Artur Płaczkiewicz

Białoszewski:
Truth, Participation, and Vertical Ducks

In language, objects can be described as real or unreal, but they cannot be known or confirmed to be either. Whatever happens in language is real in the sense that it becomes actualized, it becomes “materialized” in language. I argue that in Białoszewski’s view, the deep split between the literal and the metaphorical, between language and reality cannot be sharply sustained. This, however, need be seen neither as an expression of the belief in some eternal, underlying substance or essence as proposed by Sobolewska (1993, 1997); nor as problematic as interpreted by Barańczak (1974, 1993). I claim that in Białoszewski’s case it is a manifestation of the author’s awareness of the contingency of reality and the Wittgensteinian idea that, in Rorty’s words, “there can be no such thing as a ‘systematic theory of meaning for a language’” (1991b: 57). At the same time, the only way to conceptualize the object is by describing it. There is no way around language; all knowledge has to pass through it. Hence, knowledge loses its status of providing stable categories and fixed interpretations, and becomes a dynamic process constantly being modified by continual copings of the subject.

Knowledge that is rooted in coping with reality (and not in proving and finding out about its true nature) is seen as choosing between competing descriptions (which sooner or later will be replaced by new descriptions), which in turn are seen as more or less useful at a particular moment. This perspective on language forces one to subscribe to a certain attitude towards reality, an antilogocentric attitude that cannot be reconciled with the subject-object split. On this view, on one hand the subject cannot be separated from his language and, on the other hand, the object cannot be separated from its description. The descriptions are seen as useful tools that can help subjects interact with each other and with the universe, and they are not viewed as some revelation or discovery that would resolve eternal problems by providing pieces of stable knowledge - the descriptions are more or less useful depending on a particular situation and not universally valid. The artist’s antirepresentationalism and antilogocentrism are more evident in his later works where for example he overtly states:

moulding a view from conjectures                                       lepienie widoku z domysłu

- what?                                                                              - czym?

- who am I?                                                                       - kto ja jestem?

 

- unobviousness                                                                 - nieoczywistość

                                                            (10: 102).

For Białoszewski neither the subject nor the object is privileged since they cannot be clearly separated, and at the same time they are not reconciled, united or totalized. They both preserve their singularities because they both deserve singular descriptions. Miron Białoszewski, instead of describing reality-as-it-is, “documents” his process of coping. He writes:

we sniff each other                                                             wąchamy się

nose to nose                                                                      nos w nos

fate and I                                                                           ja i los

 

tension                                                                              napięcie

laughter                                                                             śmiech

 

it’s an illusion                                                                     on jest zmyśleniem

I’ll soon be too                                                                  ja zaraz też

                                                        (8: 238).

Białoszewski recognizes the relations of causation and justification but no relations of representation. Coping means that the subject is not so much interested in what is going on as in what to do next to more fully satisfy his own desires and fulfill his beliefs, as well as to enlarge himself and to grow from the experience. As Dilman points out, “language gives us things to speak about and engage with, thus expanding our world, and at the same time itself grows out of those engagements” (2002: 8). Coping is not representation because it does not strive to produce final descriptions (i.e., something immutable), but it always remains open to new possibilities and is linked to the next event. It is unstable, dynamic and constantly being modified. Coping is closely related to the context in which it occurs. In other words, representation always extends outside the context in which it presumably occurs, but coping, in contrast, is never grounded outside its occurrence.

If the observing subject cannot be removed from the observed system, it is no longer possible to claim objectivity. As Kafatos and Nadeau remark, “All of our conceptions of the nature of reality, including those that we derive and prove scientifically, are subjectively based” (1990: 91). There is no universal method to cope with reality, thus the method of observation is often included in the particular description. Hence, Sobolewska is right when she observes that “It looks as if Białoszewski stands beside, but in fact he is always inside [Białoszewski niby stoi z boku, a w istocie jest zawsze wewnątrz]” (Sobolewska 1993: 123). The poet writes:

looking out                                                                         wyglądanie

through bars                                                                       przez pręty

 

ky                                                                                      ebo

oon                                                                                    ężyc

                                            (7: 85)

There are many consequences of the impossibility of removing the observer from the observed system. One of them seems to be the impossibility of articulating an objective truth. The conditions of observation are clearly stated in the poem (“looking out through bars”) and precisely for this reason the observed cannot be fully understood but only described in approximate terms (“ky” for the sky, “oon” for the moon). If this situation were imagined, then it would be easy to state objectively its falsehood. But what are we to do when the act of perception/observation does not lead to understanding? Then, we can only note and register the results of observations, without omitting anything, the observer and the conditions of observation included. This is an attitude of the pragmatist, and the impossibility of articulating an objective truth about the world is a consequence of the dynamic relations between different elements of reality, language and the self which are neither stable nor fixed. It means that all the parties influence each other in various ways, but ultimately reality cannot be represented in language because it is nonverbal, and the subject is unable to provide the perfect transfer or translation.

we                                                                                     my

- what? what is it? the white ones                                       - co? co to? takie białe

in the dirty ditch                                                                 w brudnym rowie

among humans                                                                   między ludźmi

vertical ducks...?...                                                             pionowe kaczuszki...?...

 

a lady from the corner                                                        pani z kąta

- those are ibises                                                                - to ibisy

                                               (8: 285)

The act/process of coping, the subject’s constant recontextualizations have led him to formulate an outrageous conjecture (“vertical ducks”), based on his observation of “the white ones.” The description in turn is soon replaced by a new description as the event evolves, and “vertical ducks” are redescribed as “ibises” as the context changes due to the input of new information, and the emergence of some new elements and descriptions within the web of interrelations (“a lady from the corner”). The stress in the text, however, is placed not on the final description or solution (“those are ibises”), but rather it revolves around the “vertical ducks,” around the possibility of their “possibility.” Are “vertical ducks” a necessary step on the path to knowledge, to the truth? Do they get us closer to ibises’ “essence,” or to the true nature of reality? In my view, the final description is not “the goal” of the text. Białoszewski’s subject is rather interested in complex interrelations and interactions that have led to the “vertical ducks.”

The poem does not represent any essence - it is simply a description of a particular situation without any pretensions to universality or objectivity. It is a “reading,” a “recording” performed by the participating observer. It is neither subjective nor objective, but it is a singular result of the concrete interactions in which many elements are unidentifiable. It is not clear in the poem whether “vertical ducks” are an invention of the author, or they have “pumped out” at some point during a conversation undertaken on the bus. In any case, their appearance cannot be fully explained because their “apparent absurdity” prevents any total explanation, and absurdity (and humour) escapes rationalization.

In the poem the process leading to “vertical ducks” is important. It is much more important than its results because the results are only potential (or virtual) and they cannot be invariably predicted - they are located in the future and there are too many influences that can alter their actualization at some point. The process, in counterdistinction, is real in the sense that it always takes place in the present. This attitude is unacceptable for essentialists because it excludes any pretensions to metaphysics as it collapses together the made and the found (i.e.: “ibises” <> “vertical ducks”).

In the poem the problem of truth as only about something “real” is set aside. There are only descriptions and no representations in it. The text is as much about “ibises” as it is about “vertical ducks” and “the white ones.” They are all competing descriptions (caught in the process of being redescribed) that give an account of the moment when “vertical ducks” move from the background to the foreground and to the background again (“the white ones” > “vertical ducks” > “ibises”), from the margins of the event to its centre and to its margins again. In this sense, in this particular context it is a poem about “vertical ducks” rather than “ibises,” about their spontaneous appearance and disappearance, which does not happen progressively but develops through unpredictable “jumps.”

Such attitude is similar to Deleuze’s approach, who as Rajchman states, “pushes the experience or experimentalism of thought into a zone before the establishment of a stable, intersubjective ‘we,’ and makes it a matter not of recognizing ourselves or the things in our world, but rather of encounter with what we can’t yet ‘determine’ - to what we can’t yet describe or agree upon, since we don’t yet even have the words” (2000: 20). I claim that the poetry of Białoszewski is a good example of the kind of experimentalism proposed by Deleuze. In his poem about “ibises,” the aim of the artist is not to name, or to give “the right” description of the object based on its recognition (the recognition is done by the third party: “a lady from the corner”). The poem describes not essential relations but their internal dynamism which attests to the non-finality of their interactions; the relations are not as yet fully determined (“we/ - what? what is it?”), and the intersubjective “we” appears to be in the constant process of formation. The poem in this sense is about an object that “cannot yet be determined” (“ibises” are given as the last word in the poem), because there is yet no agreement upon what it is, and no known words to be used for describing it. The author invents the words, or the connections between the words (“vertical ducks”), invents his own “language game” in order to describe his experience (his first encounter with a new species of birds not seen until now). In other words, the poem affirms not the recognition (representation) but rather testifies to the encounter with the other, with something which never can be fully determined or even described.

Although it is possible to claim that, in the end, “vertical ducks” are redescribed with their proper name (i.e. “ibises”) because there is an acknowledgement of the possibility that reality is “a riddle” which can be solved, I interpret the statement as expressing the idea that reality is not “a riddle” at all, but instead the world can be described with multiple descriptions, which freely coexist with each other. The final statement (“ibises”) is not provided by the poet but by the third party. So ultimately, the decision to choose the most useful and “appropriate” description remains open. It seems that cognition does not necessarily means recognition (“white ones > ibises”) but also can take place through associations (“white ones > vertical ducks”) that are able to extend themselves outside the limits of (rational) discourse.

This is possible only if the subject views himself as a participating observer so he does not make any strict distinctions between theory and practice. As Feyerabend remarks, “both theories and observations can be abandoned: theories may be removed because of conflicting observations, observations may be removed for theoretical reasons. Finally, we have discovered that learning does not go from observation to theory but always involves both elements. Experience arises together with theoretical assumptions not before them, and an experience without theory is just as incomprehensible as is (allegedly) a theory without experience” (1993: 149). The relations are always bi-directional and the distancing of the observer from the observed context becomes impossible. Theories do not fully explain the interactions so the idea of hierarchical structuring of theories and practices cannot be satisfactorily accomplished. The situation in the poem makes it clear that no privileging of any domain could lead to positive results: from “the white ones” we need the practice and experimentation to get to the “vertical ducks”; we need the theory based in the present state of knowledge to get to “ibises.” They are different descriptions of “the white ones” that can be used for different purposes, and the relations between them are dynamic. It is not the case that one is “more real or true” than the other, and they are both ultimately grounded in the participating (not solely objective) observer who is inseparable from his context.

Moreover, the descriptions are different propositions helping to comprehend a new situation, which can be called: an encounter with new birds. But neither description is essential for the comprehension of this event: “vertical ducks” is a metaphoric statement based in subject’s associations and comparable analogies, “ibises” is a literal name of the species but for those who do not know the birds, it means virtually nothing. The difference between literal and metaphorical does not appear to be strictly acknowledged. Also, the descriptions are neither reconciled nor hierarchically organized but coexist freely. For Białoszewski’s subject cognition is not always and only recognition and/or analogy (representations), because it would not result in the growth of his subject as its underlying presumption is that there can be nothing new. Cognition must also take place through associations (which are non-representational) as they force the subject to make new connections and create new relations, and to redescribe and recontextualize constantly.

Language, according to neo-pragmatists, is inherently metaphorical and metaphors have the functional power to describe associations. However, metaphors do not have pre-acquired or essential meanings that become unveiled with their articulation. Metaphors in Białoszewski’s late texts acquire their meanings only after their production. The meaning is created in the relation of constant tensions between the subject and the “apparent absurdity” of the metaphoric statement (“vertical ducks”). It is a pragmatist approach to language and metaphors because it places experimentation (epistemological search) before ontology. According to this view, metaphors do not reveal the essence of reality by translating and explaining one element in terms of another (X is Y) or by pinpointing essential attributes of particular objects (which would mean that “ibises” are essentially something like “ducks” only more “vertical”), but rather they create connections and relations between the elements without their reconciliation and totalization, still preserving their singularities (X and Y). “Vertical ducks” is a metaphor that does not reach any essence of “ibises” but it is a tool used by the subject in order to comprehend his experience, and grow from it (which is possible because in this view “vertical ducks” are not only ducks and not only more “vertical” but they are at the same time neither “ducks” nor “vertical” and they point to “something more”). Reality becomes not so much deciphered as it is affirmed in its unpredictable and dynamic aspects.

This logic is based in full participation of the subject, and in his willingness to approach new situations without any attempt to fit them into some pre-prepared conceptual structure. Knowledge in itself is seen as constantly changing discourse, which is modified with each new addition to its corpus of data. Such view is ultimately rooted in spontaneity which ensures a necessary amazement with and affirmation (even if critical) of reality as it is experienced. Dissatisfaction with reality is possible only if the subject withdraws from his context (withdraws from participation) in order to affirm some not-here and not-now, but such an attitude towards reality is alien to Białoszewski who never steps out of his context. He is a participant constantly immersed in the here and now.

Works Referred to:

Barańczak, S. Język poetycki Mirona Białoszewskiego. Wrocław: Ossolineum, 1974.

———. “Rzeczywistość Białoszewskiego.” Głowiński & Łapiński 8-22.

Białoszewski, M. Miron Białoszewski. Utwory zebrane. Vols. 1-10. Warszawa: PIW, 1987-2000.

———. “Listy do Eumenid.” Teksty Drugie 6 (1991): 83-136.

Deleuze, G. Essays Critical and Clinical. London, New York: Verso, 1998.

———. Pure Immanence. Essays on A Life. New York: Zone Books, 2001.

Dilman, I. Wittgenstein’s Copernican Revolution. The Question of Linguistic Idealism. Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire; New York: Palgrave, 2002.

Feyerabend, P. Against Method. London, New York: Verso, 1993.

Głowiński M. and Łapiński, Z., eds. Pisanie Białoszewskiego. Warszawa: IBL, 1993.

Kafatos, M and Nadeau, R. The Conscious Universe. Part and Whole in Modern Physical Theory. New York: Springer-Verlag, 1990.

Rajchman, J. The Deleuze Connections. Cambridge and London: The MIT Press, 2000.

Rorty, R. Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers. Volume 2. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991.

Sobolewska, A. “Lepienie widoku z domysłu. Percepcja świata w prozie Mirona Białoszewskiego”. Głowiński & Łapiński 114-129.

———. Maksymalnie udana egzystencja. Szkice o życiu i twórczości Mirona Białoszewskiego. Warszawa: IBL, 1997.

© A. Placzkiewicz

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