he made no lasting impression in the arena of life he felt most comfortable, is also indicative of the level to which he was withdrawn from contact with others. Duran would only send up two red flags before enlisting. As court records show, on February 16, 1986, at seventeen years old and a high school senior, Frankie was arrested for stealing a front-end loader from a construction site. He was charged in New Mexico’s children’s court with unlawful taking of a vehicle. The judge, noting that this was Frankie’s first offence—and impressed that the defendant had graduated from high school and had participated in the Junior ROTC—offered him a deal: he would drop the charges, he said, if Frankie agreed to enlist in the Army. Welcoming the opportunity to serve in the military, the charges were dropped. According to the Clarke and Lucente work, “Since he was underage, his mother had to give her approval, but that did not require much persuasion. She was proud, happy, and probably relieved to do so. ‘The Army had been [Frankie’s] only dream [since he was in] the eleventh grade,’ she said, ‘so] I signed the papers.” Better than any recruiter could do, the judge explained to the Durans that a life in the service “would offer Frankie opportunities, to pursue further education and economic advancement, not to mention the coveted status military service conveyed in the Hispanic community.” By the time he left for basic training in the summer of 1986, Frankie was excited and optimistic about the future. In a scene common among new recruits, a photograph after his successful completion of basic training “reveals a young man in his ‘dress greens’ with an expression of confidence and pride on his face, an American flag at his side.” Later, when he was asked why he had joined the Army, Frankie replied, “I needed a job, and something to look forward to.”
In the Army, Frankie spent a little time in St. Louis before being transferred back to his hometown. On December 23, 1987, in downtown Albuquerque, he was arrested and charged with the misdemeanor of soliciting a prostitute. The charge was dropped in 1990. Unlike Oswald, up until enlisting, Duran had led a quiet and reserved life, with no violent outbursts, showing no outward signs of aggression. To a greater extent than Oswald, his military career is key to understanding his actions in October 1994.

After basic training, he had been selected for training as a medical specialist just as he had requested. Although not a combat trade, he had still gone through the same basic training as other recruits, and had been trained to kill the exact same way. He would then receive his permanent duty assignment—Hawaii, Schofield Barracks. As Clarke and Lucente state, “For the first time in his life, things seemed to be breaking Frankie’s way. A career in the Army was developing as a very attractive possibility for this poor, fatherless boy from the barrio that only an optimist could have imagined.” In Honolulu, he would meet a young woman, and in 1989, a son was born, marrying soon after.

From what can be learned from military records, Frankie’s tour of duty with the 25th Light Infantry Division in Hawaii was unremarkable, which is to say he performed as an average soldier—no better, no worse. One of his officers later described the young soldier as “a very good man when he was under me.” Everything would change dramatically soon after. As Clarke and Lucente detail in their work,

On the 9 August 1990, Frankie met a group of his army buddies at a bowling alley. It was a typical night on liberty for soldiers, by late in the evening everyone, including Frankie, was drunk. An argument developed between the soldiers and some civilian men and women who objected to their boisterous behavior. Tempers and decibel levels escalated and they were ordered out of the bowling alley. As the crowd spilled into the parking lot, Frankie got into his car and tried to leave, but a crowd of hostile civilians, shouting and cursing, blocked his path. He got out of the car, confronted one of them, then got back in his car and managed to drive off.

He would turn his car around and drive back to the parking lot where the crowd was still milling around. According to Clarke and Lucente, “In what must have been a drunken rage, Frankie suddenly swerved his car and accelerated directly into the crowd of civilians, hitting and injuring a woman, and scattering the rest before speeding away.” He would later be stopped by Military police and arrested. He was charged with “drunken driving, felony assault, aggravated assault, and leaving the scene of an accident.” At a general court martial, he was convicted on all charges. Interestingly, at this hearing he had “tried to explain how sorry he was, that he really did not mean to do what he had done. He was not a violent person, he insisted. He was drunk, things got out of control, and he was truly remorseful.”
The army had once been Duran’s saviour, but he was now stripped of his military rank, forfeiting all pay and allowances, and sentenced to five years hard labour at the U.S. Military Detention Center at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. As Clarke and Lucente remark, “It was devastating, especially for a first offence, or so it seemed to Francisco Martin Duran who now, like all convicts, would be known by his first, middle and last names. There was no more ‘Frankie’ in - and after - Leavenworth, and not much to look forward to either. His military career was finished. In disgrace.” Duran’s life was up-ended and he suddenly found himself without a sense of direction or calling.

By Grossman’s definition, Duran was now displaying all the necessary characteristics of a sociopath. Whether or not his time in the service had any direct influence on his aggressive behaviour, it nonetheless materialized during this time in the service, and would continue thereafter. Because a dishonourable discharge is dishonourable, finding work after the fact is difficult. After being released from Leavenworth after two years, he moved his family to a trailer park in Widefield, Colorado, where he found a job as an upholsterer. According to Clarke and Lucente, “The alienation that began with his court martial and deepened during his incarceration steadily evolved into an obsession with getting even.” However, the question remained, with whom could he blame his troubles? According to his defence attorney, “his intended victim was a ‘symbol’... The Commander in Chief, a person who just happened to be Bill Clinton.” As Clarke and Lucente summarize, “It was president Clinton’s position and prominence—not his politics—that determined Duran’s course of action.”

After a careful examination of Lee Harvey Oswald and Francisco Martin Duran’s early years, we may state that both evolved characteristics definitive of a sociopath, as defined by Grossman, during their time as armed service personnel. It would seem that the environment provided by the military, and the culture of aggression and violence fostered in the respective military branches, enabled their latent inner “sociopath” to emerge. The final capacity in which their service in the military could affect their assassination attempts is in regards to the development and execution of their plans.

In continuing to examine the role the military played in forming Lee Harvey Oswald—the assassin—this paper will assume two things: that he acted alone in killing the president, and that he fired three shots from the Texas School Book Depository. Too many controversies exist surrounding the assassination to be debated within the context of this paper. As such, the remaining evaluation of Oswald’s Marine proficiency will weigh on the evidence concerning the nature of the three shots fired. Following the same criteria as the Warren commission does in chapter four, the assassin, in looking at (1) the nature of the shots, (2) Oswald’s Marine training in marksmanship, we may attempt to determine if his Marine Corps training played a significant role in the assassination.
The nature of the shot was fairly simple. From the sixth floor of the Texas School Book Depository building, the shots were at a slow-moving target proceeding on a downgrade in virtually a straight line with the alignment of the assassin’s rifle, at a range of 177 to 266 feet.\(^{59}\) For the commission, four marksmanship experts testified before the Commission, all stating that the shots that struck and killed the president were “not ... particularly difficult” (Maj. Eugene D. Anderson, USMC). “I mean it requires no training at all to shoot a weapon with a telescopic sight once you know that you must put the crosshairs on the target and that is all that is necessary.” (Robert A. Frazier, FBI expert in firearms identification and training). “Well, in order to achieve three hits, it would not be required that a man be an exceptional shot. A proficient man with this weapon, yes.” (Ronald Simmons, chief of the U.S. Army Infantry Weapons Evaluation Branch of the Ballistics Research Laboratory.) “… An easy shot.” (M. Sgt. James A. Zahm, noncommissioned officer in charge of the Marksmanship Training Unit in the Weapons Training Battalion of the Marine Corps School at Quantico, VA). From the experts’ statements,\(^{60}\) it would seem that anyone familiar with a firearm would have been able to take that shot. Marine marksmanship proficiency was not necessary. In regards to Oswald’s Marine training, he received extensive training in marksmanship (as do all recruits). As part of basic training, he followed an intensive eight-week training period during which he received instruction in sighting, aiming, and manipulation of the trigger. After familiarization with live ammunition in the .22 rifle and .22 pistol, Oswald, like all Marine recruits, received training on the rifle range at distances up to five hundred yards, firing fifty rounds each day for five days. Although he scored just below “sharpshooter,”\(^{61}\) his skill as a Marine would not be key in making the shots that took president Kennedy’s life, as per the expert testimony given at the commission.

When considering Duran’s plot to assassinate Clinton, as court records reveal, it shows a great deal of forethought. After deciding to assault the White House, he purchased “weapons and ammunition that could be adapted to the different situations he might encounter (such as the shotgun for short-range accuracy and devastation, the assault rifle for a more distant target)... an oversized trench coat to conceal his customized assault rifle and extra ammunition.” Duran’s considerations of distance in choosing the calibre of gun and subsequent ammunition purchase, are signs of knowledge of firearms, however, this knowledge could be acquired outside of military training in a civilian capacity. There has been no research done into this aspect of the Duran case, as such, any conclusions are merely speculative; however, one may assume that in the U.S. where the second amendment allows people the right to bear arms, that basic knowledge of firearms and their capabilities is not hard to come by. Furthermore, Duran’s plan was not detailed further than shooting at the White House. One may assume that in basic military training, a soldier is taught the basics of assaulting a position to obtain an objective. When considering Duran’s plan to assassinate the president, no military influence is discernable, other than the use of firearms. So what then was the impact or effect of time in the armed services on Lee Harvey Oswald and Francisco Martin Duran?
As assessed earlier in the paper, starting at an early age, both were alienated and anti-social, failing to develop the social skills that would allow them to interact with others and develop relationships, resulting in a general lack of empathy towards others. Although both displayed different signs of aggression earlier in life, both Oswald and Duran experienced increased aggressiveness during their time in the Marine Corps and Army. Furthermore, both were trained to kill during the basic training phase of their careers, however, neither of their advanced training with firearms provided any discernable advantage in their assassination plots. Referring to the original definition of a sociopath, and that it foresees the possibility of a sociopath killing outside of combat, both Duran and Oswald may be classified as such, and their stints in the armed service enabled their sociopathic tendencies by providing an aggressive environment. However, society provides aggressive environments on its own. For the purposes of this paper, we may state that the U.S. Armed Services played a role in shaping the sociopathic nature of Lee Harvey Oswald and Francisco Martin Duran, but was not instrumental in their assassination plots and attempts against the office of the U.S. president.

Endnotes

1. Samuel Byck attempted to kill president Richard Nixon by hijacking a plane in order to fly it into the White House.
2. Giuseppe Zangara attempted to assassinate Franklin Delano Roosevelt in 1933.
5. *The values that define a marine*, http://www.marines.com/main/index/making_marines/culture/traditions/core_values
11. Grossman, *On Killing*, 6. Actions designed to convince an opponent, through both sight and sound, that the posturer is a dangerous and frightening adversary.
14. Ibid.
15. Ibid.
16. Lieutenant-Colonel as abbreviated.
20. Ibid., 182.
21. Ibid., 183.


27. Ibid., 379.

28. Ibid., 380.

29. Ibid.

30. Ibid., 380, 382.

31. Ibid., 383.

32. Ibid., 384.

33. In the U.S. Marine Corps, for enlisted service members, the lowest rank is “Private,” followed by “Private First Class,” “Lance Corporal,” and then “Corporal.” http://www.marines.com/main/index/winning_battles/ranks_responsibilities/enlisted_ranks

34. *Chapter 7: Lee Harvey Oswald*, 385.

35. Ibid., 386.

36. Ibid., 387.


39. Ibid.

40. Ibid.


42. Ibid.

43. Clarke and Lucente, “Getting even,” 133.

44. Ibid.


46. Clarke and Lucente, “Getting even,” 133.

47. Spanish for “neighbourhood.”


49. *U.S. v. Duran* website, Flores testimony (March 27, 1995).

50. Clarke and Lucente, “Getting even,” 133.

51. Ibid., 133.

52. U.S. v. Duran website, Flores testimony (March 27, 1995).


54. Ibid.

55. Ibid., 139.


57. *Chapter 4: the Assassin*, 189.

58. Ibid., 190.

Black Female Entrepreneurs vs. The Masculine Structure of Black Business in the 1920s

Kaitlyn Majesky

The 1920s was a decade in American history that witnessed the growth of entrepreneurial activity, propelled by the rise in purchasing power. Yet, the beginning of the twentieth century was also characterized by racial tensions between black and white Americans, with blacks attempting to claim their own forms of citizenship through entrepreneurial activity. The purpose of this essay will be to uncover the role that black women held in creating a unified black business community. More specifically, the business methods they used will be analyzed in order to understand how black female entrepreneurs disrupted the predominant masculinity of businesses and business practices. The business practices employed by black female entrepreneurs were shaped by their race and gender, and thus, it was these practices that disrupted the masculine structure of entrepreneurial activity.

The artifact titled, “Booker T. Washington Papers. National Negro Business League Printed Matter for 1915-1923, including Booklet on Organizing a Local Negro Business League,” is a document that outlines the goals of the National Negro Business League (NNBL), formed in 1900. The main focus of the document is to explain how localized black communities should construct local business leagues. Various steps are listed which outline the process of forming a local business league, describing institutional features that should be present. Features of a local business league that are required include: the creation of standing committees; elections for the positions of president, vice-president, secretary, and treasurer; and a mechanism for communication with the National Negro Business League. A key motive of the NNBL, emphasized in this document, is to ensure that the black community is educated on matters of black business and entrepreneurship; this would be accomplished through the advertising of black business in business directories. The purpose of the document was to strengthen black business, and it recommends that businesses partake in practices such as cooperative buying, to increase profits.
As outlined by Joan Scott in *Gender and the Politics of History*, gender is a category that is embedded in the “meaning of power”, of which both power and gender are in tension with one another.¹ In her article, Scott questions the ways in which “implicit understandings of gender” are employed and “reinscribed.” In applying this definition of gender to the NNBL document, various questions arise in relation to gender and the evolution of gender categories. Throughout the document there are ample references to the important role that black businessmen played in creating a strong and unified black business community. Women are periodically mentioned in the document, however, their influence as business actors is marginalized compared to that of males, with emphasis being placed on the male role in business. The recognition of women entrepreneurs in the document does not specify whether women were to be involved in the informal or formal realm of business. This ambiguity leads to questions pertaining to shifts in gender identities and categories. How were women able to embrace these new economic opportunities, and when they did, in what way was gender reconstituted in the marketplace?

This essay will attempt to answer and pose questions related to the role of black women as economic actors in the 1920s. More specifically, the focus of this essay will centre around the relationship between black women and the market, and the way in which this relationship resulted in a rupture in the previous power structure between black men and women within the business world; a power structure that was characterized with black men being defined as the dominant actors in market relations.² In this process of unearthing understudied aspects of black female’s roles and identity in relation to the market, the dominant power structure between men and women becomes elusive. Thus, a queer reading of the document will be provided, with the goal of identifying practices of black female entrepreneurs that disrupted previously assumed definitions of gender, the market, and historical time. In analyzing this specific group of historical actors, it is also relevant to include ethnography as a methodology in order to analyze, “...the meanings, functions, and consequences of human actions and institutional practices, and how these are implicated in local, and perhaps also wider, contexts.”³

Before an analysis is provided on the NNBL artifact in relation to black business women, it is important to outline the previous areas of scholarship on the topic of black female entrepreneurship in the early twentieth century. Much of the scholarship completed on the role of women in the black beauty industry deals with the cultural impact of female black entrepreneurs. For example, many studies outline the ways that black beauty entrepreneurs contributed to new definitions of aesthetic standards for black women. Some studies also outline the ways in which black women working in beauty companies utilized their relations with other women formed through the beauty industry, in order to mobilize and protest against race riots.⁴ While the aforementioned studies have been valuable in order to assess the cultural impact that the beauty industry had on black women's bodies and political activism, they have neglected to analyze black women in relation to the marketplace. The early twentieth century and the 1920s was a time when blacks were beginning to take on a role as economic actors. Thus, this essay will attempt to analyze the ways in which black women were able to define themselves as economic actors, and employ market practices to foster business growth and increase profitability.
In the early twentieth century, Booker T. Washington was the primary spokesman who sought to increase the visibility of African-American entrepreneurs and business. In 1900, he established the National Negro Business League, which marked the beginning of what some scholars have termed as the “Golden Age of Black Business.” This “Golden Age” was characterized by the growth in black business, which was tied to ideals of racial uplift through entrepreneurship. Booker T. Washington’s business strategy was embedded in the rhetoric of racial uplift as he believed that blacks, through participating in the “open market,” could prove their indispensability as economic actors to both blacks and whites.

At the beginning of the NNBL, black men were acknowledged as the leaders of the black business community, with women being relegated to that of a supportive and thus, an informal role. In order to assess the role of black women as economic actors, attention must be drawn to the inherent masculinity imbedded in business structures and practices.

As noted by scholar Kathy Peiss, “...business history’s traditional subject, the firm, has been largely constructed as a self-contained, indisputably masculine enterprise.” She notes that at the beginning of the twentieth century, a time when “manhood” was in crisis, small businesses began to evolve into corporations, resulting in the creation of a male professional and managerial class. Manhood was partly able to be achieved through, “corporate teamwork and goals.” Entrepreneurial success was also viewed as a necessary precondition for restoring black manhood, and thus entrepreneurship in the black community was directly tied to masculinity.

In the NNBL, men also held the influential leadership roles, leading women to form their own business leagues. How then, did black women attempt to disrupt the masculine characteristics of business, through their own engagement in entrepreneurial activity? In addition, how were black women able to capitalize on their relations with other women in order to form their own networks of consumers?

The beginning of female black entrepreneurship can be traced back to the antebellum period in U.S. history. Historically, slavery had placed many legal and extra legal restrictions on black females, which limited their ability to work on even minor business projects. Yet, it was in the antebellum period that black women began to take up business activity through hairdressing. In 1890, a U.S. census found that there were five hundred and fourteen black women beauticians, in 1900 there were nine hundred and eighty-four, 1910 three thousand and ninety-three, and by 1920, there were twelve thousand six hundred and sixty-six black female beauticians. Many females began to turn to the beauty industry as a result of the social and economic characteristics of the period. Due to racial and gender discrimination, black women were limited to domestic work. Yet, a decline in the demand for domestic work left many females turning to prostitution as a means for income. This social reality was a key factor in causing black women to turn to the beauty industry as a way to earn an income, and possibly, a profit.

As noted in Kathy Preiss’ article on gender in business history, black women faced exclusion from the market due to limited capital and poor access to credit. The marketplace, as previously outlined, was also defined as a sphere of male influence, and was
imbedded in masculine ideals of the early twentieth century. Also, due to the lack of formal education available to black women, many women who were able to enter into the beauty industry often lacked information on management, taxation, and the legal system. While black women faced these structural barriers to entry into the marketplace, they assumed the role of economic actors, and were able to redefine entrepreneurship as a profession.

The black beauty industry has been defined as “market-driven” and containing a “marketplace logic.” In order to enter into the beauty industry black female entrepreneurs capitalized on three key economic and social features of the early twentieth century—existing networks of women, consumption patterns, and advertising techniques. The methods employed by black women to capitalize on these features worked to disrupt the common notion of entrepreneurship being a male practice. A queer reading is useful in this analysis because little research has been done on how black females, through employing methods of business that were specific to their gender and racial category, had reworked and influenced masculine business practices. This aspect of black business has not been widely studied or archived, and thus, “stand in a queer (that is, oblique and askew) relationship to official archives…”

The black business leaders in the 1920s had promoted the rise in black purchasing power, and claimed what was termed “consumer citizenship.” White entrepreneurs in the 1920s had more money to spend on marketing, and thus, threatened the livelihood of black female-owned businesses. It was in this climate that black female entrepreneurs capitalized on the “ethnic resources” they had in order to decrease the cost of advertising; the method used to advertise was selling door-to-door, and utilizing existing relations with women in the black community. Black beauty entrepreneurs also sought to capitalize on the working class consumption habits of the 1920s, which demonstrates that they were aware and concerned with market demand for their products. As noted by scholar Kathy Peiss, “...business women blurred the lines between business, philanthropy, community building, and politics.”

Black beauty entrepreneurs also were influential in producing business practices that were sustained well past the 1920s. Female entrepreneurs functioned as middlemen minorities due to the fact that they targeted an audience that elites were “loath to interact” with, and this practice was utilized in later years by commercial advertisers. Another form of business that black female entrepreneurs employed is what was termed as the “direct sales method,” which in contemporary usage is called multi-level marketing or pyramid organization. This business practice entailed agents selling the beauty products and services while concurrently recruiting new agents. The new agents were trained first and then went out to work, with the process repeating itself. Thus, the methods used to sell products on behalf of black women were highly market driven, and had an impact on the practice of entrepreneurial activity.
There were three main beauty industry businesswomen in the early twentieth century—Madame C.J. Walker, Annie Turbo-Malone, and Sara Spencer Washington. These women were influential in the beginning of the twentieth century, and remained prominent figures throughout the 1920s. Madame C.J. Walker had struggled to become part of the community of black entrepreneurs, often facing marginalization in the early years of the National Negro Business League (NNBL). Yet, Walker, like her counterparts, was a businesswoman that sought to employ financial and marketing techniques to her hair product business that would increase profitability. Walker was the most successful of these three women in capitalizing on the direct sales method, as she travelled South and gave speeches, demonstrating her products and trading agents. The practice of reinvesting profit into manufacturing was one method used by Walker which helped to foster growth in her business.

Very little scholarly research has been done on Sara Spencer Washington, but it is known that she was an important figure in the expansion of beauty schools. Washington also employed similar methods to Madame Walker, however, Washington was able to expand her business and create a subsidiary company. She created Apex News magazine in 1928, which served as a crucial marketing tool. The magazine established a public relations department whose purpose was to work alongside black organizations in the U.S. to encourage the practice of buying from black businesses. Similarly, Annie Turnbo-Malone created a beauty school whose purpose was to increase the economic opportunities for black women. In 1920, the Poro College was completed, and it employed one hundred and seventy-five people. Thus, it is evident that these black female entrepreneurs sought to expand black business through creating the opportunity for other black women to enter into the beauty industry.

How did black business women contribute to the unity of the black business community? As previously mentioned, in the early years of the NNBL many of the black male leaders positioned business women in informal entrepreneurial roles, believing that they would aid in black male business ventures rather than take a significant role. However, as outlined throughout this paper, black women assumed roles in the formal sphere of business, creating their own companies, and establishing their own market techniques. Due to the fact that black women were forced to employ marketing and financial practices specific to their gender and racial category, the methods they used served to disrupt, or undermine, the masculinity that was inherent in the business structure. As noted, there has been little scholarship on how black women confronted and redefined masculine business and business practices in the early twentieth century. Yet, what scholarship is available suggests that their contribution to unifying and creating a strong black business community was significant, and concurrently, worked to undermine masculinity within the business community.

As demonstrated throughout this essay, the business practices employed by black female entrepreneurs were shaped by their race and gender, and thus it was these practices that disrupted the masculine structure of entrepreneurial activity. “Booker T. Washington Papers. National Negro Business League Printed Matter for 1915-1923, including Booklet
on Organizing a Local Negro Business League,” provides a starting point for assessing the role of black female entrepreneurs in the 1920s. While black women were defined in the beginning of the twentieth century as “supporters” of male entrepreneurial activity, black business women rejected this claim, and sought to expand their share in the marketplace. This was accomplished through capitalizing on the various economic and social realities of the period. Therefore, it was their specific position as “black females” that shaped the business practices they employed; these business practices were not only highly market driven, but also stood in contrast to the practices employed by male businessmen. The role of black female entrepreneurs as economic actors, who disrupted masculinity through the marketplace, is a claim that has been supported throughout this essay, yet, still requires further research amongst gender and economic historians.

Endnotes

8. Ibid.
9. Ibid., 222.
26. Ibid.
Racy Hygiene: How Eugenics Shaped the Everyday World of Sanitary Napkins

Lauren Kilgour

The Progressive Era in the United States, ranging from approximately 1880-1920, was a period marked by disruption and change. Large-scale industrialization, urbanization, and immigration were forces that contributed to the remaking of the societal landscape. Pastoral, white, old-stock Americans were anxious about the changes and disruptions these forces caused—they feared losing their dominant place in, and control over society. Often, they voiced their fears about the presence and movement of new Americans, by equating them with anxieties about disease, contagion, and public health and welfare, in general. Another symptom of their anxiety is evident in changes in the understanding of race. Older ideas of race, as a set of visual markers and innate characteristics, began to shift. In earlier years, race had largely been a project of defining Caucasian and non-Caucasian, to distinguish and allot power based upon each group’s respective “superiority” and “inferiority.” However, in this period, race became entangled in the cultural changes of the period, and was applied differently. On the one hand, old-stock whites increasingly identified themselves as Anglo-Saxon or Nordic, distinguishing themselves from other European “races.” On the other hand, certain groups—labour agitators, prostitutes, the insane—were seen as threatening to Americans’ racial “health,” even if they were otherwise considered white or “Nordic.” In short, the longer narrative and project of racial ranking around the world was applied internally to the United States’ own population. By defining and locating “the other” within their own population, old-stock Americans sought to preserve the older social hierarchy (which placed them at the top) by reanimating it with these new racial concepts. This new social hierarchy resulted in the emergence and application of internal racism within the United States’ own population. Furthermore, internal racism was essential to combatting what was termed “race suicide.” The theory behind race suicide was that the superior, old-stock Americans were being outbred by the racially inferior—the growing immigrant and working classes. These old-stock Americans thought that the purity of their culture and republican values of white America were being jeopardized and denigrated by mixing socially and biologically with immigrants and the
working classes. They sought to quell this mixing with a variety of social programs, such as miscegenation laws, and sterilization and birth control campaigns. All of these social programs sought to enforce the social and biological separation of old-stock Americans in the name of “race betterment.” Thus, these social programs intervened in the lives of the United States’ population, to preserve the “purity” of old-stock Americans, and the racial hierarchy that those notions of purity constructed within the United States.

Through aligning their fears and anxieties with scientific theories of the period, old-stock Americans’ social programs were able to gain legitimacy. Prior to the atrocities of World War II, science and scientific practice around and about the management of bodies still retained an aura of objectivity, which was created by the detached mechanical reproducibility of numbers, figures, and measurements. Additionally, the technocratic nature of Progressive Era society viewed the scientists behind these theories as “experts,” whose training and knowledge gave their theories authority. Combining objectivity and authority allowed the very social nature of science to be obscured, while its practices were legitimized and applied. Progressive social reformers used this legitimacy to their advantage. A key example of this legitimization is evidenced by the germ theory of disease. Emerging in the late nineteenth century, the germ theory created heightened awareness of invisible microbes and their potential hazards. Progressive social reformers valourized and upheld this theory because supporting the regime of sanitization and hygiene it espoused allowed them to advance their own social agendas, chief of which was race betterment. This naturalization signals the rise and concretization of eugenics in the United States.

Eugenic principles became so widely disseminated and popularized during the Progressive Era that their career extends beyond that specific periodization. In fact, eugenics so thoroughly saturated American society that it can be noted at even the most mundane sites. This paper considers one such site: sanitary napkins. To understand the relationship between eugenics and sanitary napkins, I will explore how eugenic principles structured the marketing of sanitary napkins, and helped convince women to use them. Using a 1926 Kotex advertisement as an indicative artifact, I will explore its visual content to support my argument. By exploring the gendered social tensions surrounding germs, women’s increasing autonomy, and bodily dissimulation and signification present in the advertisement, I will argue that the biological, sexual, and visual quests for hygiene that sanitary napkins enabled and embodied worked to support the deeply eugenic desire for white purity.

During the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries in the United States, there was an increased focus on the “messy bodies” and “dirty rags” produced by menstruation. While the stigma and rhetoric of filth surrounding women’s bodies were not new, the intensification and acceleration of attempts to control that perceived filth were, which reflected the growing influence of the germ theory of disease on cultural thought as it solidified during the mid to late nineteenth centuries, and beyond. However, while the germ theory generated many medical triumphs, it also complicated certain parts and processes of the human body. Using the sanitary principles of the germ theory, doctors
relabeled the homemade fabric pads that women had made and used for centuries as “makeshift,” and deemed them “unhygienic and dangerous to health.” This renaming disrupted the domestic way in which women had regulated their bodies for centuries as manufacturers recognized that the new scientific discourse around menstruation was creating a climate for a new product, and began the process of developing a new scientific and hygienic way for women to manage menstruation.

Engineers working for Kimberly Clark Corporation during World War I invented the basis for this new product: “cellucotton.” This tissue was created by a new, less expensive process, which blended cellulose and wood pulp. Originally, cellucotton had been intended for bandaging wounded soldiers during World War I. However, this material gained new dimensions when World War I battlefield nurses started to use it during their periods. Kimberly Clark recognized the potential of this use, and began to develop a new product.

As a result, Kimberly Clark formed a new division, Cellucotton Products Company, and began work on a new brand—Kotex. Introduced for sale in 1921, Kotex, so-called because of its blend of cotton-like texture, was a new incarnation of already existing attempts at a commercial napkin. However, unlike earlier attempts, Kotex was the first commercially made napkin to be successfully marketed and sold. Its birth marks the rise of the so-called “sanitary napkin.” Its slightly different form, comparatively low price, disposability, and extensive advertising campaign in the *Ladies’ Home Journal* were key factors in its success.

Kimberly Clark’s Kotex offered a new solution to what an increasingly sanitary-conscious society was claiming was a newly intensified “problem”: unhygienic menstruation practices. The Kotex napkin was a scientifically modern way to leave behind the much-lampooned older practices of soaking, washing, and reusing homemade cloth napkins. However, while convenient, Kotex was far from problem-free: economically, although less expensive than other feminine hygiene products, they were still out of reach for many women; socially, they did not cater to the majority of the market; physically, they were simply uncomfortable—the stiff gauze would sometimes chafe women’s skin so harshly it would bleed, and the belts used in conjunction with the napkins (up into the 1970s) often caught and mercilessly tore out pubic hair, while also slipping and sliding between the legs. Yet despite all of these aspects, Kotex, and the many competitors that cropped up in its wake, were hugely popular. Families found a way to buy them. Young women’s high demand made up for their market minority. Vast numbers of women patiently snipped and smoothed edges with scissors and Vaseline, until the unwieldy standardized napkins were tailored to their individual contours.

However, the history of sanitary napkins is about much more than marketing a new product to women. Sanitary napkins demonstrate heightened efforts to regulate women’s bodies during what historian Nancy Tomes notes has been called “the ‘golden era’ of [the] American public health movement.” The Kotex advertisement ran in the pages of the popular magazine, *Ladies’ Home Journal* in 1926, and its visual and textual information demonstrates the effort to sell bodily hygiene through linking it with old-stock American society’s “scientifically legitimized” desire for white purity and race hygiene.
The advertisement demonstrates the connection between the anxieties about germs, and the racial anxieties of eugenics through the reproductive, gendered, and increasingly autonomous bodies of women. As Joan Scott reminds us, gender “is a constituent element of social relationships based on perceived differences between the sexes,” and “is a primary way of signifying relationships of power.” These elements of Scott’s definition are present in this advertisement, both explicitly and implicitly. The rise of the germ theory in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, and the corresponding awareness and fear of invisible germs, resulted in what Nancy Tomes has called “antisepticonscious America”—a phrase that notes the increased awareness and desire for hygiene. Tomes notes that fears about traditional ailments, such as tuberculosis, began to lessen in the World War I era. However, Tomes also notes that advertising played a key role in keeping this earlier “antisepticonsciousness” alive during the interwar years. Advertising accomplished this by repositioning germ fears in social ways. Instead of focusing on real disease, advertisements used pseudoscientific jargon to conjure fear around sites of social “dis-ease”—locations and practices that produced social unease or discomfort because they were perceived as transgressive. What is interesting about these imagined ailments is how they intersected with real ones. Sometimes, like Listerine’s “halitosis,” they would be closer to imagination. Other times, as this Kotex advertisement shows, imagination and reality were much more entangled. This advertisement took the real germ fears embodied by decomposition of biological waste, and mixed them with the social fears about women’s increasing environmental autonomy. Consequently, this advertisement highlights society’s expectations and demands for women’s conformity. This conformity dictated that women needed to regiment their bodies to actively participate, and be comfortable, beyond the home’s threshold. This regimenting of the female body indicates a process by which sex difference was made-up, through the management of women’s bodies, and used to structure the environmental social relationships and power dynamics experienced by these women. Thus, this advertisement addresses a gendered social tension caused by germ awareness.

Furthermore, there are three environmental elements in this advertisement that draw a biological-environmental relationship between sanitary napkins and eugenics. The first two are the advertisement’s title and subtitle: “What the World Expects of Women Today”; and “In society - in business - demands the discarding of makeshift hygienic methods.” One reading of this title suggests the responsibility of women—toward their bodies, their social environment, and their bodies in their social environment. Ostensibly, this title is speaking about women monitoring their menstruation. However, implicitly, it picks up older threads of women’s home management, and is thus connected with the changing perception of women’s bodies in new social environments.

During the 1880s and 1890s, sanitarians’ long efforts to pathologize the home came to fruition. In part, sanitarians’ success was owed to the growing recognition of the germ theory of disease, which enforced many of the sanitarians’ desires. Older hygiene measures of ventilation, sanitary plumbing, disinfection, and water purification gained renewed force from the discovery of and popular interest in the microbe—which is especially apparent in
how it was both an object and tool of sanitation policy.\textsuperscript{33} This popular interest exemplifies what Tomes calls, “the gospel of germs.”\textsuperscript{34} The gospel is important, because it strengthened a connection between “a clean, moral life, and safety from disease.”\textsuperscript{35} This connection imbued Victorian women with power and responsibility. It was up to them to vigilantly manage and protect their homes. Within these home-citadels, the plumbing was of specific import. The key sites for this were in the washroom and the basement. They were seen as “portals to the sewer system,” and thus, a breeding ground for germs.\textsuperscript{36} The growing calls for increased sanitation led to the rise of the white china toilet, and the “master plumber.”\textsuperscript{37} The toilet’s smooth surface was easily cleaned, and thought to provide very little opportunity for germs to conceal themselves. While the “master plumber” appears almost heroic, as women directed him down to the basement where he “fought with his skill and scientific knowledge the disease germs invading and threatening the life of the household.”\textsuperscript{38} Thus, biological waste and plumbing were key sites around which germ fears were mobilized.

The advertisement addresses these fears, and embeds them in menstruation’s discharge, and women’s biological “plumbing.” This advertisement conveys the idea that women’s bodies acted like mobile units of domestic management in society. Their menstrual waste and biological plumbing seem to represent the same “portals to the sewers,” to the society enacted in this advertisement.\textsuperscript{39} Furthermore, coding women’s bodies as sources of disease also meant that they were coded as sites that needed to be managed. According to the gospel and the germ theory, this need for management demanded scientific hygiene. However, complying with these standards of hygiene meant much more than just using sanitary napkins. As Christina Cogdell states, in this period, social reformers and eugenicists alike were promoting “hygiene of the body, home, and environment as a predominant influence on and symbol of the advance of civilization.”\textsuperscript{40} Using sanitary napkins allowed women to maintain the hygiene of the home, their bodies, and the environment. This coded them as “civilized.” Furthermore, this type of hygienic civility was “almost equivalent to one’s being... ‘American.'”\textsuperscript{41} Moreover, those who could afford to abide by these modern scientific standards of hygiene were predominantly white. Thus, coding hygiene as “civilized” and “American” often meant ascribing to and upholding white notions of purity. In short: women’s quest for biological purity, in the home and in their bodies, supported eugenics by preserving the purity of white bodies and white ideals.

Furthermore, social tensions stemming from women’s increased sexual autonomy also draws connections between eugenics and sanitary napkins. As Lynn Dumenil notes, the 1910s marked the emergence of a new morality.\textsuperscript{42} Shifting sexual mores were a key element in this new moral code. Many 1920s observers posited that the “dislocation of war” caused these changes. However, as Dumenil points out, these changes were the result of more than one catalyst.\textsuperscript{43} Although unmentioned by Dumenil, the type of sex education that young women were receiving seems to have been an integral factor. From 1890 to World War I and beyond, sex education for young women underwent a transformation. It was made hygienic. A general fear of “vulgar” information, and mothers’ growing sense of inadequacy to explain menstruation, led to the rise of health and hygiene manuals.
for domestic use. 44 *Daughter, Mother, and Father: A Story for Girls*, published in 1913, provides an excellent example of these manuals. 45 In its pages, the father (who just happens to be a doctor) teaches his daughter about the biological science of menstruation; while the mother relays the reproductive facts “every girl should know, preferably from her own mother’s lips.” 46 Ironically enough, these manuals allowed mothers to avoid just such an interaction by creating a distance between mothers and daughters, and between biological sex and sexuality. In a concerted effort to maintain daughters’ innocence, these manuals cut out any explanation of sexuality or desire altogether, which began the work of separating sexuality from reproduction. Effectively, this separation helped to divorce a generation of young women’s sense of pleasure from procreation. Educationally, this “de-sexualized” young women’s bodies; however, it also offered them an opportunity to socially “re-sexualize” their bodies according to their individual desires. This separation is key to understanding the increased sexual autonomy of the new woman and the flapper. Although not identical figures, both represent the increased independence these women enjoyed as a result of working and attending college. However, this independence did not go unchecked. In an entanglement of agendas, both society and independent women sought to control this new sexuality by controlling its products. This need to control is exemplified by the birth control and sterilization movements. Thus, the tension surrounding female sexual autonomy was gendered, because women’s reproductive capability was a sex difference that structured social organizations. Furthermore, the power to decide or enforce reproduction (or lack thereof) also signifies a key power relationship.

Furthermore, there is one key sexuality-conscious element in this ad which demonstrates a relationship between sanitary napkins and eugenics. This key element is one of the smaller headlines, which reads, “You can get it anywhere, today.” The “it” in this phrase is strikingly ambiguous, and allows for many possible readings of the phrase. On a superficial level, the intended translation appears to be: “You can buy Kotex anywhere today.” However, the ambiguous nature of the phrase allows for more promiscuous and complicated translations, such as the sexualized translation: “You can have promiscuous sex more freely these days”; the popular culture translation, according to Elinor Glyn’s definition of “it”: “You can embody sex appeal through easily, and inexpensively buying and using Kotex”; the venereal disease translation: “You can contract a venereal disease from any of your multiple sexual partners”; or the social class translation: “You can become pregnant from invisibly “unfit” sexual partners.” 47 These examples have drawn out the translations that build a relationship between sanitary napkins and eugenics, but they certainly do not exhaust the interpretive potential of this phrase. The venereal, sexual, and social translations I have sketched are all variations on a theme: fears around increased female sexuality. A palpable societal fear was that women’s increased sexuality would accelerate old-stock Americans’ “race suicide.” 48 These fears seemed to be scientifically justified by the transitioning views of heredity. Lamarckian “soft heredity” was fading, and Mendelian “hard heredity” was growing. This meant that social reform could no longer “uplift” the “inferior.” Those so-labeled were increasingly thought to be biologically fixed in those categories. No amount of tinkering with their social environment would engender
lasting improvement.\textsuperscript{49} Thus, society’s preventative measures escalated. This escalation is evident in the Immigration Act of 1924, and the push for voluntary and involuntary sterilization during the 1920s.\textsuperscript{50} This sterilization sought to curb the reproduction of “unfit” genes via racist, nativist, and biological premises.

The sterilization movement is of special importance to my discussion of sanitary napkins and eugenics because it demonstrates that even the most extreme eugenic practices were mapped onto, and marketed by, the mundane technology of sanitary napkins. During the 1920s, eugenicists sought to popularize sterilization by associating it with modern female sexuality. Originally called “asexualization,” sterilization was repositioned in the 1920s as the ultimate way for women to embrace sexual freedom, through permanently ending their bodies’ capability for biological reproduction.\textsuperscript{51} Dr. Robert Latou Dickinson is a key figure whose work sought to popularize this notion. He narrated his incredibly invasive sterilization methods as “harmless and natural.”\textsuperscript{52} This shift to naturalness was key. It offered a version, and vision, of sterilization as legitimate, effective, and ethical to both doctors and women.\textsuperscript{53} Furthermore, renaming “asexualization” as “sterilization” allowed doctors to detach this procedure from patients’ fears that it would “unsex” them. This would have been a particular selling point in this society of increased female sexual freedom. Women wanted to be free to enjoy and indulge their sexuality without the repercussions of pregnancy—and doctors peddled this procedure as the means to achieve that freedom. However, there were ulterior motives at work. Many of the doctors and social reformers who advocated sterilization, and its less permanent version—birth control—were also eugenicists. They supported these strategies that increased women’s sexual autonomy, because these same strategies also decreased women’s biological autonomy. In short, eugenicists supported these strategies because they furthered racial hygiene agendas by curtailing the pregnancies of sexually free women.

However, enabling the sexual freedom of these women also let eugenicists label them as deviant, which allowed eugenicists to justify the extreme measures of sterilization they used to contain this “sexual deviance.” The political scientist-cum-historian Diane Paul captures the multifarious nature of eugenicists’ support of sterilization perfectly when she states, “Scientific theories are socially plastic; they can be, and frequently are turned to contradictory purposes. Thus, we should not expect absolute correlations between scientific theories and social views.”\textsuperscript{54} Paul’s statement highlights how the malleability of science makes feasible seemingly contradictory actions. It helps us to understand how, in the powerful hands of eugenicists, sterilization—a procedure about permanent limitation—became a procedure about permanent freedom. In peddling sterilization only in terms of freedom—as a way to achieve freedom from pregnancy, and freedom to embrace sexuality—sterilization became desirable.

Furthermore, the popularization of bodily freedom for women through separating their reproduction from their sexuality was also reinforced and marketed to them by the advertisements of sanitary napkins. As a fact, menstruation signals that a woman’s body is
physically ready for, and capable of reproduction. The marketing of sanitary napkins sought to elide this fact, both socially and biologically. Sanitary napkins achieved this elision through their visible concealment in packaging and purchase. They were sold in unmarked paper packages, in the interaction-free domain of mail order catalogues, or over the counter mainly by female clerks in mostly female departments of stores. These practices of buying and selling suggest that the bodies of women who bought sanitary napkins would not be associated with the reproductive capability denoted by menstruation. Furthermore, sanitary napkins also achieved this elision through the physical freedom they offered women.

Advertisements told women that using sanitary napkins meant they would not be confined to the house, and would not need to wear the frumpy clothing needed to conceal other older, larger, more noticeable menstrual technology—such as rubber aprons. Instead, advertisements told women that the streamlined and disposable nature of sanitary napkins made women free to wear their most fashionable, fitted clothing out into the social world without anyone detecting, or them leaving a trace, that they were menstruating. This implied freedom meant that women could continuously, and exclusively, display their sexuality to the social world, because buying and using sanitary napkins meant they would not have to don or act out the costumes or behavioural scripts of menstruation, and consequently, of reproduction. Thus, this advertisement demonstrates a connection between sanitary napkins and eugenics, because these napkins proposed to offer women a way to experience the physical freedom enabled by the division between sexuality and reproduction. This division was popularized by the white, middle-class, moral, modest sexual education manuals at the turn of the twentieth century, and taken to extremes by eugenicists who advocated for sterilization. In short, using sanitary napkins allowed the women who used them to menstruate the “white” way—the “American” way.

The third and final social tension that explores a relationship between sanitary napkins and eugenics revolves around bodily dissimulation and signification. This discussion picks up on the same threads of racism, nativism, and biological discrimination just addressed for sexual autonomy. It is important to further discuss those threads, because they are as equally entangled in the products of that sexual autonomy as they are in the autonomy itself. As one journalist put it in 1913, the nation had indeed “struck sex o’clock.” Eugenicists, moralists, reformers, and others worried that this meant there would be a proliferation of the “unfit.”

To combat this supposed proliferation, eugenicists worked to implement four main policies: immigration restriction for groups seen as genetically undesirable, racial segregation to prevent miscegenation, restrictive marital laws, and compulsory sterilization of the unfit. While these policies allowed them to target many people they classified as “unfit,” it chiefly focused on two key groups—the “feebleminded” and African-Americans. Eugenicists saw both as key contributors to the degeneracy of the white race, and they saw sexually free young women as key facilitators to this degeneracy. “Slumming,” “rainbow parties,” “black and tans,” and a host of other activities that were inclined to blur traditional distinctions
between social propriety and sexuality were key sites of anxiety. However, much of this anxiety only traveled one way—toward women. Their sexual freedom either labeled them deviant—if the children it produced were not pure white or were born out of wedlock—or it labeled them degenerate, if they were the “unfit” half of the union, whose sexual freedom would allow “inferior” genes to proliferate. Both invoke women’s bodies as a site, and tool, of deception. Thus, either way, women’s reproductive capability was positioned as a chief cause of the United States’ racial deterioration. This positioning demonstrates the gendered nature of this social tension because women’s reproductive capability structured social relations and signified power dynamics in American society.

Finally, this advertisement also draws a relationship between sanitary napkins and eugenics by mobilizing fears and desires around bodily dissimulation and “passing.” The advertisement draws this connection in two key ways. Textually, it is accomplished by the smaller heading, “Only Kotex is ‘like’ Kotex.” Visually, this is accomplished by the charcoal sketches of women in the top half of the advertisement. The phrase acts as both a lesson and a warning in a variety of ways. Explicitly, it teaches women to be discerning when selecting their sanitary napkins. Implicitly, it warns women in two ways. To the “pure,” it is a warning to protect their bodies against imitation and deception. To the “impure,” it is a warning that society is aware and wary of bodily dissimulation, and that their “innate inferiority” will eventually unmask them; and in both cases, women’s bodies are invoked as sites and tools of deception. Furthermore, this final heading conjures a connection to a specific type of white woman. The drawings show middle- and upper-class white women. Many have raised chins, or refuse to look directly at the viewer. None have slouchy posture. These gazes and stances endow all of them with an air of haughty independence, carrying the air that such independence was not a privilege, but their right. Their dress is also important. Individually, and as a whole, the depicted women mix shirtwaists and walking skirt-inspired outfits with cloche hats, bobbed hair, and boxy drop-waist silhouettes accented with flashier embellishments. Combined with their gazes and stances, this image summons visions of women that are neither new women, nor flappers, but both simultaneously. These women are sexualized, independent, and assertive. This reading is reinforced by the quick style of the charcoal sketch. It animates them. They become alert, lively, aware—discerning. This reading demonstrates that the rhetoric and visuals used to market sanitary napkins invoked a hierarchy of “purity,” placing high-class, “pure” white women at the top.

The advertisement used a mixture of social enticement and coercion to attract women who were excluded from the pure, white category, and give them a way to try and include themselves in it. It implicitly told these excluded women that using sanitary napkins would allow them to participate in the hygienic rituals that “belonged” to the white women at the top rung of the racial hierarchy of purity. To these excluded women, this hygienic ritual became a “whitening” ritual. The use of this technology associated them with, and allowed them to “pass” for the socially desired “pure,” white American woman. Thus, this seemingly mundane product enforced and upheld eugenic ideals and ideologies on an everyday level.
In sum, although quotidian in nature, the marketing of sanitary napkins in the United States during the 1920s gestures toward larger themes at work in that historical moment. Noting the gendered social tensions involved in the biological, sexual, and visual quests for hygiene after which these sanitary napkins endeavoured, it cannot be overlooked that the marketing of this mundane technology employed eugenic notions of white purity. This method of advertising targeted many categories of women in many different ways. Its hygienic nature appealed to “antisepitcious” old-stock American women who wanted to preserve the purity of their whiteness, and the white nature of its hygiene appealed to women who wanted to “whiten” themselves because of its social desirability. However, on a larger, perhaps more subversive scale present on both sides of this racial divide, sanitary napkins demonstrate a move toward streamlining women’s bodies in a fundamental way. Yet, while streamlining was imposed upon women in many ways, they also appear to have been complicit in this process, as well. From sterilization to mass produced fashions, society offered women ways to streamline their bodies both inside and outside, permanently and impermanently, which women embraced in a variety of degrees and manners. Here, it is pertinent to begin to ask how and why the streamlining of women’s bodies became so widespread and popularized. The simpler answer would be that these 1920s practices of streamlining women’s bodies demonstrate the hygienic cultural imperative of that moment. However, this answer is unsatisfying because it leaves questions, concerns, and anxieties about women’s growing autonomy under-described. To address these tensions around women’s autonomy more fully, it may be more apt to understand these efforts at streamlining women’s bodies, both by society and women themselves, as means of managing women’s consumption of the social world, and the social world’s consumption of women. This relationship, although emblematized by the 1920s, started before and extends beyond that period, for the relationship between women’s bodies and society has a history that is perpetually marked by complexity, mutability, and constant renegotiation.

**Endnotes**

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A Sea of Change: Water and the Transformation of the American Man

Sara Farb

In his famous 1782 work, Letters From an American Farmer, Jean de Crevecoeur asks the question, “What then is the American, this new man?” Even then, only six years after Independence, being an American meant the opportunity to become someone entirely new. During these formative years, much of America’s population arrived through expeditions from Europe, where ships would bravely venture across the vast Atlantic that would bring them to the New World. For the people embarking upon this journey, the water that lay between their pasts and their futures represented the transition from their identities as Europeans to their new roles as Americans. Water was the means through which they could transform.

Although Jeffrey Eugenides’ Middlesex takes place long after Crevecouer’s time, water plays the same transformative role. In the novel, water acts as a fundamental tool in the transformations of Lefty, Jimmy Zizmo, and Cal, into new American men. One thing is certain: without water, none of the three could make their unique metamorphoses into the men they become.

Lefty is Bithynios’ most eligible bachelor. This, of course, is not much of a title, given that the village is exceptionally small. So small, in fact, that other than his sister Desdemona, the only two women eligible to marry are Lucille Kafkalis, who “bathes maybe once a year,” and Victoria Pappas, who “has a moustache bigger than [Lefty’s].” These women’s unfavourable traits, however, have little to do with his lack of desire for them; the only woman he desires is Desdemona. Even in such a small village where “cousins sometimes married third cousins,” which, Lefty points out, Desdemona and he also happen to be)—Lefty knows that a sibling marriage is the ultimate taboo. Certainly, they would be facing a great deal of judgment and criticism from the members of the village should their decision to marry become public, making it nearly impossible to live a relaxed and happy life. For Lefty and Desdemona, the Turkish attack on their village means they are forced to uproot their lives and move away immediately.
No one in Smyrna knows Desdemona and Lefty’s secret—the city to which they flee, and where they await their journey to America. Yet, Lefty is unable to express his love openly for Desdemona, due in large part to her reluctance to surrender to sexual urges, keeping their romantic relationship at bay: “He looked at her, in the way of the night before, and Desdemona blushed. He tried to put his arm around her, but she stopped him.”

It is made quickly apparent that Lefty’s full transformation from the role of Desdemona’s brother to the role of her husband can only be achieved on the boat to America. As they are being let on to the ship, Lefty tells the immigration officer not that he is with his sister; rather, he tells him “I have my wife with me.” With this statement, Lefty seizes the opportunity to begin redefining his identity through his relationship to Desdemona, an identity to be consecrated on the open waters of the Atlantic Ocean and lived out.

Often in literature, a ship on water signifies menacing or troubling events, isolation, or a journey to the unknown. Coleridge’s *The Rime of the Ancient Mariner* and Homer’s *The Odyssey* are examples of this kind of literary trope. America’s early Pilgrims too, who, on their way to the Americas, could not, as William Bradford remarks in *Of Plymouth Plantation*, “abolish the difficulties and terrors which reaching the New World entailed,” point to the challenges associated with ships. Sometimes, however, as in the case of Lefty’s pilgrimage to America, “Water is… a presence which signals beginnings.” Indeed, by being on a ship, surrounded and supported by endless water, Lefty’s new identity can begin taking form. Though they were permitted aboard the ship as husband and wife, Lefty and Desdemona decide that, while getting married on board is their goal, they will start their romantic relationship from scratch. As Desdemona effectively plays her part as the initially standoffish, and simple, yet lovely girl, Lefty becomes a distinguished and desirable young man who, despite being “a higher class than she is,” proposes to and marries Desdemona before they reach America.

The final step toward Lefty becoming indisputably Desdemona’s husband occurs on the lifeboat, the site for the couple’s lovemaking. They disembark the larger ship for the more private vessel. Until this point, the ocean has passively provided the opportunity to drown Lefty the Brother, and to birth Lefty the Husband. When the couple gets to the lifeboat, however, the water’s transformative influence takes on a much more active role: while making love, “Lefty crawled on top of Desdemona and the two of them hardly even moved; the ocean swells did the work for them.” (Because of the ocean, Lefty can officially consecrate his husbandly love for Desdemona, and arrives in America a new man.

If it had not been for the fact that he was on a boat, surrounded by water, Lefty might not have had been able to transform from Desdemona’s brother into her husband. Water at first offers Lefty the opportunity to begin his evolution: the ocean is what carries him away from his past and towards his future; it is a symbol of a fresh start. As the journey proceeds and he moves closer and closer to America, the water’s role is more active, aiding him in establishing the sexual relationship with Desdemona that he will be able to continue comfortably in his new home. With the ocean’s help, Lefty’s transformation from Greek brother to American husband is as fluid as the water itself.
As in Lefty’s case, the journey across water provides a new beginning for Jimmy Zizmo as he transforms into a new American man. However, in the case of Jimmy Zizmo, this journey also embodies his transformation. Jimmy is not a particularly happy person. His marriage for example, is certainly not a source of great joy: he is constantly enforcing his “nutritional quackery”) upon Sourmelina, both in an attempt to control her exasperatingly carefree behaviour, and in the hopes that it will “reduce [her] bile,” (in order to make her a satisfactory future mother of his children. Jimmy also follows a very strict diet himself, and is extremely tense and suspicious of everyone (he is, after all, breaking the law as a rumrunner), especially unexpected visitors: “Someone knocked at the door. Zizmo, who had an inexplicable aversion to unannounced guests, jumped up and reached under his coat.” Even the birth of his daughter does not bring contentment to Jimmy: “Shortly after Zizmo saw his daughter, he came up with his final scheme. This scheme to become the Muslim Minister Fard, would provide an escape from his present identity and a chance to reinvent himself.

While Lefty’s journey opposes the traditional metaphor of trouble and uncertainty, Jimmy’s certainly adheres to it. Jimmy decides fake his own demise, bringing Lefty along as a witness to his apparent death, so that he can make a clean break from his life and start anew. Jimmy takes Lefty with him one night on a routine run to Canada to collect alcohol. In order to get to Canada, they must cross the frozen Lake St. Clair. Lefty is instructed to carefully observe the colour of the ice—darker or lighter—in order to determine where it might be thinner and so avoided. (The treacherous and uncertain path that Jimmy takes along the ice represents the identity transformation that he makes in the novel: as Jimmy Zizmo, he was staying the course of a relatively assimilated man living in a predominantly white America, where he wished to start a family, remaining cautious in his illegal exploits. He was, in other words, following the lighter, less perilous path. Soon, Jimmy realizes that he requires a complete life change, and that he must act fast—as fast as his accelerating car, which he steers with less and less caution, disregarding the security of the lighter path and choosing the darker one. A further example of how Jimmy sways from the safe course and into more treacherous territory in his own life is seen in the way he denounces the Greeks while in Greek company, favouring the side of the Turks, in a conversation about the nations’ recent war: “Stop bellyaching. The war was the Greeks’ fault.” (Here, Jimmy proves his new apathy towards Greek society, clearly casting off his former identity.

Finally, Lefty has jumped out of the speeding car to save his life: “[Jimmy’s car] hits a dark patch on the frozen lake.” (Jimmy not only lands his car in a dark patch, but also more literally, his identity, as he becomes Minister Fard, the Muslim prophet espousing the theory of Tricknology, and the inferiority of the white race to The Black Nation.) From his immersion into the dark patch, Jimmy emerges a new man.

The frozen lake across which Jimmy drives is a treacherous tool through which he can end his life as Jimmy Zizmo, and begin his life as Minister Fard. Furthermore, the ice— itself, water transformed—and his journey across it also represent Jimmy’s metamorphosis,
from a man living a fairly miserable life engrossed in and surrounded by American assimilation, to one who openly and comfortably denounces American ideals. For Jimmy Zizmo, water does not merely provide a means of transformation into a new man in America: it represents his transformation.

Both Jimmy and Lefty journey across the surfaces of bodies of water. Yet a horizontal journey is not the only kind that water offers: as widely as it can span, water can run even more deeply. The symbolism of plunging into water’s depths—a much more challenging journey than across its surface—evokes both total rebirth and purification, often despite the personal turmoil and unfamiliar elements one might encounter.

It is fitting, then, that Lefty and Jimmy’s transformations into new American men, while significant, do not run much deeper than the surface. Lefty’s role changes, but inside, he is still connected by blood to Desdemona; Jimmy acts and lives as an entirely different person, but Minister Fard still resembles the man he once was. Cal, on the other hand, undergoes a much deeper transformation, one that is sanctified after a full submersion in water. Cal literally transforms into an American man through the consecration of water.

The transformative effects of a submersion into water are made evident at Calliope’s baptism. What should be a holy and pure ritual is defiled by the infant Calliope’s urination on Father Mike after the third and final submersion under water: “By the third time up, therefore, I had indeed been reborn: as a fountain.” The narrator notes that “no one wondered about the engineering involved” in a stream of urine shooting and arcing in the air from the genitalia of an apparently female baby. Though Calliope is, from a religious perspective, being christened as a girl—the gender she was assigned at birth by the inept and distracted Dr. Philobosian—this submersion into water, in fact, proves that she is something other than female, and so marks the beginning of the birth and sanctification of Cal the male. This perverted baptism is more transformation than transubstantiation.

Cal the Man’s official christening occurs in the tank at Sixty-Niners. Initially, Cal is reluctant to plunge under water, keeping his head above the surface. He does not fully commit to his duty in the tank, preferring a level of detachment. In the same way, Cal does not fully immerse himself in the role of male. While he may appear male to most people (with his clothes on) through his appearance and behaviour, inside, Cal changes very little: when he first tries on a suit, he “didn’t feel what a boy would feel.” Cal is decidedly in gender limbo, and therefore, cannot enjoy a normal life in America. Since the Euro-American binary sex system does not have room for a third sex (Green), Cal knows he must live unambiguously as a man if he wishes to break free of a world full of ogling perverts and unfair treatment.

When Cal finally decides to submerge himself completely under water something changes significantly, and the “shame over having a body unlike other bodies [passes] away.” This pivotal decision inspires Cal’s full commitment to living as a man in his
subsequent return home. He reintroduces himself to Desdemona as her grandson,\textsuperscript{26} and happily takes his role as Chapter Eleven’s “bro.”\textsuperscript{27} Just as he immerses his whole body into the water, Cal takes the plunge to journey through the depths of maleness, with all of its mysteries and pleasures.

For Cal, water is the means through which he becomes an entirely new person, transforming into a man. However, it represents more than just a transformative tool. Water is a purification: in his profane christening in the tank at Sixty-Niners, Cal is sanctified as someone who adheres to the sacred Euro-American binary sex system, and can finally live as an acceptable American man.

In \textit{Middlesex}, water is the key ingredient in the transformations of Lefty, Jimmy Zizmo, and Cal into new American men. In Lefty’s case, the Atlantic Ocean is first a passive, then active aid in his transition from Desdemona’s brother to her husband. For Jimmy Zizmo, the journey across the frozen Lake St. Clair not only provides the means for his transformation into Minister Fard, an entirely new man in America, but it also represents this transformation. For Cal, a submersion in water is the final step and confirmation of his metamorphosis into the American man he is to be for the rest of his life.

Crevecouer could not have known the longevity of his famous words when he wrote them. However, Eugenides’ use of water as a transformative tool makes evident the contemporary relevance of Crevecouer’s statement about the American man.

\textit{Endnotes}

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The Godfather: A Case Study of the Businessman

_She Godfather (1972) as an Allegory to the American Dream_

Svebor Pavic

His suit is made of the finest cashmere fabric and his tie of pure silk. His business is handled efficiently, and his transactions over the phone, swiftly; he is the product of the American Dream. Is he businessman or gangster? At the very least, we can say that the gangster shares the same motive as the businessman: the accumulation of profit. At the absolute most, we can say they share a parallel in ideals: an obsession with the relentless pursuit of the American Dream. _The Godfather_ (1972), by Francis Ford Coppola, stereotypes the Italian-American life by glorifying the gangster as a function of the patriarchal system, one that operates as an organized family business through the use of violence. The film is often praised, however, by the Italian-American community because the values of family, tradition, and loyalty that are being stereotyped are actually at the heart of the Italian-American culture. Nonetheless, this stereotype of the immigrant experience is a necessity for the film to function as a broader allegory to the American Dream, one which criticizes the corrupt ideology of the American capitalistic system, and one which promotes greed and individualism.

The film separates the underlying theme of the importance of family into two distinct relationships for the gangster: the role of the business family, and the role of the blood family. In both relationships, however, the film stereotypes the Italian-American family by using the act of violence to uphold the survival and integrity of the family. For the gangster, the family acts as an operative unit of business, with the mandate of self-preservation and expansion. Self-preservation allows the family business to function in a hierarchal, almost military type order. In _The Godfather’s_ patriarchal system, Don Corleone (Marlon Brando) is “the godfather,” and his legacy passes through his eldest child, Sonny (James Caan), and eventually down to his youngest son, Michael (Al Pacino). The gangster uses violence and extortion as a source of expansion for the business family to realize its profit, therefore, violence is never presented as an arbitrary act of aggression in the film, but a necessary and calculated function of the business strategy of the gangster. When the gangster uses violence as a means for his business, his mannerism and dialogue follows: “Make him an offer he
can’t refuse” translates into a prospective murder victim being slain if deemed uncooperative, while “it’s only business” is a request not to take the competitors death personally. Indeed, for the Corleone family, “blood is a big expense,” and is exemplified in the scene when Sonny’s bloody machine gun death is followed by a ruthless kick to the head; clear evidence of a mafia hit fixed on personal revenge. In contrast, Michael’s clean, coordinated, and efficient killing of corrupt police captain McCluskey (Sterling Hayden) and Virgil “The Turk” Sollozzo (Al Lettieri) displays a calculated business move that he insists to the family is, “not personal, it’s strictly business.” Thus, it is evident that violence in The Godfather does not take place in the sanctioned framework typically found in the conventions of the crime genre, where government agents seek to uphold the law against evasive criminals in the name of social order, but rather, it lies in a complex criminal underworld where mob bosses and corrupt cops fight to ensure economic survival at all costs.

Moreover, the blood family plays a significant obligation to the gangster, as it represents a fundamental ethic of respect and loyalty in the tradition of Italian culture. Indeed, not only is family an integral theme in the film, but it also serves a vital role in the entire production process, as well. In regards to the mode of production, Coppola’s personal obsession with the importance of the Italian heritage is presented through his choice of casting. In the September. 2003 issue of “Cigar Aficionado,” Coppola declares, “I wanted either an Italian-American or an actor who’s so great that he can portray an Italian-American.” In addition, Coppola decided to employ his own relatives in the film: his sister Talia Shire portrayed Connie Corleone, his mother Italia Coppola serves as an extra in the restaurant meeting, and his father Carmine Coppola is the piano player in the Mattress sequence; therefore, it could be said that The Godfather displays the importance of the family heritage in Italian culture by creating the film authentically, from the ground up. Nonetheless, the importance of the blood family to the Italian heritage is demonstrated within the narrative of the film. While in Las Vegas, Michael and Moe Green enter into a heated argument over the future ownership of the casino. After Michael’s middle brother sides with Moe Green, Michael quickly threatens him to never, “take sides with anyone against the family again”; in a way, symbolizing an act of punishment equivalent to the one found in the workings of the business family. The Godfather treats loyalty to the blood family as a fundamental ethic to the Italian heritage, one that maintains the integrity of the family through loyalty and tradition.

What, in particular, is it about the presentation of the Italian family in The Godfather that truly appeals to the Italian-American audience? In “The Godfather and American Culture: How the Corleones Became ‘Our Gang,’” Chris Messenger believes that Italian-American men in particular, find examples of male control and authority that are no longer privileged in modern day society. As such, the Italian-American man idolizes Don Corleone and his raspy voice because he displays the characteristics of the strong and dominant alpha-male, traits that speak to their “yearnings and affiliations,” ones they wish to find in themselves. The images of the powerful Don are able to supply the idea of a “strong and benevolent father to take care of both family and an unimpeded business life,” one which also carries an emotional appeal to the Italian-American youth. However, while
The Godfather may appeal to certain yearnings of the Italian-American culture, it also presents a dilemma to their moral values, and poses as a “laboratory for moral conflicts in reader identification,” according to Messenger. Therefore, while the Italian-American men may look up to Don Corleone as a successful father figure, they may also have conflicting feelings about his use of violence as a justification for his success. Thus, The Godfather is a film that is simultaneously celebrated by the Italian-American community because the cultural codes that are presented are actually at the roots of the Italian heritage, and detested because these same codes are being stereotyped through the use of violence.

The Godfather has been seen by many commentators as a critique of American capitalism. The British Daily Telegraph newspaper described it as a “vision of the hollowness of American capitalism and its effect on the family.” As a longstanding and traditional form of filmmaking, the crime genre has always been the essential paradigm for investigating the inherent contradictions of the American dream of success. In Dreams and Dead Ends: The American Gangster Film, Jack Shadoian confirms that the genre is structured by a fundamental antagonism between the gangster and the law, or more explicitly, between the individual and society. In the classical view, law is viewed as a legitimate function for upholding the social order in our society. In contrast, however, the gangster film presents the legal apparatus as illegitimate and ultimately untrustworthy, such as the corrupt police captain McCluskey. Thus, if democracy is the essential process by which we organize ourselves to perform business, and if this system is corrupt, then so too is capitalism. As Glenn Man warns, “Capitalism is resting gently on the ground, atop the crushed shards of democracy.”

In The Godfather, no matter how much Michael tries to legitimize his family business, he cannot escape from a world made corrupt by the practitioners of modern big business. Robert Warshow in “The Gangster as a Tragic Hero” proclaims, “The gangster’s whole life is an effort to assert himself as an individual, to draw himself out of the crowded, and he always dies because he is an individual... the gangster speaks for us, expressing that part of the American psyche which rejects the qualities and the demands of modern life, which rejects ‘Americanism’ itself.” Yet, how could the gangster reject “Americanism” itself, when he is a part of this system, stuck in one that is founded on individualism. Therefore, Pauline Kael is right when she argues that is not a rejection of American life, but wrong when she states that, “It’s what we fear Americanism to be.” From the Enron scandal to the current catastrophic economic depression, the gangster is not what we fear in America—it is the America that we fear of. It’s a system based on individualism and greed, one which promotes itself through the hallucination and hollowness of the American Dream, and seeks to protect itself with its corrupt democracy. A system of broken promises for the immigrant, and meaningless profit for the hardworking businessman, it truly is a system that, through its portrayal in The Godfather, brings out the worst characteristics in human beings: individualism, greed, self-interest, and materialism. Michael Corleone and his family are just another product of the American Dream, countless victims stuck in the cyclical system of American capitalism—and it could be said that so are we.
Sibaudio
Street Scene, 2004
Digital, 1360 x 2048
http://www.sxc.hu
Assassination and the American Judicial System

“To what extent did the vengeful courtroom conduct of the trials of Leon Czolgosz and Charles Guiteau shape the legal proceedings in the trial of Giuseppe Zangara?”

Alex Treiber

The legal proceedings in the trials of presidential assassins have been controversial episodes in American history. This problem poses a unique question: can an assassin of an American president ever be fairly tried in the court of law? When Giuseppe Zangara attempted to assassinate Franklin Delano Roosevelt (FDR) on February 15, 1933, two men before him, Charles Guiteau (in 1881) and Leon Czolgosz (in 1901), had successfully attempted a similar task on the lives of sitting presidents Garfield and McKinley, respectively. Although Zangara was foiled, he inadvertently shot and killed Chicago Mayor Anton Cermak, who happened to be on stage with FDR at the time of the shooting. Though he did not actually assassinate FDR, Zangara was tried for the attempted murder of the president (and four other wounded persons) and the murder of a prominent politician. Like Guiteau and Czolgosz, Zangara met a similar fate of execution. By the time the trial of Zangara began on February 20, 1933, almost fifty-two years after the trial of Charles Guiteau, it became clear that a legal precedent had been set by these two earlier successful assassins, which effectively condemned Zangara to death before his trial proceedings ever began. In a comparative perspective of all three trials, this argument will be made through an analysis of the public pressures placed on the trial, the major flaws in the trial proceedings, and the misdiagnosis of mental illness.

Theoretically, the American judicial system is supposed to be separate from the political and public spheres of influence. However, in practice, during the trial of each assassin the influence of politicians and the general public were crucial in the conviction and execution of Czolgosz, Guiteau, and Zangara.

From assassination attempt to execution, Guiteau’s crime languished in the public eye for longer than both Zangara and Czolgosz’s crimes combined. Much of this had to do with the fact that Garfield did not die until two months after he was shot. Additionally, many in the judiciary were unsure as to how to proceed with a presidential assassin, as the
only other successful assassin of a president was John Wilkes Booth, who was killed in a shoot-out with Union soldiers. As the legal teams for the prosecution and defense built their cases, Guiteau was placed in a Washington jail while awaiting the beginning of his trial. Though Guiteau was behind bars, guarded by police, and unseen by the public, the assassin's name was immediately known throughout the country. The headlines of every newspaper covered the assassination attempt, and began to assess Guiteau's character and the kind of man that he must have been to have committed such a crime. The Boston Congregationalist remarked that Guiteau was a “cold-blooded villain,... [and] a representative of a much larger class... of others like him [who] can run such a race, almost unchecked... due in some considerable measure to the sickly sentimentalism of the present day.” This public curiosity and anger was evidenced by the huge crowds that filtered into Washington with the hopes of not only catching a glimpse of Guiteau, but also to be present at a lynching that so many hoped would occur. Each day, the county jail received hundreds of letters written to Guiteau uttering death threats. One letter suggested that the assassin “be forced to eat two ounces of [his] own flesh each day,” and another suggested he be “given thirty-nine lashes a day until death.” Public anger was so palpable that two attempts were made on Guiteau's life before the trial even began.

After three months of waiting for the trial to commence, when Guiteau finally faced the court in November 1881, the newspapers had dubbed the trial as the “biggest event in Washington since the impeachment of Andrew Johnson.” Seats in the courtroom were in such high demand that, once seated, “people did not leave during the noon recess so as to not give up their spot.” Evidently, few of these spectators could seriously entertain the possibility that their president's assassin could avoid, for any debatable reason, a much-deserved execution. Unfortunately for the judicial process, these sentiments were widespread, making the selection of an impartial jury extremely difficult. Of the one hundred and thirty-one potential jurors, and the final twelve that were eventually selected, only one said that he did not know anything about the case. The others had certainly made up their minds as to Guiteau's guilt. The jurors were quoted as saying such things as: “Guiteau should be hanged,” “no amount of torture is too great for him,” and “the plea of insanity is all bosh.” Considering the length of the trial lingering in the public eye, the vitriolic assessments of Guiteau's character, and the widespread public outrage, it is apparent that these pressures on the trial deemed Guiteau’s guilt as a foregone conclusion.

The time between Guiteau's crime and execution would be just short of one year at three hundred and sixty-three days. The great length of the trial was a legal precedent that District Attorney Thomas Penney worked adamantly to ensure would not be replicated in the State's handling of assassin, Leon Czolgosz. Buffalo's law enforcement officials had received an embarrassing backlash from the public, as they were questioned how Czolgosz was allowed to fire multiple shots at the president. Penney believed that the swifter justice was brought to Czolgosz, “the sooner the assassin could be put in his grave, and the sooner Buffalo’s law enforcement officials could put the horror and guilt of the president’s murder behind them.”
Penney’s ability to carry out this “justice,” and redeem the reputation of the Buffalo police was made easier by the public anger and pressures calling for swift action. Like in the case of Guiteau, public outrage over the assassination attempt on the president’s life was palpable. At the time of the shooting the crowd at the Pan-American Expo hoped to get the opportunity to lynch Czolgosz before he was taken into custody by the police. This anger spilled over into the following day’s newspaper’s coverage of the assassination attempt. By the time President McKinley had succumbed to his injuries eight days later, on September 14th, the newspapers, like the Boston Morning Journal, had already declared, before the trial had even begun, that “the assassin of the president will be hurried to the electric chair... there is not the slightest shadow of doubt that Czolgosz will be indicted for murder in the first degree.”

It became apparent that—like the reaction before Guiteau’s trial began—for the public, Czolgosz’s guilt was a foregone conclusion.

Unlike the public outrage during Guiteau’s trial, the rhetoric about Czolgosz took on an ethnic dynamic. In addition to declaring Czolgosz a “diabolical” assassin who was certainly headed to the chair, the newspapers used the ethnicity of Czolgosz’s name to try to rationalize to Americans that Czolgosz’s crime was alien and un-American. Buffalo’s The Evening News declared the day after the assassination attempt that “we are pleased to know the assassin is not an American.” The Journal of the American Medical Association echoed these sentiments, describing the shooter as a “man... who, thank God, bears a name that cannot be mistaken for that of an American.” Unbeknownst to The Evening News or the Journal of the American Medical Association, or perhaps intentionally, Czolgosz was not an “alien” foreigner, but an American citizen, born in Alpena, Michigan. While the press had mistaken Czolgosz as a foreigner, this allowed Americans to compartmentalize Czolgosz as entirely un-American and an alien to American society. This kind of rhetoric helped cement public furor, and allowed Americans to make incorrect generalizations about immigrants and their place in society.

Evidently the public outrage placed immense pressures on the system to dole out a speedy conviction. In stark contrast to the length between crime and execution of Guiteau, the total number of days between Czolgosz’s crime and execution was a paltry fifty-one days. It took the court one hour to find twelve jurors, and in a total of eight hours of court time over two days, Czolgosz was found guilty. Carlos MacDonald, Czolgosz’s medical examiner, would later remark that “justice was neither attended by delay nor harassed by the trivial technicalities of the law,” noting that the “‘machinery of justice’ moved so smoothly and so rapidly.” In a study released four months after Czolgosz’s execution, Dr. Walter Channing lambasted the so called “machinery of justice,” by arguing that the investigators, because of these pressures to carry out “justice” so rapidly, missed important pieces of the investigation. Although, Channing would even concede in this study that “public opinion had indignantly condemned Czolgosz in advance, and no court and jury could be expected to stand up and oppose the will of the people.” With a commitment to ensure that Guiteau’s trial proceedings would not be emulated, coupled with the motivation to redeem the police forces reputation, public anger had taken on a condemnatory ethnic tone that would push Czolgosz’s trial proceedings to convict and execute Czolgosz in a record fifty-one days.
The record pace in which Czolgosz’s trial and execution took place would only be outmatched by another assassin, Giuseppe Zangara. In a span of only thirty-three days, Zangara attempted to assassinate FDR; faced two separate trials; and faced execution by the state on March 20, 1933. Like the public reaction to the other assassins, public pressures called for swift “justice.” Yet Zangara’s trial faced public pressures that were more formidable than those felt by the trials of Guiteau and Czolgosz. Much of this has to do with the huge advancements in technology since 1881. These advancements allowed for newspapers to be more widespread and easily accessible. As a direct consequence of this, news of FDR’s assassination attempt spread throughout the world like wildfire. In Miami, only twenty minutes after the assassination attempt, the Miami Herald had released an “extra” on the streets detailing the unfolding events at Bayfront Park. Zangara’s crime had created a media frenzy: gossip columnists and reporters jockeyed to get the latest scoop, while multiple film companies rushed to release sound movies of the assassination attempt. Unfortunately for Zangara, this widespread dissemination of the news about his attack on the president would mean that Zangara’s assassination attempt had permeated the world and the American public’s consciousness faster than any other previous assassin.

Zangara’s assassination attempt faced not only public pressures throughout the world, but immense political pressures from the nation’s highest members of government. Florida Governor David Sholtz told the press that he did not see the value in the sanity commission; to him, Zangara was already sane and guilty. This fact demanded decisive action that he, as Governor, was willing to expedite. Governor Sholtz would tell the New York Times on February 17th that he was confident that “Zangara could be brought to trial within forty-eight hours.” This confidence and call for speedy action was seen in newspapers throughout the country. The Miami Daily News argued that “there must be swift, decisive action... let the law take its course, but make that course so speedy and sure as to emblazon a warning to the world against the toleration of a Zangara anywhere in the society of man.” The sympathy and outrage led to Zangara receiving hundreds of death threats in the county jail mail each day. With rumours of a “lynching party” spreading throughout Miami, Sheriff Dan Hardie considered the public anger so high that he felt it necessary to search anyone that entered the courtroom for weapons when Zangara’s trial began on February 20th.

Like Czolgosz, the public sought to distinguish Zangara as a foreign entity from the American public. Highlighting his thick Italian accent, newspapers like the Miami Herald described him as a “swarthy Italian, typical of his breed.” The ability to describe Zangara as alien to society made it easier for many Americans to rationalize how his foreignness subsequently led to the irrational act of attempting to assassinate their president. Though Zangara had become a naturalized citizen in 1931, most newspapers commented on his racial and ethnic inferiority. The animosity towards Zangara’s Italian heritage made many Italian-Americans fearful for their security. In Miami, in response to these escalating tensions with the Italian community, a delegation of five prominent citizens of Italian descent wrote an open letter to the American people: “All of Miami’s Italian-Americans are honest and law abiding citizens ... such persons as Zangara are to be considered without
a country or a religion.” Unfortunately for Zangara and the Italian-American community, the debate surrounding Zangara’s ethnicity and his racial traits served to play into the stereotypes that had restricted Italian immigration and other undesirable immigrants in the Immigration Act of 1924.

Considering the technology in 1933, Zangara’s assassination attempt received more widespread coverage than any other assassin. Political, public, and prejudicial pressures pushed the proceedings along at a rate faster than any other prior or future assassin. Although Channing’s argument was applied to Czolgosz, it is an important question for all trials of assassins: can the court or a jury really be expected to overturn the desires and opinions of an angry public?

The assassination of each president put the American judicial system at a crossroads. Even though the public and members of the judiciary had already decided on each assassin’s guilt, the law, in theory, stated that Guiteau, Czolgosz, and Zangara were innocent until proven guilty. Without a precedent on how to deal with a case of such magnitude, in reality, the trial proceedings were a “farcical” replication of an impartial and fair trial. Though each assassin was not lynched by a murderous mob, it appears that with a lack of legal precedent and the numerous flaws in the proceedings, each assassin was, in effect, lynched by the law.

Guiteau, at the outset of the trial, was put at an immediate disadvantage. In an attempt to put together a defense team, he found that very few attorneys wanted to be associated with the defense of a presidential assassin, fearing that it would harm their future legal careers. In the end, Guiteau’s brother-in-law, George Scoville, accepted the task of being Guiteau’s attorney. Despite the fact that Scoville had practiced law for more than thirty years, he had only ever handled two criminal cases. On top of this, Scoville faced an extremely talented and experienced prosecution team: District Attorney George B. Corkhill; Walter D. Davidge, who had practiced law for more than thirty years; and one of the nation’s best attorneys, John K. Porter. In a plea to the court by Scoville for assistance in preparing Guiteau’s case, Judge Walter Cox responded apathetically by appointing Leigh Robinson as co-counsel, a former member of the Confederate Army, and a new entrant to the Washington bar. The defense’s lack of experience could not have been any clearer in Scoville’s first rambling statement to the court, “I understand that I am not competent for a criminal trial of this kind...” This lack of experience would become further apparent in Scoville’s inability to control his client. Throughout the trial, Guiteau would make wild interruptions, correcting the prosecution, the judge, and even his own defense. This obnoxious behaviour was picked up immediately by the press, and was only used against him to incite the court and greater public outrage. Judge Cox refused to remove Guiteau from the courtroom because he believed that by removing Guiteau he would be showing the court that he believed that Guiteau was somehow mentally unbalanced. When Guiteau finally took the stand on
November 28, 1881, testifying for nearly a week, Guiteau only harmed his case further. In an exchange with the prosecution during his cross-examination, Guiteau erupted in an outburst to a question he did not like, “If your head is so thick that you can’t get the idea in, I won’t try to pound it in. Don’t try to ask your questions in that mean, sickly sort of way.”27 This kind of reaction was played up in the media and viewed as despicable and arrogant, which only served to heighten the calls for his conviction.

When closing arguments began on January 12, 1882, Guiteau was allowed one final chance to implicate himself, and make a mockery of the court. In his final statement he concluded by saying, “I am not afraid of anyone shooting me. The shooting business is in decline.”28 While the trial may have lasted three months, it took the jury, whom were entirely prejudiced to Guiteau’s guilt to begin with, under an hour to deliberate.29 They found Guiteau guilty by punishment of execution. The challenges that Guiteau faced by the court system were insurmountable—Guiteau had been equipped with a disproportionately poor defense team, a jury that was prejudiced against him, and a court that allowed him to implicate himself on the stand. Though his legal proceedings were marred with irregularities Guiteau was executed on June 30, 1882.

The rapid speed in which Czolgosz’s trial took place was in part due to the determination of the public and District Attorney’s office to ensure that the never-ending absurdities of Guiteau’s trial were not repeated. This speed, unfortunately for Czolgosz, resulted in numerous irregularities in the trial proceedings. The first of which began in Czolgosz’s initial detainment. Czolgosz’s admitted guilt and his ties to anarchy are ascribed because of statements that Czolgosz signed. A published version of his confession included “relevant” parts of statements made by Czolgosz. This publication did not show the questions that DA Penney asked him, nor did it show the whole context that the excerpts were taken from.30 What the publication did show was that Czolgosz did not have a lawyer, nor was any legal advice offered to him. The law, in 1901, did not require police offers to offer Czolgosz an attorney.31 The DA was quick to point out that Czolgosz was obviously uninterested in legal representation on the grounds that he was an anarchist and did not believe in the legal system.32 However, if the investigation had gone on longer, this firm belief that Czolgosz was an anarchist may not have been as clear as originally believed. As previously noted Dr. Walter Channing’s study, published four months after Czolgosz’s death, showed important gaps in the investigation. In an interview with well-known anarchist, Emil Schmilling, whom Czolgosz had reportedly been in association with, Schmilling argues that Czolgosz only approached him four months before the assassination attempt without any knowledge of anarchist thought.33 Channing notes that the Superintendent of Police in Cleveland, a leading detective throughout the nation, argued that he “had been unable to connect Czolgosz with anarchists or any society of anarchists.”34 If Czolgosz had not been as well-read in the works of anarchism as suggested, it would seem rather irrational that he would adopt a new ideology and martyr himself after having just learned about the workings of anarchism. Unfortunately for Czolgosz, the speed at which the trial was proceeding would not allow for more than this superficial investigation.
Though Czolgosz’s lack of counsel during his interrogation was not against the law, he did not receive legal counsel until the weekend before the trial was to begin. The court’s inability to find Czolgosz an attorney was in large part due to the fact that, like in the case of Guiteau, many local attorneys were growing nervous that they might face professional retribution if they undertook the task of defending an anarchist. Eventually, Loran L. Lewis and Robert C. Titus reluctantly accepted the appointment. A large part of the reason that both Lewis and Titus accepted the task was because they were made well aware that it would be impossible to put Czolgosz to death if he had no defense. As a result of this late “defense” appointment, Lewis and Titus were unable to adequately consult with each other, nor get Czolgosz’s full cooperation. Though it became clear later, as evidenced by Titus’ initial statement to the court, neither lawyer actually sought to adequately defend their client: “If the Court please, it had been thought best by my distinguished associate and myself, to [offer]... a reason why we are here in defense of the defendant... it was made to appear, to Judge Lewis and myself that... we owed alike to our profession, to the public, and to the Court that we accept this assignment.”

This unwillingness to defend Czolgosz to the best of their ability was also reflected in the prejudices held by the jury. When the jury was created, every selected juror had previously admitted a prejudice towards the defendant’s guilt. This became apparent when the jury, in under an hour of deliberation, found Czolgosz guilty. The determination to push Czolgosz’s trial through the legal process as quickly as possible resulted in a trial that missed important pieces to the investigative puzzle.

Fifty-two years after Guiteau’s trial and thirty-two years after Czolgosz’s, Zangara’s trial was not immune from the pressures to deliver a speedy, sane, and “guilty” verdict. Like both Guiteau and Czolgosz, if the crowd at the political rally at Bayfront Park had been given the opportunity, Zangara would have been lynched. The trials of Guiteau and Czolgosz set a precedent filled with errors that, unfortunately for Zangara, would be repeated. In his memoir written days before his execution, Zangara noted the atmosphere at the political rally, and his treatment after committing his crime: “The people tried to kill me, but the police surrounded me at once and put me in a car and took me to the Miami jail. On the way to jail the police abused me.” The first of many irregularities would begin after his detainment by the police. Although the law in 1933 required the police to inform Zangara of his rights before obtaining a confession, it did not limit nor proscribe the methods in which confessions could be obtained. As Zangara was not entitled to a lawyer before or after questioning, it was not always apparent, considering his lack of English, whether or not Zangara understood what was being said to him. This questioning resulted in Zangara being branded as an enemy of the “Capitalists.” Zangara argued that “what we ought to do is to kill all the Capitalists [and] burn all the money.” Although Zangara excused his actions for a political cause, it is interesting to note that he was actually unable to explain his ideology, how it worked, and how he came to develop this worldview. Zangara argued that his ideology was a mix of philosophical anarchism and socialism, yet when quizzed about these ideologies it became apparent that Zangara was unread in any political theory. Interviews with Zangara’s relatives and those who he had known to
associate with could not ever recall Zangara being passionate about anything, and certainly not passionate about politics. Like in the case of Czolgosz, pressure for a speedy resolution took precedence over a full investigation into Zangara's motives. Hardie's interrogation transcript evidently alludes to attempting to rationalize Zangara as an inferior foreigner who had committed a crime in the name of a doctrine that was alien to the American public.

With the "machinery of justice" moving speedily along, on the morning of Thursday, February 16th, less than twelve hours after the shooting, Hardie brought Zangara before Court Judge E.C. Collins for arraignment on four counts of attempted murder. Though Zangara refused counsel, Judge Collins appointed to Zangara's defense, three lawyers: Iverson Lewis Twyman, a general practitioner with trial experience and a former president of the Dade County Bar Association; James M. McCaskill, past president of the bar, with some experience in criminal law; and Alfred E. Raia, a property lawyer and a fluent Italian speaker, who appeared to be there only to act as an interpreter. While certainly an improvement from Guiteau and Czolgosz's defense attorneys, these men had been appointed because of their positions in the community and not because of their skill as criminal attorneys.

This lack of experience in criminal law would be crucial in Zangara's rapid conviction. The first problem that the case posed for his defense team was determining how Zangara would plead. Zangara had fired 5 bullets, critically wounding two (Chicago Mayor Anton Cermak and Mabel Gill), whose conditions and outcomes were yet to be determined. Twyman asked the court to issue a continuance until their fates were known. He argued that if Zangara pleaded guilty in the attempted murder of FDR and the five others, and then Ms. Gill or Mayor Cermak died, he would effectively have been found guilty of murder. While the judge should have clearly postponed the trial for this reason, politics and public pressures forced the hand of Judge Collins to proceed. Twyman carried on pleading guilty on behalf of Zangara on each of the four counts of attempted murder. Twyman, inexplicably did not consider the insanity plea, despite evidence suggesting that, perhaps, he should have; nor did he move to request for leniency. More bizarrely, before Judge Collins deliberated his verdict, Twyman asked the judge to interrogate Zangara on the stand. Considering that Twyman had extensive knowledge of how difficult working with Zangara was, it seems astonishing that Zangara's own lawyer asked the judge to interrogate him. As it should have been expected, Zangara's testimony, like Guiteau's before him, only served to hurt his case. Not only did Zangara rouse anger from the judge and public by showing a lack of remorse for attempting to shoot the president and critically wounding Mayor Cermak, he established an in-court precedent for his subsequent trial that showed that he knew what he was doing and that he acknowledged his own sanity. After the judge's interrogation, even the prosecutor did not see it necessary to question the defendant. Zangara's own lawyers sufficiently ensured that he would receive the maximum penalty for attempted murder, and effectively foreclosed any hope for defense if Cermak or Gill died. As a result, Zangara was sentenced to eighty years in prison.
If this were not enough, while awaiting his second arraignment (and eventually Cermak’s death), Zangara’s lawyer rejected the possibility of an appeal to Judge Collins’ decision. Curiously, the lawyers did not proceed to appeal because they left the decision to appeal the sentence to Zangara who was ultimately satisfied with the sentence and wanted no appeal.\textsuperscript{48} This would be one of other important decisions left to Zangara despite the question of his mental competency and comprehension. Mayor Cermak eventually died on March 6, 1933, initiating Zangara’s second trial, which began on March 7th. Unfortunately for Zangara, his attorneys proved their incompetence yet again. Though Zangara had pled “guilty” in the first trial, he was legally eligible to plead “not guilty” at his second trial. This should have appeared to Zangara’s defense team as the smartest avenue of defense. If Zangara pled “not guilty” he was entitled to a twelve-man jury. If he was found guilty, he could only be sentenced to death if a majority of the jury refused a recommendation of mercy. The lawyers would certainly have had a better chance appealing to the sentiments of a twelve-man jury than trying to convince a judge who refused a recommendation of mercy.\textsuperscript{49} Not only did Twyman plead his client “guilty,” in his closing arguments to the court, he argued that Zangara was “a sane man... a political zealot who had told the truth at every stage... he knows that he is right, and at the same time he knows that he is sinning against the land of his adoption... [he is also] shockingly agreeable to the punishment which he knows he will receive.”\textsuperscript{50} Strangely, Zangara’s very own attorney concluded to the court that Zangara knew what he was doing, and that he was not in objection to the imposition of the death sentence.\textsuperscript{51} Considering the gaps in the investigation of Zangara’s motives, and the absolute incompetence of his defense team, it came as little surprise that the judge found Zangara guilty and ordered his execution. The precedent set by the trials of Guiteau and Czolgosz allowed legal ineptness to be an acceptable standard. Though each assassin faced a court rather than a mob, the court would only delay the inevitable.

A major focal point in the trial of each assassin was the question of whether or not the assassin was mentally sane at the time of the crime. The courts operated, and continue to do so today, under the M’Naughten Rule, a product of the British legal system. The rule, adopted in 1843, held that a defendant was sane if he knew the difference between right and wrong. If the defendant could be proven legally insane, and therefore unable to determine the difference between right and wrong, he was legally not responsible for the crime that he committed.\textsuperscript{52} Though the definition of legal insanity and its use in the courts evolved greatly between 1881 and 1933, it was used rather infrequently and often under corrupt measures, dubbed the “insanity dodge” where the wealthy and well-connected could avoid conviction.\textsuperscript{53} In the end, each assassin was declared sane and culpable for their actions in the assassination. Though many scholars argue that it would have been unlikely that the defendants would have been declared insane, considering the tremendous pressures on the trials to carry out a sane and guilty verdict, the trial lacked the due process to determine whether or not these assassins were actually sane or insane.
When Guiteau pled “not-guilty” before the court he did so under three reasons: insanity, as it was God’s volition and not his; malpractice by the doctors; and the fact that the president had died in New Jersey, and the Washington court did not have jurisdiction in his case. Scoville believed that insanity was the only reasonable avenue that Guiteau’s defense could take. To prove insanity, the defense had to show that insanity ran through the Guiteau family, a peculiar prospect for Scoville who was Guiteau’s brother-in-law and newlywed husband to Guiteau’s sister. Scoville’s research revealed that Guiteau had an uncle that had died in a New York insane asylum, and a cousin whose sanity had also been in question. As Scoville’s inquest into the family tree mounted he received greater pressure from the Guiteau family to abandon the hereditary insanity defense. Facing pressures from his new family and the public, Scoville’s investigation had become a conflict of interest. At the same time, to counter the insanity defense, the prosecution enlisted John P. Gray, a conservative interpreter of the M’Naughten Rule, to become an unofficial counsel. Despite the fact that Gray had clearly already decided that Guiteau was sane—and was helping the prosecution to prove it—Gray was appointed by the court to carry out a supposedly impartial, pre-trial mental examination of Guiteau.

Gray’s investigation into Guiteau’s sanity was not so much an assessment of his sanity but of his moral character. By Guiteau admitting to Gray that he had engaged in sexual activity that led to the contraction of venereal disease, Gray would argue that this contraction was self-induced; therefore, making Guiteau responsible for any illness that was an outcome of his indiscretions. To support the insanity defense, Scoville turned to a series of experts on mental illness. The first expert was Dr. James G. Kiernan, the editor of the Chicago Medical Review, who argued that Guiteau was insane. However, in the cross examination grilling of Kiernan, his qualifications were called into question, effectively rendering his testimony useless. Prosecutor Davidge asked Kiernan what proportion of the world was insane. Kiernan confusingly replied that five out of every twenty-five persons were insane. Davidge then turned to the jury to tell them that his testimony meant that at least two of them were bound for the asylum. Scoville then turned to Charles Spitzka, a staunch critic of Gray, and one of the most outspoken in stating that Guiteau was insane. Spitzka had interviewed and examined Guiteau in prison, declaring that his brain was “not diseased but imperfect.” The prosecution, fully aware of the professional dispute between Gray and Spitzka, attempted to discredit Spitzka and damage his credibility. The prosecutors alleged that Spitzka was not an actual doctor but a veterinarian, and attempted to discredit his testimony because of his youth. Spitzka’s refusal to say whether or not he believed in God also hurt him. Spitzka, like Kiernan, would have his testimony rendered useless based on personal attacks on his character, rather than the merit of his evidence.

In the end, Guiteau was not afforded the due process to determine whether or not he was insane. Though the declaration of insanity was certainly well ahead of the times, there were tremendous irregularities in the investigation into Guiteau’s sanity. Allegations were later brought out that the state’s lawyers coached witnesses and bribed experts to testify that Guiteau was sane. Other evidence shows that the state moved to suppress and destroy letters and documents that might have shown that Guiteau was insane.
In handling the assassination of President McKinley, Guiteau’s trial had set an important precedent for DA Penney in how to treat a presidential assassin: “Do not, the record of Garfield’s assassination cautioned, let the definition of insanity come up for debate… do not take too much time.” By 1901, the M’Naughten test that was widely accepted in 1881 began to face harsher criticism from the scientific and legal world. Charles Spitzka along with Carlos F. MacDonald began to spearhead the crusade for a more liberal definition of legal insanity. Believing that the M’Naughten test was intellectually bankrupt, they argued that a killer not only needed to know right from wrong, but also needed “the power to choose the right and avoid the wrong.” Responsibility should no longer be a matter of moral understanding, but of a healthy willpower and an environment that allowed it to operate.

Despite this liberalization in thought over the M’Naughten test, insanity was still an extremely hard thing to prove, particularly under the enormous pressures to charge Czolgosz as sane and guilty. DA Penney wanted to bring justice swiftly to Czolgosz, believing that the case did not warrant thoughtful or extended discussion of the defendant’s sanity or motives. Interestingly, the court left the decision to declare insanity up to Czolgosz, who fortunately for Penney, did not take this opportunity. Essentially, the court may have tasked an insane man with the responsibility of determining his own sanity. It begs the question: does an insane person know that they are insane?

Though Czolgosz was unwilling to cooperate with a defense of insanity, the court sought a psychiatric expert on the behalf of the defense to examine Czolgosz. It was important for the court to tie all the loose ends after the debacle of the Guiteau trial. The court ended up selecting Carlos F. MacDonald, the reformer who had a history of challenging the M’Naughten test. Though a seemingly positive sign for Czolgosz’s defense, it appears that MacDonald’s reformer reputation was not what the court was looking to in his appointment. MacDonald had becomes the doctor most identified with the scientific production of death by modern means through the electric chair. MacDonald constantly sought to improve the process of electrocution, which at the time, left the body disfigured and blistered. Czolgosz’s body would be able to serve MacDonald’s goal of perfecting the electrocution process.

On Friday, September 20, 1901, DA Penny allowed MacDonald and another doctor to examine Czolgosz over the weekend. This gave MacDonald two full days to determine Czolgosz; sanity before the trial began on the Monday. The doctors came to their conclusions through the consultation of Czolgosz’s statements to the DA and interviews with Czolgosz on their own. On the Monday morning, minutes before the trial was to begin, MacDonald met with Czolgosz’s attorney, and the prosecution declared that Czolgosz was sane and responsible. Though MacDonald had wished to comment on the scope of the law and psychiatric theory, he was unable to do so because of the time constraints placed on his investigation. In the actual trial, no experts were called to testify on Czolgosz’s mental condition, and his mental state was never referenced on record during the proceedings. After the trial, MacDonald would remark that “owing to the limited time—two days—at our disposal prior to the trial, and the fact that his family relatives
resided in a distant state... we were unable to obtain a history of his heredity beyond what he gave us. A thorough investigation into Czolgosz’s family by Dr. Walter Channing would later show that not only did he have a hereditary link to insanity (his maternal aunt was insane), Czolgosz had suffered an illness that was followed by a period of odd behaviour leading up to this assassination attempt on McKinley. In the end, with the determination of DA Penney to complete the investigation and trial as quickly as possible, the investigation of Czolgosz’s sanity was extremely limited. As allegations would later show, Czolgosz had a hereditary link to insanity and experienced a serious bout of illness that resulted in markedly different behaviour from when Czolgosz had been healthy. Czolgosz had not been afforded the due process to determine his sanity.

In 1933, despite greater liberal thought about the M’Naughten test and mental insanity, it was still an extremely unpopular course of defense. Theoretically, courts were more accepting of legal insanity; however, practically, this defense had worked in a very minute number of cases. The cases that successfully pled insanity certainly did not have the same amount at stake; these cases did not have to deal with an attempt on the life of the president or the murder of a prominent politician. The only two cases that did deal with the president and the plea of insanity resulted in a rejection of this plea. Public pressures and flaws in the trial proceedings and diagnoses of mental psychosis prevented both Czolgosz and Guiteau from pleading insanity. This pattern would continue with the trial of Zangara.

Initial reports declared Zangara sane. A couple of hours after the shooting, Zangara was given a superficial medical exam by county doctor E.C. Thomas. Thomas concluded that Zangara was “normal in every respect... suffering only from nervous gastritis induced by fright.” Despite the fact that Dr. Thomas had surveyed him for less than an hour, he went as far as to declare Zangara sane. When the court appointed Zangara a legal defense team, they immediately requested a “sanity commission” to determine their client’s mental health. The court appointed Dr. I. Henry Agos, “a respected psychiatrist,” and Dr. T. Earl Moore, “a young practitioner.” The doctors were to present their findings on Saturday, February 18th. This would leave Moore and Agos less than twenty-four hours to determine Zangara’s sanity.

The speed at which the sanity commission proceeded, though outstandingly fast, can possibly be understood as a result of the outside pressures placed on the courts. Governor Sholtz had already told the newspapers that he deemed Zangara sane without the sanity commission’s verdict, while other newspapers declared with their psychiatric experts (who had never examined Zangara), that Zangara should be declared sane. On the Saturday morning, Agos and Moore delivered the following report to the court: “Examination of this individual reveals a perverse character, willfully wrong, remorseless, and expressing contempt for the opinions of others... such ill-balanced erratic types are classified as a psychopathic personality.” Interestingly, the doctors did not discuss the M’Naughten test, and failed to disclose whether or not Zangara was legally sane. Years after the trial and execution of Zangara, both Agos and Moore argued that they were not asked to determine this legal conclusion. No other doctors would be asked to examine Zangara, and no other
psychiatric evaluation would be written during Zangara’s lifetime. Since the commission had argued that Zangara was a “psychopathic personality,” it seems peculiar that his defense team chose not to plead “not guilty by reason of insanity.” At the very least, they should have sought another psychiatrist to determine legal insanity. Twyman, like Czolgosz’s defense attorneys, chose to leave it to Zangara to determine his sanity. In court, Twyman would blatantly declare that Zangara “scoffs at the idea he may be insane.”

The ineptness of Zangara’s defense team did not give Zangara the ability to plead insanity. Zangara’s actions were attributed to political martyrdom, yet had the defense and the investigators taken the time to actually examine Zangara, his family history, and his bizarre behaviour, they might have come up with a different conclusion. Twenty years after Zangara’s death, Dr. Moore, in an interview with the New Yorker declared the following: “I considered him a paranoiac character, if not a true paranoiac. Medically, he was not sane. Legally, he was considered sane in that he could recite the rules of behaviour and knew when he was acting contrary to those rules. I am sure if he were alive today and we had the modern facilities for examining him psychiatrically, he would be adjudicated as a very insane person.” In fact, Dr. Moore is one of several psychiatrists that argue today that a multitude of medical diseases could have explained Zangara’s behaviour. Unfortunately, as Zangara was not afforded the due process, this conclusion will never be resolved in the court of law.

Although the determination of insanity was extremely difficult during the time of these trials, none of the assassins were afforded the due process to determine whether or not insanity was a possibility. Guiteau’s defense was destroyed by the political landscape of the time; the nature and speed of Czolgosz’s trial did not allow for Czolgosz’s sanity to ever be determined; while Zangara’s incompetent defense team did not allow him to pursue the insanity defense. While it may never be conclusively determined whether or not any of these assassins were actually insane, the law, in each of these cases, never provided the assassins with the opportunity to come to this conclusion.

The assassins Guiteau, Czolgosz, and Zangara were unfairly tried in the court of law. Public and political pressures on the trial demanded their sanity and their guilt. The trials acted as a formality rather than an avenue to pursue the public’s calls for “justice.” In an unfortunate consequence of chronology, Zangara’s trial fell after the trials of Guiteau and Czolgosz. Each of those trials was riddled with irregularities that would set a legal precedent that Zangara’s trial would replicate. The best avenue of defense for each of these assassins was the plea of “insanity.” Unfortunately for the assassins, conservative political thought, the incompetence of their defense, and the public pressures pushing against this, none of the assassins would be afforded the due process to determine this conclusion. Although much has changed since 1933, it does not seem all that improbable that these same forces could once again manipulate the principles of justice should another assassin be brought before a court of law.
Endnotes

4. Ibid., 50.
6. Ibid., 124.
13. Ibid.
17. Ibid., 109.
18. Ibid., 105.
19. Ibid., 105.
23. Ibid., 116.
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25. Ibid., 123.
26. Ibid., 133.
28. Ibid., 138.
29. Ibid., 139.
31. Ibid.
32. Ibid.
34. Ibid.
36. Ibid., 44.
37. Ibid., 51.
39. Ibid., 52.
40. Ibid., 253.
41. Ibid., 50.
43. Ibid., 106.
45. Ibid., 115.
46. Ibid., 118.
47. Ibid., 120.
48. Ibid., 122.
50. Ibid., 161.
51. Ibid.
53. Ibid., 53.
56. Ibid.
57. Ibid.
60. Ibid., 131.
61. Ibid.
62. Ibid., 134.
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71. Ibid., 107.
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73. Ibid.
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