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Volume 6, 1985 |  |
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The Deconstruction of an Idea (Crime and Punishment and The Brothers Karamazov)David K. Danow, University of South CarolinaThe fundamental identity Raskol'nikov's "idea" and Ivan Karamazov's is commonly acknowledged. Their jointly held theory affirms the right of the "extraordinary" individual to afford himself the necessary dispensation in the face of societal law to overstep its bounds in the interest of accomplishing some higher goal. For Raskol'nikov, the idea is rooted primarily in historical example; Ivan derives it from an inverted theological position. "There is no virtue if there is no immortality", he observes, thereby asserting a seemingly logically deduced rationale, allowing in exceptional cases for amoral conduct as a standard model of behavior. Curiously, the utterance represents the only instance in the entire novel where the notion is communicated (in highly abbreviated form) as direct speech on the part of its author. Yet in both Dostoevsky's first and last major novels, the fundamentally atheistic idea is expressed within analogous dialogic structures composed of reported speech and ironic discourse intended to discredit a theory, which is at the same time first being adumbrated. Characterized by a seeming paradox - the simultaneous articulation and rejection of an idea - such discourse deserves further investigation. It is the present intention to explore these related structures from this perspective in an effort to suggest how the idea in both instances is ultimately devalued. To briefly anticipate, in being questioned about an idea which is itself immediately placed in question, the author of that idea is obliged to reconsider its origins and initial formulation, on the one hand, and to reevaluate it in light of the current encrustation of meanings and significance which have accrued to it since its original formulation, on the other. Its author must return to the beginnings, as it were, deconstruct his ideological "creation" to determine in effect if the current product conforms to the original intention - and if not, to see how it differs. Such procedure characterizes the case of Raskol'nikov in particular, yet that of Ivan is clearly analogous. In fact, "the deconstruction of an idea" aptly describes the ideological underpinnings of Crime and Punishment, aimed in its entirety at undermining Raskol'nikov's theory. By comparison, The Brothers is structured as the confrontation of two ideas - Ivan's and Zosima's. However, in Dostoevsky's last novel as well, the method by which the atheistic idea is ultimately deprived of its ideological weight is essentially the same, as this study intends to show. In Crime and Punishment Porfirij Petrovich recalls at a strategic moment Raskol'nikov's article devoted to the problem of crime. He refers to its reportedly sketchy conclusion and requests greater elucidation on the part of its author. But first, in calculated fashion, the clever detective himself summarizes those aspects of special interest.
92
Odnim slovom, esli pripomnite, provoditsja nekotoryj namek na to, chto sushchestvujut na svete budto by nekotorye takie lica, kotorye mogut... to est' ne to chto mogut, a polnoe pravo imejut sovershat' vsjakie beschinstva i prestuplenija, i chto dlja nikh budto by i zakon ne pisan. (198-9) Vse delo v tom, chto v ikhnej stat'e vse ljudi kak-to razdeljajutsja na "obyknovennykh" i "neobyknovennykh"'.' Obyknovennye dolzhny zhit' v poslushanie i ne imejut prava perestupat' zakona, potomu chto oni, vidite li, obyknovennye. A neobyknovennye imejut pravo delat' vsjakie prestuplenija i vsjacheski prestupat' zakon, sobstvenno potomu, chto oni neobyknovennye. (p. 199) (1) Thus is Raskolnikov's idea initially presented in summary fashion by an unsympathetic, alien "voice". In effect, it is left to Raskol'nikov to rebutt this usurped, initial presentation of his own theory, which Porfirij had effectively reported in such manner as to immediately elicit further unsympathetic reaction from a potentially friendly quarter. "Kak? Chto takoe? Pravo na prestuplenie? ... Da kak zhe eto? Byt' ne mozhet, chtoby tak!" (p. 199), mutters a disconcerted Razumikhin. Having been put in such defensive position, it is now left for Raskol'nikov "to take up the challenge". Fully comprehending the situation ("Raskol'nikov usmekhnulsja usilennomu i umyshlennomu iskazheniju svoej idei". (p. 199), he undertakes the task all the same, elucidating, at this stage, in relatively balanced, judicious manner those points he wants to emphasize. He begins by ironically acknowledging Porfirij's "accurate" assessment, but then goes on to declare that he had not insisted that extraordinary individuals are necessarily obliged to commit crimes, as Porfirij, according to Raskol'nikov, had presumably suggested. Oddly, Porfirij had not insisted on the point either, nor had he specifically attributed it to the former student. However, Raskol'nikov does affirm that if genius is hindered in its strivings, it becomes incumbent for it to "eliminate" whatever "obstacles" might stand in the way. On the one hand, he observes, no one has the right to wantonly commit crime (ubivat' kogo vzdumaetsja ... ili vorovat' kazhdyj den' na bazare), on the other, he firmly takes his stand with the leaders and "blood-letters" (krovoprolivcy) by grounding his view as follows: Odnim slovom, ja vyvozhu, chto i vse, ne to chto velikie, no i chut'-chut' iz kolei vykhodjashchie ljudi, to est' chut'-chut' dazh sposobnye skazat' chto-nibud' novenkoe, dolzhny, po prirode svoej, byt' nepremenno prestupnikami, - bolee ili menee, razumeetsja. (p. 200) Here his use of repeated qualifications (ne to chto velikie; chut'-chut' iz kolei; chut'-chut' dazhe sposobnye; bolee ili menee) and telling diminutive (chto-nibud' noven'koe) indicate Raskol'nikov's willingness to allow a certain breadth to his elitist category, affording entry to those who might make only a "small contribution" towards altering mankind's lot - himself included. The former student's paradoxical aspiration to find
93 himself in such mongrel company (vykhodjashchie ljudi/prestupniki) does not escape notice by the astute detective, who has succeeded in putting him on the defensive regarding his guiding principle. ("Odnim slovom, vy vidite, chto do sikh ??r tut net nichego osobenno novogo". 200) And rightly so, for the question may be fairly posed - in what can Raskol'nikov's own "new word" be said to consist? Especially when he himself acknowledges that his division of the world into cannon fodder and generals is nothing new. Beyond this he must have an idea of his own, some governing notion that affords him the "right to overstep" (pereshagnut' khotja by i cherez trup, cherez krov'), and which would place him squarely in the category of those who are to move the world in some new direction (dvigajut mir i vedut ego k celi). And this he lacks, having failed to distinguish an essentially static notion, which categorizes, defines, and tells how it is in the world, from one which is dynamic, motivational, and therefore, moves the world. Amounting to an old and hardly original taxonomy vulgarly expressed as "there are two kinds of people in the world" (ljudi ... razdeljajutsja voobshche na dva razrjada), Raskol'nikov's idea is thus not at all synonymous with that kind of idea which distinguishes genius from the masses, offering the latter new insights and more advanced goals. His entire thought fails, then, on two counts. First, as he himself perceives, it is superfluous from the start. For if one wonders if one is a Napoleon, one is decidedly not. Such crucial realization comes slowly however, and - as a turning point in the novel, leading to Raskol'nikov's eventual submission - only after the crime is committed. Second, by not being dynamic but only taxonomic, his idea does not afford him any "rights" whatever, according to his own stated crucial realization comes slowly however, and - as a turning point in the novel, leading to Raskol'nikov's eventual submission - only after the crime is committed. Second, by not being dynamic but only taxonomic, his idea does not afford him any "rights" whatever, according to his own stated criteria. Thus the question arises - for what reason need he have killed in the first place if there is no subsequent plan to justify his having "overstepped"? This is a question which Raskol'nikov does not ask (within the context of his interior monologue). Moreover, it is one which Porfirij, who poses a host of attendant related questions, cannot logically ask (since it would have to be predicated upon the knowledge that Raskol'nikov had indeed perpetrated a crime, a fact to which the detective is not made privy, his sharp intuition notwithstanding). But it is precisely the one which Sonja does ask - and which Raskol'nikov can neither satisfactorily (from hers) answer. Hence, these two linked considerations indicate paradoxically that Raskol'nikov's idea is not an idea by his own definition. It is not the kind, in other words, which affords one the right to overstep societal bounds and, therefore, contains within it the seeds for its own deconstruction. In being obliged to confront his own theory (by both Porfirij and Sonja), Raskol'nikov eventually recognizes that his original premises not only do not hold but are themselves both an indication and a source of the inherent inconsistencies which finally invalidate the idea for its author himself.
94 How such process of deconstruction is accomplished may be detailed through a brief consideration of Raskol'nikov's "confession" to Sonja, during the course of which he offers a series of explanations for having committed the crime. (1) - Nu da, chtob ograbit'. (p. 317) In fact, none of these are the "whole reason". Furthermore, these rationales deconstruct one another simply by virtue of their extensive proliferation. Raskol'nikov himself reduces the stature of his own argument, in other words, each time he offers a new explanation as a substitute for a previous one (none of which qualifies in any case to be regarded as "visionary" in the first place). In addition, he provides a counterargument or explicit negation of each in turn, as the following statements correlated with those above clearly indicate. (1) [...] ja eshche ne reshil - voz'mu ili ne voz'mu eti den'gi [. . .] (p. 317) I ne den'gi, glavnoe, nuzhny mne byli [. . .] kogda ja ubil; ne stol'ko den'gi nuzhny byli, kak drugoe... Ja eto vse teper' znaju... (p. 322) Finally, he offers one last explanation: "Mne drugoe nado bylo
95 uznat' [...] Smogu li ja perestupit' ili ne smogu! [...] Slushaj: kogda ja k starukhe khodil, ja tol'ko poprobovat' skhodil..." - to which he immediately offers the conclusive deconstructive correlative, exclaiming: "Ja sebja ubil, a ne starushonku! Tut tak-taki razom i ukhlopal sebja, naveki!..." (p. 322) This, then, is his answer. Having equated man in the abstract with a louse, and having striven in grotesque manner to rise above the lowly status he had thus designated, he finds he has not achieved his end - and eventually discovers his own humanity in the process. But this is something which, like a birth, occurs gradually and painfully, and is only hinted at towards the close of the novel, whose overall purpose is to document instead the self-ordained trial leading to that potential self-discovery. In summation, Raskol'nikov's idea is presented, first of all, to Porfirij, who then proceeds to conduct a critical analysis of what he has managed to coerce from his young interlocutor. However, when Raskol'nikov confesses to Sonja and tries to explain his motive, it is he who conducts his own critical review of what had been his guiding principle, and himself finds both the idea and its author lacking by his own established criteria. Hence the idea now appears fragmented and in sad disarray. ("Net [...] eto ne to! [...] eto ne to! [...] Net, eto ne tak! Ja opjat' ne tak rasskazyvaju!" (p. 32O) In essence, his entire discordant account of the rationale behind his ultimately self-assertive act is presented in the form of reported inner speech in an effort to recount the train of thought which had generated the deed. The series of explanations as to why the murder was committed are themselves past-oriented structures, since reported speech is essentially a reconstruction of a past utterance affording new present significance. Reported speech in general makes the past once a-gain present by revivifying and vitalizing it with the present significance which prompts its renewed evocation in the first-place. This is accomplished by virtue of its being incorporated within a new dialogical context. By contrast, the related de-constructions are immediately present-oriented and are therefore substantially more conclusive ("Ja eto vse teper' znaju ..." p. 322), since they are initially articulated in the present and are contemporaneous with the narrative itself -with the events of the novel which are currently unfolding in the far more decisive here and now. Having been deconstructed this time by its author, the idea is no longer viable. Raskol'nikov must now own up: he has no idea - and never did. The manner here outlined - by which what had appeared to be an idea is reduced to a mere shadow of one - is repeated through analogous technique in Dostoevsky's last novel, where essentially the same philosophical fragment is transformed into a haunting specter and nothing more. In The Brothers the initial account of Ivan's idea is rendered by Fedor Pavlovich's brother-in-law Miusov, whose role in this respect parallels that of Porfirij Petrovich in the earlier novel. Ostensibly intended as an entertaining distraction during the family gathering in the elder's cell, Miusov's diatribe directed at Ivan functions primarily as the first account of an idea destined to be thoroughly discredited by the time of its second and final telling. In both instances, the
96 manner by which this is accomplished is essentially the same, corresponding, moreover, to the pattern in Crime and Punishment previously detailed. ...ja vam rasskazhu, gospoda, drugoj anekdot o samom Ivane Fedoroviche, interesnejshij i kharakternejshij. Ne dalee kak dnej pjat' tomu nazad, v odnom zdeshnem, po preimushchestvu damskom, obshchestve on torzhestvenno zajavil v spore, chto na vsej zemle net reshitel'no nichego takogo, chto by zastavljalo ljudej ljubit' sebe podobnykh, chto takogo zakona prirody: chtoby chelovek ljubil chelovechestvo - ne sushchestvuet vovse, i chto esli est' i byla do sikh ??r ljubov' na zemle, to ne ot zakona estestvennogo, a edinstvenno potomu, chto ljudi verovali v svoe bessmertie. Ivan Fedorovich pribavil pri etom v skobkakh, chto v etom-to i sostoit ves' zakon estestvennyj, tak chto unichtozh'te v chelovechestve veru v svoe bessmertie, v nem totchas zhe issjaknet ne tol'ko ljubov', no i vsjakaja zhivaja sila, chtoby prodolzhat' mirovuju zhizn'. Malo togo: togda nichego uzhe ne budet beznravstvennogo, vse budet pozvoleno, dazhe antropofagia. No i etogo malo, on zakonchil utverzhdeniem, chto dlja kazhdogo chastnogo lica, naprimer kak by my teper', ne verujushchego ni v boga, ni v bessmertie svoe, nravstvennyj zakon prirody dolzhen nemedlenno izmenit'sja v polnuju protivopolozhnost' prezhnemu, religioznomu, i chto egoizm dazhe do zlodejstva ne tol'ko dolzhen byt' dozvolen cheloveku, no dazhe priznan neobkhodimym, samym razumnym i chut' li ne blagorodnejshim iskhodom v ego polozhenii. Po takomu paradoksu mozhete zakljuchit', gospoda, i o vsem ostal'nom, chto izvolit provozglashat' i chto nameren eshche, mozhet byt', provozglasit' nash milyj eksentrik i paradoksalist Ivan Fedorovich. (XIV, p. 64 - 5) His use of the term "anekdot" is telling, since it bears the distinct connotation of an account intended to be humorous. Such intention, of course, runs counter to Ivan's own intentions imbued within his (reported) speech but affirms Miusov's antagonistic position from the start. The latter emphasizes that Ivan presented his notion "in the presence of ladies", an intentionally unflattering detail suggesting a certain indelicacy compound by Ivan's reportedly "triumphant" manner. Miusov's general characterization of both the idea and its author signals an intention diametrically opposed to that originally intended. The entire account, in fact, is couched in language and tone meant to suggest a thoroughly untenable point of view, whose potential stature is immediately diminished by its being contemptuously related by an antagonist intent upon discrediting it. Introduced by a pair of ironic superlatives (interesnejshij i kharakternejshij) and sustained corresponding intonation, Ivan's
97 idea is characterized as inconceivable and utterly indefensible, allowing for grotesque possibility (dazhe antropofagia: egoizm do zlodejstva). Indications of such extreme viewpoint are present throughout Miusov's brief account, where the language attributed to Ivan brooks no dispute or possible qualifying detail: na vsej zemle net reshitel'no nichego takogo; ne sushchestvuet vovse; ves' zakon; totchas zhe issjaknet; vsjakaja zhivaja sila; nichego... ne budet; vse budet; dlja kazhdogo; dolzhen nemedlenno; v polnuju protivopolozhnost'; ne tol'ko dolzhen byt'; priznan neobkhodimym, samym razumnym ... blagorodnejshim iskhodom. The idea is thus summed up by a speaker, who imbues the account not only with his own intention (to disparage the idea; to denigrate its author) and ironic intonation but with his own speech, incorporated to indicate feigned surprise and mock indignation (malo togo; i etogo malo; po takomu paradoksu; the repeated use of the emotively loaded "dazhe"). For Miusov, Ivan does not speak, he pontificates - an impression he also wants to convey (on [...] zajavil; on zakonchil utverzhdeniem; izvolit provozglashat' i [...] provozglasit')- His concluding, falsely endearing epithets (nash milyj eksentrik i paradoksalist) softens neither the effect nor the characterization (of either the author or his idea). Thus is Dmitrij's excited request for clarification immediately inspired: "'Zlodejstvo ne tol'ko dolzhno byt' dozvoleno, no dazhe priznano samym neobkhodimym i samym umnym vykhodom iz polozhenija vsjakogo bezbozhnika!' Tak ili ne tak?" (p. 65) His outburst, it might be noted, parallels Razumikhin's similarly voiced disbelief in the earlier work; in the two respective instances, the roles of Ivan's brother and Raskol'nikov's friend fulfill the same compositional need: to sound the alarm at what is being articulated. Dmitrij's further remark - "zapomnju" - is, of course, a false lead; the idea is not his (to act upon or guide others), it is Ivan's - a striking realization, when it is recognized how greatly distanced he is from it by the manner of its presentation, from which moreover, he is almost entirely excluded. (2) In recounting Ivan's idea there is, as remarked earlier, only a single laconic statement in the entire novel which can be directly attributed to him (as other than reported speech or that of an alter ego): "Net dobrodeteli, esli net bessmertija." (p. 65) By contrast to such paucity of direct speech on the part of the author of the idea, the clearly unsympathetic point of view chosen for its initial formulation and expression -paralleling Porfirij's similar presentation - is itself anticipatory of the idea's eventual foreclosure. No less than Raskol'nikov's, Ivan's capitulation as ideologist is prepared for by the device which allows his theory to be presented in such deprecating manner. In contrastive tones, the elder Zosima observes with far greater sympathy and perspecuity: "Ideja eta eshche ne reshena v vashem serdce i muchaet ego. [...] Poka s otchajanija i vy zabavljaetes' [...] sami ne veruja svoej dialektike i s bol'ju serdca usmekhajas' ej pro sebja... V vas etot vopros ne reshen, i v etom vashe velikoe gore, ibo nastojatel'no trebuet razreshenija..." (p. 65) The dramatic manifestation of that accurate and prophetic remark left open (as the ellipses here signify) is realized only at the end of the novel during the confrontation between Ivan and that part of himself which "mocks inwardly" (usmekhajas' [...] pro sebja).
98 The ironic elaboration of the idea in the cell thus foreshadows its ultimate collapse as viable ideational construct when filtered through the devil as instrument for its final negative critique. In Crime and Punishment, as an additional explanation of what had drawn him to his fantastic conclusion, Raskol'nikov exclaims to Sonja: "[...] ja ved' i sam znaju, chto menja chert tashchil. [...] chert-to menja potashchil, a uzh posle togo mne ob'jasnil, chto ne imel ja prava tuda khodit' [ . . .] Nasmejalsja on nado mnoj [ ...]" (VI, p. 321, 22) In this instance, such information is conveyed to the reader as told to Sonja; whether it is to be taken literally of figuratively (in the mind of Raskol'nikov as well as the reader's) remains problematic. In The Brothers, by contrast, Ivan's confrontation with his devil is dramatized as part of the action and plot of the novel, rather than presented as reported information. Curiously, such drama may be succinctly formulated by referring to Raskol'nikov's plaint in the earlier work (nasmejalsja on nado mnoj); it begins in the later novel essentially when Ivan's devil announces: "Ja i prishel, chtob ugostit' sebja etim udovol'stviem." (XV, p. 83) Yet here, too, the status of the devil remains problematic: he is both "real" in the sense that he is given speech and a physical manifestation described in some detail; at the same time, he is clearly a figment of Ivan's disturbed imagination and capable of vanishing into ether upon the proper provocation. In dialogic interaction with Sonja, Raskol'nikov deconstructs his own idea; the devil accomplishes this with regard to Ivan's. The protagonist himself, in the one case, and the character's alter ego, in the other, perform the identical function by devaluing a previously upheld idea. The manner in which this is accomplished is analogous but not the same. Raskol'nikov, on the one hand, is expressly shown in conflict with himself - the present "ego" with his past self. In the ensuing core dispute which holds the central place in the formally structured dialogue between Sonja and Raskol'nikov, the latter's present self vanquishes his anachronistic opponent through exteriorized verbal discourse, in which Sonja acts as intermediary in the hitherto internal dialogue between Raskol'nikov's two selves now made overt. Having been confronted by Sonja, Raskol'nikov is obliged - in like dialogic manner - to confront himself. In the case of Ivan, there is a similar confrontation between past and present selves, but no such exteriorized dispute is depicted. Moreover, in this instance, where the devil explicitly challenges Ivan (cited below), no broadly encompassing framework for dialogue (as that between Sonja and Raskol'nikov) exists either - except as an artificial construct. Although the devil as character in his own right is distanced from Ivan through the novelist's art as some other, thus affording the potential for dialogue -that potential is never realized. For while presumably quoting Ivan directly for most of his lengthy uninterrupted speech, which serves to provide a more detailed account of Ivan's theory than offered at first, the devil now brooks no interference (or dialogue), just as Ivan's own original formulations previously did not. What dialogue exists is interiorized within the devil's speech itself, as will be shown, rather than exteriorized, as in the earlier work. (3) Here the method of final foreclosure more closely resembles that employed during Porfirij's and Miusov's less devastating accounts, where an ironic presentation accompanied by an antipathetic intonation produce a second conflicting intention in-
99 terlaced with the original. The result is a speech act embroiled in internal dialogue, in which the original intent and contradictory aim evident in the report are clearly opposed. As the novel's quintessential example, the devil's principal speech is here cited of necessity in its entirety. O, ja ljublju mechty pylkikh, molodykh, trepeshchushchikh zhazhdoj zhizni druzej moikh. "Tam novye ljudi, - reshil ty eshche proshloju vesnoj, sjuda sobirajas', - oni polagajut razhrushit' vse i nachat' s antropofagii. Glupcy, menja ne sprosilis'! Po-moemu, i razhrushat' nichego ne nado, a nado vsego tol'ko razrushit' v chelovechestve ideju o boge, vot s chego nado prinjat'sja za delo! S etogo, s etogo nadobno nachinat' - o slepcy, nichego ne ponimajushchie! Raz chelovechestvo otrechetsja pogolovno ot boga (a ja verju, chto etot period, parallel'no geologicheskim periodam, sovershitsja), to samo soboju, bez antropofagii, padet vse prezhnee mirovozzrenie i, glavnoe, vsja prezhnjaja nravstvennost', i nastupit vse novoe. Ljudi sovokupjatsja, chtoby vzjat' ot zhizni vse, chto ona mozhet dat', no nepremenno dlja schastija i radosti v odnom tol'ko zdeshnem mire. Chelovek vozvelichitsja dukhom bozheskoj, titanicheskoj gordosti i javitsja cheloveko-bog. Ezhechasno pobezhdaja uzhe bez granic prirodu, voleju svoeju i naukoj, chelovek tem samym ezhechasno budet oshchushchat' naslazhdenie stol' vysokoe, chto ono zamenit emu vse prezhnie upovanija naslazhdenij nebesnykh. Vsjakij uznaet, chto on smerten ves', bez voskresenija, i primet smert' gordo i spokojno, kak bog. On iz gordosti pojmet, chto emu nechego roptat' za to, chto zhizn' est' mgnovenie, i vozljubit brata svoego uzhe bezo vsjakoj mzdy. Ljubov' budet udovletvorjat' lis' mgnoveniju zhizni, no odno uzhe soznanie ?? mgnovennosti usilit ogon' ?? nastol'ko, naskol'ko prezhde rasplyvalas' ona v upovanijakh na ljubov' zagrobnuju i beskonechnuju"... nu i prochee, i prochee v tom zhe rode. Premilo! (p. 83) Ivan can only sit holding his hands to his ears looking down at the floor, as the voice continues. Vopros teper' v tom, dumal moj junyj myslitel'; vozmozhno li, chtoby takoj period nastupil kogdanibud' ili net? Esli nastupit, to vse resheno, i chelovechestvo ustroitsja okonchatel'no. No tak kak, vvidu zakoreneloj gluposti chelovecheskoj, eto, pozhaluj, eshche i v tysjacu let ne ustroitsja, to vsjakomu, soznajushchemu uzhe i teper' istinu, pozvolitel'no ustroitsja soversenno kak emu ugodno, na novykh nachalakh. V etom smysle emu "vse pozvoleno". Malo togo: esli dazhe period etot i nikogda ne nastupit, no tak kak boga i bessmertlja vse-taki net, to novomu cheloveku pozvolitel'no stat' cheloveko-bogom, dazhe khotja by odnomu v celom mire, i, uzh konechno, v novom chine, s legkim serdcem pereskochit' vsjakuju prezhnjuju In censorious tones that exceed those previously employed by Miusov, the devil expresses an openly derisive viewpoint which is especially devastating to its auditor, since it emanates this time from Ivan himself and is, indisputably, his own. Irony is the principal rhetorical weapon leveled against him, as the devil's opening statement (O, ja ljublju mechty) heralds its all-pervasive use. This is immediately augmented by the single apostrophe laced with ironic overtones (Tam novye ljudi - ty reshil) and later by the condescending reference to the former theoretician (moj junyj myslitel'), now humbled by his own prideful words. Ivan's evident sense of superiority makes him an especially vulnerable target as his pompous epithets and pronouncements are flung back at him (Glupcy; po-moemu...; slepcy nichego ne ponimajushchie; vvidu zakoroneloj gluposti chelovecheskoj), concluding with the gross parallelism: "Gde stanet bog [...] - Gde stanu ja [...]" Such verbal constructs belong to Ivan himself as reported speech; however, the contrastive intonations by which they are now expressed are, indeed, the devil's own work, as are a number of crude assessments punctuating his speech (nu i prochee, i prochee v tom zhe rode. Premilo!; i shabash! Vse eto ochen' milo). There is thus a clear verbal inlay of the devil's words incorporated within the greater framework of those expressly attributed to Ivan, creating an internal dialogue within a verbal structure which might otherwise appear as monologue. (4) Similar to Miusov's report, the youthful penchant for uncompromising formulations is again highlighted - but this time through an entire series of hyperbolic pronouncements, which are both the very substance of the speech itself and its most condemning aspect: razrushit' vse; nachat' s antropofagii; razrushat' nichego ne nado; a nado vsego tol'ko razrushit'; s etogo nadobno nachinat'; etot period [...] sovershitsja; padet vse [...] mirovozzrenie; nastupit vse novoe; ljudi sovokupjatsja; no nepremenno; chelovek vozvelichitsja; chelovek budet oshchushchat'; ono zamenit emu; vsjakij uznaet [...] i primet smert'; on [...] poimet [...] i vozljubit; to vse resheno; to vsjakomu [...] pozvolitel'no ustroitsja [...] na novykh nachalakh; "vse pozvoleno"; to novomu cheloveku pozvolitel'no stat'; "vse dozvoleno" (i shabash!). Clearly, the unyielding, programmatic intention is Ivan's; while the ironic intonation serving to denigrate that intention is the
101 devil's. In effect, the grandiose verbal usage attributed to Ivan (chelovechestvo otrechetsja; chelovechestvo ustroitsja) is immediately undermined by its negative presentation. In sum, the reader is provided both the sense of an uncompromising youth taking up the task of once and for all drawing up a blueprint for the future of "mankind" - and of its concomitant disapproval by the speaker taking account of that predictive effort. (5) Finally, contrary to the reader's possible expectation, there is no point in either novel where the idea is articulated in impressive, convincing form. It is consigned instead, on the dramatic plane, to such twin sorry manifestations as the murder of an avaricious old woman and a drunken sot of a father. While on the dialogic plane, it is denigrated at the beginning of the two works, and is displaced beyond dialogic interaction for long periods thereafter - but remains fixed throughout in the mind of the readers. In effect, the idea is transplanted from the mind of its author (Raskol'nikov; Ivan), as it were, to that of the reader, where it can neither be readily assimilated nor easily dismissed. In terms of its overall elaboration, its place in the respective works must be acknowledged as minimal, and yet it represents in both the guiding principle generating the work's pivotal event - which is generically the same in each. Within its respective dialectic, neither novel allows for a balanced, judicious presentation of its protagonist's governing thought. Instead, it is first presented unsympathetically as reported speech (Porfirij; Miusov); is then minimally defended by its author, in the case of Raskol'nikov, and in no real sense at all by Ivan; and is finally reduced to ashes at the end - by Raskol'nikov himself in the presence of Sonja, and in more abstruse fashion by Ivan's devil (which is Ivan himself) in the presence of Ivan. The idea is thus first articulated negatively, defended weakly or not at all, and - at the crucial moment - is summarily defeated. Raskol'nikov, in other words, can offer neither Sonja nor himself a convincing rationale whereby the means justify the ends (which is all the idea seeks to demonstrate in either case, as Ivan's devil readily proclaims). Ivan must also ultimately reject his own formulation, since (in both cases) the idea reduces to an elaborate justification of criminal self-assertion - which in Dostoevsky's world is always murder. Such "world" is, of course, an artificially constructed verbal universe composed of language in its multiform diversity. The intent here has been to explore a single delimited area within a rich domain of possibility: the use of reported speech to reinforce one viewpoint within a dialogic structure expressing mutually opposed intentions. Thus, the respective roles of Porfirij and Miusov are analogous in this regard; both reject what they report. Similarly, the confrontations between Raskol'nikov's past and present selves and between Ivan's former and present egos allow for a single viewpoint to emerge as triumphant - that which contradicts what is concomitantly expressed. In all these related instances, the idea as presented is interwoven with thoroughly conflicting intentions and intonations, producing internalized dialogue within a single speech utterance.
102 No utterance among those considered, in other words, may be taken at face value, since each belongs to more than one speaker - or to the same character at different periods. The internally dialogized word is thus manifested throughout these structures, characterized by mutually conflicting points of view struggling for a sympathetic hearing. NOTES
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